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The object of my inquiry throughout the thesis was to reconcile the advancement of religion as a recognised 
charitable purpose, and this is undertaken through a critical socio-legal review, taking in to consideration, inter 
alia, historical and contemporary tensions that exist with regard to the legal recognition of religion within charity, 
and the fundamental need for charity in society, whereby the two principles may be critically bound, but often 
with competing interests and values, especially in a contemporary global climate. 
 
The research raises questions about current issues within charity law in a socio-political landscape, such as public 
benefit, and is significant because of the considerable and recent changes to charity law internationally, with many 
more likely.  For instance, in the last 60 years alone, there have been nearly 30 reviews of the law relating to 
charity, in a variety of jurisdictions.  This illustrates the magnitude of some of the legal issues associated with 
charity law that will inevitably impact on the charity sector and in turn, society generally. 
 
In addition, the research makes causal links between charity and a well-functioning society, not least because of 
the many and varied services that charities provide to numerous communities. Consequently, the research will 
assist policymakers, the judiciary, the charity sector and academics to understand trends in charity law, and assist 
in decision-making processes.  Therefore, the overall benefit of this research will be with regard to policymaking 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
I. Introduction  
 
This chapter has a number of introductory functions.  It establishes the substantial original 
contribution to the research area, the purpose of the research, and introduces some key concepts 
pertaining to the thesis’ statement, which will be explored in detail in later chapters.  These 
include the relationship between charity and religion; religion’s role and place within society; 
issues pertaining to state control and religion; the rule of law; a consideration of the 
consequences of removing religion from the fabric of society; and some discussion as to the 
benefits of protecting religion within society, particularly from a charity law perspective.  This 
material will assist in contextualising religion and charity, and their legal and sociological place 
within society.  
 
A few brief comments should be made here in relation to the legal theory of charity law in 
order to underpin the research appropriately; Chapter 2 considers these matters in further detail.  
Whilst there appears to be dearth of specific charity law legal theories, I have sought to ground 
the research in some contemporary theories.1  These theories confirm the relevance of charity 
itself within society and, specifically in relation to this thesis, confirm the importance of the 
advancement of religion with society. 
 
II. The Research 
 
This thesis seeks to reconcile the advancement of religion within the charity narrative, and it 
does so in relation not only to some specific common-law legal systems, but also in relation to 
some socio-political contexts on a national and international basis.   
 
There does not appear to be an agreed definition of what is specifically meant by a socio-
political context, and indeed, it appears to be an expansive term.  For the purposes of this thesis, 
 
 
1 I am grateful for the research of Professor Matthew Harding and Dr Matthew Turnour in this regard because it 
aided the discussions in this chapter. 
2 
it is utilised broadly, referring to systems composed of both social elements and political 
elements, and the interaction between them, and their relationship with religion, and thus 
religion within charity.  
 
Further, for the purposes of this research, I refer to, in the majority of instances, the contexts 
of a democratic society, as might be understood within such common law jurisdictions as the 
United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia and Canada.  I acknowledge, however, that there are 
some instances where I refer to non-common law jurisdictions, such as Egypt and Germany, 
and also some non-democratic societies, including some Islamic states.  I   included such 
jurisdictions because of the relevance of the research specific to the issues being addressed at 
that point in the thesis.   
 
In addition, I mainly refer to Judeo-Christian constructs of religion, which include Christianity 
and Islam, throughout the thesis.  However, I do also make reference to other constructs of 
religious and spiritual belief, including Scientology, Jediism, and Druidism.  Such a breadth of 
consideration reflects the diverse social paradigms of religion and belief on a global scale and 
thus embeds the notion that religion is a concept that sits within many of the societies to which 
this thesis refers, thus underpinning the overall object of my inquiry.  That being that the 
advancement of religion is a legitimate paradigm and one that is reconcilable once its socio-
legal contexts are understood, as this thesis demonstrates. 
 
As a consequence, I consider a variety of jurisdictions, including Australia, New Zealand, the 
United Kingdom, and Hong Kong, illustrating the international relevance of the advancement 
of religion as a socio-political-legal construct.  The majority of the jurisdictions are closely 
related because their jurisdictional heritage arises from English law.  Consequently, it is useful 
to consider charity law from a comparative point of view to assess the evolution of the law, or 
issues arising in the law, that are specific to particular jurisdictions.  As noted, the minority of 
the jurisdictions utilised do not have traditional historical connections with English law, for 
instance Germany and the United States.  However, I deemed it pertinent to consider matters 
arising from such jurisdictions because of availability of material and because of issues raised 
by common law judges in relation to those specific jurisdictions that were pertinent to the 
assertions made in the thesis. 
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In addition, it is important to recognise that religion often seeks to function within an 
environment that is increasingly critical of religion generally. 2  Consequently, in order to 
review this head of charity within its socio-legal context, I demonstrate why the advancement 
of religion has a continued and fundamental place within contemporary society.  Further, I 
argue that charity law is the appropriate vehicle to enable the advancement of religion to be 
upheld for the benefit of society as a whole within the context of a democratic society, generally 
speaking.   In drawing this conclusion, as noted, I address the framing of the advancement of 
religion and its role in charity in relation to its public policy and socio-legal setting because to 
do otherwise would ignore the fact that law does not sit in isolation from its social and political 
environments.  As a result, I look to reconcile the advancement of religion not just from a black 
letter law perspective, but I also look to reconcile the advancement of religion within a variety 
of contexts, which includes social, cultural and economic contexts. Each context was then 
linked back to the charity framework.  I acknowledge that the principle legal regulation of the 
advancement of religion is through charity law, and as such, black letter law discussions form 
some of my arguments. For example, through public benefit, which includes critical analysis 
of commercialism and New Age belief systems.  However, asserting that the advancement of 
religion is reconciled solely through black letter law regulation is to ignore other important 
socio-political factors associated with the advancement of religion that stem from religion as a 
construct.  As a result of this broad scope of inquiry, therefore, I could acknowledge that law 
develops from, and with, its social and political influences and environments.   
 
Consequently, the purpose of my inquiry throughout the thesis was that the advancement of 
religion is reconcilable through an understanding of the socio-political and legal context of 
religion, and what charity means within society.  In other words, the multi-layered context 
provides for the reconciliation of the advancement of religion as a charitable purpose. 
 
This thesis resulted from ongoing research in relation to the advancement of religion that 
revealed the complex relationship between religion and charity, highlighting many challenges 
facing the legal profession in considering and applying charity law principles in relation to the 
concept of religion and its advancement, which is a legally-recognised charitable purpose.  
Such undertakings, however, are occurring within the framework of an allegedly increasingly 
 
 
2 This chapter, and later chapters, set out examples of such criticism. 
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secular society, and conversely, within the context of newly emerging belief systems, as well 
as the growing shadow of extremist religious organisations.  In addition, many international 
charity statutory reforms have occurred within the last decade.3  For instance, in 2018 in New 
Zealand, the Minister for the Community and Voluntary Sector announced a review of the 
Charities Act 2005,4 which is continuing at the time of writing.  Such reforms illustrate the 
burdens on states to review the role of charity, and consequently the advancement of religion, 
within societies generally, and to ensure that charitable endeavours are governed and regulated 
appropriately. 
 
As a result, this thesis provides a timely platform to develop previous research and debate 
critical legal challenges that are at the heart of, generally-speaking, the democratic societies to 
which I refer, not only for the legal profession, but also for governments and, importantly, for 




III. The Substantial Original Contribution to the Research Area 
 
The research presented in this thesis is qualitatively substantial and original.  This is 
demonstrated in a number of ways.  Leading on from earlier research, I identify the 
fundamental connections between society, law, charity and religion, and key issues associated 
with the advancement of religion as a head of charity.  I present methods of mitigating or 
assuaging such issues from a legally-defensible perspective, that of charity law, that take into 
consideration socio-political perspectives as might be acknowledged within, generally 
speaking, democratic society.  I demonstrate, therefore, that the advancement of religion is 
reconcilable because it can be understood from its socio-legal contexts. 
 
In undertaking this approach, I have acknowledged that charity law cannot be examined in 
isolation and must be considered within a broad socio-political framework; this contextualises 
the function and relevance of the advancement of religion in its contemporary setting.  
 
 
3 For example, the Charities Acts 2006 and 2011 (UK), and the Charities Act 2013 (Australia). 
4 “Review of the Charities Act” https://www.dia.govt.nz/charitiesreview.  It should be noted that the author is part 
of the Review sector user group, although “charitable purposes”, is outside the scope of the Review at this stage. 
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Consequently, this holistic approach takes into consideration, inter alia, socio-legal Christian, 
Islamic and “new age” religious matters, thus acknowledging multi-faith and plural modern 
societies.  It is correct that some of the societies to which I refer are not considered democratic 
societies as might be generally understood, however, as I have noted, it was important to 
include some of these findings.  This was because such a comparative methodology enabled 
me to demonstrate a number critical aspects pertaining to the context of religion and how one 
may argue for its legitimacy in a variety of contexts that establish the value of religion within 
charity law throughout many societies, thus reflecting religious charities’ global relevance. 
 
As a result, the findings demonstrate the continued legal and social legitimacy of the 
advancement of religion as evidenced for example, through the rule of law, the doctrine of 
public benefit, and economic and commercial enterprises.  Consequently, this thesis is 
important in helping to understand the relevance of religion embedded within charity law as 
part of a democratic society as would be understood in a, generally-speaking, common law 
jurisdiction.  Accordingly, this thesis demonstrates a comprehensive and original approach to 
scholarship in this field. 
 
This chapter now considers some key introductory material, beginning with charity and 
religion. 
 
IV. Charity and Religion  
 
In endeavouring to reconcile the advancement of religion, as the object of my inquiry, it is 
important to understand the relevance of charity within society; I briefly make some 
observations on this point.  The concept of charity is ancient, underpinning many aspects of 
societies, filling welfare gaps, reducing burdens on governments and society, and is 
increasingly central in today’s times.  In the United States, for example, around 75 per cent of 
families contribute to charity, with charitable giving increasing sharply from USD 50 billion 
annually in 1980 to USD 325 billion in 2014.  The number of charitable organisations in the 
United States alone in 2016 was recorded as 1.5 million.5  Therefore, charity’s role within 
 
 
5 Cihan Tugal “Faiths with a Heart and Heartless Religions: Devout Alternatives to the Merciless Rationalization 
of Charity” 2016 Rethinking Marxism 28 at 422. 
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society should not be underestimated.  Consequently, the governance of charity is a state and 
society concern to ensure that legally-recognised charities meet their obligations and duties, as 
well as ensuring that charitable governance is suitable to meet the appropriate needs of society.   
 
Another important factor in conducting the object of my inquiry is to understand the 
fundamental relevance of religion to society, which I address briefly here.  Religion is “of 
immense importance within the legal environment and the law is often deployed as an 
instrument for safeguarding religious interests.”6  A number of assumptions have been made 
pertaining to law’s role in underpinning religious affairs.  The first relates to the profundity of 
religion in comparison with other human interests, suggesting any such legal acknowledgement 
will be of value to religious communities. This is an important point to make because in a 
multicultural world there may be a number of religious organisations that require protection 
due to their size or even due to their possible unpopularity.7  The second point is from: 8 
 
… the standpoint of religious adherents, their religious identity and the beliefs and practices 
dictated by their faith often assume such a degree of importance in their lives that they are liable 
to suffer special harm if these are not accommodated by the law. Thirdly, it is widely … 
accepted that religion generally has a beneficial impact which often permeates the wider 
community and that religious pursuits should thus be encouraged by the law since they promote 
the interests of society.  
 
Consequently, “the international legal order has sought to guarantee religious rights and 
freedoms, while state legal systems have bestowed special exemptions and privileges on 
institutions and belief systems adjudged to be religious.”9  Such overarching legal recognition 





6 Andrew Iwobi “Out with the old, in with the new: religion, charitable status and the Charities Act 2006” 2009 
Legal Studies Vol 29 No 4 December at 621 referring to PW Edge Religion and Law: an Introduction (Ashgate, 
Aldershot, 2006) at 6-8. 
7 At 621. 
8 At 621. 
9 At 621. 
7 
In order to understand the relationship between charity and religion as a key consideration in 
this thesis, it is important to set out, albeit briefly in the introductory matters, their particular 
relationship.  In doing so, the evidence points to the connection between charity and religion 
as being ancient and complex.  Further, charity has been depicted as being desirable, and in 
relation to that, many religions advocate such a trait.  As a result, “the law of charity favours 
religion not only be advantaging that virtue but also by treating as charitable the very pursuit 
of religion itself – hence the emergence of advancement of religion as one of the main heads 
of charity.”10   
 
The connection between religion and charity remains just as strong today.  Evidence of this is 
illustrated by the response of faith-based organisations, for example, after Hurricane Katrina 
struck the United States in 2005.  Every major religious group provided relief, which included 
funds, supplies and thousands of volunteer workers.  Individual churches provided assistance 
on their own initiative.  Further, denominations and their relief agencies, including the Lutheran 
World Relief, the Mennonite Disaster Service and the Presbyterian Disaster Assistance, arrived 
in numbers, and faith-based relief organisations such as the Salvation Army, provided ample 
support.11  Indeed, it is said that faith communities are at the forefront when responding to 
natural disasters.  Further, such organisations are said to be “highly motivated, flexible and 
creative”12 because they can provide assistance on many levels, including providing shelter, 
clothing, food, transportation, counselling, to name but a few methods of relief.  It was further 
noted, in relation to Hurricane Katrina, the predominant source of help in the immediate weeks 
after the disaster came from religious organisations as opposed to secular bodies.13 
 
However, one key issue with religion in a contemporary context is that whilst ancient history 
reflects the legal entrenchment of the advancement of religion as a charitable purpose, there is 
 
 
10 At 622, citing A Bradney Religions, Rights and Laws (Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1993) at 120.  See 
later in this chapter, and Chapter 3 for further discussions on legally recognised charitable purposes, which 
includes the advancement of religion. 
11 Stanley Clark, Giedre Gadeikyte and Erik Kasper “People Power: Natural Disasters as Catalysts for Civic 
Agency” in Volunteerism and Philanthropy: Ideal or Ideology? (LCC Liberal Arts Studies LCC International 
University Vol IV 2011) at 61. 
12 At 61-62, referring to Stephanie Gajewski et al “Complexity and Instability: The Response of Nongovernmental 
Organizations to the Recovery of Hurricane Katrina Survivors in a Host Community” (2011) Nonprofit and 
Voluntary Sector Quarterly April Vol 40 No 2 at 389ff. See Chapter 8 for an explanation as to the reason behind 
the success of religious charities. 
13 At 62, referring to Richard Forgette et al “Before, Now and After: Assessing Hurricane Katrina Relief” (2009) 
Population Research and Policy Review February Vol 28 No 1 at 31ff.   
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evidence that religion’s continued support within contemporary society is under pressure. This 
is particularly so in relation to its prominent position within charity law.14  For instance, actor 
and comedian Ricky Gervais, a critic of religion and of the privileges bestowed upon religious 
charities, memorably Tweeted: 
 
Same sex marriage is not a privilege, [it’s] equal rights.  Privilege would be something like gay 
people not paying taxes, like churches don’t.15 
 
Gervais is not alone in his views.  A cursory search on Twitter and Facebook, to name but two 
social media platforms, reveals continued criticism.  Indeed, the quotes of famous critics, 
including Stephen Fry, Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens, continue to be viewed and 
shared by thousands of proponents.16  
 
However, it is not just celebrities, with their inevitable influence over the public, who are 
placing pressure on religion in society.  Criticisms have been levelled at governments for 
allegedly failing to prevent discrimination in the charitable sector and for favouring religion.  
For example, The New Zealand Herald questioned the Government’s stance on food giant 
charity Sanitarium for failing to crack down on the organisation’s charitable purposes.  The 
reporter argued that the rationale of continuing to support “archaic British law”17 is arguably 
“no longer relevant in a secular, 21st century democracy”18  because an organisation “should 
not get tax exempt status because you promote belief in a supreme being, or multiple supreme 
beings.”19    
 
Further evidence of negative public feeling is evidenced in relation to the New Zealand Destiny 
Church, “fronted by self-appointed bishop Brian Tamaki, and his wife”;20 it has been centre-
 
 
14 I explore the legal context of religion in charity law later in this chapter briefly, and in later chapters. 
15 Twitter, Ricky Gervais (@rickygervais). 
16 For example, Samuel Osborne “Stephen Fry was asked what he would say to God if they met.  His answer is 
being investigated by police” The Independent (7 May 2017) 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/stephen-fry-blasphemy-god-ireland-confronted-by-met-
a7722191.html. 
17  David Farrar, Kiwiblog 23 February 2015, citing The New Zealand Herald, 
http://www.kiwiblog.co.nz/2015/02/advancement_of_religion_should_not_be_a_charitable_purpose.html.  
18 Farrar; Sanitarium was established by the Seventh Day Adventist Church to promote biblical principles. 
19 Farrar. 
20 Simon Plumb “Government moves to strip Destiny Church charities of their tax-exempt status” One News Now 
(3 October 2017) 
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stage of the media for a number of years.  Much of the public attention stems from the Tamaki’s 
own personal wealth, “which has drawn consistent public criticism for years because of the 
church's tax-exempt status.”21  Further, in 2016, an online petition called for the-then Prime 
Minister John Key to remove from Destiny Church as a charity.  This petition was in response 
to Mr Tamaki’s public proclamation that the 2016 7.8 magnitude earthquake in Kaikoura, New 
Zealand was the fault of homosexuals and sinners.22 
 
The petition received over 100,000 signatures and whilst the Prime Minister did not strip the 
Church of its charitable status in relation to this petition, the negative public feeling towards 
the Church continued.  Much of this stemmed from the announcement by the Board of the 
Department of Internal Affairs – Charities Services that it had “decided to remove Destiny 
International Trust and Te Hahi o Nga Matamua Holdings Limited from the Charities Register 
on 20 December 2017 …   because of the charities’ persistent failure to meet their annual return 
obligations.”23   Destiny Church has appealed this decision, and if the appeal fails, assets 
belonging to the Destiny International Group could be taxed more than NZD 1.2 million.24 
 
It could be argued, therefore, that there is a contradiction between religion and charity, although 
this has not always necessarily been clearly expressed by denigrators of religion.  The 
contradiction may arise because many would view charity as the material result of charitable 
works, such as relief for the poor.  Such relief comes about through political consciousness 
being raised in regard to the plight of the needy.  However, religion has been said to be an 





21  Zac Fleming RadioNZ “Destiny Church founders move into new 'resort' home” (24 October 2017) 
http://www.radionz.co.nz/national/programmes/checkpoint/audio/2018619033/destiny-church-founders-move-into-
new-resort-home. 
22  https://www.change.org/p/john-key-strip-destiny-church-from-tax-free-status and 
https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11749215.   
23 Department of Internal Affairs  - Charities Services Hot Topics “Update on Destiny International Trust and Te 
Hahi o Nga Matamua Holdings Limited from the independent Charities Registration Board (22 November 2017) 
https://charities.govt.nz/news-and-events/hot-topics/update-on-destiny-international-trust-and-te-hahi-o-nga-
matamua-holdings-limited-from-the-independent-charities-registration-board/. 
24 Dan Satherley “Why Destiny Church might avoid a tax bill, despite charities’ deregistration” NewsHub (23 
November 2017) http://www.newshub.co.nz/home/money/2017/11/why-destiny-church-might-avoid-a-tax-bill-
despite-charities-deregistration.html. 
25 Daniel Stevens “Rescuing Charity” in Charles Mitchell and Susan R Moody (eds) Foundations of Charity (Hart 
Publishing, Oregon, 2000) at 31.  
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utilising religion to try to resolve social issues is a waste of taxpayers’ money.  Further, money 
could be used more effectively by taxpayers to pursue charities that are not underpinned by 
allegedly self-interested moralistic and intangible principles that spring from religious 
beliefs.26   
 
Additionally, it could be argued that granting charitable status to a religious body “gives moral 
credibility to an organisation” 27  because an organisation that receives legally-recognised 
charitable status has complied with a number of legal requirements.  This indicates an entity’s 
purposes are “worthy enough to receive the support of the state”,28 signalling an endorsement 
by society.29  This may lead to the charitable sector losing credibility and public confidence if 
it becomes “dominated by polarising organisations”. 30  Indeed, there are many who view 
religious bodies as polarising, not least because a number of religions and their sects do not 
support some contemporary social views, such as same-sex marriage, abortion and 
LBGQTIA31 rights. 
 
Further, granting religious bodies charitable status enables religions to take advantage of 
various financial exemptions not afforded to non-charitable bodies.  This, in effect, gives  
economic support for having a particular belief system.  In other words, a state endorses the 
advancement of religion through charity law, and in doing so enables religious charities to 
obtain a number of privileges not available to secular bodies.  As Kirby J observed in the 
Australian High Court case Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v 
Word Investments Limited, “courts must recognise that this is deeply offensive to many non-
believers, to people of different faiths and even to some people of different religious 




26 At 31. 
27 Jane Calderwood “Controversial charities and public benefit” [2018] NZLJ March at 67. 
28 At 67. 
29 At 67, referring to Pauline Ridge “Religious Charitable Status and Public Benefit in Australia” (2011) 
Melbourne Law Review 35 at 1073.  
30 At 67. 
31 LGBTQIA - inclusive term for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer and/or questioning, intersex and 
asexual, and/or allies. 
32 Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v Word Investments Limited [2008] HCA 55 at 
[155] 
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Whilst there does seem to be much criticism levelled at religion and the advancement of 
religion, the continued relevance of religion within society and charity becomes more apparent 
as I consider further introductory matters.  In addressing these matters, I turn now to the history 
of charity, and religion’s place within charity. 
 
V. A Brief History of Charity and Religion’s Place within Charity 
 
The title of this thesis takes its name, in part, from a translation of Paul’s letter to the 
Corinthians, where he states: “And now abideth faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest 
of these is charity.”33  Research suggests that the concept of charity has “gained something of 
a bad name, epitomised by the [simile] ‘as cold as charity.’”34  It is conceivably why some of 
the contemporary versions of Paul’s letter have replaced “charity” with “love.”   
 
However, the context of “love” is not of romance, rather it is philanthropic love - benevolence 
and compassion, echoing its charitable heritage.  Whilst charity’s reputation may have become 
tarnished in some regard, it is undeniable that charity, as a sociological construct, is ancient 
and resilient, and one that underpins society.  Consequently, from its ancient history to its 
modern-day form, our “increasingly crowded and diverse world needs all the charitable love it 
can find.”35  Indeed, even if just viewed through an economic lens, charities constitute the most 
significant component of non-governmental organisations.  Further, they lend themselves to 
promoting the growth of civil society.  One way is through the diverse forms that charitable 
organisations may take that allows charities to be flexible in their form, and so fit in different 
ways within the socioeconomic fabric of society.  For instance, charities can be trusts, societies, 
wills or corporations.  In addition, charities also sustain the fabric of civil society by alleviating 





33 1 Corinthians 13 King James Bible (Zondervan HarperCollins Christian Publishing, Nashville, 2002). 
34 The Hon Justice Margaret McMurdo AC “Faith Hope and Charity: the Resilience of the Charitable Trust from 
the Middle Ages to the 21st Century The WA Lee Lecture 2011” 2013 QUT Law Review Vol 13 No 1 at 1. 
35 At 1. 
36 Kerry O’Halloran “Charities, civil society and the charity law reviews of the island of Ireland” 2002 Policy & 
Politics October 32 at 265-266. 
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Charity is said to be an expression “of the better side of human nature”,37 and is undoubtedly 
as “old as mankind itself.”38  The word “charity” has its history in the French word “charite”, 
which came from the religious Latin “caritas”, meaning “love in its perfect sense”.  
Colloquially, this refers to “benevolence, philanthropy or goodwill.”39  However, whilst a lay 
person’s definition of charity may be considered benevolence, philanthropy or goodwill, the 
legal sense has a “somewhat shadowy meaning” 40  and is different from the layperson’s 
meanings whereby:41 
 
A gift simply to ‘benevolent purposes’ is objectionable: a benevolent purpose may be (but is 
not necessarily) charitable.  The same is true of gifts to philanthropic purposes, utilitarian 
purposes, emigration, and public purposes: they all go further than legal charity. 
 
It is clear, even from this brief consideration of the meaning of charity, that its framework is 
construed in a relatively narrow sense.  The legal control of funds and activities are public for 
all intents and purposes and thus subject to public scrutiny and accountability.  Such control 
measures should, in theory, provide public confidence that legally-recognised charity is 
therefore “fit for purpose”.  However, public opinion does not always recognise such control 
measures. 
 
Many democratic societies have incorporated the concept of charity into their sociological 
frameworks whereby charitable giving is a common personal and commercial undertaking, and 
indeed, many charitable constructs have now been embedded in legislation, such as the New 
Zealand Charities Act 2005.  However,  “the close relation of religion and relief of those who 
are in need has produced, in very diverse communities, many common notions as to what is 
 
 
37 Peter Luxton The Law of Charities (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) at 3; Juliet Chevalier-Watts 
Charity Law International Perspectives (Routledge, Oxford, 2018) at 1.  It is noted that some of this 
introductory material is also referred to in Juliet Chevalier-Watts “Arts and Culture – Charity Law, International 
Perspectives” in Marta Cenini (ed) Trust e Patrimoni Culturali (Publication forthcoming). 
38 Luxton, at 3. 
39 Hubert Picarda QC The Law and Practice Relating to Charities (4th ed, Bloomsbury Professional, Haywards 
Heath, 2010) at 3. 
40 Kerry O’Halloran, Myles McGregor-Lowndes, and Karla W Simon Charity Law & Social Policy: National and 
International Perspectives on the Functions of Law Relating to Charities (Springer, Netherlands, 2008) at 9. 
41 At 9, citing Picarda, above n 39, at 221 (footnotes omitted).  It should be noted that where later chapters may 
refer to the “philanthropy”, this is where research has utilised it interchangeably with “charity”. 
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the proper working out of moral imperatives.”42  For instance, the English law of charities43 
finds its roots in the Judaeo-Christian traditions whereby in the traditional manner of religion, 
charity was a key component.  This is reflected in the following principles which it has its 
basis:44 
 
i) The first commandment, to love thy God, which required self-sacrificing devotion;  
ii) The second commandment, to love thy neighbour, which obliged a person to 
provide mutual assistance; and 
iii) That evil lay at the root of maintaining personal wealth and goods. 
 
As Christianity grew in popularity, philanthropic forms of charity were promoted, alongside 
the Church’s promise for eternal salvation for those who provided charity.  For those who did 
not, eternal punishment would result.  Consequently, the Church was significant in delivering 
relief to those in need, and “all charitable property was necessarily in the hands of the church”.45  
Therefore, most charitable gifts were made under the authority of alms for the poor or made 
for the Church itself.46 
 
Accordingly, the history of charity “reflects the change from the concerns of the Church and 
its lawyers and theologians to overtly Protestant and later liberal influences.”47  Therefore, 
religion’s influence is evident in charity’s history, especially within the Western construct.  
Indeed, the “common law has recognized trusts for the advancement of religion as charitable 
 
 
42 Picarda, above n 39, at 3. 
43  This thesis refers consistently to the English concept of charity because the majority of common law 
jurisdictions find their charity law heritage in the traditional English definitions and legal concepts of charity.  
More specific legal definitions may be considered in later chapters, where appropriate. 
44 Ann O’Connell and Joyce Chia “The Advancement (or Retreat?) of Religion as a Head of Charity: A Historical 
Perspective” in John Tiley (ed) Studies in the History of Tax Law (Vol 6, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2013) at 370, 
citing Frederick Bird “A Comparative Study of the Work of Charity in Christianity and Judaism” 1982 The Journal 
of Religious Ethics 144 at 145-149; see also Juliet Chevalier-Watts Law of Charity (Thomson Reuters, 
Wellington, 2014) at 168. 
45 At 371, as cited in Patrick Adler “Historical Origin of the Exemption from Taxation of Charitable Institutions” 
in Patrick Adler (ed) Tax Exemptions on Real Estate: an Increasing Menace (Westchester Country Chamber of 
Commerce, New York, 1922) at 13; see also Chevalier-Watts, above n 44, at 168. 
46 Chevalier-Watts, above n 44, at 169. 
47 Picarda, above n 39, at 3, referring to, inter alia, Gareth Jones History of the Law of Charity 1532-1827 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1969); WK Jordan Philanthropy in England 1408-1660 (London, 
1960); and Charles Stuart Loch DCL ‘Charity and Charities” in Encyclopaedia Britannica (11th ed, Vol V, 1910). 
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for as long as it has recognized the concepts of ‘charity’ and ‘trust’”48 meaning that religious 
institutions have been a granted a range of advantages, ranging from exemption from 
perpetuities to current tax exemptions.   
 
Whilst piousness and charity have long since been associated, and certainly from medieval 
times, it is said that the English recognised piousness as including not only specific religious 
gifts and acts, but as also including donations for the poor and various activities to benefit the 
populace.49   Therefore, in light of the historical correlation between religion and charity it was 
surprising that the Statute of Elizabeth 1601,50 likely one of the most influential charitable legal 
frameworks, failed to mention religion in its Preamble.  This statute, for the first time in legal 
history, set out a non-exhaustive legally recognised list of charitable purposes. 51   These 
purposes52 were later abridged by Lord Macnaghten in the seminal case of Commissioners for 
Special Purposes of Income Tax v Pemsel as follows:53 
 
Trusts for the relief of poverty; trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for the 
advancement of religion; and trusts for purposes beneficial to the community not falling under 
any of the preceding heads.  
 
This grouping became the foundation for many common law jurisdictions’ determination of 
legally-recognised charitable purposes, which obviously includes the advancement of religion. 
For example, in New Zealand, the advancement of religion is set out in s 5(1) of the Charities 
Act 2005, whereby “… charitable purpose includes every charitable purpose, whether it relates 
to the relief of poverty, the advancement of education or religion, or any other matter beneficial 




48 Kathryn Chan “The Advancement of Religion as a Charity Purpose in an Age of Religious Neutrality” 2017 
Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 6 at 115. 
49 At 115, referring to Jones, above n 47, at 4 and Kathryn Chan “Taxing Charities/Imposer les Organises de 
Bienfaisance: Harmonization and Dissonance in Canadian Charity Law” 2007 Canadian Tax Journal at 481. 
50 Also referred to as the Statute of Charitable Uses.  This thesis utilises the “Statute of Elizabeth” throughout. 
51 The statute has long been repealed, although the Preamble lives on as the foundations of charitable purposes in 
common law jurisdictions. 
52 See chap 3 for the full list of charitable purposes. 
53 Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax v Pemsel [1891] AC 531 (HL) at 583. 
15 
Returning to the issue of the absence of religion in the Preamble, the closest the Preamble came 
to acknowledging religion was the repair of churches as a charitable purpose.  This apparent 
aberration might be understood by considering the non-religious standpoint of Queen Elizabeth 
I, which included “the desire of the Puritans to have a religion free of state interference.”54   
 
With the Pemsel case came a consensus that for a charity to be legally recognised at common 
law, an entity or gift must be founded entirely for charitable purposes and benefit the public.55  
The law recognised that a purpose must fall within one or more of the four Pemsel heads of 
charity, and the advancement of religion therefore became an explicitly-recognised charitable 
purpose.   
 
However, the advancement of religion “as a charitable purpose is complex and increasingly 
variable”.56  This is no doubt in part due to the evolution of religious beliefs within society, as 
well as the development of religious neutrality within constitutions.  It is also in part due to 
“charity law’s continued failure to meaningfully address the difficult issues raised by”57 this 
head of charity.  Such issues have provided a greater voice to those “favouring the abolition of 
the religious charity”.58  This, therefore, has inevitably led to the question of “what is the public 
benefit of advancing religion?”59 
 
This thesis will, therefore, demonstrate the adaptability and resilience of the socio-legal 
concept of charity, and as a result, that the advancement of religion is a defendable and 
“effective institution for delivering philanthropy”60 in the 21st century.   This is because this 
thesis embeds the advancement of religion within its social and legal contexts, and what charity 
means within a democratic society, generally speaking.  As a result, this diverse method of 
reconciling the advancement of religion demonstrates that this charitable purpose is 
reconcilable because it can be understood from its sociolegal contexts. 
 
 
54 Gino Dal Pont Charity Law in Australia and New Zealand (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2000) at 147; 
Chevalier-Watts, above n 44, at 168. 
55 See later chapters for more detailed observations in relation to the doctrine of public benefit. 
56 Chan, above n 48, at 115. 
57 At 113. 
58 At 113, referring to Christine R Barker “Religion and Charity Law” [1999] Juridical Review 30; and Peter Edge 
“Charitable Status for the Advancement of Religion: An Abolitionist’s View (1995/1996) 3 Charity Law & 
Practice Review at 29. 
59 At 114. 
60 McMurdo, above n 34, at 1. 
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I turn now to some related concepts that will provide an additional framework for this thesis’ 
precepts, beginning with religion and society. 
 
 
VI. Religion and Society 
 
Religion has numerous definitions. Emile Durkheim61 defined religion as “the serious life”,62 
where he pointed out that “it typically involved discipline and training, and participation in 
public rituals that defined life cycle and identity of the participants.”  He noted that “[i]f religion 
generated everything that is essential in society, this is because the idea of society is the soul 
of religion.”63   
 
Legal systems have endeavoured to define religion in order determine which individuals or 
groups will receive legal benefits.  For instance, legally-recognised charitable bodies will 
benefit from certain pecuniary advantages, inter alia, over and above other non-charitable 
entities.  Thus, a definition of religion “as a means of inclusion and exclusion has sociological 
effects and is sociologically informed.”64 
 
However, “the very meaning of religion is contested”65 because “[t]here is no consensus … 
about what the word means.”66 Indeed, it has been stated that the precise “definition of the 
concept of religion, or of what generally constitutes a ‘religion’, is difficult, if not impossible, 
because of the intangible and wide-ranging nature of the topic.” 67  Certainly, it has been 
 
 
61  Émile Durkheim - French sociologist. Credited as being one of the principal founders of modern 
sociology, along with Karl Marx and Max Weber. 
62 Bryan S Turner The Religious and the Political: A Comparative Sociology of Religion (Cambridge University 
Press, New York, 2013) at 242, referring to Emile Durkheim The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (Library of 
Alexandria, 1921). 
63 Durkheim, above n 61, at 314. 
64 Russell Sandberg and Rebecca Catto “Law and Sociology: Toward a Greater Understanding of Religion” in N 
Doe and R Sandberg (eds) Law and Religion: New Horizons (Peeters, Leuven 2010) at 288. 
65 Cathy Byrne Religion in Secular Education: What, in heaven’s name, are we teaching our children? (Leiden, 
Boston, 2014) at 12. 
66 At 12, citing Bron Taylor “Exploring Religion, Nature and Culture” (2007) Journal for the Study of Religion, 
Nature and Culture 1 No 1 at 9. 
67 At 12, citing the Australian Bureau of Statistics “Religious Affiliation” 2006 1301 1 Year Book Australia 
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/bb8db737e2af84b8ca2571780015701e/bfdda1ca506d6cfaca2570de00
14496e!OpenDocument; see later chapters regarding the charitable definition of “religion”. 
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recognised that “defining religion is an ‘exercise of power’ which can have serious 
repercussions.”68  Nonetheless, it is acknowledged that the meaning of religion is not fixed, 
and has changed over time across and within societies.   
 
Law may also operate to give an understanding of sociological constructs of religion because 
changes to religious definitions can be “brought about or marked by legal mechanisms.”69  For 
instance, “boundary disputes may erupt formally in legislatures and courts of law.”70 Therefore, 
it is evident that law’s impact on religion and its continued social relevance is paramount, and 
that they are inherently bound together.  Consequently, the foundations of this thesis are 
underpinned by sociological constructs, and, as will be discussed briefly in this chapter, by 
political and state matters also. 
 
With concepts of religion, regardless of its definition, comes the principle of religious freedom.  
This is a notion familiar in many societies today.  It can be considered a freedom of conscience, 
where there is a “basic assumption of theories of civil liberties and tolerance.”71  The objective 
of civil society is to afford surety for its populace, whilst at the same time ensuring that religious 
beliefs remain an individual construct.  This means that a specific secular state would be 
obligated to acknowledge religious freedoms.   
 
As an example of this, the religiously-founded 17th century English Civil War was ended by 
the “Glorious Revolution”.72  Scotland and England had been unified, and novel ideas as to 
tolerance were being propounded by political theorists John Locke and Samuel von 
Pufendorf.73  The Lockean view of secularism was that religion should be a private concern 
alone and must not intrude on the civic sphere.  In reality, Locke, in his “A letter on tolerance” 
in 1667, actually desired ending the conflicts between Catholics and Protestants, particularly 
 
 
68 Sandberg and Catto, above n 64, at 288, citing J Beckford Social Theory & Religion (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2003) at 23. 
69 At 289. 
70 At 289, citing Beckford, above n 68, at 13. 
71 Turner, above n 62, at 144. 
72 The “Glorious Revolution”, also known as the Revolution of 1688, or the Bloodless Revolution.  “The Glorious 
Revolution of 1688-1689 replaced the reigning king, James II, with the joint monarchy of his protestant daughter 
Mary and her Dutch husband, William of Orange. It was the keystone of the Whig (those opposed to a Catholic 
succession) history of Britain.” Edward Vallance “The Glorious Revolution” 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/civil_war_revolution/glorious_revolution_01.shtml.  
73 Turner, above n 62, at 144. 
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amongst the puritan factions.  In addition, there was growing openness in 17th century societies 
between states that formed long-term trade agreements, and also those that undertook 
colonisation.  Such values of acceptance and the separation of state and religion were key to 
the American constitution.  In effect they created free markets of religion, which do not always 
favour Christianity,74 and have “opened up a cultural space for a civil religion.”75 Thus, in a 
“plural, diverse and multicultural society, social diversity could perhaps be contained within 
the broad umbrella of a ‘civil religion’”.76   
 
This notion of social diversity may also be reflected in the way in which religion is a motivator 
for some social actions.  For instance, sociological research carried out on evangelising 
Christian missionaries “demonstrates that religion can be a motivation for migration in a 
contemporary world”.77  Further, that “religious identities still play a role within Western 
European borders.”78  
 
Nonetheless, it was asserted that the 21st century would see an increase in secularism, with a 
waning influence of religion and a limited presence of religion in society.79 Indeed, in 1999 
“God’s obituary” appeared in the final 20th century edition of The Economist, declaring 
religion irrelevant.80  However, less than two years later dramatic events unfolded in New York 
with the destruction of the Twin Towers by Islamic fundamentalists.  With this attack came the 
“re-entry of religion into the western psyche that would not be easily shaken”,81  and the 21st 
century began with a strengthening of religious and spiritual beliefs and identities, and an 
increase in religiously-associated conflicts.  Consequently, in 2007 The Economist retracted 
religion’s death notice:82 
 
An Islamist party rules once-secular Turkey; Hindu nationalists may return to power in India’s 
next election; ever more children in Israel and Palestine are attending religious schools that tell 
 
 
74 At 144. 
75 At 144. 
76 At 144. 
77 Sandberg and Catto, above n 64, at 281. 
78 At 281. 
79 Byrne, above n 65, at 11, referring to Peter Berger The Sacred Canopy (Doubleday, New York, 1967). 
80 At 11, referring to “Obituary: God” The Economist (23 December 1999). 
81 At 11. 
82 At 11, citing “The New Wars of Religion” The Economist (1 November 2007). 
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them that God granted the whole Holy Land. On present trends, China will become the world’s 
biggest Christian country …  religion is an inescapable part of politics. 
 
Certainly, it is undeniable that the “relationship between religion, law and society … has 
changed dramatically in recent years”,83 not least because of the “long shadow of September 
11th 2001.”84  It is said that this event “both caused and … perpetuated … a number of moral 
panics concerning the wearing of religious dress, the application of discrimination laws to 
religious bodies and the status of religious laws.”85  
 
Leading on from the atrocities associated with the “long shadow of September 11th 2001”, and 
as a brief point of note here, it would be remiss to ignore the fact that religion does have a dark 
history.  Such darkness is equally found in contemporary times and is mentioned in coming 
chapters.  Such issues include religious extremism and violence; discrimination against women 
and minority groups; abuse of children; and bigotry.  These issues cannot be denied.  
Nonetheless, mechanisms are in place that may go some way to mitigate perceived or real 
problems related to religion, at least in relation to charity law.  For instance, the rule of law 
provides checks and balances to ensure that charity operates effectively within society.  This 
can occur through charities services finding that religious bodies fail to meet certain criteria, 
for example, the body’s activities may be illegal or oppose public policy.  Public policy can 
include the system of government, the safety of citizens, and national security.86  Indeed, I 
demonstrate that despite the negative aspects of religion, the charity law’s mechanisms can 
ensure appropriate governance of charities through the rules of law and this provides a method 
of ensuring that religion operates effectively within society for the benefit of society. 
 
Returning to matter of secularisation, it has been asserted that “[o]ur age is not an age of 
secularization, it is an age of exuberant religiosity”,87 reflected in a contemporary resurgence 
of religious and spiritual beliefs.  The resurgence is said to be in response to the social crisis of 
 
 
83 Sandberg and Catto, above n 64, at 275. 
84 At 275. 
85 At 275. 
86 See Chapter 4 Rule of Law for discussions. 
87 Mark C Modak-Truraan “Symposium Introduction: Law, Religion, and Human Rights in Global Perspective” 
(2003) 22 Miss C L Rev 165 at 165, citing Peter L Berger “Globalization and Religion” (2002) The Hedgehog 
Review 4 at 10.  
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“the widespread secular materialism in both the Western industrialized countries and the Third 
World”.88 Evidence of this crisis is apparent in the growth of urban poverty, failing public 
infrastructure, increasingly violent societies, and “feeling that problems can no longer be 
solved, controlled or even adequately addressed.”89  Therefore, individuals and communities 
turn to, or return to, religion as a source of contemporary comfort, illustrating the continued 
relevance of religion.  Indeed, the notions and precepts of religion invariably span the ages.  
Further, the foundations of religion, irrespective of specific belief systems, offer degrees of 
hope and comfort.  This is the case regardless of the variety of stresses being suffered by 
populations when other tangible state provisions appear to be failing.  The reality, therefore, is 
that there has been a worldwide religious renaissance.   
 
It is not just a social crisis that has been occurring; a political crisis has also developed.  This 
is evident in the “deepening fragmentation of the political culture and the flagging confidence 
in government, politicians and, to some extent, in the political process itself.”90  Such crises 
have led to a resurgence of Christian and Islamic fundamentalism, evangelicalism, 
Pentecostalism, Orthodox Judaism, broader concepts of spiritualism, new age movements. 
 
However, a contemporary concern associated with religion is the apparent rise in violence said 
to be connected to religion, which is often referred to as religious terrorism.  Whilst religious 
violence dominates the media, there is nothing necessarily new, however, about this connection 
between religion and violence.  From:91  
 
… biblical wars to crusading ventures and great acts of martyrdom – violence has lurked as 
shadowy presence.  It has colored religion’s darker, more mysterious symbols.  Images of 
death have never been far from the heart of religion’s power to stir the imagination.  
 
Although there may have been a historical connection between religion and violence, it does 
appear to have increased with contemporary times.  Research in 2014 showed that 74 per cent 
 
 
88 Scott Thomas “Religious resurgence, postmodernism and world politics” in John L Esposito and Michael 
Watson (eds) Religion and Global Order (University of Wales Press, Cardiff, 2000) at 38. 
89 Turner, above n 62, at 144. 
90 At 144, referring to Jean Bethke Elshtain The Trial of Democracy (Basic Books, New York, 1995). 
91  Mark Juergensmeyer Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (University of 
California Press, California, 2000) at 6. 
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of citizens endure “high levels of religious hostilities, violence, or conflict, a markedly higher 
percentage than just five years ago, when 45 per cent … lived with such levels.”92 
 
Certainly, many of the distinguished intellectuals of their time, which include Durkheim, 
Marcel Mauss and Sigmund Freud, have questioned why religion seems to perpetuate violence, 
and equally, why violence perpetuates religion.  Whilst it is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
answer such complex questions, what can be said is that whilst religion is not always the 
innocent party in relation to begetting violence, religion does not ordinarily lead to violence.93  
It occurs “with the coalescence of a peculiar set of circumstances – political, social and 
ideological – when religion becomes fused with violent expressions of social aspirations, 
personal pride, and movements for political change.”94 
 
Unfortunately, such circumstances are not unusual in contemporary times.  This may lead to 
more violent expressions as communities are faced with greater challenges to, or denials of, 
their desired ways of life.  With ever-growing global populations come issues associated with 
urbanisation, population density, transport issues, anonymity and alienation associated with 
city life, not to mention the greater presence of displaced and dislocated communities.  These 
have produced social environments that evade state control, and such environments are exposed 
to greater threats of civil unrest and, indeed, terrorism.  Violence can come from small 
militarised groups with devolved authority structures, or from lone individuals with a personal 
agenda, or circumstances that may progress to unstable war zones.   
 
The threat of contemporary violence has led many governments to reduce the mobility of 
populations, which can be undertaken in a variety of ways.  Governments have walled off, or 
enclaved some communities, for example, by building security measures across borders 
between Mexico and the United States, and between Israel and Palestine.  Other examples can 
be found with more complex methods of social segregation, such as the wealthy communities 
in Cape Town, South Africa, living in secured gated communities.  Such reductions in mobility 
 
 
92 Brian J Grim, Greg Clark and Robert Edward Snyder “Is Religious Freedom Good for Business?: A Conceptual 
and Empirical Analysis” 2014 Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion Vol 10 Article 4 at 3. 
93 Juergensmeyer, above n 91, at 6. 
94 At 10. 
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inevitably impact social structures leading to resentment and often violence within 
communities.   
 
One might assume that such developments have little connection with religion and are perhaps 
merely a result of demographics, social inequalities and government policies. However, what 
is evident is that some of these acts of violence are “fuelled by distinctive ideologies that both 
explain and counter the instability, degradation and inequalities of global modernity.” 95 
Further, when individual alienation and private resentments become associated with collective 
movements that are equipped with powerful ideologies, then what were once isolated acts of 
violence now become co-ordinated and cohesive.   
 
Unfortunately, religion does appear to be a powerful motivation for violent acts, at least within 
the Christian-Judeo-Islamic traditions.  This is because these religions divide “the world clearly 
in to the profane and the sacred, identifies an enemy, offers justification for resentment and 
aggression, and promises a future without inequality and suffering.”96 In those circumstances, 
religion provides an explanation for real or perceived injustices.  Further, it offers a resolution, 
if not necessarily in this earthly life, then in a promised afterlife.   
 
More concerning is when “this religious imaginary is combined with a sense of national 
degradation, then the motivational force of religion is intensified.” 97  This is unfortunate, 
because one only has to view the various global news reports to witness either intentional, or 
unintentional, degradation of some populations in relation to religious views.  For instance, 
some religions are referred to as cults.  “Cult” is invariably regarded as a pejorative term in 
itself, but in addition, research has led to observations that the “coercive behaviour of cults can 
cause severe distress or psychological trauma, and can disrupt the lives of families.”98  It might 
be argued that a cult is different from a religion.  However, it has been noted that some religious 
organisations are “cultish, harmful to their members and yet they claim fiscal exemptions for 
 
 
95 Turner, above n 62, at 23. 
96 At 23-24. 
97 At 24. 
98 John Perkins “Charity or religion: can we advance one without the other?” 2012 Australian Humanist No 105 
Autumn at 6. 
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activities like dissemination of their music CDs, [and] hiring stadiums for evangelical events 
to extract donations from their loyal adherents.”99 
 
Nonetheless, given the close correlation between religion, state and charity that “established 
their symbiotic relationship at the turn of the 16th century, it is unsurprising that from such 
beginnings”100 it was religious principles which “thereafter identified the moral imperatives 
that came to inform the law”.101  However, this led to the social and moral battlegrounds of 
their day, including conflicts surrounding slavery, contraception and suffrage.  Contemporary 
moral battlegrounds also reflect religious influences, including advocates for ‘traditional 
marriage’, and arguments against abortion and LGBTQIA rights.  Thus, religion’s influence is 
being challenged by society’s desire to promote equality and human rights.102 
 
Further, the media is often alive with not only reports of religious-inspired violence, but also, 
for example, the unsavoury “activities of paedophile priests”.103  This “indicate[s] that the 
activities of religious people are not always benign.”104  Consequently, it has been argued that 
the cost to communities as a result of these criminal, or socially-unacceptable behaviours 
associated with religion, is not just a social cost, but also financial because of the pecuniary 
benefits that legally-recognised religious charities receive.105 Indeed, “there appears to be a 
strong public sentiment that taxpayers should not be required to support others’ religious beliefs 
and practices through the tax system”.106  Kirby J reflected such sentiment in his “strongly 
worded judgment”107 in the Australian High Court decision Federal Commissioner of Taxation 
v Word Investments Ltd:108 
 
 
99 Sofia Zudova On the taxation of religious charities and the public benefit of charitable exemptions (Victorian 
Parliamentary Internship Research Report The University of Melbourne June 2016) at 7, referring to the Church 
of Scientology, the Hillsong Church, and the Paradise Community Church. 
100 Kerry O’Halloran “Moral Jeopardy: The Challenges for the Church and for Religion Internationally” in The 
Church of England – Charity Law and Human Rights (Springer International Publishing, Switzerland, 2014) at 
205-206. 
101 At 206. 
102 At 206, referring also to McFarlane v Relate Avon Ltd [2010] IRLR 872 at [23] and C Taylor A Secular Age 
(Belknap Press/Harvard University, Cambridge, 2007). 
103 Perkins, above n 98, at 6. 
104 At 6. 
105 At 6. 
106 Kathryn Chan “Religious Charitable Status and Public Benefit in Australia” 2011 Melbourne University Law 
Review Vol 35 at 1082. 
107 At 1082. 




Charitable and religious institutions contribute to society in various ways.  However, such 
institutions sometimes perform functions that are offensive to the beliefs, values and 
consciences of other taxpayers.  This is especially so in the case of charitable institutions with 
religious purposes or religious institutions.  These institutions can undertake activities that are 
offensive to many taxpayers who subscribe to different religious beliefs or who have no 
religious beliefs.   
 
Whilst it is acknowledged that Kirby J’s dictum was made in relation to statutory interpretation, 
it suggests that “tax exemptions in favour of religious groups should be supported by 
convincing public benefit rationale.”109 
 
As a result, it is unsurprising that it has been observed that the “inclusion of religion as a ‘head 
of charity’ is … quite anomalous”.110 Not least because a “major issue is how to balance the 
positive contributions that religion makes to public life with the harms that are created by some 
religious institutions and norms.”111  I endeavour to provide some balance, at least with regard 
to charity law. 
 
In light of such media attention and public opinion, it is understandable how religious 
motivations for defending a particular way of life may fall under greater scrutiny and, alongside 
that, the social consequences that arise from defending those particular belief systems and their 
associated ways of life, which can include violence. 
 
Regardless of the motives of such violence, violence associated with religion inevitably leads 
to fear, and then anger, as communities wrestle with the notion that the ethos of religion is 
tranquillity and peace and should not be fear-inspiring.  This leads to greater criticism being 
levelled at religions generally. 112  Thus, any religious belief is at risk of denigration and 
condemnation. This furthers the ever-increasing chasm that is developing between the right to 
freedom of belief and the deepening concerns society harbours with regard to religion 
 
 
109 At 1082. 
110 Perkins, above n 98, at 6. 
111 Kathryn Chan “The Advancement of Religion as a Charitable Purpose in an Age of Religious Neutrality” 2017 
Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 6 at 135. 
112 Juergensmeyer, above n 92, at 5. 
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generally.  As result, it is evident that with contemporary times come greater state control over 
religious organisations and pursuits. 
 
 
VII. State Control 
 
Even though religion is playing a “more significant and ever-changing role in public life”,113 it 
might be believed that the relationship between religion and states is kept separate, and “the 
dominant way of understanding the relationship between religion and politics in the Western 
world is through the lens of secularism”.114 However, it is clear that many democratic states 
have much influence and control over aspects of religious life.  Different religious groups have 
different kinds of status and are managed in distinct ways depending on the political persuasion 
of the government in question.  One only has to consider the various public debates across 
Europe and the United States in relation to the wearing of the hijab, niquab, burqa and 
crucifixes in public spaces. 
 
Such debates are centred around politics; the control of religion; notions of national identity 
and culture; and traditions and history also play a crucial role.115  Indeed, it has been argued 
that with globalisation and the blurring of traditional national and state boundaries, identity 
becomes a political issue.  In a global society, it is religion that is increasingly defining identity.  
However, identity no longer sits neatly within political borders, and this becomes ever more 
apparent as citizens from democratic and non-democratic societies co-exist as a result of, for 
example, global migration as a consequence of employment, family, or conflict.  This can result 
in modern political conflicts arising from conflicts of religion being “the primary vehicles of 
civilizational complexes.”116   
 
This aforementioned political theory has been key to understanding the conflict that has arisen 
between political Islam and the West. This manifested itself in the two Gulf Wars; the invasion 
of Iraq; conflicts in Sudan and Somalia; the war in Afghanistan; the wars in Chechnya; and the 
 
 
113  Anders Berg-Sorensen “Introduction: Contesting Secularism” in Anders Berg-Sorensen (ed) Contesting 
Secularism: Comparative Perspectives (Ashgate Publishing Limited, Farnham, 2013) at 1. 
114 At 1. 
115 At 1. 
116 Turner, above n 62, at 24. 
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crisis in Pakistan.  It has also been utilised to try to understand micro level religious conflicts, 
which, as mentioned earlier, includes the wearing of certain religious clothing by women and 
the regulations placed on minarets in Switzerland.  The latter conflicts “can be read as everyday 
manifestations of these civilizational tensions.”117  
 
The rise in conflicts relating to religion has resulted in increases in government restrictions on 
various sections of society.  Research shows that communities subject to elevated levels of 
constraints imposed by governments rose from 58 per cent of the global populace in 2007 to 
64 per cent in 2012.118  The simultaneous rise in such restrictions and religious hostilities is not 
a coincidence.  It has been established that there is a “robust and consistent connection between 
the lack of government respect for religious freedom and higher levels of social hostilities 
involving religion.”119 Further, “previous theory and research go beyond drawing correlational 
connections to establishing a case for causation.”120   
 
Unfortunately, with the increasing fear in society of religion, governments, in response, 
continue to assert control over religious groups and activities by restricting their freedoms, and 
a cycle of increasing tensions and hostilities emerges.  This is because variable analyses of such 
theories have “empirically demonstrated that government restrictions on religious freedom are 
the strongest predicator of religious violence and conflict”.121  Indeed, religion, particularly the 
fundamentalist variants of religion, often provides solace and comfort and an explanation122 
for the perceived failures of modern times.  Therefore, religion becomes particularly attractive 
to many who feel alienated by their state, politics, social circumstances or economics. Whilst 
state control may have a deleterious effect on religion within societies, a key factor in relation 
to religion and society that must be considered is the rule of law, and its close relationship with 
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119 At 3. 
120 At 3. 
121 At 3. 
122 Jonathan Fox “The Multiple Impacts of Religion on International Relations: Perceptions and Reality” 2006 
IFRI 4 Winter Edition at vi. 
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VIII. Rule of Law 
 
It is said that “the rule of law [is] one of the most fundamental characteristics of liberal 
democratic societies” 123  as the “synthesis of effective and impartial judicial systems and 
ordinary citizens’ recognition of the law as legitimate”,124 thus providing a legally-based civil 
stability. 
 
Research suggests, overall, that the rule of law has a positive impact on the relationship 
between religion and society, be that political, economic or social.  For example, it has been 
asserted that where states demonstrate an effective rule of law, there are overall fewer societal 
and religious conflicts.  There is evidence that constitutional regimes where the rule of law is 
observed, by and large, have different methods of tackling religiously-based opposition, as well 
as differing methods of assessing regime conduct, in comparison with authoritarian regimes.  
For example, constitutional regimes provide impartial forums for addressing settlement of 
conflicts, such as courts and tribunals.  In contrast, authoritarian regimes tend to prefer to 
contain dissent and settle conflicts through violence and coercion. 125   Evidence of this 
illustrated through the experiences of the Jehovah’s Witnesses during 1928 to 1945 in two 
opposing legal regimes: the United States and Nazi Germany.126  This matter is discussed in 
detail in the Rule of Law chapter but it is worthwhile making a brief comment here to underpin 
the relevance of the rule of law within the context of religion.  Jehovah’s Witnesses in Nazi 
Germany were in conflict with National Socialism.  Consequently, the National Socialist State 
banned the movement leading to the deaths of many thousands of Witnesses at the hands of 
Nazis.  The conflict between the two entities arose because of a gap between political ideals 
and religious beliefs with no opportunity to engage effectively with the rule of law to resolve 
the differences.   
 
In contrast, the United States, whilst also in conflict with the religion, provided the opportunity 
for the movement to engage in pragmatic and legally-justifiable changes for the United States 
 
 
123 Seung-Whan Choi “Fighting Terrorism through the Rule of Law?” 2010 Journal of Conflict Resolution 54(6) 
at 941. 
124 At 941. 
125 Pauline Cote “The Rule of Law and Religious Minorities: A Case Study of Jehovah’s Witnesses” The Review 
of Faith & International Minorities (2007) 5 3 at 11. 
126 At 11. 
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and the Jehovah’s Witnesses through the rule of law.  The contrast between the two states’ 
approaches reflects the relevance of the relationship between religion and the rule of law to 
encourage and perpetuate political and social stability.  
 
Further, in relation to the rule of law, religion is said to be “one of the few catalysts that exists 
through which a private conscience can become a public conscience.”127  Consequently:128 
 
Institutional religion in society, and institutional religion alone, seems to reliably and 
consistently provide that collector function.  Institutional religion has had an undefined role in 
mustering and shaping collective conscience and values in moral ways – and when institutional 
religion pluralized, so much the better for we avoid the excesses … identified so long ago … 
“the tyranny of the majority.” 
 
Indeed, it has been asserted that the societal grasp of civil liberties and duties, and the norms 
of freedom, are based on ethical and religious constructs:129 
 
… legal freedoms cannot be properly understood without appreciating the existence of 
corresponding duties and responsibilities.  This understanding of rights-duties and freedoms-
responsibilities in turn rests ultimately on moral and theological principles which informs our 
Western political, religious and philosophical cultures and traditions. 
 
IX. Protecting Religion 
 
Charity law, therefore, may offer a way of demonstrating the advantages of religion in ways 
that underpin the roots of societies, and thus help lessen the religious tensions that currently sit 
within many democratic societies, and indeed some non-democratic states that I have 
mentioned in the thesis.  Indeed, I contend that promoting the benefits of religion should be 
actively pursued because “religious hostilities and restrictions create climates that can drive 
away local and foreign investment, undermine sustainable development, and disrupt huge 
 
 
127 Terrance S Carter “Advancement of Religion as a Head of Charity: What are the Boundaries?” 2006 October 
http://www.carters.ca/pub/article/church/2014/advrel_nov14.pdf at 9.  
128 At 9, citing HR Sorensen and AK Thompson The Advancement of Religion is Still a Valid Charitable Object 
in 2001 (Centre for Philanthropy and Non-Profit Studies, QUT, 2000) at 3. 
129 At 9-10, citing Frank Iacobucci “The Evolution of Constitutional Rights and Corresponding Duties: The Leon 
Ladner Lecture” (1992) UBC Law Review 1 at 1. 
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sectors of economies.”130  Consequently, charity is even more vital to restore societies that may 
have been damaged through the impact of religious hostilities arising from government 
policies.  The need to promote religious freedom is further evidenced by research 
demonstrating that such freedom is a “key ingredient to peace and stability, as measured by the 
absence of violent religious persecution and conflict.”131   
 
Beyond the scope of providing stability within communities, religious freedom also encourages 
socio-economic expansion.  For instance, religious freedom is associated with other forms of 
freedom, and there is key connection between “a variety of positive social and economic 
outcomes ranging from better health care to higher incomes for women.”132  Further, it is 
asserted that where religiously-based organisations function in an open market place, religion 
is key “in the human and social development of countries.”133  This is evidenced in the presence 
of proselytizing protestant faiths that were associated with worldwide economic growth.  In the 
1800s in the United States, protestant organisations operating alongside other religious 
organisations established academic institutions, hospitals, prisons, and churches, as well as 
distributing books.  However, such activity does not just reside in the past. It was recognised 
that contemporary faith communities in a number of African regions not only deliver services 
within health and education, they also deliver support for orphans, those with disabilities, and 
the vulnerable within societies.134   
 
Indeed, there is evidence that religion’s “contribution to social capital and social cohesion is 
also manifest in the contribution that religious communities and organizations make in the 
public square.”135  This occurs when followers of a faith “live out the ethics of their faith 
corporately and when they responsibly participate in public dialogues about the nature of truth, 
the meaning of justice and compassion, and our responsibilities to one another.”136 Therefore, 
faith can advance within communities through corporations and promote notions of unity, 
compassion and support, which are some of the concepts of charity. 
 
 
130 Grim, Clark and Snyder, above n 92, at 3. 
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It is evident that religion fulfils roles in society that governments are either unable to, or choose 
not to.  Thus, when most Western democratic societies are intent on reducing religious 
freedoms further and risking further religious societal tension, the advancement of religion, 
through charity law, may be an appropriate vehicle to exhort religious freedom, because:137  
 
… charity law is [a] means by which the state manages its coexistence with religious groups.  
The state concedes privileges to those religious groups that it determines to be beneficial to 
society.  In return, religious groups who determine the privileges worthwhile are prepared to 
mould their purposes, as necessary, to comply with public benefit requirements.  
 
This type of compliance is justifiable since it corresponds with the fundamentals of charity law, 
“which is to facilitate activities that the state determines are beneficial to society as a whole.”138  
Indeed, “[w]ith the rule of law dominant in our societies, nothing but what is measurable in 
everyone’s terms can be entertained.”139  This means charity has to be measurable to justify its 
benefits and this, consequently, applies to the advancement of religion.  
 
One of the ways in which a charity is measured is through the doctrine of public benefit, as 
discussed fully Chapter 7.  Briefly, however, this doctrine provides a useful tool by which the 
judiciary can assess the benefit of a religious purpose.  For instance, the New Zealand case 
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… if there is evidence that the purpose is subversive of all morality, or it is a new belief system, 
or if there has been public concern expressed about the organisation carrying out the particular 
purpose, or if it is focused too narrowly on its adherents.  
 
Those parameters acknowledge that religion is generally beneficial to society, hence why the 
benefit should be presumed, but they are sufficient enough to ensure stringent consideration of 
a religious organisation.  Simply put, public benefit, as part of legitimate state control, and 
underpinning the rule of law, ensures that religious entities operate for the public, as prescribed 
by law, and thus benefit the public appropriately.   
 
The resulting social benefit is that state control of religion through charity is not as seemingly 
confrontational to religious groups as other types of state control may be.  This reduces tensions 
generally from religious groups, as well as providing public confidence in relation to religious 
activities and enhancing public perceptions of religion within society. This may neutralise some 
of the perceived negative effects of violence associated with religions, which may perpetuate 
the notion of the real benefits of religion in society, thus reflecting the continued value of 
religion in contemporary times. 
 
Consequently, some form of state control is key to religion’s contemporary place in society.  
As a result, I will set out the reasons why the law of charity, as a state-controlled measure, 
enables the beneficial function of religion to be propounded for the good of society as a whole, 
even in the face of growing criticism and pressure for religion to be denounced.  Therefore, the 
advancement of religion, through charity law, can deliver a positive message of religion 
through the benefaction of charity, thus supporting contemporary and healthily functioning 
societies at their very core.  
 
X. Commercialism and the Economics of Religious Charities  
 
I present a number of critical discussions relating to commercialism and economics, and their 
relationship with the advancement of religion.  Prima facie, economics and religion appear 
curious bedfellows. Equally, the same may be levelled at commercialism and religion. Indeed, 
research demonstrates that in both historical and contemporary times, these relationships have 
been subject to criticism.   However, evidence reveals that commercialism and religion are 
often closely aligned, and that commercialism may actually benefit religious charities, and 
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therefore society.  In considering this issue, some key cases illustrate the sometime paradoxical 
issues associated with commercialism and religion. Such paradoxes include the perception that 
a commercial religious charity may lose its altruistic nature in the eye of the public, and that 
international courts may approach commercialism and religion in disparate ways.  Such issues 
may then undermine the position of religion within charity generally.   
 
In relation to economics and religion, it has been argued that it is distasteful to equate religion 
to monetary terms.  This may be because a belief system could be demeaned by reducing it to 
mere economics.  Nonetheless, as I reveal, there is a close historical and modern connection 
between money and religion.  By way of brief historical example, the Bible refers at length to 
monetary matters, and it does so more times than it does to heaven, hell or prayers;142 it appears 
that money “occupies an important place in what we consider to be God’s inspired words.”143 
 
By examining the economics of religion, I demonstrate the interconnectedness of social, legal 
and political frameworks.  This is because economics are invariably influenced by numerous 
socio-political factors, and charity law is no exception to this.  This means that the advancement 
of religion is influenced by, and influences, secular political and social frameworks.  I, 
therefore, demonstrate the secular relevance of the advancement of religion within society.  It 
might be questioned as to why it is germane to consider the secular relationship with the 
advancement of religion when religion is clearly not about secular views.  However, I assert 
that that religion and the advancement of religion should not be examined separately from 
secular society because the legal governance of charities, through the rule of law and state 
policies, is shaped by numerous influences including public advocacy, political will and 
international political pressures.   
 
In addition, it may be beneficial to relate religion to the secular because this can provide a 
tangible narrative in relation to religion. This is relevant because society often recognises 
tangible evidence as having more worth than ethereal evidence; the latter is invariably 
prescribed to religion.  Tangible evidence of the benefits of the advancement of religion can be 
utilised, for example, by policy makers and charitable organisations to make objective 
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decisions about charitable governance.  This may in turn provide public confidence in relation 
to the advancement of religion. 
 
XI. Removing the Advancement of Religion as a Head of Charity 
 
There is no evidence yet that any Commonwealth jurisdiction is planning to remove the 
advancement of religion as a charitable purpose.  Nonetheless, in order to consider holistically 
the theme of this research, that of reviewing and reconciling this head of charity within a socio-
legal and political environment, it would be remiss not to address the possible consequences of 
such action.  Indeed, it is timely to do so, not least because the public voices criticising this 
head grow ever louder.  For example, a Bill was submitted to the Australian Victorian 
Parliament that would, amongst other matters, remove this head from charity law.144  If a state, 
therefore, is to consider such an approach, it is imperative that research is made available to 
ensure that there is clear and full disclosure of related consequences.  As a result, this research 
provides timely and necessitous debate of a key issue in the charity law narrative. 
 
I reveal that there would likely be widespread societal consequences should the advancement 
of religion be removed as a charitable purpose, including reduction of social welfare 
programmes, isolation of religious groups, and overall significant economic burdens placed on 
states and communities.  States therefore should balance carefully such costs in comparison 
with any perceived benefits of the removal, which may include increased civic trust in the 
charity sector. 
 
One of the key ways in which I create this discourse is by critically reviewing New Zealand 
case studies of specific religious charities.  It is commonly acknowledged that religious 
charities are internationally lauded for their humanitarian aid and relief work, social welfare 
provision and social development initiatives.  However, it is perhaps not commonly understood 
how such charities achieve this global success. 
 
 
144  Peter Mulherin “Religious Organisations’ Tax Exemption Status: Mark Sneddon quoted in Victorian 






The assessment of this research provides an insight into the global success of religious charities, 
which is said to be through the utilisation of a framework unique to religious charities and no 
other type of charity. The three aspects to this framework draw on sociological concepts: 
religious social capital, religious content and religious cultural power.  This framework reveals 
a methodology available only to religious charities, and this has particular significance in 
providing support and aid to a variety of communities.  Secular communities also benefit from 
the application of this specific methodology because this framework has the ability to span the 
gap between the religious and the secular as a result of its sophisticated narrative.  This 
narrative includes concepts of social justice, sacrifice and morality.  Consequently, it appeals 
to a wide audience, which is reflected in the consistently high levels of donations and support 
bestowed upon religious charities.  Such support then equates to well-executed and successful 
aid campaigns.  I consequently consider some theoretical issues that may arise should the 
advancement of religion be removed as a charitable purpose under the auspices of charity law.   
 




Chapter 2. Methodology and Legal Theory 
 
This chapter sets out the methodologies that I have utilised in this thesis, as well as outlining 
some relevant legal theories that underpin the research. 
 
It has been noted that charity law “remains remarkably under-theorised despite its great age”.145  
Nonetheless, I have placed the research within some legal theories that demonstrate the 
robustness of the advancement of religion within the framework of charity law in a socio-legal 




In part, I utilise traditional doctrinal research methodology, focusing on textual analysis of 
statute and common law, alongside articles, monographs and other pertinent materials.  This 
methodology is concerned with the analysis of legal doctrine and how it was developed and 
applied.146 Legal doctrines are “systematic formulations of law in particular contexts”.147  Such 
doctrines “clarify ambiguities within rules, place them in a logical and coherent structure and 
describe their relationship to other rules.”148  The assessment of doctrine is important for this 
thesis because it is “an essential part of legal activity aiming to capture the subtleness of law in 
words.”149 
 
The doctrinal methodology is said to fulfil an important role because “it offers insight into 
existing rules and previously decided cases.” 150   Therefore, this methodology is most 
appropriate for this thesis because it will enable me to gather and evaluate perspectives on 
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charity law and religion in a broader context initially, and then focus on key issues within 
jurisdictions for more detailed evaluation.  This will enable me to determine early relationships 
between religion and charity law; the relationship between religion, charity and society; and 
conduct critical analysis of various issues facing religion within this head of charity.  Historical 
analysis of literature can be important because I can “draw lessons that are applicable to 
improving the current law”,151 where appropriate.  
 
Assessing legal doctrines, such as public benefit, “explains why a rule is a valid legal rule in a 
given society”,152 and its context can be assessed in relation to its history, sociology and even 
on an economic basis.153  This is appropriate because charity law is grounded in a variety of 
such contexts. 
 
However, it has been asserted that this methodology is too limited because it “assumes that law 
exists in a doctrinal objective vacuum, rather than within the social framework or context.”154  
It is true that the law does not exist in a vacuum, rather it functions within, and impacts on, the 
community.155  Nonetheless, I argue that this methodology still enables me to consider the 
social framework and context that are likely to have influenced the legal doctrines.  As a result, 
this thesis goes beyond the descriptive, and it instead moves to a discursive model.  This will 
be of value when being utilised by the examiners and, when published, for its readers.  This is 
because such critical commentary is likely to raise questions which may provide a platform for 
further research.  In addition, the gathering and assessment of contemporary and relevant 
information will look to provide well-reasoned answers or submissions.   
 
Further, I can consider the implications and consequences of legal changes, or lack of change, 
so as to enable readers to formulate further critical thinking.  Importantly, one of the key 
reasons to ensure that this thesis utilises a discursive methodology is because it enables the 
reader to engage actively in the legal debate being presented by the material.  This will enable 
 
 
151 At 24. 
152 Mark Van Hoeke “Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) for What Kind of Discipline?” in Mark Van Hoeke (ed) 
Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? (Hart Publishing Ltd, 
Oxford, 2011) at 8. 
153 At 8. 
154 Ali, Yusoff and Ayub, above n 146, at 493. 
155 At 493. 
37 
readers to reflect upon and question the submissions and issues.  This will provide opportunities 
for further critical research, and it will undoubtedly add to the field of literature.   
 
Due to the nature of the thesis’ discussions, it is also relevant to utilise interdisciplinary 
methods of research.  This is because whilst doctrinal research concerns itself with legal rules, 
these rules will not always provide an explanation for a particular ruling.  Such a ruling can be 
interpreted by considering its social or historical context.156  Charity law is a creation of social 
and historical contexts, therefore interdisciplinary research methods are relevant for 
appropriate critical analysis within this thesis. 
 
II. Legal Theory 
 
Ronald Dworkin noted that a “general theory of law must be normative as well as 
conceptual.”157  In other words, there must be a “theory of legislation, of adjudication, and of 
compliance.” 158   Herbert Hart noted that legal theory, or jurisprudence, consists of the 
identification of principles that best “cohere with the settled law and legal practices of a legal 
system and also provide the best moral justification for them”.159  One of the key concepts 
within jurisprudence is the affinity between legality and justice.  In other words, the “internal 
morality of the law demands that there be rules, that they be made known, and that they be 
observed in practice by those charged with their administration.”160  Further, and specifically 
in relation to charity law, it has been said that law “is made for guiding conduct, or for 
coordinating activity for the common good, or for doing justice, or for licensing coercion.”161  
These latter views underpin much of the ethos of charity in relation to charity’s role within 
society. 
 
However, it has also been asserted that “legal theory has failed to provide any significant 
explanation or justification of what academic lawyers do … and thus of what academic law 
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might be.”162  In spite of the lack of overall legal theory, I have taken inspiration from scholars 
who have sought to provide some theoretical frameworks, and why expounding such 
frameworks is important for the law of charity.  This is because confirming the relevance of 
religious charities within society, as this thesis has sought to do, illustrates the “goals of that 
body of law”,163 as well as explaining how those goals can be achieved.164   
 
Matthew Harding observed that charity law and its relevance should be framed within two of 
its key features.  Firstly, that charity law is organised around a legal definition of charity.  This 
principle must be met if a body is to be legally charitable.165  Internationally, such principles, 
or criteria, are broadly similar, such as the general description of charitable purposes, which 
includes the advancement of religion.  In addition to the requirement of charitable purpose, a 
purpose must have public benefit, whereby a purpose must benefit the public in some legally-
recognised way.166   
 
The second key feature of charity law is that a state gives legally-recognised charitable entities 
preferential treatment, including some tax exemptions and providing reputational 
advantages.167 
 
Consequently, Harding states that any account of charity law should be sensitive to these two 
factors, and it explains why a state might extend such favourable treatment to those entities that 
fall within charity law parameters.  He does so through a liberal theory perspective.  In other 
words, charity law makes possible what would otherwise not be possible, where purposes 
achieve a certain legal status.168  This is identified as “power-conferring rules.”169   
 
These rules enable people to bring about legal changes for themselves, as well as other people, 
but those rules do not levy obligations.  In relation to charity law, the criteria of charity confirms 
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whether or not entity will obtain legally-recognised charitable status, and determines those 
circumstances that must be met by those who ensure that those aforementioned power-
conferring rules, which can vary a person’s own legal standing, as well that of others.  In other 
words, an individual may assert those power-conferring rules associated with charity law by 
obtaining legal charitable status.  If those criteria are met, an individual can create a number of 
legal variations, including claiming tax exemptions; being able to register as a charity with a 
regulator; and generating rights, powers and duties under charity law.170 
 
It is asserted that if charity law is best underpinned by these power-conferring rubrics, then the 
purpose of charity law will become clear.  This is because the societal purpose of such rubrics 
is “to provide individuals with facilities for realizing their wishes.”171  Hart stated that this is 
“one of the great contributions of law to social life.”172  Joseph Raz noted that the social 
function of power-conferring rules may be a confusing concept, but that social effects refer to 
intended, or foreseen consequences, of power conferring.  This could include fraud reduction, 
or encouraging people to form particular relationships.173   
 
Harding asserts that utilising this liberal perspective to ground a liberal theory of charity is 
justifiable because “charity law entails what might be called facilitative, incentive and 
expressive strategies.”174  Such strategies are best understood as ensuring that individuals can 
and will pursue charitable purposes, and that this pursuit is maintained, and also augmented 
over time.  In other words, a “central feature of charity is that the state uses it to promote 
charitable purpose.”175  Therefore, “the point of charity law is to be found in the value of 
individual freedom and in the range of goods the realisation of which is made more likely by 
the pursuit of charitable purposes.”176   
 
Additionally, the relevance of charity law, within a set of power-conferring rules, “is revealed 
in light of the value of positive freedom … the value of autonomy.”177  Engaging in autonomy 
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is an individual choice, and “depends on a willingness to cultivate and realise virtues, skills 
and capacities as well as a preparedness to make decisions and commitments.”178  The benefit 
of autonomy further requires a state to bring about conditions for a person to live 
autonomously.  This relates to charity law because charity law, as a set of power-conferring 
rules, “serves the value of autonomy by making a contribution to these conditions.”179   
 
Harding notes that amongst the conditions for autonomy there must be a number of choices 
that may be chosen, and charity law widens these numbers of choices available.  For instance, 
charity law provides an option to create a trust to relieve poverty.  Without charity law, there 
would be limited ways of relieving poverty.  By choosing to relieve poverty through a charity, 
a person, inter alia, is given access to certain tax benefits and an enhanced reputation.180  
Therefore, providing these options is “its very point, because the normative function of power-
conferring rules is to provide options.”181  Consequently, the role that these options makes to 
wide variety of options available for those purposes that are legally-charitable “is a contribution 
to the conditions of autonomy.”182 
 
A further key factor for Harding, which also reflects Raz’s theory, is to consider what a state 
aims to achieve through charity law.  A purpose of charity law is to increase the likelihood of 
charitable purposes being carried out.  It does this through the privileges and benefits that are 
afforded to registered charities that are not afforded to non-registered entities.  A state has these 
aims in order to generate goods, those being contributions to human wellbeing, therefore it 
encourages charitable purposes to be carried out to benefit society.183   
 
Harding considers this matter in detail, but for the purposes of this chapter, I summarise that 
there are two sets of goods.  The first is collective goods, which can be realised in a number of 
ways, and these have a public character that many, or sections of a community, can access, 
including education and health care.  Religious charities often provide such services.  For 
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example, the Salvation Army provides, inter alia, education and employment services.  
Secondly, there are individual goods, which are private in character and are not available to all 
sections of a community.184 
 
An example of how purposes and goods are linked is to consider the doctrine of public benefit.  
In order for a purpose to be charitable, it must demonstrate public benefit, as prescribed by law, 
and a purpose will realise collective goods, for instance, by advancing religion, as the state 
endorses.185 
 
It might be argued that a liberal state that sanctions as well as assists in the fulfilment of goods 
which are autonomy-enhancing may just benefit individuals as opposed to benefitting 
communities as a whole.  However, many goods, such as health and education, contribute to 
autonomous situations for the entire communities. These, therefore, have a collective value.  
Further, it has been argued that autonomy can only be achieved when societies offer a kind of 
public ethos that contains collective goods.  These goods could be environmental stewardship, 
political stability, the rule of law, political engagement and tolerance to different ways of living.  
Such collective goods can be achieved through charitable purposes.186 
 
It may be argued that it would be difficult to justify the advancement of religion within this 
legal theory because religion might undermine the conditions for autonomy for everyone. For 
instance, by demanding seclusion in some instances, or by entailing discrimination in relation 
to gender or sexual preference.187  However, Harding asserts that the advancement of religion, 
“from a liberal perspective, it is in light of the demands of an autonomy-enhancing public 
culture that the state’s promotion of goods entailed in various religious purposes may be best 
understood.”188  It is probable, therefore, that pursuing religious purposes will ensure a diverse 
civic ethos of tolerance and empathy.  This is because “the conditions for autonomy are 
substantially enhanced in circumstances where a variety of religious beliefs and practices 
 
 
184 At 15. 
185 At 20. 
186 At 32-33, referring to, inter alia, Charities Act 2006 (UK) ss 2(2)(i) and (h), for example “the advancement of 
environmental protection or improvement” and “the advancement of citizenship or community development.” 
187 At 33-34. 
188 At 33. 
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coexists peacefully.”189  Consequently, charity law “is arguably one of the liberal state’s most 
important vehicles for sustaining public culture of the type that … is necessary to the living of 
autonomous lives.”190 
 
Another way of considering the legal theory of charity law is to recognise charity’s place within 
civil society.  Civil society is said to be a “sphere of institutions, organisations and individuals 
located between family, the state and the market in which people associate voluntarily to 
advance common interests.”191  According to Matthew Turnour, society can be divided as 
follows:192 
 
1. business (the first sector); 
2. government (the second sector); 
3. not-for-profit, non-government, voluntary, intermediary (the third sector); 
4. family (the fourth sector). 
 
Charity sits within the third sector.  However, it has been asserted that there is a lack of legal 
theory in relation to entities within civil society, and further, as I have noted, “there is no clearly 
identifiable jurisprudence for the third sector.”193   
 
Nonetheless, it could be argued that charity law may sit within a legal theory that illustrates 
charity’s place within society.  This is because it can be argued that the “unique essence of the 
laws applying to civil society … is that this function is not coercive but rather enabling and 
preferring voluntary association and contribution.”194  It might be argued that law is essentially 
coercive, but in reality, some “laws simply enable and others prefer.”195   
 
 
189 At 34.  Note that Harding, at n 71, refers to Thornton v Howe (1862) 31 Beav 14 whereby purposes that “are 
adverse to the very foundations of all religion” will not be charitable. 
190 At 33.   
191 Matthew Turnour “Modernising charity law: steps to an alternative architecture for common law charity 
jurisprudence” in Myles McGregor-Lowndes and Kerry O’Halloran (eds) Modernising Charity Law Recent 
Developments and Future Directions (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2010) at 231, citing H Anheir Civil 
Society Measurement, Evaluation, Policy (Earthscan, London, 2004) at 22. 
192 At 230. 
193 At 232 
194  Matthew Turnour and Myles McGregor-Lowndes From Charity to Civil Society: Sketching Steps to an 
Alternate Architecture for the Common Law (Paper Presented at the ARNOVA 2007 Conference, Atlanta, 15 
November, Session D10) at 7.  This paper advocates for a number of legal theories that might be an appropriate 
framework for modern philanthropy although are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
195 At 7. 
43 
 
An example of preferring legislation is found in the United States s 501(c) of the Internal 
Revenue Code where organisations can satisfy exemption from paying income tax. 196  
Consequently, placing charity law within a theory of jurisprudence relative to civil society 
underpins the laws that “enable and prefer voluntary association to advance non-commercial 
common interest”,197 reflecting much of the concept of charity. 
 
Whilst it is evident that there is a dearth of legal theories in relation to charity law, I have sought 
to ground my thesis within some rational concepts elucidated in recent times, which provide 
justification and explanation of charity law within the context of my research.  
 
 
196 At 7. 
197 At 7. 
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Chapter 3. Charity, Religion and Society 
 
As established, this thesis seeks to reconcile the advancement of religion in the charity 
narrative, and it does so in relation to various socio-political-legal contexts.  This chapter is 
important because it sets out the complex relationship between charity, religion, and society 
generally, reflecting the key interrelationship between all these constructs.  In doing so, this 
chapter serves to illustrate the function of the advancement of religion within its socio-legal 
foundations.  This is because I demonstrate the correlation between law, society and religion.  
As a result, this chapter illustrates how embedded religion, and thus religion within charity, is 
within our social frameworks, and consequently, this chapter begins the reconciliation of the 
advancement of religion assertions. It was important to begin the reconciliation of the 
advancement of religion within these specific contexts because, as I have already asserted, the 
law develops from, and within, its socio-political frameworks.  Therefore, in order to 
understand the legal context of this charitable principle, it was important to embed it within its 
other contexts.  As a result, the reconciliation of the advancement of religion becomes more 
coherent and reasoned.  
 
In endeavouring to do so, I set out the complex relationship between charity, religion and 
society generally, reflecting on some of the key issues pertaining to the continuing 
acknowledgement of religion within society, as well as considering how the advancement of 
religion can promote social welfare.   
 
The chapter begins by considering some historical markers relating to charity and charity law, 
which will contextualise the relevance of charity and charity law within society, even in 
contemporary times.  Other matters to address include the relationship between religion and 
charity, and religion and society; defining religion; addressing secularism; and finally, placing 
religion within the law.   
 
As a result, I assert that each of these matters is key in piecing together the examination of the 
socio-political and legitimate function of the advancement of religion, and thus fully underpin 
this thesis’ object of reconciling the advancement of religion within the framework of charity 
law.  I begin by considering a brief history of charity and its law to contextualise the importance 
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of those constructs and thus lay the foundations for later assertions in relation to reconciling 
the advancement of religion. 
 
I. A Brief History of Charity and Charity Law 
 
Charity is deep-rooted within the human psyche and human behaviour.  “It aims to provide 
emotional, spiritual, and material comfort to those in need as taught by many religions and 
communities.”198  Indeed, charity “is deemed an important virtue in many moral systems.”199  
Charity has some roots in Christianity, whereby the English term “charity” is derived from the 
Latin “caritas”.  This was utilised by St Jerome in the Latin Bible, the Vulgate, which originally 
was translated as “love”. Over the centuries, however, as people became more familiar with 
the King James Bible, “love” became “charity”, and so charity evolved from its religious 
beginnings into a legal meaning.200   
 
From its early times therefore, “charity” has been one of the central tenets of Christianity, 
encompassing a central obligation to consider others first, even if one must self-sacrifice.  Some 
the Old Testament prophets spoke of the need to set aside the old, unjust ways, and put others 
first.  For example, Micah was asked “What does the Lord require of you?”, and he responded 
“To act justly and to love mercy and to walk humbly.”201  Even before Micah’s consideration, 
the Law of Moses commanded that “You shall love your neighbour as yourself.”202 The love 
of one’s neighbour “is the basis of nearly all activity which has been traditionally described as 
charity.”203   
 
Indeed, the scriptural traditions of all three Abrahamic religions oblige their followers to be 
generous towards others.  Both the Jewish and Christian Bibles warn of the perilous 
 
 
198 Nuzhat Malik “Defining ‘Charity’ and ‘Charitable Purpose’ in the United Kingdom” 2008 International Journal 
of Not-for-Profit Law Vol 11 No 1 November at 37. 
199 J Gregory Dees “A Tale of Two Cultures: Charity, Problem Solving, and the future of Social Entrepreneurship” 
2012 Centre for the Advancement of Social Enterprise at 321. 
200 Gareth G Morgan The Spirit of Charity (Professorial Lecture Faculty of Organisation and Management 
Sheffield Hallam University 3 April 2008) at 3. 
201 At 4, citing Micah 6:8 The Bible NIV translation 700BC. 
202 At 4, citing Leviticus 19:8 The Bible NRSV translation. 
203 At 4. 
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consequences for those too eager to hang on to their own wealth,204 and in Islam, the Qur’an 
similarly echoes such sentiments, warning:205  
 
Have you met those who deny the Day of Judgment?  They are the ones who turn away the 
orphan, and have no urge to feed the destitute and needy.  Woe to those who pray but lack 
compassion and eschew moral duty, who make a show of false piety and disdain charity.   
 
Therefore, numerous religions have their foundations in charity, and from Buddhism to 
Zoroastrianism, religions exhort their believers to be generous to those in need.   
 
Even non-religious philosophers, including Confucius and Aristotle, recognised charitable 
giving as a virtue.  Confucius incorporated charitable behaviour within his fundamental 
qualities, which regularly translated as “benevolence, charity, and humanity.”206  Aristotle 
believed charity to be a feature of benevolence, that being the ability to provide altruistically 
to those in need when they needed it.207  
 
The Christian Parable of the Good Samaritan effectively demonstrates charity’s concept of 
virtue.  Here, a person from a reviled cultural group stopped to help a traveller who had been 
robbed and injured.  Others had passed by without assisting, including those from esteemed 
groups.  This tale illustrates “the intrinsic moral value of acting selflessly, out of 
compassion”,208 focusing on the person’s altruistic motives, and their readiness to forgo their 
own concerns.  Indeed, any personal gain is seen to dilute the moral value of the act, raising 




204 James William Brodman Charity & Religion in Medieval Europe (The Catholic University American Press, 
Washington DC, 2009) at 10, referring to Psalm 68:6-7; Ecclesiasticus 4:4 and 4:10; Isaiah 58:7; and James 2:17 
The Bible; see also Michael Cook Ancient Religions, Modern Politics: The Islamic Case in Comparative 
Perspective (Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2014) at 199-200, referring to the Matthew 6:1-
4; Luke 14:13-14; 1 Timothy 6:17-18: Mark 14:7; Matthew 26:11; and John 12:8, inter alia, The Bible 
205 At 10-11, citing 107:1-7 the Qur’an.  The available literature provides a variety of spellings of Qur’ran and 
this thesis utilises the most common spellings. 
206 Dees, above n 199, at 322. 
207 At 322; referring to Nichomachean Ethics, a series of books considered to be Aristotle's best-known work on 
ethics. 
208 At 322. 
209 At 322. 
47 
Whilst it took many centuries before a legally-recognised framework of charitable 
administration evolved, some religions demonstrate that even in ancient times there was a 
prescribed system of charitable giving.  For instance, the Law of Moses set out a system of 
tithes, whereby the Israelites were required to reserve 10 per cent of their harvest as an offering 
for God, partly to support the poor and needy.  Even today, many Christian and Jewish 
followers contribute 10 per cent of their salary to charity.  Under the Islamic principle of zakat, 
Muslims give two and half per cent of their wealth each year for the needy.210  Therefore, 
charity and religion are inherently and historically bound within many societies and remain so 
in today’s allegedly secular times.  
 
The formal legal system of charitable giving and administration came about, in part, because 
of the societal and pious revolution of the Reformation. 211  “The overthrow of the papal 
supremacy and the decline of the authority of organised religion was paralleled by” 212  a 
“change of viewpoint concerning the nature and functions of religion, both in the individual 
and in society.”213  Consequently, charitable objects became more secular in nature, as people 
considered more worldly needs as opposed to the fate of their souls, as had been decreed in 
times gone by.  For example, in earlier times, a papal decree of Gregory IX urged religious 
followers to save their souls by bestowing some of their means for religious causes.  Those 
who ignored this appeal might not receive the Eucharist, which would result in being buried in 
unconsecrated ground.214  A person who had died without a will, and thus had failed to ensure 
he had undertaken important merciful endeavours before he died, might also suffer the same 
fate.215  In medieval times, the ecclesiastical courts upheld gifts for pious and charitable causes 
wherever possible, meaning an increase in power of the religious institutions. 
 
 
210 Morgan, above n 200, at 5; see later chapters for further discussions on zakat. 
211 “The Protestant Reformation was the 16th-century religious, political, intellectual and cultural upheaval that 
splintered Catholic Europe, setting in place the structures and beliefs that would define the continent in the modern 
era. In northern and central Europe, reformers like Martin Luther, John Calvin and Henry VIII challenged papal 
authority and questioned the Catholic Church’s ability to define Christian practice. They argued for a religious 
and political redistribution of power into the hands of Bible- and pamphlet-reading pastors and princes. The 
disruption triggered wars, persecutions and the so-called Counter-Reformation, the Catholic Church’s delayed but 
forceful response to the Protestants” http://www.history.com/topics/reformation.  
212 Gareth Jones History of the Law of Charity 1532-1827 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1969) at 10. 
213 At 10, citing AG Dickens The English Reformation (Schocken, London, 1964) at 325. 
214 At 3, referring to Letter of Authorisation for Collectors for Charitable Institutions, approved by the 4th Lateran 
Council (1215) and included in the decretals of Gregory IX, cited in Brian Tierney Medieval Poor Law (University 
of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1959) at 46. 
215 At 3. 
48 
 
However, because of the aforementioned societal and pious disruption that came about in the 
1600s, there came a need to control charitable gifts more systematically - the key legislative 
reform was the Statute of Elizabeth I601 216   providing an administrative mechanism for 
charities,217 thus, inter alia, reducing burdens on the State to meet the needs of society's poor 
and hopeless. The Act was repealed in 1888218  but the Preamble endured because it was 
recognised as being the foundation for the legal definition of charitable purposes that continues 
to be acknowledged within numerous jurisdictions. 
 
The Preamble reads as follows:219 
 
Whereas land, tenements, rents, annuities, profits, hereditaments, goods, chattels, money, and 
stock of money, have been heretofore given, limited, appointed, and assigned as well by the 
Queen’s most excellent majesty, and her most noble progenitors, as by sundry other well-
disposed persons: some for relief of aged, impotent, and poor people, some for maintenance 
of sick and maimed soldiers and mariners, schools of learning, free schools, and scholars in 
universities; some for repair of bridges, ports, havens, causeways, churches, seabanks and 
highways; some for education and preferment of orphans; some for or towards the relief, stock, 
or maintenance for houses of corrections; some for marriages of poor maids; some for 
supportation, aid, and help of young tradesmen, handicraftsmen, and persons decayed; and 
others for relief or redemption of prisoners or captives, and for aid or ease of any poor 
inhabitants concerning payment of fifteens, setting out soldiers, and other taxes; which land, 
tenement, rents, annuities, profits, hereditaments, goods, chattels, money, and stock of money, 
nevertheless, have been employed according to the charitable intent of the givers and founders 
thereof, by reason of frauds, breaches of trust, and negligence in those that should pay, deliver 




216 Malik, above n 198, at 37.  This Act is also known as the Charitable Uses Act 1601; this thesis utilises the 
“Statute of Elizabeth” throughout.  See later chapters for further discussions on this statute. 
217Michael Chesterman Charities, Trusts and Social Welfare (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1979) at 19. 
218 The Act was repealed by the Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act 1888; s 13(2) of that Act preserved the 
Preamble of the Statute of Elizabeth, noted by Malik, above n 198, at 38. 
219 Donald Poirier, Charity Law in New Zealand (Department of Internal Affairs, Wellington, 2013) at 79-80; see 
also Gino Dal Pont Charity Law in Australia and New Zealand (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) at 46-
47; and Juliet Chevalier-Watts Law of Charity (Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2013) at 7. 
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One of the functions of this Act was to replace the Catholic Church’s role prior to the 
diminution of its power in assisting the needy, but with a contemporary “secular notion of 
philanthropy.”220  In reality, the Act was a reforming act to correct the misuses resulting from 
the governance of charitable trusts rather than define charity generally; the Preamble merely 
set out a catalogue of purposes recognised as charitable.221  As mentioned, the Preamble lives 
on, providing the “foundations for the legal definition of charitable purposes, which is still 
recognised today.”222 
 
After the enactment of this Act, courts recognised a purpose as charitable if it fell within the 
purposes in the Preamble or, as commonly known, falling within the spirit and intendment of 
the Preamble.  This latter phrase is utilised by today’s courts to determine the charitable nature 
of an object.  Whilst not explicitly stated in the Preamble, it was established by the Court of 
Chancery that in order for an entity, or a trust, to be charitable it must be of a public character.223 
In other words, for the benefit of the community, or an appreciably important section of the 
community.  This invariably consists of a two-limbed test.  Firstly, whether the purposes confer 
a benefit on the public, or on a sufficient section of the public.  Secondly, whether the class of 
persons eligible to benefit constitutes the public, or a section of the public.224 
 
Whilst the Preamble provided the first legal recognition of charitable purposes, the Court in 
Morice v Bishop of Durham225 took the initial steps in setting out a definition of charity, 
enshrining the Preamble within a simplified formula226 as follows:227 
 
1. Relief of the indigent; in various ways: money: provisions: education: medical assistance; 
&c: 
2. The advancement of learning; 
 
 
220 Chevalier-Watts, above n 219, at 7, referring to Poirier, above n 219, at 80. 
221 Jean Warburton, Debra Morris and NF Riddle Tudor on Charities (9th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2003) 
at 2-3. 
222 Juliet Chevalier-Watts Charity Law International Perspectives (Routledge, Abingdon, 2018) at 10; see also 
Chevalier-Watts, above n 219, at 7. 
223 Warburton, Morris and Riddle above n 221, at 7, referring to, inter alia, Jones v Williams (1767) Amb 651 at 
652. 
224 At 7; public benefit will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 7. 
225 Morice v Bishop of Durham (1804) 9 Ves 399. 
226 Jones, above n 212, at 122. 
227 Morice, above n 225, at 532. 
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3. The advancement of religion; and 
4. Which is the most difficult, the advancement of objects of general public utility. 
 
This classification became the “quintessence of legal charity”.228  Following this classification 
came the more well-known classification of charitable purposes as enunciated by Lord 
Macnaghten in Commissioners for Special Purposes v Pemsel.229  Evidently his Lordship was 
influenced by Morice’s classification, as the classifications strongly resemble each other.230  
Lord Macnaghten’s classification reads as follows:231 
 
‘Charity’ in its legal sense comprises four principle divisions: trusts for the relief of poverty; 
trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for the advancement of religion; and trusts for 
other purposes beneficial to the community, not falling under any of the preceding heads. 
 
This categorisation is the foundation for contemporary charity law in many jurisdictions, and 
its influence can be found in a number of statutes. For instance, New Zealand’s Charities Act 
2005; England and Wales’ Charities Acts 2006 and 2011; Canada’s Income Tax 1985; and 
Australia’s Charities Act 2013.   
 
II. Giving to Charity and Religion 
 
However, these laws of charity merely provide a regulatory framework to facilitate donations 
to an approved variety of purposes.  What they do not do is “teach those who are subject to 
their authority to give to persons in need.”232 In fact, the common law traditions of charity are 
silent on to whom one should give, and how much.  Nor do they provide reasons to give; those 
questions are left to be answered elsewhere. 233   Consequently, other aspects of civil 
communities, as might be seen in democratic societies, such as economics, psychology and 
morals, have endeavoured to provide those answers.  As one might imagine, those answers 
 
 
228 Jones, above n 212, at 126; Chevalier-Watts, above n 222, at 54. 
229 Commissioners for Special Purposes v Pemsel [1891] AC 531. 
230 Chevalier-Watts, above n 222, at 54. 
231 Pemsel, above n 229, at 583. 
232 Kathryn Chan “Advancement of Religion in an Age of Religious Neutrality” 2017 Oxford Journal of Law and 
Religion 6 at 129. 
233 At 129, referring to David Stevens “Rescuing Charity” in Charles Mitchell and Sue Moody (eds) Foundations 
of Charity (Hart, 2001). 
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vary considerably, depending on the community and individuals in question.  This can in turn 
leave many charities vulnerable to the whims and desires of humans, resulting in greater 
vulnerability for those in need where a state may not be in a position to assist. 
 
Interestingly, “it is the normative universes of religion that seem to fill the gaps most 
completely, answering the big questions about charity in culturally specific but relatively 
consistent ways.”234  For instance, Islam affords a useful example as to the way in which a 
religion may provide answers to such societal questions.  The general approach to charity can 
be divided into distinct Islamic concepts, “including ushr (alms of agricultural produce), 
nawaib (alms for extraordinary circumstances), sadaqa (‘voluntary’ alms), and zakat 
(‘obligatory alms’)”, 235  and as noted earlier, Islamic law explicitly instructs followers in 
relation to property which is subject to zakat.236 Further, Islam contains much detail as to why 
Muslims should be charitable, and outlines the advantages for receivers and givers.  This has 
been attributed to the Prophet, who stated: “Protect your wealth through zakat, cure your ill 
with sadaqa, and be ready, against misfortunes, with dua (prayer).”237 
 
Therefore, whilst charitable regulation suggests that charity is a choice, there appears to be 
little to explain charity’s real benefits to society, other than that which may be surmised by 
general knowledge, or by influences from a number of aspects of civil communities, such as 
media campaigns and advertising.  This therefore means that “the maintenance of the needy 
within the community [is left] ‘to the vagaries of human initiative and volition.’”238   
 
On the other hand, religion provides a method by which a community is benefitted more fully 
by charity without being left to the whim of humans.  For instance, as mentioned earlier, the 
Islamic construct of zakat, which is subsequent in importance only to prayer as a principle in 
Islam, is a compulsory and inseparable part of the faith; failure to observe it is equivalent to 
 
 
234 At 129. 
235 At 129, referring to Omer F Senturk A Comprehensive Guide to Zakat: Charity in Islam (The Light Inc, New 
Jersey, 2007) (originally published in Turkish as Soru ve Cevaplarla Zekat 2006) at 3-8. 
236 At 130, referring to Farishta G de Zayas The Law and Institution of Zakat (Other Press, New York, 2003); 
instructions include how much to pay; when it should be paid; and the categories of those entitled to receive it. 
237 At 129, citing Senturk, above n 235, at 35. 
238 At 131, citing Jacob Neusner and Bruce Chilton (eds) Altruism in World Religions (Georgetown University 
Press, 2005) at 38. 
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the negation of Islam itself.239  Sikhism ensures its followers set aside 10 per cent of their 
earnings (dasvandh) for the needy and poor,240 and the New Testament requires similar of its 
followers.241 Judaism offers similar exhortations to its faithful, although the act of giving is 
seated within the broader scope of mitzvot, or obligations, and classes various types of alms 
according to a particular version of economic justice.242 
 
Whilst some would not necessarily agree with the “epistemic claims underlying these 
narratives”,243 it cannot be denied that charities are a fundamental requirement of likely most 
societies, democratic or otherwise, to protect those in need.  It is also asserted that “charities 
constantly need more funding to sustain our civil community”,244 although it is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to determine the full scope of that claim.  If, however, it is accepted that 
charities do fill voids in communities that are often neglected, for a variety of social and 
political reasons, then the religious narrative, through its various doctrines of obligations, as 
just one aspect of religion, can be a valuable tool in the redistribution of wealth through charity 
for the benefit of communities as a whole.245  This occurs without state coercion or pressure, 
which, as seen in Chapter 1, can have damaging consequences on communities.  
 
Of course, it can be argued that religion is not the only reason to give to charity, and I do not 
seek to undermine any type of charitable giving.  However, what is being asserted is that 
religion is a valuable tool in the charity armoury, even in civil societies that may seek to 
denigrate religion.   
 
It might, however, be argued that obliging religious followers to give to charity actually 
undermines the ethos of charity, which includes altruism, good will and benevolence.  Indeed, 
the obligations of religion are often framed in narratives associated with spiritual rewards for 
pious gifts.  Christianity is not exempt from this, as noted earlier, and the central parables 
 
 
239 At 131, referring to de Zayas, above n 236, at xxii-xxiv. 
240 At 131, referring to Parkash Singh Community Kitchen of the Sikhs (Singh Brothers, Amritsar, 1994) at 60. 
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242 At 131. 
243 At 131. 
244 At 131. 
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revolve around emulating Jesus in order to inherit eternal life;246 other religions follow suit.  
Hindus seek freedom from the karmic cycle if their conduct advances others’ wellbeing, but it 
must be devoid of self-interest, which is an ironic twist. 247  Classical Judaism encourages 
charitable works in return for divine redemption,248 and Islam encourages almsgiving for great 
rewards, and promises adverse consequences if it is not carried out.249  
 
How, then, can it be asserted that people who are impelled to give to charity because of 
religious norms will do so for the public good, when such narratives are in direct contrast to 
the secular notion of altruism?  In other words, altruism means that a person can serve others 
without a benefit to their own self, and indeed, it may be at a cost to oneself.250  It is perhaps 
difficult to rationalise the encouragement of such self-centred behaviour with that of charitable 
giving.  It may be argued, however, that evaluating the motives for giving is not appropriate, 
not least because it is very difficult to evaluate such motives.  Motives might be practical or 
moral.  Is there a difference between being motivated to carry out a charitable act in order to 
assuage a guilty conscience, for instance, after seeing a homeless person when one has 
moderate means, and being motivated to carry out a charitable act because of a religious 
obligation?  Many would probably argue that there is little or no difference.  The end result is 
certainly the same: a charitable endeavour has taken place for a public good.   
 
Further, what is evident is that these functions of religion enable redistribution of wealth for 
charitable purposes, making them “instrumentally valuable to the public as a whole.” 251  
Certainly, recent research provides evidence that those who claim to be of a certain religion 
tend to make greater charitable donations than those without a belief system.  Sikhs and Jews 
appear to be the most generous in charitable giving, just ahead of Christians, Hindus and 
Muslims.252  It is said that this is because “faith should motivate people to acts of generosity”253 
 
 
246 At 133. 
247 At 132, referring to Richard Davis “Classical Hinduism” in Jacob Neusner and Bruce Chilton (eds) Altruism 
in World Religions (Georgetown University Press, Washington, 2005) at 176. 
248 At 132, referring to Jacob Neusner and Alan J Avery-Peck “Altruism in Classical Judaism” in Neusner and 
Chilton (eds), above n 247, at 47. 
249 At 132, referring to Emil Theorin “Altruism in Islam” in Neusner and Chilton, at 247. 
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252  John Bingham “Religion ‘makes people more generous’” The Telegraph (9 June 2014) 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/10885180/Religion-makes-people-more-generous.html. 
253 Bingham, citing Reverend Dr Martyn Atkins General Secretary of the Methodist Church. 
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although it should be noted that pecuniary donations represent only a part of charitable giving.  
Other non-financial charitable acts were not specifically measured, and thus only religiously 
motivated financial gifts were measured within this research.   
 
This research is supported by similar research carried out in Malaysia, which has a significant 
Muslim population.  It was noted that charitable donations were often allied with religious 
views, whereby “religion and charity go hand in hand.”254  This is because religion is confirmed 
as having a significant effect of human conduct.  Indeed, due to many religions having donation 
to charity as a central tenet, it is perhaps unsurprising that religion is a significant feature when 
considering the effect of religion on charitable giving.255  The conclusions drawn from this 
research, inter alia, determined that religious beliefs were found to be an important arbiter in 
the encouragement of charitable giving, which further supports previous research 
undertaken.256   
 
What these various pieces of research illustrate, therefore, is that religion has a significant role 
within the constructs of charity.  This consequently supports communities generally, thus 
improving the quality of societies overall.  Without religion within charity, it is likely that many 
charitable endeavours would not be possible, and this would be detrimental to many societies, 
democratic or otherwise. 
 
Nonetheless, it would be unfair to assert that non-religious people do not carry out numerous 
charitable acts.  Unquestionably they do, but this does not lessen the impact of religious giving 
in relation to charity.  Rather it merely emphasises the fundamental relevance of religion within 
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(2008) International Journal of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Marketing Vol 13 No 1 at 1. 
255 At 744. 
256 At 739, referring to Ranganathan and Henley above n 254, at 1-11; J Reitsma, P Scheepers and M Te 
Grotenhuis “Dimensions of individual religiosity and charity: cross national effect differences in European 
countries” (2006) Review of Religious Research Vol 47 No 4 at 347-362; and EF Jackson et al “Volunteering and 
charitable giving: do religious and associational ties promote helping behaviour?” (1995) Nonprofit and Voluntary 
Sector Quarterly Vol 36 No 2 at 218-238. 
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It is worthwhile now looking at religion and its influence and relevance within society to 
understand its impact on communities so as to underpin the assertions I make in this thesis. 
 
III. Religion and Society 
 
In furthering the object of my inquiry, that of reconciling the advancement of religion within 
its socio-legal constructs, it was also important to make some correlations between religion and 
society generally to understand their relationship, and thus lay the groundwork for later 
assertions relating to the reconciliation of the advancement of religion.  I turn to this matter 
now. 
 
Whilst it is outside the scope of this thesis to consider sociology beyond a few well-chosen 
remarks, it should be noted that law and sociology share similar principles.  For instance, both 
are concerned with a range of significant forms of social relationships, and they require the 
abstract to be applied to the concrete.257 Thus:258 
 
The relationship between religion and society cannot be understood without reference to law 
and the relationship between religion and law cannot be understood without reference to 
sociology.  A sociology of law and religion is concerned with how social forces shape the legal 
regulation of religion and how law is used to affect religion and its social expression.  It seeks 
to shed further light upon the complex relationship between religion, law and society. 
 
It has been argued that the religion’s distinctive position is embedded in the meaning of being 
human. Since the beginnings of society and human consciousness, humans have continued to 
question the meaning and purpose of life.259  Thus, religion is a universal phenomenon because 
humans are meaning-seeking animals.260  Not only do humans seek out religion to interpret 
meaning, but religion also influences human behaviour.  For example, religion is said to be 
 
 
257 Russell Sandberg and Rebecca Catto “Law and Sociology: Toward a Greater Understanding of Religion in N 
Doe and R Sandberg (eds) Law and Religion: New Horizons (Peeters, Leuven 2010) at 287, referring to K Patchett 
“The Role of Law in the Development Process” (1987) 48 Commonwealth Legal Education Association 
Newsletter at 36. 
258 At 287. 
259 Barry W Bussey “The Legal Revolution Against the Place of Religion: The Case of Trinity Western University 
Law School” 2016 BYU Law Review Issue 4 January at 1136. 
260 Jonathan Sacks The Persistence of Faith: Religion, Morality and Society in a Secular Age (Continuum, 
London, 2005) at 9. 
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negatively related to abortion rates; babies born to unmarried parents; marriage breakups; and 
late bill payments.  Further, as noted, religiously-committed people are more active in 
charitable volunteering, and active in charitable donating.261 
 
Such searches for the meaning of life and influences on behaviour have had significant impact 
on the place of religion within society, and with that the legal framework.  History implies 
religion was adjoined explicitly to the structures of liberal states, as opposed to being added by 
chance, and “[t]his design is firmly established in a history steeped in human events and 
philosophical inquiry as to the meaning of life.”262 Consequently, religion was a “means of 
pinning down and managing the ideas and practices”263 for the welfare of Western societies.  
 
Western history “is replete with the ebb and flow of the state demanding ultimate allegiance 
from its citizens”264 and religion has been used to cement loyalty to the state.  Polybius, after 
living in Rome for many years, noted “in 150 BC ‘The quality in which the Roman 
commonwealth is distinctly superior … is the nature of its religion … is that which maintains 
the cohesion of the Roman state.’”265 
 
Further, religion has been seen as being at the root of morality, whereby if god was not 
recognised then all things would be tolerated. 266   This may be an arguable point in a 
contemporary democratic society, and certainly some notions of religion and morality are a 
cause of tension in today’s society.  For example, with regard to “traditional” Christian notions 
of abortion, marriage and contraception, to name but three.  Nonetheless, religion did, and still 
 
 
261 Niclas Berggren and Christian Bjornskov “Is the importance of religion in daily life related to social trust? 
Cross-country and cross-state comparisons.” (2011) Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 80 at 461-
462, referring to LR Iannaccone “Introduction to the economics of religion” (1998) Journal of Economic 
Literature 36 at 1465-1496; N Berggren “Rhetoric or reality?  An economic analysis of the effects of religion in 
Sweden” (1997) Journal of Socio-Economics 26 at 571-596; and RD Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and 
Revival of American Community (Simon & Schuster, New York, 2000); see Chapter 6 for discussions on the “halo 
effect” of religion. 
262 Bussey, above n 259, at 1136. 
263 At 1136, citing Derek Peterson & Darren Walhof The Invention of Religion: Rethinking Belief in Politics and 
History 7 (Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 2002). 
264 At 1141. 
265 At 1141, citing Will Durant Caesar and Christ (Simon & Schuster, New York, 1944) at 93, citing 4 Polybius, 
Histories 56 (Loeb Classical Library ed, 1925). 
266 Sacks, above n 260, at 36, referring to Fyodor Dostoevsky The Brothers Karamazov (The Russian Messenger, 
Moscow, 1880). 
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does, impact on morality.  However, we do not need religion to be moral, rather we, as humans, 
need to be part of a community,267 and this subsequently informs our identity.268   
 
 
IV. Religion and Identity 
 
Identity is a key part of religious traditions, which makes religion a fundamental part of the 
human condition.  For example, whilst Catholicism has cultural variances, it has been found 
that some nations that fall within that same religious space, such as within the Northern 
Lutheran rim, they “tend to cluster according to their configuration of market, state and family 
for the pursuit of work and welfare”.269   
 
Further evidence of religious identity is to be found in the wake of the collapse of the “once 
proudly godless [albeit enforced] Soviet Union”.270  Here religion has assumed prominence 
again in the emerging discourse on national identity through “its teachings, rituals, vestments 
and symbolism … to build and maintain communities … in all three of the South Caucasus 
states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.”271  In addition, religion has served as a key 
instrument of “otherisation”.  This is where one identifies with others through similarities and 
differences, for instance, separating Armenians from Azerbaijanis, and vice versa. 272  
Moreover, it has been noted that “Islam is first and foremost a marker of identity”.  For instance, 
in Kazakhstan, if a person is born into a Kazakh family, they are nearly always immediately 
 
 
267 At 45. 
268 Nukhet A Sandal and Jonathan Fox Religion in International Relations Theory: Interactions and Possibilities 
(Routledge, Abingdon, 2013) at 28. 
269 Kees van Kersbergen “From charity to social justice: religion and the European welfare state traditions” in 
Pauli Kettunen and Klaus Petersen (eds) Beyond Welfare State Models (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 
2011) at 93. 
270 Katya Migacheva and Bryan Frederick “Religion, Conflict, and Stability in the Former Soviet Union” in Katya 
Migacheva and Bryan Frederick (eds) Religion, Conflict, and Stability in the Former Soviet Union (Rand 
Corporation, Santa Monica, 2018) at 14. 
271 At 13-14, referring to Daniele Hervieu-Leger Religion as a Chain of Memory (Rutgers University Press, New 
Brunswick, 2000) at 140-162 (translated by Simon Lee). 
272 At 14, referring to Rogers Brubaker “Language, Religion, and the Politics of Difference” 2013 Nations and 
Nationalism 19 1 at 3. 
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Muslim.  According to a recent poll, 96.9 per cent of Kazakh respondents identified themselves 
as Muslim.273 
 
Similar patterns of identify and religion emerged with settlers in Hong Kong.  In this situation, 
the early settlers mainly comprised of refugees from mainland China, but there was little 
support to be gained from the colonial rule of the time.  As a result, the settlers turned to their 
own communities and mutual help to assist with plugging the welfare gaps left by the ruling 
party.  Key in providing support for such communities were the religious groups.  Their 
traditions were bound in Chinese culture, and as a result, the notion of charity and giving 
remains “fundamentally inspired by the distinctive Chinese attitude.”274 It is also noticeable 
that the Asian charity model has many of its roots within, inter alia, Taoism, Confucianism and 
Buddhism. 275   Therefore, religious traditions, which are observed as part of so many 
communities, are sources of morality and identity.  As a result, historical religious influences 
continue to pervade many communities, underpinning the community functions of religion 
within the charity narrative.  Nonetheless, whilst it is evident that identity may be a key factor 
in relation to religion broadly, I do not necessarily suggest that identity should influence charity 
law per se.  This is because the construct of “identity” within religion is fluid and not every 
recognised religion, or spiritual belief system, has defined notions of identity.  Therefore, 
making “identity” a key factor on the definition or influence of charity law may constrain 
charity law when, in reality, charity is such a fundamental aspect of many democratic societies.  
Rather the purpose of my addressing identity within religion was to embed the construct of 
identity within religion as part of this thesis’ discussions and demonstrate the importance of 






273 Nargis Kassenova “Islamic Revival and Trajectories of State-Society Relations” in Migacheva and Frederick, 
above n 270, at 118, referring to B Bekturganova and M Nurgaliyeva Ethnic and Religious Identifications of the 
Regional Youth Report (Association of Sociologists and Political Scientists, 2016). 
274 Damian Bethke “Charity Law Reform in Hong Kong: Taming the Asian Dragon?” 2016 International Journal 
of Not-for-Profit Law 18(1) May at 16; Chevalier-Watts, above n 222, at 173. 
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V. Religion and Infrastructure 
 
The impact on many civilizations, Western or otherwise, by religion is not just evidenced in 
morals or identities.  Its impact on “the contribution of religious organisations, throughout 
history, to building the constitutional infrastructure … of contemporary society is beyond 
estimation.”276  States such as Ireland, Australia, New Zealand and Canada owe a debt to such 
organisations because religious organisations provided the foundations for contemporary 
welfare and learning establishments.277  Consequently, their influence is still felt today in 
supporting and providing state infrastructure.  It further acts as “midwife to many prominent 
third sector endeavours in the community services industry.”278  These religious bodies often 
have close links to charitable institutions.  For instance, many hospitals and schools are 
registered charities, as well as being religious institutions.  
 
There are also other beneficial impacts of religion within society that have been observed 
beyond the spiritual and infrastructural benefits.  As has been noted, having a religious focus 
has the effect of lowering divorce rates; impacting negatively on the rates of abortion; as well 
as encouraging timely payment of bills.279  Health benefits are also said to spring from being 
religiously-minded, whereby church attendance can add up to seven years to life expectancy, 
in addition to lowering blood pressure; impacting positively on alcohol and drug usage; 
improving mental health; and developing a strong immune system.280   
 
Consequently, the impact of religion and religious charities can be felt within the very 
infrastructures of many societies,281 illustrating the fundamental relevance of religious charities 
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279 Berggren and Bjornskov, above n 261, at 461-462, referring to LR Iannaccone “Introduction to the economics 
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to multiple communities, even if those communities are not consciously aware of such 
relevance. Therefore, any move to exclude religion as a head of charity may impact adversely 
on some instrumental sections of the community, including not just the infrastructure of many 
communities but the very fabric and connections of communities themselves. 
 
However, whilst I have made numerous references to the concept of religion, I have, as yet, 
not considered the meaning of religion, to which this chapter turns now. 
 
VI. Introduction to Religion and Defining Religion 
 
Whilst it is important to define religion, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide an 
exhaustive exploration of religion.  Rather, I will outline religion and its meaning, both 
generally and at charity law, so as to underpin the terms utilised throughout the thesis and to 
provide some context as to religion within charity law. 
 
It is said that non-legal definitions of religion can be divided into two varieties.282  Firstly, as 
functional, where religion is recognised as what it does for individuals or social systems.  
Secondly, as substantive, which refers to what religions consist of, such as narratives, symbols 
and institutions.  Religion may also take on other functions, including making sense of a 
person’s relationship to nature, history and society.  Religion is said to be compelling because, 
inter alia, its stories are often told in childhood.  They may be presented not just orally, but also 
with symbols, pictures, songs and rituals, which help form the religious imagination, and so 
become the foundations for religious understanding. 283   Therefore religion can become 
embedded early within the psyche of many. 
 
In relation to religion and charity, it has been observed that:284 
 
 
agencies in the world; David Paton “The World’s Biggest Charity” Catholic Herald (16 February 2017) 
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282 David Herbert Religion and Civil Society Rethinking Public Religion in the Contemporary World (Ashgate 
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283 At 30-31. 
284 Kerry O’Halloran Religion, Charity and Human Rights (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014) at 10, 
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The importance of religion as a fundamental spring of charity can scarcely be overestimated.  
It is part of the makeup of Man to want to give.  It is part of the ethics of most religions to 
encourage that. 
 
Religion’s relevance for mankind is further demonstrated in the way in which religion can be 
seen as being multi-faceted –“as a belief; as an identity; and as a way of life.”285  Religion as a 
belief represents the “substantive content of a convictional position”,286 typically including 
“doctrines, theological categories and the investment of authority in figureheads such as the 
priesthood.” 287   Key to religious belief are “dualisms such as truth/falsity and 
orthodoxy/heresy.”288  With regard to religion as an identity, this relates to the creation and 
preservation of collective association.  Identity can overlap with ethnicity, nationalism, and 
family and cultural traditions.  It is often seen as being the primary source of prejudice and 
oppression of the religious.  With regard to religion as a way of life, this can be conveyed 
through clothing, food restrictions and segregation of communities in order to follow a 
particular belief.289  However religion is viewed, be it as a belief system, as an identity, or as a 
way of life, “it commonly functions by invoking an authority which is considered to be final 
… and transcendent.”290 
 
In relation to charity, whilst religion was not mentioned explicitly in the Preamble of the Statute 
of Elizabeth, it was evident that it came within the spirit and intendment of the Preamble.  This 
was because the relief of poverty and distress, which appeared to underpin numerous purposes 
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[N]o insignificant portion of the community consider what are termed spiritual necessities as 
not less imperatively calling for relief, and regard the relief of them not less than as a charitable 
purpose than the ministering to physical needs. 
 
These points, therefore, support assertions earlier in this chapter of the relevance of religion 
within charity, and thus society.  However, ‘religion’ per se has not been “wholly amenable to 
legal definition.”293 
 
Within charity law, ‘religion’ is generally construed liberally.  The primary case is the 
Australian High Court case of Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax, where 
Mason ACJ and Brennan J identified the following principles:294 
 
… the criteria of religion are twofold: first, belief in a supernatural Being, Thing, or Principle; 
and second, the acceptance of canons of conduct in order to give effect to that belief, though 
canons of conduct which offend against ordinary laws are outside the area of any immunity, 
privilege or right conferred on the grounds of religion.  Those criteria may vary in their 
comparative importance, and there may be a different intensity of belief or of acceptance of 
canons of conduct among religions or among the adherents to a religion. 
 
This definition was recognised in Australasia, although English courts have utilised slightly 
different definitions.  In Re South Place Ethical Society, Dillon J observed:295 
 
Religion, as I see it, is concerned with man's relations with God, and ethics are concerned with 
man's relations with man … It seems to me that two of the essential attributes of religion are 
faith and worship; faith in a god and worship of that god. 
 
Dillon J further defined ‘worship’ as:296 
  
… something which must have some at least of the following characteristics: submission to 
the object worshipped, veneration of that object, praise, thanksgiving, prayer or intercession. 
 
 
293 Kerry O’Halloran Religion, Charity and Human Rights (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014) at 10. 
294 Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax (1983) 154 CLR 120 at 136. 
295 Re South Place Ethical Society [1980] 1 WLR 1565 at 1571-1572. 
296 At 1572, citing R v Registrar General, Ex parte Segerdal [1970] 2 QB 697, [1970] 3 All ER 886 (CA) at 709 
and 892, which concerned the Church of Scientology. 
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The English charity law definition of religion, at that time, defended “a theistic concept of 
religion man's relation with God - and attributes it two essential attributes: faith in a god and 
worship of that god.”297  
 
Dillon J, in Re South Place Ethical, did offer “a clear, though doubtful response to possible 
critics”:298 
 
It is said that religion cannot be necessarily theist or dependent on belief in a god, a supernatural 
or supreme being, because Buddhism does not have any such belief … It may be that the 
answer in respect of Buddhism is to treat it as an exception, as Lord Denning MR did in his 
judgment in R v Registrar General, Ex parte Segerdal ... 
 
What the approaches of Australia and England illustrate is that the charitable model of religion 
is subject to varying interpretations, and England, at the time of the South Place Ethical 
decision, was most certainly restrictive.   
 
It presents a theistic conception and a number of essential elements--faith and worship--which 
are characteristic of traditional Western religions and are defined in accordance with the 
postulates of these religions. The clearest proof of this is that Buddhism, whose religious nature 
cannot possibly be disputed, is treated expressly as an exception.299 
 
This restrictive method of defining religion may, however, be a popular approach in the public 
eye.  I have already observed the often negative associations in relation to religion and the 
benefits it receives from its recognition at charity law.  Therefore, if courts are deemed as 
interpreting “religion” conservatively, the public may have confidence that any apparent 




297 Miguel Rodriguez Blanco “Religion and the law of charities” 2005 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 8(38) at 257. 
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299 At 258. 
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England was not alone in this conservative approach.  Canada appears to have “one of the 
narrowest understandings of religion”.300  The Canada Revenue Agency’s publication on the 
criteria for charitable status identifies three main characteristics for religion: “faith in a higher 
power, such as a God, Supreme Being, or Entity; worship or reverence; and a particular and 
comprehensive system of doctrines and observations.”301 
 
Consequently, in relation to the association between religion and society, such restrictive 
approaches may actually have gone some way towards reassuring society that religions are not 
being unduly advantaged through charity law at the expense of non-religious bodies.  The 
apparently rigorous criteria that such charitable bodies must meet may enable people to 
recognise the benefits to society that result from religious bodies being charitable.  
 
However, in relation to the notion of religion, the approaches of English and Canadian courts 
evidently contrast with those of the United States Supreme Court or the High Court of 
Australia, which provide broader characterisations.302  As a result, such diverging judicial 
approaches may, unfortunately, give rise to public concerns that religions are being treated 
disparately.  This may undermine religion’s position in society because the public might have 
limited confidence that courts would apply the required criteria rigorously in all circumstances.  
Indeed, there is no easy answer to this issue, because whilst the English courts did follow a 
restrictive interpretation of “religion”, it is apparent now that some changes have occurred 
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VII. England and Wales 
 
The Charity Commission for England and Wales has recognised the “promotion of religious 
harmony” as a new charitable purpose.  This is not necessarily limited to religions per se, rather 
it take account of “beliefs” that are recognised by the European Court of Human Rights.303  
This has now been consolidated in the Charities Act 2011, where a purpose may be charitable 
if it promotes “religious or racial harmony”.304  Further, the Act also provides a description of 
religion, although it is only partial:305 
 
… religion” includes— 
(i) a religion which involves belief in more than one god, and 
(ii) a religion which does not involve belief in a god. 
 
Its effect has been to remove uncertainty about whether the common law construct of religion 
excluded faiths with more than one god, such as Buddhism.  Consequently, the common law 
definition of religion is still operative, although it has been broadened, and this is reflected in 
two recent Registration Decisions of the Commission.  In the first one, the Gnostic Centre,306 
the Commission, relying on its own guidance, noted that the:307 
 
… characteristics of a religion for the purposes of charity law are: 
a. the belief system involves belief in a god (or gods) or goddess (or goddesses), or supreme 
being, or divine or transcendental being or entity or spiritual principle, which is the object or 
focus of the religion (referred to in this guidance as ‘supreme being or entity’); 
b. the belief system involves a relationship between the believer and the supreme being or 
entity by showing worship of, reverence for or veneration of the supreme being or entity; 
c. the belief system has a degree of cogency, cohesion, seriousness and importance; 
d. the belief system promotes an identifiable positive, beneficial, moral or ethical framework. 
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In 2010, the Druid Network for England and Wales 308  was successful in its registration 
application because it met the required criteria of religion that was detailed in the Gnostic 
Centre application; the Gnostic Centre failed to meet that criteria. 
 
The English Supreme Court also recently interpreted “religion” in the Places of Worship 
Registration Act 1855 as including “a spiritual or non-secular belief system, held by a group 
of adherents, which claims to explain mankind’s place in the universe and relationship with the 
infinite, and to teach its adherents how they are to live their lives … ”.309  Thus, England, along 
with Australia and New Zealand, 310  reflects a significantly broader approach to religion.  
Although England “continues to exclude belief systems that explain the universe solely in terms 
of the human senses and science.”311 
 
Such liberal developments may further undermine the status of religions within many 
democratic societies.  This is because liberalising the definitions may be interpreted as unduly 
favouring religions, at a time when religions are often negatively construed in the public mind.  
However, such critics may be heartened to note that whilst the definition of religion may be 
broadening, there are checks and balances available to courts to ensure that religions seeking 
charitable status can be struck down, even if they advance the religion satisfactorily.  For 
instance, the Australian High Court stated that “canons or conduct which offend against the 
ordinary laws are outside the area of any immunity, privilege or right conferred on the ground 
of religion.” 312   In other words, the Court explicitly noted that if a “religion has such 
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Whilst England does not express such limitations so explicitly, Thornton v Howe confirmed 
that religions must not offend public morality.314  Thus, whilst an organisation may meet the 
religious requirements, if it engages in illegal activities, or activities that offend a societal 
ethical conventions, which might include dangerous psychological techniques, or children 
being involved in sexual acts, it will be unlikely to meet the public benefit requirement and 
may be struck out. 315  Consequently, the public may have some confidence that religious 
charities are still subject to stringent legal criteria, regardless of the evolution of the 
characterisation of religion itself. 
 
On a more general level, there may be an argument which would resolve public confidence 
issues in relation to religion.  That being that there should be a standard legal approach to 
religion, where the standard definition should apply to all religions.  This appears to be a logical 
approach, but there may be policy reasons to support fluctuating definitions of religion within 
democratic societies.  For example, much United States case law on the denotation of religion 
derives from constitutional first amendment cases that are related to individual rights.  As a 
result, the meaning of religion has merited from a broad construction,316 which reflects the 
desire of a state to ensure various freedoms, including religion.   
 
Further, there is an argument that the definition of religion should be subject to variation when 
considering the motive of the religious gift.  For example, more leeway could be demonstrated 
in situations where donations for apparent pious purposes are based on the donor’s intention, 
as opposed to trying to obtain relief on tax or rating.317  This is justified because:318 
 
Legal definitions … do not describe an objective reality but form a part of the normative 
language in which the legally protected values are cast.  The specific purpose of any given rule 
is best captured by describing the special problem that the rule [is] intended to attack: if a 
refinement of an accepted meaning of a particular word or a phrase will help us tailor the rule 
 
 
314 At 291, referring to Thornton v Howe (1862) 31 Beavan 14. 
315 Gino Dal Pont “Charity law and religion” in Peter Radan et al (eds) Law and Religion: God, the State and the 
Common Law (Routledge, Abingdon, 2005) at 217, referring to Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-
roll Tax (1983) 154 CLR 120; Church of Scientology of California v Kaufman [1973] RPC 635; and MP Battin 
Ethics in the Sanctuary (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1990) at chapter 2. 
316 Dal Pont, above n 315, at 207-208. 
317 At 208. 
318 At 208, citing W Sadurski “On legal definitions of ‘religion’” 1989 Australian Law Journal 63 at 842-843. 
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better to attack this evil, then this refined meaning should be adopted [so] there is nothing odd 
or improper in reading the same word differently in two different [cases]. 
 
Moreover, ensuring that there is a possibility of interpreting religion which is dependent upon 
the particulars of a case would address the apparent problem of Western religious bias against 
non-Christian faiths.  This stems from the idea that the denotation of religion in common law 
states evolved within a largely Christian Protestant context, which has strong distinctions 
between religion and the secular, which is not so prevalent in non-Western cultures.  This 
means that in contemporary multi-faith, multi-cultural Western countries, charity law should 
recognise non-Western standards of religion to benefit all communities.319 This would support 
the evolving definitions of religion.  Favouring a benignant construction of religion for 
charitable purposes underpins Hammond J’s (as he was) astute remarks in Re Collier 
(deceased) for valid policy reasons:320 
 
Charitable bodies have always been distinctly important in socio-economic terms. Charities 
were a creature of Tudor/Stuart philosophy, and owed their origins to a Christian-ethic system 
of equity.  But, the voluntary sector could go no real distance to meeting the needs of the poor, 
the sick, and the oppressed, and other needs, in heavily industrialised societies.  Welfare 
systems evolved … In contemporary circumstances, charities often tackle what a conservative 
bureaucracy or state will not.  They are often innovative.  And, in some jurisdictions, charities 
have even become delivery vehicles for state programmes. 
 
As noted earlier, religious bodies can be found in a multitude of organisations, not just, for 
instance, in churches and mosques, but in schools, hospitals and aid agencies.  Therefore, 
religious charities carry out a wide variety of supportive functions in many communities.  
Favouring broad religious definitions in a charity law framework is more likely to have 
constructive effects overall on communities as a result of the positive activities of the religious 
organisation.  Therefore, there are sound policy reasons to support Hammond J’s construction 
of charity, particularly in relation to the advancement of religion. 
 
 
319 At 207, referring to E Penalver “The Concept of Religion” 1997 Yale Law Journal 10 at 812 and 812; Western 
bias is reflected in Yeap Cheah Neo v Ong Cheng Neo (1875) LR 6 PC 381; see also later chapters for discussions 
on non-Western religions; see also generally Juliet Chevalier-Watts Charity Law International Perspectives 
(Routledge, Abingdon, 2018). 
320 Re Collier (deceased) [1998] 1 NZLR 81 (HC) at 95; see also chapter 7 for further discussions on the doctrine 
of benignant construction. 
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Additional answers to questions as to the benefits to society of liberalising the definition of 
religion may also be found when I consider notions of secularism, to which this chapter turns 
shortly, and indeed, when I consider, in the section following that, the relationship between 
religion and the law.  However, before I consider these matters, it should also be noted that in 
addition to a charity’s religion being recognised at law, a body must also advance religion, 
which I now address.   
 
VIII. Advancing Religion 
 
This will be legally understood within the construct of common law charities if it comprises 
“the promotion of spiritual teaching in a wide sense, and the maintenance of the doctrines in 
which it rests, and the observances that serve to promote and manifest it.”321  The Canadian 
Federal Court of Appeal noted that in relation to furthering religion, a charity’s focus should 
be “positive” and “targeted”; it is insufficient that the charity merely enables pious beliefs to 
be followed.322   
 
Therefore, for a body to be recognised at charity law as advancing religion, not only must the 
religion itself be recognised, but the body must also advance that religion in a legally-
understood way.  This provides courts with an opportunity to ensure that religious bodies are 
undertaking their religious duties appropriately such that they benefit the public, and therefore 
provides evidence that checks and balances are in place.  Such checks and balances provide 
certainty for society that religions carrying out charitable acts have met a rigorous legal 
criterion.   
 
However, not all case law, prima facie, reflects such a stringently regulated approach.  For 
instance, in the New Zealand High Court case Liberty Trust v Charities Commission,323 the 
 
 
321 Kathryn Chan “Advancement of Religion in an Age of Religious Neutrality” 2017 Oxford Journal of Law and 
Religion 6 at 116, citing Keren Kayemeth Le Jisroel Ltd v IRC [1931] 2 KB 465 (CA). 
322 At 116, referring to and citing Fuaran Foundation v Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (2004) FCA 181 
at [15]. 
323 Liberty Trust v Charities Commission [2011] 3 NZLR68 (HC); see also chapter 7 for additional discussion on 
Liberty Trust. 
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Court adopted what might be considered a liberal understanding of the advancement of 
religion.   
 
One of the Trust’s core activities included acting as a mortgage lending scheme.  It did this by 
offering interest-free loans.  Liberty Trust stated that this scheme advanced religion by 
expounding Biblical financial ideologies.  It is acknowledged, that on the evidence presented, 
there was no issue with this type of activity advancing religion because these principles being 
taught “are an aspect of Christian Faith as expounded by Liberty Trust.”324  It is asserted, 
however, that the issue that arises is in relation to public benefit.  Generally speaking, it will 
be presumed that purposes that advance religion will afford public benefit. Therefore, whilst 
the presumption for a court is that a purpose will satisfy the public benefit criteria, “it remains 
for the court to be satisfied that the gift satisfies the public benefit requirement.”325 
 
In considering whether or not Liberty Trust’s scheme did confer public benefit, the Charities 
Commission (as it was), relying on Re the Grand Lodge of Antient Free and Accepted Masons 
in New Zealand, submitted:326 
 
Liberty Trust’s scheme is simply “edification by example” which does not meet the public 
benefit test. The [Commission] submits that this is because the scheme principally confers 
private benefits whereas, to be a charitable purpose, any private benefit must be ancillary to 
the wider charitable purpose. The [Commission] submits that any wider community benefit 
from a mortgage scheme, not based on need, but based on religious financial principles is too 
remote. 
 
Mallon J disregarded the significance of the Grand Lodge case, stating that “a difference 
between that case and the position here is that Liberty Trust’s edifying example is directly 
 
 
324 Liberty Trust, at [69]. 
325 At [100]; see also Juliet Chevalier-Watts “Trusts for Religious Purposes” [2010] NZLJ 55 at 56; Juliet 
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Charities Act 2006, s 3, has now removed the presumption of public benefit for all heads of charity, which includes 
the advancement of religion. 
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linked to the Christian faith.”327  Further, her Honour observed that “private benefit is part and 
parcel of Christian living”.328  
 
Liberty Trust desired that the beneficiaries of the loan should be able to live without financial 
liability in order to spread the Bible’s message.  Mallon J asserted that she found it "difficult 
to distinguish [the scheme] from a mass in a Church which is open to the public".329  This 
meant that, in her Honour’s view, Liberty Trust’s scheme enabled loanees to "lead a Christian 
life free of the burdens of debt".330  
 
Certainly, it might be argued, as I have done previously, that “[t]he focus … is on the adherents 
first and foremost, which should theoretically rebut the presumption of public benefit because 
it appears too remote;”331 I have not been alone in such criticism.332  Consequently, this case 
may do little to reassure the public that, in some circumstances, religious activities may be 
subject to a generous interpretation.  As a result, it could be argued that such a generous 
interpretation of public benefit may lead to an extension of this legal principle, which may, 
consequently, lead to the opening of the floodgates with future cases.   
 
However, in answer to this, and reflecting an evolution of my earlier published propositions, 
what this case does do is implicitly acknowledge religion’s inherent position within society. 
Indeed, it respects Hammond J’s aforementioned benignant construction of charity.  If Mallon 
J had not found public benefit in this case, this would signal a rejection of the relevance of 
religion in a contemporary setting, with a downstream effect of reducing the importance of 
religion in the charitable sector.  Therefore, I contend that Liberty Trust is a useful case in 
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It was noted earlier that secularism may have a role to play in undermining charitable acts 
associated with religion.  Therefore, to explore such assertions, I turn to what is meant by 
secularism and its possible impacts on the charity narrative.  It should be noted, however, that 
it is only possible to consider a brief foray in to this topic because secularism is a complex 
concept, and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider it in more detail other than to 
provide some basic principles that provide a framework for the narrative of this thesis.  
However, it was still considered pertinent to address this topic within this chapter because of 
the assertion earlier in the thesis that many common law countries are becoming increasingly 
secular, and thus it may be that secularism may have an impact on the reconciliation of the 
advancement of religion generally. 
 
 
IX. Secularism  
 
Early leading sociologists, including Comte, Marx, Weber and Durkheim, observed a 
weakening significance of religion with regard to social institutions and the lives of individuals.  
Comte argued that history had arrived whereby empirical and scientific thinking would replace 
theology and metaphysics.  He celebrated the death of religion as he saw sociologists as the 
shapers of the secular future of society.333  Thus, sociology was in opposition to theology.  
Marx, who was militantly anti-religion, called for the eradication of religion because it was the 
“opium of the people” which caused a massive obstruction of genuine class consciousness.  
Ironically, however, Marx also recognised the benefit of religion within society, observing 
“that religion … is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it 
is the spirit of spiritless situation.”334   
 
Marx’s generally less than sympathetic stance was recognised in the works of Weber and 
Durkheim. Weber believed that the transcendence of religion no longer had a role in the process 
of modernisation.  This was because the “intensification of instrumentality and bureaucracy as 
 
 
333 Jayeel Serrano Cornelio “Is Religion Dying?  Secularization and Other Religious Trends in the World Today” 
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the guiding principle of social life could only mean that the space for aesthetics, emotions, and 
the subjective is shrinking.”335 
 
Durkheim did recognise that religion underpinned societal cohesion but as society became 
more complex, religion’s influence over different institutions of society would be expected to 
wane.  His focus turned to the moral force of religion, which was only found in the collective.  
His concern was that as religion declined, this necessitated the decline of the collective, 
“leaving the individual to the personal and the subjective.”336  
 
Such views, however, appear to have been unfounded.  The ascendance of secularism appeared 
to have been limited to only a minority of European societies, and political secularism, whereby 
the state and religion are separated, “was jolted with the establishment of the first modern 
theocracy in Khomeini’s Iran.”337 Shortly after that, other religious uprisings occurred in the 
public domain, in states including Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Turkey, Afghanistan, and 
Pakistan.  One might argue that these were generally Islamic states, thus secularism did not 
impact on those states with that religious bent.  However, the movement against secularism 
was not just restricted to such states.  For example, Sri Lankan Singhalese Buddhist 
nationalists; Indian Hindu nationalists; and Israeli religious ultra-orthodoxy did not recognise 
the separation of state from religion and symptomised a crisis of secularism.338   
 
Further, secularism is being challenged in Western democratic states, suggesting that religion 
is just as important now in contemporary democratic states as it may have been historically. 
For example, Protestant fundamentalism is increasing within the United States, and in addition, 
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in a number of European states, migrant workers and intensified globalisation have shed the 
shackles of marginalised religion, creating a rich religious diversity.339 
 
How, though, should secularism be understood?  Broadly speaking,340 
 
The best way to understand … is to see it in opposition to religious hegemony, religious 
tyranny and religious and religion-based exclusion.  The goal of secularism…is to ensure that 
the social and political order is free from institutionalized religious domination so that there is 
religious freedom, freedom to exit from religion, inter-religious equality and quality between 
believers and non-believers. 
 
However, regardless of the secular movement, religion’s impact can be felt in many socio-
political international Western arenas.  It is a multifaceted-phenomena that influences many 
levels of politics and society, including international relations, where for instance, religion can 
motivate policymakers’ decisions.  It has been argued that “state leaders and decision makers 
can ascribe meanings to reality by assessing foreign policy through their religious lenses.”341 
Therefore, even though it has been asserted that secularism is a rising phenomenon, the reality 
is that religion can influence how contemporary policymakers “identify causes of global 
problems, allies, enemies”,342 as well as how they are able to assess national interests, thus 
demonstrating the profundity of religion within politics in democratic societies. 
 
In addition, religion can also add legitimacy to governments, as well as to particular 
government policies.  For example, a number of United States presidents have utilised religious 
imagery to legitimise foreign policies.  Jimmy Carter used conciliatory religious discourse to 
bring different world views to the table in the context of Middle East peace talks.  Ronald 
Reagan referred to the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as an “evil empire”, and 
George W Bush frequently utilised religious imagery to justify the wars on Iraq and against 
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terror.343  It appears that the current President, Donald Trump, is also no stranger to the use of 
such religious weaponry to invoke fear of Islam.  
 
Therefore, whilst secularism maybe a recognised movement, its actual influence, socially and 
politically, may be limited in reality.  As a result, I assert that this is important to acknowledge 
because it adds weight to my overall argument that religion is an ever-present influence as a 
result of religion’s fundamental influence on society and individuals.  For instance, whilst a 
particular democratic state might be considered secular, such as Australia, in reality, religious 
influences may still strongly be felt in entities such as hospitals and schools.  Thus, one could 
argue that there is no bright line separation of state from religion. This may be positive for 
societies generally, especially in relation to religion and charity.  There is argument, in the 
context of religious charities, that “in essence, what makes religion ‘good’ from a societal point 
of view is that it makes us want to become better – it makes people become better members of 
society.”344  A secular view may, mistakenly, diminish the influence of religion to the particular 
understanding of a person, as opposed to acknowledging its broad societal contributions 
through a variety of vehicles.  Consequently, it may be that supporting a strongly secular policy 
may have adverse consequences for charities.  This is because religious charities support a 
variety of communities and consequently reduce pressure on governments to undertake such 
social welfare.  As I asserted earlier in this thesis, charity is vital within many societies, 
democratic or otherwise, and a key charitable principle is the advancement of religion.  To 
disfavour the advancement of religion through the promotion of secularism risks undermining 
the fundamental relevance of religion within charity, and thus societies.  I have demonstrated 
throughout this thesis that the advancement of religion is reconcilable through its socio-legal 
contexts and thus secularisation, whilst perhaps not a key concern for religious charities per se, 
may have some negative consequences for the charity sector if the position of secularism is 
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As a further point, and one that I make because it may be a subset of the issue of secularisation 
in relation to religion and charity, secularisation may impact negatively on phenomena such as 
cultural defence and cultural transition.  As has already been observed in this chapter, the 
construct of identity may be of real importance within religion within identity, and thus 
communities.  This is particularly of relevance when a religion is attacked, or a community is 
facing hostile force.  For example, religion was said to form part of a defensive shield against 
English domination in parts of Ireland, Scotland and Wales.  Similarly, in Northern Ireland, 
Presbyterian and Catholic identities supported the separated communities in the face of historic 
hostilities.  Such arguments can also be utilised to explain the high rates of religion in Poland 
and Lithuania in relation to Russian domination.345  Therefore, religion in communities offers 
defences to apparent or perceived threats from outside influences, drawing communities closer 
and providing comfort and belonging.  It might be argued that growing secularisation may 
undermine religious identity and if that is so, then the ability of religious charities to operate 
effectively within communities may also be impacted.  This is because there may be lessening 
numbers of donor and volunteers for such charities, as well as less government support, when 
in reality, those communities that feel threatened by conflict or hostilities may need to rely 
more substantively on the support of their religious community support during these stressful 
times.  Secularisation, therefore, may be a deleterious construct for communities in need. 
 
The same theory can be applied with regard to cultural transition, where religion may offer 
means for group mobilisation, as well as imparting some sense of belonging, especially in 
situations where societies may view such groups indifferently or with hostility.  I already 
outlined the importance of religious groups for Hong Kong settlers because of the failing of 
the colonial government to provide support to its immigrant communities.  Religious groups, 
with their strong Chinese cultural traditions, provided much needed assistance and resources,346 
thus communities were supported, and flourished, as a result of the strong religious 
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foundations.  Therefore, any growing trend of secularisation may be detrimental to many 
communities because this may undermine the close community networks and support provided 
by religion and charity.  In the global communities that are evident in so many states, the mental 
and physical wellbeing of citizens is paramount for healthy and functioning states.  Religious 
charities can and do continue to support such functions for the benefit of the state.  
Consequently, any diminishing impact of religion, and thus religious charities, may have an 
overall deleterious effect.  However, such discussions are merely a point of note because the 
construct of secularism is a broad one and beyond the scope of this thesis generally.  However, 
it was worthwhile mentioning these key points because if one discusses religion generally, then 
it would be disingenuous not to mention the place of secularism within society also. 
 
I turn now to consider the relationship between law and religion, and in addressing such 
matters, I consider how the law and charity law may legitimise the value of the advancement 
of religion as part of the overall inquiry in to the reconciliation of the advancement of religion. 
 
X. Relationship between Law and Religion 
 
It has been asserted that “the ultimate source of law is God, or some God”347 analogy, and is 
explained as follows:348 
 
Law is in every culture religious in origin.  Because law governs man and society, because it 
establishes and declares the meaning of justice and righteousness, law is inescapably religious 
in that it establishes in practical fashion the ultimate concerns of a culture … Second, it must 
be recognized that in any culture the source of law is the god of that society.  If law has its 
source in man’s reason, then reason is the god of that society.  If the source is oligarchy or in a 
court, senate, or ruler, then that is the god of that system … Modern humanism the religion of 
the state, locates law in the state and thus makes the state, or the people, as they find expression 
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Historically, law and religion were unified, therefore finding the religious legal source was 
unnecessary.  In some cultures, even today, this is still evident.  For instance, for Muslims, 
Shari’a is the “divinely ordained guide for law, religion, hygiene … and all of life.” 349  
However in Western contemporary democratic states, it has been traditional to distinguish law 
and religion, and church and the state, although this has not been without its critics.  Lord 
Denning lamented that “without religion, there can be no morality, there can be no law,”350 
although many would likely disagree with such sentiment. 
 
Regardless, however, of the Western tendency to distinguish law and religion, it is asserted that 
law and religion are actually closely linked and, indeed, interdependent:351 
 
Every legal system shares with religion certain elements – ritual, tradition, authority, and 
universality – which are needed to symbolize and educate men’s legal emotions.  Otherwise 
law generates into legalism.  Similarly, every religion has within it legal elements, without 
which it degenerates into private religiosity. 
 
There has undoubtedly been a shift in the role of democratic governments in religion 
throughout the centuries.  Historically, as religion played a significant role in everyday life via 
poor relief, education, and family life, so governments’ roles were fairly limited.  However, it 
is argued that even though religion has become increasingly a private concern, governments 
now play a considerable role in controlling religion.  This is evidenced in the control of 
religious communities; what religious dress may be worn in public; restrictions on the 
behaviour of the ordained; and the size and design of religious buildings in particular localities.  
All these interferences are governed by law or policy.352  Thus, what “religious organizations 
and adherents do is increasingly an issue of regulatory control.”353   
 
Conversely, whilst many democratic states are increasingly concerned with the control of 
religion, protecting international freedoms of religion and belief has had a long history.  Since 
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the 16th century, “there has been a need for international arrangements concerning religion and 
belief in Western Europe.”354  Early arrangements concentrated on the way in which authorities 
dealt with various Christian belief systems and regulated Church and state relations; The Peace 
of Augsburg 1555 and the Treaty of Westphalia 1648 are such examples.  After the French 
Revolution, fundamental freedoms were recognised for individuals, including the freedom of 
religion.  Later recognition of religious freedoms for individuals came about, for example, in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 and the European Convention on Human 
Rights, both guaranteeing religious freedom.355   
 
Religious liberty, however, requires autonomy or self-governance 356  through self-
determination and self-regulation, as well as passive non-interference from government or the 
courts.357  Such autonomy may exacerbate public concerns as to the activities of some religious 
groups as a result of such lack of state intervention.  However, as mentioned earlier, Western 
government intervention in religion is evident in modern day life, and this is certainly the case 
with regard to legally-recognised charities in many jurisdictions. Although this “degree of 
control exercised by the state over religious groups through charity law will wax and wane 
according to the relative strengths of the two parties to this symbiotic relationship.”358   
 
This is evidenced in the differing approach of the courts in relation to religion throughout the 
years.  In Joyce v Ashfield Municipal Council,359 the question for the Court was whether the 
Exclusive Brethren’s religious services provided sufficient public benefit, because public 
access to these services was restricted.  The Court took a generous view and determined that 
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The House of Lords, however, in Gallagher v Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints360 
took a more conservative approach.  Lord Scott noted that religions, whilst being beneficial, 
can be divisive, and that secrecy within religious practices breeds suspicions and prejudices.  
Conversely, openness in such practices will have the opposite effect.361  
 
It has been asserted that such differences in views may be a reflection of society’s mood at the 
time.  For instance, the Gallagher case was heard after the 2005 London bombings, when 
religious tensions were riding high.  State security controls increased dramatically, and this 
included control over religious organisations, including courts’ willingness to discourage 
private religious activities.362  Further, the Charity Commission for England and Wales has 
adopted a more progressively counter-terrorist function, as evidenced in the Commission’s role 
in the activities of the North London Central Mosque.  The Commission had concerns that the 
Mosque Trust was infiltrated by Islamic fundamentalists resulting in non-adherence to the 
Trust’s recognised charitable purposes.  As a result, the Commission immobilized the Trust’s 
bank accounts and removed Sheikh Abu Hamza Al-Masri, who was said to be a radical cleric, 
as well as closing the mosque for a period of time.363 
 
Notwithstanding levels of state control being exerted, I assert that a certain level of control is 
actually beneficial with regard to the connection between religion and the public.  In other 
words, the controls imposed by democratic governments on religious charities simply serve to 
promote the benefits of religion in communities.  In turn, such control provides legitimacy for 
the operation of religion within charity.  Therefore, I contend that charity law is a method by 
which a democratic common law state may manage its relationship with religion and religious 
entities.  When a state determines that a religious group provides benefit to the public through 
its legal mechanisms, then the state will cede privileges to that religious group.  In return, the 
religious group will ensure that its purposes comply with the state’s legal requirements in order 
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Consequently, democratic state control is “legitimate in principle because it accords with the 
rationale of charity law, which is to facilitate activities that the state determines are beneficial 
to society as a whole.”365  This means that rather than a state acknowledging a religion as 
delivering a public benefit in line with its own religious principles and raison d’etre in 
accordance with a state’s provisions, instead religions might be seen as being “within the 
embrace of the state”. 366  Thus they are subject to the state’s values and agendas. 367  One 
interesting illustration is evidenced in the notion that Roman Catholic adoption and fostering 
agencies should ensure that their policies do not discriminate against same-sex couples.368 
 
As a result, the advancement of religion, through charity law, can continue to benefit society 
and provide public confidence that the relevant checks and balances are established, which 





There is evidence “of a creeping polarisation, within and between some contemporary 
societies, on faith-based differences.”369  Religion’s political relevance has increased following 
on from the fateful 9/11 attacks, “drawing in more countries and ratcheting up the tension 
between some elements of Islam and some nations of the Judeo-Christian tradition.” 370  
Consequently, there are only a small number of Western societies do not have some form of 
divide between those holding conservative religious beliefs and those whose views differ 
fundamentally.  Therefore, I observe that the ancient roots of religion have continued their 
stronghold even today, reflecting the longevity and fundamental importance of religion, even 
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However, there is now a pressing need for dialogue between differing factions and it is possible 
that it is charity’s deep-seated relationship with religion that may provide a much-needed olive 
branch.  Not least because religion continues to have, as it has for millennia, a valuable role in 
supporting society, not only in finding one’s place in the universe, but also in alleviating 
suffering in a myriad of ways, some ethereal, some more concrete.371  The consequence of 
losing the advancement of religion as a head of charity has serious implications for societies 
because of the reliance on religious activities that support so many communities.  The law, 
consequently, gives legitimacy to beneficial religious activities through charity regulations. 
 
Clearly, charitable acts can and do occur without religious overtones.  However, I have 
demonstrated that charity’s very essence finds its history in religion, and such engrained history 
continues to permeate cultures and communities.  Consequently, religion’s continued influence 
within charitable acts and its role in society are still felt keenly, even in allegedly more secular 
societies. 
 
Whilst religious traditions encourage the transfer of material wealth for possibly self-serving 
reasons, it is not for a court or a state to evaluate the truth or reality of such sentiments. Rather, 
it is evident that religions can and do support the public through charitable norms in a measured 
and regular way thus justifying the special treatment given to religion within charity law.  
Consequently, I argue that the advancement of religion should continue to be protected by legal 
frameworks, as recognised in many commonwealth states, because through the advancement 
of religion, charitable activities are “widely regarded as a valuable component of civil society, 
and such activity should be facilitated.”372   
 
This chapter, therefore, was an important one in relation to the reconciliation of the 
advancement of religion because it set out the complex and continuing social and legal 
connections between charity, law, religion and society, reflecting the key interrelationship 
between all these constructs.  In doing so I demonstrated the function of the advancement of 
religion within its socio-legal foundations through the correlation between law, society and 
religion.  As a result, I critically assessed how embedded religion, and thus religion within 
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charity, is within our social frameworks.  Consequently, this chapter began the reconciliation 
of the advancement of religion assertions and provided the context for discussions presented in 
the following chapters.  The next chapter is a critical examination of the rule of law, which 





Chapter 4. Rule of Law 
 
 
No examination of charity law would be complete without attention being given to charity and 
religion and their relationship with the rule of law.  I assert that this chapter is vital in assisting 
in my inquiry as to the reconciliation of the advancement of religion because it aids in 
reconciling this charitable purpose by embedding the construct of religion and charity within 
the socio-political and legal contexts of the rule of law.  In order to do this, I address the 
relationship between the rule of law and religion and confirm that there is a nexus between a 
strong rule of law, as might be acknowledged in a democratic society, and political and socially 
stable democratic states.  Therefore, I assert that the rule of law is an important facet in the 
reconciliation of the advancement of religion because of the strong correlation between the rule 
of law, charity law and thus the advancement of religion.   
 
As a result, the concepts addressed in this chapter underpin numerous themes considered 
throughout the thesis, thus the fundamental significance of the rule of law within charity law, 
and specifically the advancement of religion, will be explored.  Such themes include comparing 
law and religion as normative structures, and the role and importance of religion within law, 
including the resolving of religious conflicts.  I look to determine the role of the rule of law 
within charity law and its impact on charity and religion.  Consequently, this chapter provides 
a key legal framework that underpins the continued role of the advancement of religion in the 
charity narrative, and aids in reconciling this charitable purpose because it can be understood 
from this particular socio-legal perspective. 
 
I. Introduction to the Rule of Law 
 
To begin these discussions, it is pertinent to clarify the meaning of the rule of law and its place 
in democratic society generally. This provides a context for the later discussions pertaining to 
the rule of law, religion and thus charity. 
 
Much has been written in relation to the doctrines of the rule of law throughout the decades.  I 
seek not to challenge such writings, and nor to set out an exhaustive examination of the key 
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writings.  Instead, I focus on some established principles of the rule of law and how they relate 
to religion and thus to charity law.  Put simply, the rule of law may be seen as representing the 
core values of supremacy of law over arbitrary state powers, thus all are equal before the law.373   
 
A number of socially-divergent opinions regarding the rule of law date from thousands of years 
ago.  For instance, 2,500 years ago Greece sentenced Socrates to death for, inter alia, heresy.  
It is said that Socrates preferred to remain in prison because he asserted if he escaped, this 
would subvert the stability of state because he had broken the agreement between himself and 
the laws of the state.  Thus, Socrates illustrated the importance of the rule of law in maintaining 
good social order.  In contrast, at a similar time in China, Confucius denigrated the rule of law.  
In his view it was not justice but, “righteousness and social harmony based on role obligations 
[that were] the symbol for the ideal society.” 374   
 
In contemporary times, many democratic states have implemented institutional changes that 
endeavour to reduce corruption and to strengthen the rule of law.  This demonstrates the innate 
relevance of the rule of law in relation to a politically and socially stable democratic state.  
Thus, the rule of law, democratic culpability, and the reduction of corruption are part of the 
societal models belonging to the “norms of governance.” 375   Such norms are considered 
necessary methods of exercising politico-economic power. 376   Governance is crucial in 
controlling socially unacceptable individual or group wielding of power.  Consequently, the 
rule of law is one of the societal constructs of authority that prescribes proper methods of rule.  
The rule of law limits individual freedom to utilise authority such as the law prescribes.377   
 
In relation to the object of this thesis inquiry, that of the reconciliation of the advancement of 
religion, as this thesis sets out, charity law has prescribed rules, and the advancement of 
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With regard to the definition of the rule of law, in the Western legal philosophical viewpoint 
“is forever associated”378 with the jurist AV Dicey:379 
 
… rule of law is a characteristic of the English constitution, we generally include under one 
expression at least three distinct though kindred conceptions.  We mean, in the first place, that 
no man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct 
breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of the land 
… 
We mean in the second place … not only that with us no man is above the law, but (what is a 
different thing) that here every man whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary 
law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals … 
… There remains yet a third and different sense … We may say that the constitution is 
pervaded by the rule of law on the ground that the general principles of the constitution (as for 
example the right to personal liberty, or the right of public meeting) are with us the result of 
judicial decisions determining the rights of private persons in particular cases brought before 
the courts; whereas under many foreign constitutions the security (such as it is) given to the 
rights of individuals results, or appears to result, from the general principles of the constitution. 
 
Whilst the rule of law may be “forever associated” with Dicey, it is also “subject to various 
definitional and normative disputes”. 380   Seung-Whan Choi asserts that there “should be 
present in most democratic societies with a high-quality rule of law: (1) fair, impartial, and 
effective judicial systems and (2) a nonarbitrary basis according to which laws and the legal 
system as a whole can be viewed as legitimate.”381   
 
Further to this, Joseph Raz argued that a “fair and impartial judicial systems require at least an 
independent judiciary branch with fair-minded judges, prosecutors and lawyers, as well as 
strong and stable law enforcement or police”.382  Institutionalising such a judicial mechanism 
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indicates a state’s acknowledgement that everyone is equal before the law, and that they should 
be able have their disputes heard and reconciled in court.383   
 
Choi further asserted that only when just and autonomous judicial organisations are 
institutionalised will people have faith in legal standards, and legal and constitutional practices, 
amongst other matters.  Thus, when such practices have been established, individuals will tend 
to follow relevant legal practice to settle disputes, as opposed to turning to violent means 
resolve disputes.  Therefore, when people have confidence in a state’s institutes of law they are 
more willing to bring their disputes to those institutes for resolution.  Consequently, confidence 
in such institutes results in a recognisable stability for socio-political relationships.384   
 
The rule of law, therefore “encompasses broad societal respect for and protection of legal 
entitlements including ownership in tangible and intangible property (contractual rights, 
patents, etc.) and, equally important, personal safety from crime”.385  Further, the rule of law 
safeguards the benefits and obligations of democratically-made laws for citizens, as well as 
state establishments.386 As a result, it can be said that the rule of law brings certainty and trust 
for citizens, and underpins a peaceful and ordered state.   
 
In the converse, a lack of rule of law is often the hallmark of a government that is likely subject 
to international condemnation, where genocide, ethnic cleansing and waging of aggressive 
wars are all too familiar;387 these are not likely to be democratic states.  Consequently, where 
the dignity of individuals is compromised, be that through arbitrary application of rules or 
unjust decisions – in other words, social injustices at the hands of the state388 – social and 
political norms break down.  The rule of law is therefore intended to protect citizens from such 
injustices and is pivotal in creating and promoting social justice.  As Tom Bingham noted, 
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rather than living “in a regime which flouts the rule of law … [it is] “[b]etter to put up with 
some choleric judges and greedy lawyers.”389   
 
II. Religion and Law 
 
As part of the reconciliation of the advancement of religion, it is now relevant to consider the 
relationship with religion and law, and thus its connection with the rule of law, in order to 
embed my assertions within their socio-legal contexts. 
 
Over the years religion has adopted a progressively more discernible position in public matters, 
be that positive or negative visibility, and every state has adopted some position towards 
religion and its citizens.390  Some democratic states have adopted a non-secular stance and 
others have adopted a more non-religious system.  Within those non-religious states are variety 
of regimes, ranging from a strong commitment to secularism, to more accommodating regimes 
that commit to a state’s neutral stance whilst at the same time engaging in religious 
collaboration.  The rule of law is an important element within the constitutional and legal norms 
of each regime.391  
 
Law and religion can be viewed as societal occurrences and because they coexist, they interact 
with one another.392  Indeed, law and religion have enough similarities so as warrant some well-
thought through comparisons.  Such compatibility may explain, in part, the close links between 
law and religion across the ages, and their comparisons highlight “common discursive 
structures[s] underlying both legal and religious discourses.”393 
 
Both law and religion are standardising constructs that regulate many societies.  Law and 
religion interpret certain writings, and those writings may be upheld as being true and must be 
adhered to.  Both law and religion purport to promote order and peace, but both structures carry 
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with them the potential to bring violence to protect or defend each structure, and as such may 
result in civil or world wars, or religious wars.   
 
The accepted constructs of law and religion function in two ways.  Firstly, in society, where 
they provide some community mandate, and second, to the individual, where people are 
granted certain societal significance and standing.  A religion can provide communal faith, as 
well as individual salvation.  Constitutionalism forms a communal state, as well as defining the 
rights, obligations and civic identity of individuals within that state.394  Further, particular 
principles are the ruling codes and creeds of a society, and as such legal communities require 
legal principles much as religious communities require religious principles.  Such doctrines are 
“elucidated systematically and presented thematically.”395  Thus, what is evident is “that legal 
and religious discourses are constituted by a circumincession of text, doctrine and tradition.”396 
This in turn reflects a reciprocal relationship between each other. 
 
Religion can be important for law for a number of reasons, for example, with regard to political, 
marital or sexual practices.  Thus, a law enforcement agent can give proper consideration to 
the context of a particular situation, and the law is enriched and developed.  However, there 
are also some notable issues caused to law by religion.  It has been argued that “liberalism was 
born as a solution to the problem of religious pluralism”,397 therefore a liberal legal state might 
be confronted by a number of issues connected to religion.  These can be triggered by 
renouncing authority over non-secular matters, alongside the requirement to maintain more 
authority overall.398  I can utilise charity law to illustrate this, which assists in embedding these 
assertions within the object of my inquiry, that of the reconciliation of the advancement of 
religion. 
 
In early English charity law, states developed the rule that a charitable trust that supported 
superstitious use, in other words false religious purpose, such as Judaism or Catholicism, would 
be void.  This was because states had categorised religion in a specific way, therefore 
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heathenism (as Catholicism and Judaism were deemed at the time) was not recognised as 
falling within a state’s recognition of specific religious doctrines.  As a result:399 
 
When religion is equated with a particular religious faith, whose doctrines can be expounded 
by an authoritative organisation, or derived from an authoritative textual source, the courts can 
determine religious issues by making use of the discipline of that single religion. This may not 
only involve disputes concerning religion, but also the proper way to deal with other religious 
systems. 
 
It should be made clear that the legal systems mentioned above have moved on from this 
position.  Consequently, the English charity law position, as with Australia, New Zealand and 
Canada, as examples, have established that the advancement of religion is no longer restricted 
to the Church of England.  Non-Anglican denominations have been accepted, as have, inter 
alia, Judaism, Buddhism, Islam, Hinduism and Druidism.400 
 
Therefore, many democratic states now recognise multiple religions existing for charity law 
purposes, and courts also remain neutral as to the different religions.401  However, such a stance 
can lead to issues when a court is faced with a religious assertion, and the veracity of that claim 
must be made by that Court.  Such an issue is illustrated in the criminal case R B and G.402 
Here, the English Court of Appeal had to consider granting custody of children to a non-
Scientologist parent.  However, the granting of this custody would have involved removing the 
children from their current home.  Trial judge Latey J evidently had strong opinions regarding 
Scientology, taking the view that being raised by Scientologists would not be in the children’s 
interests.  His Honour said that that Scientology was “immoral and socially obnoxious … 
corrupt, sinister and dangerous.”403  The Court of Appeal referred to Latey J’s statements, 
observing that they:404 
 
 
399 At 9. 
400 At 9, referring to Thornton v Howe (1862) 31 Beav 14; Re Watson [1973] 3 All ER 678; Re Schoales [1930] 2 
Ch 75; Re Michael’s Trust (1860) 28 Beav 39; Re South Place Ethical Society [1980] 1 WLR 1565; see also 
Application for the Registration of the Druid Network (Charity Commission for England and Wales, 21 September 
2010). 
401 Neville Estates Ltd v Madden [1962] 1 Ch 832 (Ch) at 853; Hester v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [20015] 
2 NZLR 172 (CA) at [7]. 
402 Edge, above n 392, at 9, referring to R B and G [1985] FLR 493. 
403 At 9, citing R B and G, at 157. 
404 At 9, citing R B and G, at 502-503. 
91 
 
Added colour to the suggestion that what the judge primarily had in mind was the exposure of 
[S]cientology rather than the interests of the child which was in fact and in law all he was 
concerned with.  However, towards the end of the judgment the judge did relate the practices 
of [S]cientology to the circumstances of these particular children.  He did carry out the 
balancing exercise.  Although he plainly felt strongly that these children were at risk from 
exposure to [S]cientology, I find no reason to suppose that in carrying out that essential 
balancing exercise he did not do so judicially. 
 
Therefore, it might be argued that issues can arise with regard to the objectivity of the judiciary, 
a fundamental principle of the rule of law, when religious values collide with a secular legal 
order.  Although in response to this, the Court of Appeal was satisfied that whilst Latey J may 
have had strong opinions on a religion, he did perform his judicial functions appropriately. 
 
Nonetheless, religion matters to law, and thus to the rule of law, in a number of ways.  Firstly, 
religion functions to provide a context to legal discourses, for example, in relation to sexual or 
marital practices,405 as mentioned earlier.  Secondly, religious interests have been given a 
distinct place in legal analysis.  This is either through international or constitutional rights – 
“the profundity of religious interests, their centrality to the rights of the individual believer, 
their importance to broader cultural and communal life, or their role in society as a whole.”406  
Thirdly, because religion poses unique issues to liberal legal discourses that seek to advance 
legal diversity as a response to the increase in religious pluralism.407  The law enables diversity 
by recognising and protecting minority group concerns through laws that focus on equality and 
tolerance.  Within the context of the common law, the law has its basis in constructs of social 
justice and is closely aligned with democracy.   
 
It is a context that provides opportunities for charity law to address social justice issues, and 
there are indications that a variety of charity law reform developments have been used 
strategically by governments to improve social cohesion generally.  Such discussions, 
therefore, are pertinent in relation to the reconciliation of the advancement of religion.  Thus, 
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for instance, in recent years England and Wales have been subject to substantial charity law 
changes resulting in the Charities Acts 2006 and 2011.  There was significant engagement 
between the not-for-profit sector and the government, and bodies such as the National Council 
for Voluntary Organisations played a key role in sector coordination, policy development and 
articulating sector interests.  Such engagement enabled interested parties to negotiate terms of 
engagement in relation to sharing public benefit provision, a key principle of charity law.408   
 
It may be argued that charity law, through judicial interpretation, has contributed to “a 
profusion of quixotic charitable causes and elitist aesthetic amenities which could be perceived 
as socially divisive”.409  However, I argue that charity law can serve to “ameliorate hardship, 
demonstrate altruism, generate engagement in community life, enrich the fabric of society and 
generally facilitate social cohesion.”410  Indeed, ever since the Statute of Elizabeth, charity law 
has articulated the agenda for the partnership between government and the third sector.  That 
sector has become ever more sophisticated, and as a result, has become ever more entwined in 
the workings of the democratic political system.  For instance, statutory regulatory charitable 
bodies were introduced to connect the sector and government, 411  including the Charity 
Commission for England and Wales, and the now disestablished Charities Commission in New 
Zealand. 412   Indeed, recent government moves to strengthen the policy of entering into 
partnerships with faith-based organisations (FBOs) have led to reports of religion returning to 
the public sphere or reviving public religion.413  Thus, religious charities and their relationship 
with government are seen as leading the way in revitalising not only the religious sector, but 
also the social sector through charitable endeavours.  As a result, I assert that the rule of law 
within its charity law context is a vital component in the reconciliation of the advancement of 
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Nonetheless, the core business of charity has always been public benefit through its charitable 
purposes, and obviously that inherent relationship with the rule of law, and public benefit 
continues to be fundamental to governments.  For instance, in England and Wales, such 
purposes constituted a statement of the government’s social policy objectives regarding sharing 
public benefit responsibilities that meant facilitating the shifting of some public benefit services 
from government to charity.  Indeed, this was the primary trigger for the Government at the 
time to initiate charity law reforms.414   
 
England and Wales is not alone with regard to religious charities impacting on social policies.  
In the 1990s in New Zealand, the Christian social services sector, which included a number of 
charitable bodies, challenged government policy with regard to issues within the welfare state 
at the time.  This included rising poverty, privatisation of state housing, and benefit reform.  
The reports provided by FBOs demonstrated the importance of FBOs within society at the time.  
Not only that, but FBOs began to revaluate their foundational doctrinal and philosophical 
constructs that underpinned their raison d’etre within contemporary New Zealand.  As a result, 
many moved beyond traditional forms of charity, such as emergency temporary relief, and 
adopted methods of assistance that were influenced by norms of socially-recognised justice.  
For instance, they began operating within a more business-like model and encouraged people 
to assist themselves out of need, as opposed to encouraging continued reliance on charity.415  
Such organisations included The Mission and The Salvation Army, and changes to their 
charitable endeavours were evidenced in a number of newly-established programmes.  These 
included “drug and alcohol rehabilitation programmes, youth work, employment training 
centres, supported accommodation, work with prisoners, homecare and hospice work.”416   
 
An illustration of the impact of these welfare changes on social policy within New Zealand is 
reflected in The Salvation Army’s association with the creation of the Social Policy and 
Parliamentary Unit (SPPU) in 1994.  The SPPU sought to tackle operational and political 
factors which were said to contribute to poverty in New Zealand.  It provided a strong 
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connection to the disadvantaged because of its geographical position in relation to a number of 
Salvation Army welfare facilities in South Auckland.417   
 
Consequently, I argue that the rule of law is fundamental in underpinning, and thus reconciling, 
not only models of charity law, but also the relationship between state and charities themselves, 
which inherently includes the advancement of religion.  Such interconnectedness provides 
certainty and clarity to society, whilst ensuring care and welfare for citizens.  This is because 
charities that participate in the societal governance of public matters can act:418  
 
… as the “buffer, transition device and regulator” between government and market, 
absorb[ing] the suggestions and requirements from the relevant people in the governance 
process of public affairs, input … those suggestions and requirements to the government, and 
provide … various social means to meet the social members’ diverse and multi-level wishes 
and realize own interest. 
 
This is important socially because such a relationship can strengthen social tolerances; alleviate 
social conflicts; improve resource delivery; and thus improve welfare standards for society 
overall.419  As a result, it would appear that the advancement of religion, as one facet of charity, 
and through religious charities’ delivery of social welfare, is therefore reconciled through the 
principle of the rule of law. 
 
One specific example of social improvement as a result of religious charity is evidenced in the 
principle of zakat, 420  to which I turn now.  I deemed such discussions pertinent to the 
reconciliation of the advancement of religion because, as an Islamic construct of charity, zakat 
provides a useful tool by which to demonstrate the value of religious charity in a religiously-
diverse world.  It is also important to consider the charitable principles of Islam because the 
Islamic faith is not just contained within Islamic states, rather Islam is now prevalent within 
many non-Islamic and democratic societies, including the United Kingdom and New Zealand. 
Therefore, such discussions on this religion, and the principle of zakat, reflect the holistic 
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approach of this thesis, and consequently provide another avenue for the reconciliation of the 




As mentioned in Chapter 3 in relation to prescribed charitable giving, zakat is one of the five 
pillars of Islam.  As a charitable donation it is mandatory for all Muslims of sound mind with 
resources exceeding a certain amount to transfer a certain amount of their wealth to specific 
categories of recipients set out in the Qu’ran. 421  Zakat is the only pillar of Islam that is 
concerned with financial matters, and it is the only pillar which is related specifically to Islamic 
governance. It is the fundamental pillar in the Islamic economic system, 422  thus it is an 
obligation to society.  The Qu’ran sets out eight purposes for which zakat donations may be 
utilised, and the key purposes are those that provide support for those in poverty and those in 
need. Whilst only anecdotal evidence is available in relation to the amount of donations made 
through zakat, it is estimated that USD tens of billions are generated annually.  Zakat is 
therefore central in underpinning constructs of Islamic social justice.   
 
Zakat payments are not only a method of providing social welfare, they are also a useful device 
by which to try to reduce disparities in society.  This is because zakat duties are founded on 
resources (in principle).  Therefore, when zakat is paid, a portion of resources are allocated 
from those who may have amassed some means to those who lack means.  What can be said 
about this type of religious charitable donation is that it encourages parity and social fairness 
because it operates throughout an entire range of means.  Consequently, for those at the higher 
end of the means spectrum, zakat may be seen as reducing the surfeit of riches by directing a 
portion of those riches over and above that family’s annual need.  In contrast, at the poorer end 
of the means spectrum, zakat specifies the categories within which those in need should be 
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The correct use of zakat, therefore, is a valuable illustration of the importance of religious 
charity in fostering a greater degree of equality in society, not only to support those in need, 
but also to slow the amassing of financial means by individuals who create in excess of their 
own requirements.  Therefore, it can be said that zakat contributes to social parity overall 
through state governance, and in essence, the rule of law.   This then reflects the symbiotic 
relationship between charity and state and demonstrates the importance of the rule of law as a 
method of reconciliation of the advancement of religion. 
 
I now turn other considerations in relation to the rule of law and charity, and those being some 
possible points of concern in relation to charity remaining independent from democratic 
government, and the possible impact on society as a result. 
 
IV. Independence from Government 
 
Whilst charities and state may have a symbiotic relationship, caution is offered because there 
may be hidden costs.  Certainly, there are many benefits for a charity in fostering a close 
relationship with a government, such as social standing within the third sector and the ability 
to influence policies.  Nonetheless, the issue remains that such a relationship may compromise 
a charity’s capacity to represent the interests objectively of the socially disadvantaged.  There 
are expectations that charities will be independent from governments in order to advocate 
effectively for those most in need, generally citizens who are neglected by government policies 
of the time.  Further, difficulties have been highlighted in relation to the working relationship 
between FBOs and the state.  For instance, in a report conducted by the Church of England’s 
Commission on Urban Life and Faith, it concluded that government policy had not “provided 
a secure and consistent relationship between faith communities and government at all levels.  
There needs to be greater clarity over expectations in partnerships.”424   
 
Such issues arising from this relationship can have adverse impacts on the charitable sector in 
carrying out its endeavours.  This comes alongside reports that the faith sector is not able to 
 
 
424 James A Beckford “Religion in Prisons and in Partnership with the State” in Jack Barbalet, Adam Possamai 
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fulfil the expectations of government rhetoric, as well as there being wide gaps in the 
understanding and knowledge between FBOs and non-FBOs.  Such criticisms are, ironically, 
contrasted against the reported very high levels of contributions made to various communities 
by FBOs and charities.425   
 
Therefore, in order to protect social welfare charitable works, and to provide effectively for 
those in need of the services provided, it is important that charities remain independent from 
government, as opposed to becoming a substitute for that which a government should be 
providing.426  
 
Nonetheless, it is sometimes difficult to disentangle the nexuses between government and 
charity; such nexuses have ancient roots.  The Preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth,427 as 
outlined in Chapter 3, was deemed the “judicial lodestar”428 for legally-recognised charitable 
purposes.  The Preamble was a “manifestation of the legislature’s ultimate authority to give 
legal meaning to the term ‘charity’ and to align the legal concept with a specific welfare 
agenda.”429  It is asserted that the Preamble’s charitable purposes were devised in order to 
“reinforce a broader Tudor policy agenda involving the construction of public works, local 
taxation, forced labour and the criminalization of vagrancy.” 430   Therefore, in setting out 
explicit charitable purposes within the jurisdiction of the Commissioners of the Statute, the 
Government of the time was able to gather charitable resources to underpin their own agenda.   
 
Whilst it is evident, therefore, that a democratic government may be inextricably allied with 
charity, the rule of law may ensure, to some degree, that the two sectors do have some 
independence.  The independent courts have developed and articulated the legal meaning of 
charity.  This has occurred, for instance, through drawing analogies to the purposes within the 
Preamble; developing the four-fold classification of charitable purpose, “which effectively 
 
 
425 Beckford, above n 424, at 57-58. 
426 O’Halloran, above n 408, at 312. 
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428 Kathryn Chan “The Co-option of Charities by Threatened Welfare States” (2015) Queen’s LJ 40 2 at 574, 
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Waters Law of Trusts in Canada (2nd ed, Carswell, Toronto, 1984) at 550. 
429 At 574. 
430 At 574, referring to Blake Bromley “1601 Preamble: the State’s Agenda for Charity” (2002) Charity Law & 
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replaced the Preamble as the starting point of the law”;431 and by creating the doctrine of 
political purposes.432 
 
However, it can still be argued that there is much state impact on the definition of charity; this 
is illustrated by considering the journey of charity law in England and Wales.  Up until 1960, 
with the enactment of the Charities Act 1960, the Preamble was the most modern manifestation 
of charity and its purposes in the United Kingdom.  The 1960 Act, and the 1993 version of the 
Act, both stated that charitable purposes were “purposes which are exclusively charitable 
according to the law of England and Wales”.433 However, the common law condition that such 
purposes must fall within the spirit and intendment of the Preamble of the Statute of Elizabeth 
ensures the continued influence of the Preamble still today.   
 
In 1960, the Charity Commission for England and Wales was given responsibility for the 
maintenance and administration of charities; in effect, the Commission replaced the courts in 
determining charitable standing within its own jurisdiction.  The Commission has been active 
in adding additional charitable purposes, including the relief of unemployment, and promoting 
human rights within the fourth Pemsel head, thus suggesting that it had the same powers as a 
court.434  However, with the enactment of the Charities Act 2011, the role of the Commission 
changed in relation to the development of the construct of charity law.  Parliament at the time 
took the opportunity, politically, to reshape charity law borders, setting out a statutory 
definition of charity.  Pursuant to s 2 of this Act, a purpose may be charitable if it falls within 
one of the now 13 categories of charity that are set out in s 3, which is an extension of the 
original four Pemsel heads of charity, although the additional purposes find their history in the 
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It has been argued that this classification of charitable purpose is a restatement of the “perennial 
power of the legislature to direct the charitable sector towards the ends of its choosing.”436  
This is because the purposes are, in effect, a statutory list, which came about through the 
enaction of the democratic process.  The influence of the legislature is certainly evident in 
relation to the advancement of religion.  For example, s 3 (2) of the 2011 Act states: 
 
(i) a religion which involves belief in more than one god, and 
(ii) a religion which does not involve belief in a god. 
 
This is an extension of the original common law definition of religion, which, as mentioned 
earlier, appeared to be prejudiced towards a Western Christian belief system.  This change was 
not previously supported within the common law and was the focus of substantive 
governmental discussions.  This reflects the role of the rule of law in developing charity law in 
a contemporary context.   
 
Indeed, it is still not clear that the Commission is entirely independent from government 
influence. The 2011 Act does preserve the historical common law method of analogical 
reasoning to determine charitable purpose, which in theory gives the Commission discretion in 
exercising its functions.  Nonetheless, the statutory definition of charity now reduces the scope 
of the Commission to interpret more freely charitable purposes.  Interestingly, the 2011 Act 
reflects a combination of reducing the influence of government over the Commission, whilst 
at the same time, increasing government powers over the body.   
 
The 2011 Act established the Commission as a non-ministerial government branch that would 
not be directed, nor controlled by other government departments or ministers.  However, it 
must carry out its functions consistently with the statutory objectives of increasing public 
confidence in the sector.  Further, its decisions may be appealed to the First-Tier Tribunal.  This 
Tribunal is an independent judicial body, which has the authority to quash the Commission’s 
registration decisions; indeed, the Commission’s own policies have been subject to judicial 
review.  This suggests that the Commission has limited discretion to administer charities and 
charitable purposes; that it must exercise its discretion towards specific purposes; and that there 
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is limited opportunity for it to be influenced by the executive branch of government.437  This, 
therefore, reflects an interesting combination of the influence of the state, the imposition of the 
rule of law, and independence from government.  
 
It is evident, therefore, that there may be contemporary influences on the charitable sector from 
government, which may impact adversely on the support being provided to the third sector by 
charities.  This in turn undermines the overall beneficial effect of charities to support 
communities appropriately.  This may become a concern for religious charities if the 
government of the day adopts a strongly secular approach, and it may indirectly lessen the 
impact of religion-based assistance within the charitable sector.   
 
However, the rule of law can provide some inherent protection for charities through the 
common law.  This is because judges are “stewards and beneficiaries of the common law, [and] 
they are foremost sworn protectors of the rule of law … The rule of law provides the medium 
of civil society in which the common law may be developed and applied to resolve our civil 
disputes.”438  
 
In recognising the rule of law like this, it is evident that the common law comprises a number 
of ways to guard religious charities from undue government influence, this also applies to non-
religious charities.  For example, trustees are required to observe a trust’s requirements, 
meaning that if a trustee directs funds to be utilised in a way that breaches a trust instrument, 
strict liability follows the breach of that trust.  Indeed, the Attorney-General has the jurisdiction 
to be granted an injunction to prevent a trustee from performing an activity that would not be 
deemed within the scope of charity law.439  In addition, the common law protects charities from 
falling foul of external influences by imposing fiduciary obligations on trustees and fiduciaries.  
This means that such persons are obligated to act, or not, in the best interests of the charity, 
ensuring they act without conflict of interest and cannot make a profit from their relationship 
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with the charity.440  Therefore the rule of law, under the auspice of judicial guardianship, may 
enable charity law to be applied effectively to support civil society, and as a result, is an 
important facet within my assertions that the advancement of religion is a reconcilable legal 
construct because it can be understood from the context of the rule of law. 
 
In order to further my arguments as to the reconciliation of the advancement of religion, it is 
important now to consider the more general relationship between religion and the rule of law 
to contextualise the fundamental nexus between the two concepts, to which I turn now. 
 
 
V. Religion and the Rule of Law 
 
 
It has been argued “that organised religion provides a method to ‘bridge the gap’ between 
individual belief and the general acceptance of values that sustain the law and social 
behaviour.” 441   This is because institutionalised religion within society and institutional 
religion on its own appears to provide a collector function; in other words, collecting 
conscience and values in a moralistic sense.  Whilst it might seem an outdated notion, it has 
been stated that “no society has yet solved the problem of how to teach morality without 
religion”,442 which in turn supports the view the virtuous standards of behaviour required by 
religion are indispensable for the protection of liberty.   
 
Of course, a person may have socially-acceptable morals without subscribing to a religion, and 
conversely, a person may be religiously-biased but may be lacking in socially-acceptable 
morals.   However, it is not just the private conviction of a person that is important, it is the 
overall credence given to those constructs that underpin and thus sustain the law.  Donovan 
Waters argues that a Christian principled construct was not just concerned with the high values 
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in relation to personal conduct and a mindful approach as Christian individuals, rather it was 
concerned also with service to the society.443   
 
Indeed, this code, or construct, was precisely related to loving thy neighbour, as Lord Atkin 
famously implied in Donaghue v Stevenson, in which his Lordship applied a biblical principle 
to a tortious legal issue. 444   For a believer, this was how charity, or love, should be 
demonstrated.  The courts took this moral code and secularised the motivation as a good 
neighbour not only to the faithful but also to the non-believers.445  Thus the law and religion 
shared borders, and the law was changed forever. 
 
Further, there is historical evidence that religious leaders exhorted their believers to obey the 
rule of law.  In the 18th century, preachers would acknowledge the two realms of law – the first 
being civil, and the second being religious.  Both the civil and religious realms imposed a duty 
on individuals.  Religious individuals were requested to give attention not just to their 
individual notions of religious requirements that were imposed upon them by their God, but 
also to take into account obedience to the law generally.  The latter was required because 
obedience to the civil law was necessary to realise true liberty.  Preachers were able to assert 
such matters because, generally speaking, they were well-educated and were the political and 
social leaders of the day.446   
 
Consequently, “the free exercise of religion was to be pursued not in isolation, but rather in so 
far as may be consistent with the civil rights of society.”447  The reasons clergy gave to obey 
civil law were firstly that the law was God-given.  Consequently, a religious follower was 
required to observe such law.  Secondly, the rule of law was said to benefit everyone.  Thirdly, 
true liberty would not be obtained without the rule of law because the rule of law operates by 
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Even in contemporary times, the nexus connecting the rule of law and religion is still 
acknowledged.  For instance, in recent times it was asserted that “the Ten Commandments are 
a foundation of the rule of law, and a symbol of the role that religion played, and continues to 
play, in our system of government.”449  This is because without “a moral component that 
squares with the eternal and natural rule of God that objectively sets up a standard of 
righteousness, there can be no rule of law, but the tyrannical imposition of rule by law.”450 
 
As a result, religion provides a method of collecting and shaping conscience and values.  The 
closing of the space, whereby one moves from a belief to an action that is connected to that 
belief is said to be a result of religion’s teaching in relation to accountability and responsibility, 
leading to the afterlife or a day of judgment.  The effect of this teaching is to provide a “big 
picture” for religious individuals, which is a concept that society is generally unable offer in 
the absence of religion.  Further, religious believers are generally willing to delay earthly 
gratification for spiritual salvation at a later date.  Sometimes they even suffer serious hardship 
and deprivation in doing so, yet their confidence and happiness in the present is not generally 
diminished.451   
 
Of course, it would be wrong to assert that non-religious individuals are unhappy in the present, 
nor that they cannot delay gratification for other reasons. Neither that they are unaccountable 
for their behaviours, nor that they are irresponsible.  However, religious teachings have 
provided durable and meaningful methods of instilling such values and continue to do so in 
contemporary times.   
 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to exhort the benefits of religion within society, not least 
because it is underpinned by the rule of law, which is fundamental to a healthy democracy.  
This is demonstrated further when one considers that a functioning society necessitates some 
notion of shared duty from the populace in order to flourish.  This sense of community will not 
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thrive if key private institutes, such as religious institutes, are not recognised nor supported by 
government policy.  It should also be noted that where societal objectives are, for example, 
enforced by legal privileges,452 the correlation between promoting religions and the rule of law 
is potentially important for society generally.  Therefore:453 
 
The preservation of a civilised society depends upon the willingness of many of its members 
to fulfil responsibilities they are free to ignore.  It may even depend to some extent on the 
willingness of many to forgo the pursuit of rights they are free to enforce … Any person who 
is concerned with preserving the force of law and the enforceability of individual rights should 
be profoundly concerned about the civic responsibilities upon which the legal order is based. 
 
Consequently, the private conscience of religion may bridge the gap of the recognition of 
standards that underpin the law, as well as influencing societal behaviours.  Certainly, there is 
much evidence to show that religions and churches operate on a large scale to counteract many 
of today’s societal concerns. For instance, by providing soup kitchens and food banks, as well 
as traditional welfare assistance such as clothing and financial assistance.  Further, many 
religious bodies are actively involved in providing humanitarian aid and welfare relief on an 
international scale.   
 
As a result, it seems prudent to protect and encourage religious charities, as well as religious 
pluralism, because of their overall benefit in ensuring a functional society with a sound rule of 
law.  This is because religion is fundamental in encouraging the societal standards that maintain 
the law and socially-acceptable conduct, which “even in a non-legal sense, is charitable.”454  
Indeed, there is much evidence of the major social movements in social history that have been 
significantly religiously motivated.  The civil rights movements and the abolitionist movements 
are the two most prominent examples.  Such movements motivated large numbers of people to 
suffer extreme hardships for their given cause because of a perceived duty to God; the United 
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Martin Luther King Jr, the leader of the civil rights movement, was a preacher and an activist.  
He credited his faith for leading him and enabling him to persevere in the face of adversity, 
which ultimately led to his murder.  His perceptions of faith-based good, and the need to 
improve morals, provided a means of motivating political opposition, which in turn led to 
constitutional changes.455   
 
The abolitionist movement, another form of civil dissent, was also infused with religious zeal. 
Without the espoused religious duty to oppose slavery it is unclear whether the movement 
would have been successful.  This is because in reality, the duty was espoused, consolidated 
and persevered through the American Civil War.  This meant that it even impacted on those 
who were not directly affected by slave holdings.  Consequently, religious zeal was a strong 
influence in ending slavery. 
 
Further, there is continued recognition that religious FBOs are critics of social policy.  This is 
the case both historically, where churches raised objections to slavery, and in contemporary 
times, where they highlighted issues with global debt.456  Indeed, the “prophetic vision of the 
divine commonwealth … explicitly and comprehensively challenges the individualism and 
materialism of the commercial culture of cities.”457  This is because “religious faith that is 
grounded in the prophetic tradition … inspires belief in the possibilities for real social change 
and thus promotes political mobilisation.”458 
 
If a democratic state, therefore, validates the role of religion within society, there is also another 
benefit for society, and this comes about through the rule of law.  The predictability in the 
development of law over the course of time serves the ideal of the rule of law in a beneficial 
manner.  This is not least because “predictability helps to justify decision-makers adopting a 
cautious posture towards the recognition of new types of purpose as charitable.”459  Public 
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concerns about the tyranny of religion are more likely to be appeased if it is understood that 
religious charities are limited by the rule of law. 
 
Further, “the soundness of reasoning by analogy in the charity law setting turns on the sorts of 
analogies that decision-makers draw when developing charity law.” 460   This principle of 
analogy is suited to generating predictability in the development of the law, which underpins 
the ideals of the rule of law461  as evidenced in Scottish Burial Reform & Cremation Society v 
Glasgow Corporation,462 whereby the House of Lords had to determine the charitability of a 
crematorium.  An analogy was made between a crematorium and the maintenance of a 
cemetery. The maintenance of a cemetery, in earlier times, had been found analogous to 
maintaining a burial yard attached to a church, and also to the repair of churches.  Lord 
Wilberforce stated that the “repair of churches” was of “general public utility”. Promoting 
cremation was also said to be of public utility.  Therefore, in his Lordship’s view, cremation 
was considered to be equivalent to repairing churches and therefore charitable.   
 
This analogy is perhaps tenuous but Lord Wilberforce’s utilisation of analogy was apt to 
generate predictability in the development of the law.  As a result, his reasoning aligned 
appropriately with the rule of law.463 
 
Thus, society can be reassured that even though charity law may develop, as has been seen 
with respect to the advancement of religion, the rule of law can keep such development in 
reasonable check.464  Consequently, it is unlikely that the perceived threat as to the tyranny of 
religion in civil society will occur, as set out below. 
 
In addition, by permitting religions to obtain legally-recognised charitable status, the state is 
able to enforce certain regulatory procedures imposed upon such charities.  This provides a 
measure of checks and balances that will satisfy the public that no religion will be able to wield 
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or exercise power or influence in a tyrannical way.465  This is because charities are subject to 
stringent legal doctrines and principles that ensure their purposes are for public benefit, which 
will be addressed in later chapters.   
 
I contend, therefore, that because of the inherent links between the rule of law and religion, 
democratic states can justify religion in charity.  This is because charity law provides a useful 
vehicle to ensure that the rule of law and religion remain bound together to ensure the continued 
support of communities.  As such, the advancement of religion, within charity law, is 
reconcilable through the influence of, and impact by, the rule of law, thus supporting the overall 
object of my inquiry. 
 
Indeed, history shows us that if states legally support religion, such promotion can reduce 
conflict and bloodshed.  This is because law is a pragmatic endeavour, and in connection with 
the liberal approach, “it is tasked with ensuring that societal rules are making peace, order, and 
good government possible.”466   
 
Evidence of such aforementioned bloodshed is found in the early Reformation period where 
conflicts arose between the religious minority groups and the state, resulting in the deaths of 
hundreds of thousands across Europe.  That experience, along with the recognition that a state 
could not force individuals to believe in a belief system alien to their own, led to a more 
accepting society where religious minorities were tolerated and accommodated.  This led to 
greater social harmony.467 
 
Further, recent evidence of the fundamental nexus between religion and the rule of law is 
demonstrated in relation to the historical relationships between the religious group the 
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VI. Jehovah’s Witnesses – A Tale of Two States 
 
It is noted that constitutional regimes, likely democratic states, that promote an effective rule 
of law are likely have a variety of methods of resolving religious disputes in comparison with 
authoritarian regimes.  For instance, those democratic states with a strong rule of law will 
provide impartial arenas for settling disputes, such as courts and tribunals. Disputes can be 
resolved in a transparent and legally-justifiable manner.468  In contrast, authoritarian non-
democratic states “measure success as containment of the expression of differences, settlement 
of conflicts through the use of physical and symbolic coercion, and ensuring quiescence.”469   
 
I assert that the discussions pertaining to the Jehovah’s Witnesses is relevant to the object of 
my inquiry because it contextualises the fundamental relevance of the rule of law in relation to 
religion and state disputes.  Thus, it provides evidence that the advancement of religion, by 
way of its relationship with religion generally, is reconcilable within the legal principle of the 
rule of law. 
 
I will address the social and political impact of both types of regimes on Jehovah’s Witnesses 
shortly, however, it is useful firstly to outline the central canons of political authority advocated 
by the Witnesses and how such doctrines, or canons, made the risk of conflict between the 
movement and the state seem likely. 
 
Jehovah’s Witnesses are a religious group that originated in the United States in 1879.  
Witnesses see themselves as set apart from society through their moral beliefs.  They support 
political neutrality, whereby religion is separated from the state, and there is no participation 
in political endeavours.  This is an indication of their fidelity to one true religion. 470  
Nonetheless, for early Witnesses, political authorities were deemed necessary to maintain order 
and authority, thus Witnesses were exhorted to pay their required taxes, and be respectful and 




468 Pauline Cote “Rule of Law and Religious Minorities: A Case Study of Jehovah’s Witnesses” (2007) The 
Review of Faith & International Affairs 5 3 at 11. 
469 At 11. 
470 At 11, referring to New World Translation of the Holy Scriptures (Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of 
Pennsylvania, 1995) at John 17:15-16 and Exodus 20:4. 
109 
The movement went through World War I from a pacifist standpoint, and was neutral with 
regard to politics and authority.  However, factors in the movement, including prophetic 
failures and organisational stress, led to changes in the movement.  Such changes included 
assertive evangelism and mass mobilisation.  Witnesses would preach in various public places, 
and their message was loaded with attacks on other religions and denouncements of 
commercialism, capitalism and promoting political conspiracies. 
 
Between 1928 and 1945, Witnesses were arrested en masse in the United States, Germany and 
Great Britain for offences such as unlicensed selling of literature, disturbing the peace and 
violating Sabbath laws.  Consequently, the movement experienced conflict in relation to their 
culture, and their beliefs about politics progressively allowed adversarial attack.  The treatment 
of the group in the United States, when one compares the group’s treatment within Germany 
during this same period, is an illustration of the representation of an effective rule of law to 
foster cohesion.  Consequently, the movement’s doctrine lost its negative stance in the United 
States, and evolved in to a positive approach with the “writing of the faith into the laws of the 
land.”471  The fate of the movement in Germany was very different; we consider the German 
approach first. 
 
VII. Jehovah’s Witnesses in Nazi Germany 
 
Throughout this period of time, Germany was suffering from a prolonged economic crisis as 
well as political uncertainty.  These were proving to be difficult times for an unpopular religious 
minority, which was what the Jehovah’s Witness represented.  During the late 1920s, the 
movement proselytised publically, and was in conflict with National Socialism; this grew 
worse with Adolf Hitler’s rise to power.  Witnesses refused to say “Heil Hitler”, as well as 
refusing to join in parades, sing the national anthem, or take part in military service.   
 
The doctrinal evolution of the movement led believers to eschew all worldly concepts, 
including politics, because the world was deemed to be under Satan’s influence.  Saluting the 
German flag or the Fuhrer was an act of idolatry.  Indeed, Hitler’s Reich was said to be an 
 
 
471 At 13, citing Gabriel Yonan “Spiritual Resistance of Christian Conviction in Nazi Germany: The Case of the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses” (1999) Journal of Church and State 41 No 2 at 307. 
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aspect of Jehovah’s fight with the devil.  As Jehovah’s disciples, Witnesses were commanded 
to fight such influences.  The movement was vocal in its opposition to Hitler, publically 
referring to him being the Antichrist.472  
 
In 1933, the National Socialist State banned Jehovah’s Witnesses.  What the movement 
considered political neutrality, Nazi Germany characterised as dangerous and damaging to 
public security and order.  Witnesses who failed to hide, or indeed, who did hide and were then 
subsequently discovered, were murdered by the Nazis.  After the persecutions ended, the 
movement reflected on its persecution in relation to the perceived imperfect laws of Socialism 
and the state, and the perceived perfect laws of their God, as well as their faithful devotion to 
their God.  Put simply, this meant that there was no gap bridged between the political ideals of 
the state and religious beliefs due to the authoritarian approach of the state. 
 
VIII. Jehovah’s Witnesses in the United States 
 
In comparison, the treatment of the movement was starkly different in the United States, 
leading to a fundamentally different outcome.  During this same period in the United States, 
the movement was no more popular than it was in Germany due to the movement’s political 
alienation for the same reasons as it espoused in Germany.  However, the United States 
provided an alternative platform for resolving this dispute through effective utilisation of the 
rule of law, that of the court system.   
 
This system enabled the movement to participate fully in defending their stance and the 
movement’s leaders systematically appealed rulings and engaged in the legal culture, although 
this did lead to a considerable defeat for the movement in 1940 in Minersville School District 
v Gobitis.473  In this case, the Supreme Court determined that a Jehovah’s Witness can be 
required to salute the flag.   
 
However, the State then began to consider the movement’s claims.  In 1943, the Supreme Court 
in West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette474 ruled that the Free Speech Clause of 
 
 
472 At 13 - 14, referring to Yonan, above n 471, at 317 and 320. 
473 At 14, referring to Minersville School District v Gobitis 310 US 586 (1940). 
474 At 14, referring to West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette 319 US 624 (1943). 
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the First Amendment gave protection to the Jehovah’s Witnesses with regard to their custom 
of abstention from political pledges and salutes.  Therefore, the constitutional legal process that 
was brought by the Jehovah’s Witnesses proved a major factor in expanding protections under 
the Bill of Rights.  Additionally, as a result of the engagement with the rule of law, later 
leadership of the movement encouraged less aggressive actions, and protests were reduced.475  
The rule of law enabled the state and the movement to engage in pragmatic and legally-
justifiable changes for both entities. 
 
The comparison of the two states’ approaches reflects the relevance of the nexus between 
religion and the rule of law to encourage and perpetuate political and social stability.  In 
Germany, the movement was “engulfed in helpless polarization between human law and God’s 
law”.476  Left with no suitable options, the movement was only left with clashing dangerously 
with their political oppressors.  In the United States, however, the movement was “persuaded 
into the project of writing their faith into the laws of the land.”  Here, the movement could 
utilise the full weight of the law to air their disputes formally, enabling the movement to align 
its views with the law of the land, but without prejudicing its belief system.477   
 
The rule of law, therefore, enabled the integration of an unpopular, socially-divisive and 
minority religious group into a constitutional political culture, although the law still did not 
protect all of the movement’s desires to proselytize aggressively on the streets.  
Notwithstanding some of those limitations, the extent to which constitutionalism, and 
specifically the rule of law, impacted positively throughout the movement’s discourse is a 
reflection of the social importance of the nexus concerning the rule of law and religion.   
 
In essence, therefore, the comparison of these two states’ approaches illustrates that:478 
 
… the intersection of the rule of law and religion is not just about social control but also about 
social integration.  Provided an appropriate arena to settle conflicts with the symbolic order of 
 
 
475 At 15. 
476 At 15. 
477 At 15, referring to the biblical precedent of Paul the Apostle in Acts 24:10-22 The Bible, giving authority for 
the movement to engage with state laws. 
478 At 16. 
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a given country, religiously dissident minorities can enter a process of negotiation that results 
in adjustments and moderation rather than polarization and radicalization.  
 
This is evidence that countries with an operative the rule of law are generally less likely to see 
societal and religion-based conflicts.479  Consequently, it can be said that the rule of law, at 
least in relation to religious matters, can “[serve] as a tool for mollifying or resolving 
disputes.”480 
 
It is now pertinent to consider the rule of law specifically in relation to religious charities and 
thus demonstrate the reconcilability of the advancement of religion specifically through the 
rule of law, so providing support to the overall object of my inquiry.  That of reconciling the 
advancement of religion as a charitable purpose within its socio-legal contexts.  
 
IX. Rule of Law and Religious Charities 
 
How the rule of law relates to religious charities specifically is illustrated with the example of 
the political governance of religion in Central Asia in the later parts of the 20th century.  I 
acknowledge that I have generally referred to Western democratic societies throughout this 
thesis, and this section of the thesis appears to stray from that.  I was cognisant, however, of 
the lack of available research pertaining to the rule of law and religious charities generally in 
such societies, hence turning to examples outside of the general discourse to date.  Nonetheless, 
I would assert that addressing non-Western constructs of society does not diminish the fact that 
the rule of law and religious charities have a close and vital connection, as will be demonstrated 
as follows. 
 
When certain Central Asian republics, including Turkey and Saudi Arabia, “began to loosen 
restrictions on the practice of Islam in the 1990s, a range of international Muslim charities and 
donors eager to assist with the construction of mosques and the spread of religious 
 
 
479 At 11. 
480 Benjamin Schonthal et al “Is the Rule of Law an Antidote for Religious Tension?  The Promise and Peril of 
Judicializing Religious Freedom” 2016 American Behavorial Scientist Vol 60(8) at 967. 
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education.”481 With the increase in education, as well as the community support provided 
within mosques, the local communities began to benefit.  This is because education, in a variety 
of guises, sustains individual and societal improvement.  One of the mechanisms by which 
society makes economic, social and political improvements is through the education of its 
people,482 thus the role of education cannot be underestimated.  In addition, mosques, like other 
forms of religious institutions, are places where communities can gather and share views; share 
common interests and concerns; provide comfort to the lost and grieving; and disseminate 
learning and teaching.  Consequently, what these discussions pertaining to non-Western social 
constructs demonstrate is that there is much value in such institutions for the cohesion of a 
community, thus lending weight to my assertions that the advancement of religion is 
reconcilable through the context of the rule of law. 
 
As a point of note in relation to Western democratic states, it is evident that public policy in 
the West has “clearly and consistently been in favour of supporting charities”,483 and charities 
do indeed enjoy a special position in English law,484 as with many other Western jurisdictions.  
However, the example I provided in relation to Central Asia provides a concrete illustration as 
to the actual value of charity when the rule of law is exercised appropriately.  In the Central 
Asian context for example, liberalising constitutional governance, as part of the rule of law, 
encouraged charity within the community, which can only be of benefit to the community and 
society generally.  This is important to emphasise in an age where calls for religion to be 
removed from society are being heard and disseminated widely, thereby providing further 
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This chapter demonstrates that the rule of law, religion and charity are inextricably linked. 
Indeed, the rule of law enables charity law to function appropriately within society.  This is 
because a charity’s purposes must be charitable.  Engaging in unlawful activities, or 
encouraging behaviours that are against the law, or breach public policy, may disqualify a body 
from being charitable.485  Public policy can include the “rule of law, the constitutional system 
of government … , the safety of the general public and national security.  Activities are not 
contrary to public policy merely as a result of their being contrary to government policy”.486   
 
I have shown that charity law, through its relationship with, and its governance by, the rule of 
law, is ideally positioned to fortify the needs of society in a way that is designed to promote 
public confidence in the sector; religious charities form a fundamental section of that 
relationship.  In essence, this chapter illustrates that the rule of law legitimises and underpins 
the advancement of religion within charity, providing surety to society, and ensures charity 
operates effectively within society.  As a result, I assert that this chapter has been key in 
assisting in my inquiry as to the reconciliation of the advancement of religion because it has 
embedded the construct of religion and charity within the socio-political and legal contexts of 
the rule of law.  Consequently, I assert that the rule of law is an important facet in the 
reconciliation of the advancement of religion because of the strong correlation between the rule 
of law, charity law and thus the advancement of religion.    As a result, the rule of law assists 
with the effective operation of the religious charities within democratic, and some non-
democratic societies, as well as providing public and legal confidence and surety because of 
the inherent nature of the rule of law.  Consequently, this chapter is a reflection of the social 
and political frameworks to which I made mention earlier in the thesis, thus reflecting the 
various contexts in which the advancement of religion is placed. 
 
Now that the paramountcy of the rule of law has been demonstrated in relation to charity law 
and religion, Chapter 5 furthers the discussion.  I do this by considering the advancement of 
 
 
485 Registration Decision: Greenpeace of New Zealand Incorporated (GRE25219) 21 March 2018 at [85]-[86]; 
see also Greenpeace of New Zealand Inc [2014] NZSC 104. 
486 Email from Murray Baird Acting Commissioner to the The Hon Phillip Ruddock “Submission to Expert Panel 
on Religious Freedom” (14 February 2018) at [2]. 
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religion in the context of a number of challenging historical and contemporary black letter law 
constructs, which inherently are framed in their social contexts, as well as some key discussions 




Chapter 5. Acknowledging Religion in Contemporary Society – Critical 




As will be recalled, the purpose of this research is to review critically the reconciliation of the 
advancement of religion within charity law through a sociopolitical-legal narrative, with the 
object of my inquiry being to reconcile the advancement of religion in a variety of contexts.   
The specific positioning of this chapter within the thesis was relevant because once I had made 
a number of socio-political submissions in previous chapters that were framed within their 
socio-political contexts, this chapter could then turn to some, inter alia, black letter law 
considerations in relation to the advancement of religion in various common law jurisdictions.  
I assert that it was important to set out some of the socio-political contexts first so as to gain an 
understanding of how the law sits within these frameworks.  As a result, the justiciable nature 
of the common law decisions become more inherently defensible when one has a clearer 
understanding of the relationship between law, society, and politics, even if some of those cases 
are controversial. 
 
Consequently, this chapter furthers the thesis’ overall object of reconciling the advancement of 
religion by considering key issues relating to religion and charity in a contemporary context 
that may, prima facie, actually undermine the vital role that religion plays within the charity 
sector.  As a result, the discussions include examining commercialism within religion; new age 
beliefs; and non-Western concepts of religion and charity to ascertain if such issues undermine 
the position of religion within charity law.  It is arguable that if religion lacks credibility, it 
follows that there will be limited support for such bodies to charitable in the public view.  
Nonetheless, what is revealed is the credibility of religion in some challenging circumstances 
resulting in religion, through charity, embracing many aspects of the modern world.  This 
means that religious charities, can, and should, remain stalwarts of communities.  Overall 
therefore, I argue that the advancement of religion can be reconciled within the contexts of this 




However, there are disconnects whereby the gaps are not so easy to bridge.  For example, with 
regard to the prevailing position of Judaeo-Christian religious legal principles in communities 
that do not necessarily focus culturally on such religions.  Consequently, communities that may 
have benefitted from religious charities may be marginalised.  Such disconnects suggest that 
religious charities are not as relevant in today’s times.  Nonetheless, I offer potential solutions 
to such issues that would enable the advancement of religion to sit more favourably within 
society through charity law, and thus benefit societies. 
 
Even so, these matters are not easily addressed, and many judicial decisions reflect conflict in 
the law, which can undermine the place of religion within charity, leading to uncertainty and 
public lack of confidence.  In addition, as courts endeavour to reconcile the ancient and modern, 
there is concern that religion generally may be discredited because it appears to take on the 
trappings of consumerism and commercialism, and I begin these discussions by assessing the 
relationship between religion and commercialism. 
 
II. Commercialism in Religion 
 
Commercialism and religion appear at first sight to be mutually exclusive concepts.  This is 
perhaps because religion is considered to have numerous non-pecuniary benefits, including 
moral guidance, spiritual guidance and the redistribution of goods and services to those in need, 
as opposed to ensuring a profitable existence.  Indeed, the public concept of religion does lead 
society to view commercialism and religion as distasteful.  This in part may have its history in 
greed, which is a closely connected factor with profit. Greed, is course, is one of the seven 
deadly sins that are so ingrained in Western Judeo-Christian society.   
 
Greed is also referred to as mammonism, which has religious roots, and is a word derived from 
Aramaic, the language spoken by Jesus. Mammonism means the pursuit of wealth as a key 
purpose.487  According to the Bible “ye cannot serve God and mammon.”488  Consequently, the 
pursuit of wealth, profit and, subsequently, commercialism, does not sit easily within the 
religious charitable narrative. 
 
 
487 Sheila T Harty The Sin of Greed: How ‘Profit’ Became a Dirty Word (Draft Paper, July 2015,) citing Matthew 




One recent example of such distaste is illustrated in China.  The Chinese Government 
determined that was to be a ban on the selling of shares by temples to investors.  This came 
about because it was discovered that some temple leaders had been planning on undertaking 
such activities as commercial undertakings.  Commercialising religion in such a manner was 
criticised because it was seen as extending China’s commercial culture too far489 in an “already 
unrestrained commercial culture.”490   
 
Recent criticism has also been levelled at Islam for becoming too commercial, whereby it has 
been said to be “slowly and steadily becom[ing] part of our onscreen lives … [i]t is 
omnipresent.  Ironically more so in advertising than in entertainment.”491   
 
It is apparent therefore that the “faith and fortune of the religious sector is flourishing”.492  
Indeed, commercialisation does appear to be ever-present in a religious context, with the 
growth of megachurches, drive-in confessionals and commercial pilgrimages, to name but a 
few commercial ventures.  This results in religious markets bearing the trappings of modern 
society.493  Commercialisation, in turn, has become associated with religious charities, and this 
is unsurprising when one considers it within a socio-political context.  For instance:494 
 
Analyses of religion, consumerism and the state in Western societies have shown how religion 
has been dedifferentiated in the public sphere through market forces that are increasingly 
unregulated by the state. Religion has been deprivatized … and has appeared as a social force 
on the same footing as other social forces … With the rolling back of the neoliberal state from 
its welfare activities in several domains in public life, faith-based organizations have increased 
their penetration in the public sphere … for example, the prevalence of faith-based 
organizations running facilities and programs targeting urban poverty. This has reached a 
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turning point in which we find politicians, social activists and commentators claiming that 
some religious organizations are better equipped for such actions than the current welfare state. 
With the advent of neoliberalism, faith-based organizations changed from simply offering 
charity work to being strong actors in the provision of welfare and social services.  
 
Thus, with the emergence of the neoliberal state, religion was pushed into the public domain, 
and with that, the explicit embracing of commercialism. 495   However, it appears that the 
mercantile nature of religion is not a novel concept.  For example, there is evidence that 
religious entrepreneurialism has been practiced by the Catholic Church for centuries.  This 
occurred under the canon law doctrine of “indulgences” whereby the devoted may buy their 
way out of purgatory and into heaven.  Canon law encourages Catholics to donate money to 
the church for the public good; in other words, for charitable endeavours, such as supporting 
hospitals and schools, as well as building churches and cathedrals.496 Then there is the perhaps 
uncomfortable reality that in Australia alone, the Catholic Church owns indirectly, but with 
direct control of, AUD 100 billion in property and assets, employs circa 118,000 people, and 
generates AUD 15 billion from its education, health and welfare enterprises annually.497 
 
Consequently, this section of the chapter considers how the two apparently disparate concepts, 
charity and the mercantile, may actually make unlikely bedfellows in an increasingly 
commercial world.  In doing so, I demonstrate the paradoxical benefits of commercialism 
within religious charities, and consequently, it is inferred that religious charities are likely to 
benefit communities through such commercial engagement, thus justifying the presence of 
religious charities in a modern context.  I begin by considering the Australian High Court 
Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v Word Investments Limited.498   
 
III. Word Investments – A Case of Commercialism 
 
In this case, the questions for the Court included whether or Word Investment’s (Word) objects 
were charitable, and whether an entity would be charitable if it did not carry out charitable 
 
 
495 At 210. 
496 Spencer, above n 492, at 91. 
497 At 91. 
498 Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v Word Investments Limited [2008] HCA 55. 
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activities beyond activities that made profits which were then targeted at entities that carried 
out in charitable purposes.499   
 
In brief, Wycliffe Bible Translators (Wycliffe) was originally a legally-recognised charity.  It 
carried out international religious missionary work.  Part of its work involved spreading the 
word of God through its Bible translation activities, and educating communities from the 
translated Bibles.  Wycliffe formed Word Investments Limited (Word) as, inter alia, a means 
of raising funds, which passed its profits into Wycliffe.  Word later expanded its operations to 
include financial planning services and a funeral business.  
 
The High Court determined that commercial undertakings and achieving legally-recognised 
charitable status were not necessarily mutually-exclusive models.  The Court came to this 
conclusion firstly by framing the question of charitable activities.  In other words, the 
“activities of Word in raising funds by commercial means are not intrinsically charitable, but 
they are charitable in character because they were carried out in furtherance of a charitable 
purpose.”500  Therefore, the purposes did not have to be inherently charitable, so long as they 
enabled a charitable purpose to be furthered.501  Whilst at first sight this may appear to be a 
rational approach, it has been subject to criticism.   
 
It has been suggested that there was a fundamental issue in the majority of the Court’s approach 
whereby the activities should be determined in relation to their advanced in continuance of a 
charitable purpose, in contrast with supporting a distinct and non-charitable purpose.  It 
suggests that it might be difficult to assess the correlation between mercantile undertakings and 
charitable purposes.  For instance, there may be many activities, such as purchasing land, shares 
or public collections, but there is no one test that can ascertain whether these activities might 
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Nonetheless, assistance may be found by asking if the purpose is “conducive to promoting”, 
“conducive to the achievement of”, or “tends to assist” with the main charitable purpose.503  
The nexus could also be assessed on “the natural and probable consequences” 504  of the 
undertakings.  Therefore, the charitable nature of the commercial activities can be adduced 
through close factual analysis, instead of applying a precise test, which permits a flexible 
approach in determining the charitable nature.505  This is perhaps a preferred methodology, as 
the concept of charity evolves as society evolves; a one-size-fits-all test is not necessarily 
apposite to enable charity to advance religion appropriately. 
 
The Court’s second consideration, as mentioned earlier, was whether an entity could be 
charitable if it did not carry out charitable activities beyond activities that made a profit which 
were then targeted at entities that carried out in charitable undertakings.  The Court, relying on 
Baptist Union of Ireland (Northern) Corporation Ltd v Commissioners of Inland Revenue, 
determined that:506 
 
[T]he charitable purpose of a trust is often, and perhaps more often than not, to be found in the 
natural and probable consequences of the trust rather than its immediate and expressed objects. 
 
As a result, “the charitable purposes of a company can be found in a purpose bringing about 
the natural and probable consequence of its immediate and expressed purposes.”507  This means 
that “its charitable activities can be found in the natural and probable consequence of its 
immediate activities.”508   
 
This approach, therefore, looks to “the effect of, rather than the motivation for, the 
activities.”509  This approach finds support in the New Zealand High Court case Hester v 
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Commissioner of Inland Revenue, where the Court referred to the “natural and probable 
consequences of such provision is the advancement of religion”.510  As such, the majority in 
Word concluded that Word was charitable.   
 
This suggests, therefore, that where a court can determine that profits, or any private benefits, 
are not the end in themselves, then the commercial activities are not the actual issue.  Rather it 
is the fruit of those activities that is key in determining the charitable nature of the commercial 
entity.511 Both the Word case, and in effect the Hester case, offer a “significant boost for 
charities”.  This is because in an increasingly market-driven world, where funding and fund-
raising becomes more competitive, self-funding,512 this may mean the difference between a 
charity that merely stays in existence or that is able to operate more successfully for 
communities overall. 
 
Another New Zealand case also reflects the commerciality of religion, that of Liberty Trust v 
Charities Commission.513  I have discussed this case in other chapters, but it is useful to 
consider it in this context because it illustrates how commercial principles are infiltrating the 
religious charitable sector in ways that are challenging the traditional concepts of religion and 
charity and aligning them with modern constructs. 
 
IV. Liberty Trust and Commercialism 
 
Chapter 3 sets out the facts of the Liberty case, so for my current purposes, I argue that at its 
heart, this case is an acknowledgement of the frowned-upon religious principle of usury.  
Consequently, I contend that this case illustrates a commercial approach to religion that is 
appropriate in modern circumstances.  Usury, in a religious context, originally meant charging 
interest on loans.  Historically in Christian societies, and still in many Islamic societies, 
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If your brother becomes poor and cannot maintain himself with you, you shall support him as 
though he were a stranger and a sojourner, and he shall live with you. Take no interest from 
him or profit, but fear your God, that your brother may live beside you. You shall not lend him 
your money at interest, nor give him your food for profit.  
 
If the loans given by Liberty Trust had charged interest, they would likely be construed as 
sinful in a trade or commercial context.516 However, because they are interest free, the ethos of 
religion is acknowledged, whilst at the same time enabling loanees to obtain a debt-free 
existence.  According to the Trust, Christians should not be encumbered with substantial 
financial liabilities,517 thus evidence is presented of commercial realism crossing over into the 
charitable sector.   
 
Mallon J did observe that a “mortgage scheme … is not an obvious candidate for the 
‘advancement of religion’ category of charitable purposes”.518  That, in itself, however, did not 
preclude the loan scheme from advancing religion.  Rather, religion was taught through the 
loan scheme because it operated in accordance with scripture.  Therefore, it promoted religion 
and took affirmative actions to maintain or augment religious beliefs.519   
 
The commercial aspect was further acknowledged explicitly by her Honour.  She observed that 
it was undeniable that the Trust’s scheme had a commercial flavour to it, with mention of 
money saving, investments and tax advantages.  However, Mallon J noted that commercial 
promotion of religion will not automatically disqualify a purpose from being charitable.520  
This reflects the approach taken in the Word case, as well as implicitly recognising the reality 
that religion and commercialism are closely associated.  
 
Acknowledging explicitly the relationship between religion and commerce may appear 
distasteful to many, and as a result could undermine the role of religion within charity.  
However, Mallon J emphasised that “[i]mportantly, the commercial nature of the scheme is 
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limited.”521  This means firstly that usury, as a condemned practice, is impliedly avoided.  
Secondly, her Honour confirmed that commercialism may only stretch so far, and beyond that, 
commercialism may actually negate charitable status, for instance, where the founders make a 
profit through the scheme.  
 
Whilst, therefore, providing interest-free loans does not appear to reflect the ethos of charity, 
and certainly not religious charities, perhaps it can be argued that quite the opposite is true. 
This is because the loan scheme embraces religious teachings and promotes such teachings 
through its loan scheme, whilst ensuring that usury is avoided, which underpins key religious 
principles.  Further, Mallon J stated that there are limits as to the extent of commercialism 
within a religious charitable context thus giving boundaries, which should provide some public 
confidence that the principles will not be overly extended.   
 
In addition, it can be argued that this case places religious charity firmly within the context of 
the modern day.  This is because finances and debt are key concerns to many in this day and 
age.  Enabling people to live debt-free so as to embrace religious endeavours will reduce the 
burden on communities generally.  Debt is a significant challenge to many.  It means that some 
people are unable to afford amenities or pay bills; it causes homelessness and, in some 
circumstances, suicide.  Reducing debt, therefore, is surely of public benefit, and it can be 
achieved through charity law, ensuring the principles of law are applied appropriately in a 
transparent and accountable manner, as required by charity law.  Therefore, the reality of 
modern commercialism sits within the ancient concepts of religion and is acknowledged 
through charity law to support communities. 
 
Whilst the Word and Liberty Trust cases can be utilised to justify the association between the 
mercantile and religion in a charitable context, this situation is not always so clear-cut, and 
unfortunately can lead to confusion within the charity sector, and thus may do little to aid in 






521 At [95]. 
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V. Hong Kong Sheng Kung Hui 
 
This is illustrated in the Hong Kong decision Hong Kong Sheng Kung Hui v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue.522 In this case, Hong Kong Sheng Kung Hui, the Anglican Episcopal Church, 
and its ancillary entity, the Hong Kong Sheng Kung Hui Foundation, sold a number of 
residential units and car park spaces.  From the sales, the Church received a profit of HKD 452 
million, and the Foundation made a profit of HKD 667 million.523  This led to questions being 
raised in relation to the ensuing tax bill of HKD 180 million.   
 
It should be noted that Hong Kong relies on the English charity law principles set out in this 
thesis, including the four charitable purposes expounded by Lord Macnaghten in Income Tax 
Special Purposes Commissioners v Pemsel,524  in other words, “for the relief of poverty, for 
the advancement of education, for the advancement of religion; and for other purposes 
beneficial to the community but not falling under any of the preceding types.” 525  Specifically 
in relation to this case, s 88 of the Hong Kong Inland Revenue Ordinance states that a trade or 
business being carried out by a charity must set out its purposes.  Thus a charity must operate 
to achieve those specified purposes, “which in a traditional way pertains to the promotion of 
charitable purposes,” 526 which find their basis in the Pemsel definition. 
 
The Court dismissed the assertion that the Church was not authorised to carry on a business or 
trade because of its Constitution, therefore could not have used its land as a trading asset.  
Instead, the Court asserted that the correct approach was the actual use of the asset, rather than 
the capacity of the user to carry out a specific trade or business.  “In other words, whether or 
not an asset was used in the context of a trade or business was solely dependent on its actual 
use,”527 meaning, regardless of the purpose of the activities, which was advancing religion.  
This is distinguished from the High Court’s approach in the Word case. 
 
 
522 Hong Kong Sheng Kung Hui v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2010] HKCFI 61. 
523 Hong Kong Sheng Kung Hui at [4]-[16]. 
524 Income Tax Special Purposes Commissioners v Pemsel [1891] AC 531 (HL) at 583. 
525 See Li Kim Sang Victor v Chen Chi Hsia [2016] 1 HKLRD 1153 at [72], referring to Pemsel, above n 524, at 
583. 
526 Damian Bethke and Jedrzej Gorski “Rethinking Social Ventures in Hong Kong” [2014] Richmond Journal of 
Global Law & Business Vol 13 1 at 22, referring to Inland Revenue Ordinance Advance Rulings (1999) Cap 112 
at 84(a) (HK). 
527 Patrice Marceau and Patrick Cheung National Hong Kong Report (American Bar Association Foreign Lawyers 
Forum, 2010) at 17. 
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It was asserted that the Hong Kong Court “obscurely rejected the very legitimate argument that 
the criterion must pertain to whether the charity used its revenue solely for charitable purposes, 
which in this case was the advancement of religion.”528  It was further asserted that behind this 
rational was the incorrect view that Sheng Kung Hui’s undertakings must qualify as an 
undertaking for trade or business, as opposed to advancing religion.  This was wrong, allegedly, 
because business purposes merely relate to whether business organisations are not-for-profit 
or, in some instances, where surfeit is disseminated to stakeholders or to social mission.529 
 
What this decision therefore illustrates is the unease that exists between commercialism, 
religion and charity.  In particular that Hong Kong “does not welcome the combination of a 
make money and do good approach.”530  What has been further argued is that this case is simply 
a selective taxation to discourage charitable organisations from undertaking significant or 
commercial activities, which reflects the continued unease about such practices generally.531  
This is unfortunate because such a decision, in contrast with the Australasian approach, may 
do little to provide legal certainty in such matters, and thus may undermine, in part, my 
assertions that the advancement of religion is reconcilable in this particular context.  However, 
in answer to this, I would argue that this is just one limited example of a common law 
jurisdiction choosing not to support commercialism as a charitable construct, and overall, the 
evidence does suggest that commercialism may be a justifiable construct within charity law.  
Thus, it is arguable that the advancement of religion is reconcilable through these cases because 
the law recognised the value to society of commercialism and did so in a legally-justifiable 
manner. 
 
VI. Commercialism - Concluding Remarks 
 
It is evident that the Hong Kong decision sits in contrast with the Australasian decisions, 
although the Hong Kong case may be welcomed by many because it may be seen as preventing 
businesses apparently obtaining charitable advantages.  Indeed, it has been noted that should 
 
 
528 Bethke and Gorski, above n 526, at 23. 
529 At 23, referring to Marceau and Cheung, above n 527, at 16-17. 
530 At 23. 
531 At 23-24. 
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profitable fundraising increase within the charitable sector, public support may then be reduced 
because of the perception that commercial enterprises somehow reduce the altruism of 
charities.532 
 
However, the opposite may actually be true, and if that is correct, then Hong Kong’s approach 
may be detrimental overall to the charitable sector.  This is because such differing approaches 
can send mixed messages to charities, as it is not always clear how a business will be assessed 
by the courts.  This suggests that some commercial activities, even if designed to support 
charitable purposes, may put at risk the charitable status of that entity.  In today’s 
commercially-driven world where charities compete for funding and support, this may not be 
a welcome consideration. This consequently may undermine the activities of many charities, 
to the overall detriment of those relying on the funds raised from commercial endeavours.  
Further, whilst questions have been raised as to whether commercial activities reduce the 
apparent altruism of charities, research suggests that there is societal support for charities that 
undertake some commercial and profit-driven activities.533   
 
Therefore, where courts find that commercial activities do sit appropriately in relation to 
construct of advancement of religion, the public can be assured that through charity law 
governance, which ensures transparency and accountability, then those charities will not be 
unduly advantaged at the expense of non-charitable organisations as a result of their charitable 
status.  Indeed, religious entrepreneurialism is perhaps “a reflection of the status religion plays 
in our society”534 and “a lineal and logical consequence”535 of the legal and constitutional 
recognition of religion in numerous states.  As a result, such support for religion may indeed 
prove beneficial to the charitable sector generally as funding is likely to improve through 
commercial activities.  Nonetheless, such charitable commercial ventures should rightly be 
subject to “strict scrutiny [as] they are in competition with others in the marketplace who do 




532 Murray, above n 501, at 326. 
533 At 326, fn 119. 
534 Alec Spencer "Does Freedom of Religion Imply Freedom of Religious Trade?" [2017] JCULawRw 5 at 90. 
535 At 90. 
536 At 100, citing Word Investments Ltd, above n 498, at [117]-[120]. 
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Whilst commercialism within religious charities may be justifiable, and indeed has some 
benefits for the charitable sector, other contentious charity cases have arisen that may reflect a 
disconnect between the public perception of religion and charities, and the actual reality of 
religion and charity.  I argue that even where such contentious cases arise, charity law can 
justify the existence of such religious charities. 
 
VII. New Age Beliefs 
 
The first case I consider is the Australian High Court case of Church of the New Faith v 
Commissioner of Pay-Roll Tax (Scientology case). 537  I focus on Australian jurisprudence 
because the research sits within the Australasian context of this part of the chapter. I 
acknowledge that this is a much-cited, and discussed, case and it might be argued that the 
originality of the discussions may not, prima facie, be of such a judicious nature.  However, in 
answer to this, I assert that I would be remiss if I were not to consider this case in the context 
of this thesis because of its authority and its influence in many jurisdictions. It was the first of 
its kind, in many ways, where a court had to grapple with a contentious religious subject matter, 
therefore its position within this thesis is significant.  
 
In brief, the question throughout the appeals was whether Scientology was a religion; 
Scientology was originally conceived by L Ron Hubbard.  “Scientology” is derived from the 
Latin “scio”, which means “knowing, in the fullest meaning of the word”; and the Greek 
“logos”, meaning the “study of”.538  Scientology further means “the study and handling of the 
spirit in relationship to itself, universes and other life.”539   
 
Scientology is said to offer a path that leads to “a complete and certain understanding of one’s 
true spiritual nature and one’s relationship to self, family, groups, Mankind, all life forms, the 
material universe, the spiritual universe and the Supreme Being.”540 Its “ultimate goal … is 
 
 
537 Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-Roll Tax [1983] HCA 40. 
538  Scientology “Frequently Asked Questions” https://www.scientology.org/faq/background-and-basic-
principles/what-does-the-word-scientology-mean.html. 
539 Scientology “What is Scientology” https://www.scientology.org/faq/background-and-basic-principles/what-
is-scientology.html. 
540 “What is Scientology”. 
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true spiritual enlightenment and freedom.”541  Whilst it may consider itself a religion, the High 
Court had to determine this in relation to charity law.  This led the Court to consider the 
meaning of religion.  Mason ACJ and Brennan J observed:542 
 
The relevant inquiry is to ascertain what is meant by religion as an area of legal freedom or 
immunity, and that inquiry looks to those essential indicia of religion which attract that 
freedom or immunity.  It is in truth an inquiry into legal policy. 
 
In taking this approach, their Honours considered the relevance of religion within society.  In 
doing so, they contextualised its fundamental importance to individuals and to society 
generally, alluding to the fact that new age belief systems can sit within the ancient concepts 
of religion in contemporary times.  The relevance of religion was placed within the context of 
societies and individuals trying to explain their existence within the universe.  This included 
seeking the meanings of the cosmos, life and fate. For some individuals, acceptance of the 
general character of nature will satisfy these concerns, but for many, the only adequate solution 
could be found within discovering a supernatural order, and thus faith in the supernatural.543  
In other words, “[f]aith in the supernatural, transcending reasoning about the natural order, is 
the stuff of religious belief.”544  As a result, it was argued that religious belief comes about 
“from a sense of the inadequacy of reason as a means of relating the individual to his fellow-
men and to his universe”.545   
 
In addition, religion is also concerned with the supernatural influence on humans and their 
conduct, thus in many instances religion provides “a set of ideas of how man is well-advised, 
even obligated, to live.”546  Consequently, the public benefit generally of religion is implied 
within these assertions, in other words, inter alia, certainty; comfort; codes of conduct; and a 
reassurance in the face of inadequacies.  Such implications serve to underpin the overall 
relevance of religion within society generally, and provide, in part, a justification for the 
continued acceptance of religion within communities overall.  Consequently, charity law is 
 
 
541 “What is Scientology”. 
542 Church of the New Faith, above n 537, at [12]. 
543 At [13]. 
544 At [13]. 
545 At [13], citing United States v Kauten (1943) 133 F (2d) 703 at 708. 
546 At [14], citing Clifford Geertz “Anthropological Study of Religion” (1968) International Encyclopaedia of the 
Social Sciences Vol 3 at 406. 
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able to provide the vehicle by which religion can benefit communities appropriately.  The Court 
in the Scientology case then considered further aspects to religion and where religion might 
then sit within the charity context. 
 
It was noted that of equal importance are the canons of conduct that a person acknowledges as 
relevant so as to give rise to the belief in the supernatural, making those canons of conduct “no 
less a part of his religion than the belief itself.”547  Accordingly, the Court held that the oft-
cited definition of religion is as follows:548 
 
[F]irst, belief in a supernatural Being, Thing or Principle; and second, the acceptance of canons 
of conduct in order to give effect to that belief … These criteria may vary in their comparative 
importance, and there may be a different intensity of belief or of acceptance of canons of 
conduct among religions or among the adherents to a religion. 
 
This criteria was in contrast to the narrower English approach, where Dillon J in South Place 
Ethical Society stated that the two essential “attributes of religion are faith and worship; faith 
in a god and worship of that god.” 549  The Court in the Scientology case, however, determined 
that such a definition was too limiting and would exclude non-theistic beliefs, which would 
include Buddhism, which is an acknowledged religion.550  As a result, the Court’s view was 
that the test of belief would be fulfilled by believing in a supernatural Thing or Principle, and 
would not be limited to belief in a God, or a supernatural Being.551  Consequently, the broad 
definition reflected an evolution in the meaning of religion. This reflects the idea that religion 





547 At [14], referring to Max Mueller Natural Religion (Collected Works) (Longmans, Green & Co, London, 1899) 
at 135. 
548 At [17]. 
549 At [23], citing South Place Ethical Society (1980) 1 WLR at 1572; a similar test was applied in Registrar 
General; ex parte Segerdal (1980) 1 WLR at 1572, where a chapel in the Church of Scientology was not a place 
of meeting for religious purposes, as referred to by Church of the New Faith at [24]. 
550 It should be noted that the Charities Act 2011 (UK) s 3(1)(2)(a) now states, under the head of advancement of 
religion, that ‘“religion” includes — (i) a religion which involves belief in more than one god, and (ii) a religion 
which does not involve belief in a god.’ 
551 Church of the New Faith, above n 537, at [24]. 
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In relation to the canons of conduct, the Court concluded that whilst the material to support 
their conclusion was not compelling, they could draw inferences that the adherents to 
Scientology, in carrying out the practices required by Hubbard, gave effect to their supernatural 
beliefs.552  This may be criticised as adopting too broad an interpretation of giving effect to 
supernatural beliefs.  However, what this does suggest is that the Court adopted a neutral stance 
in relation to assessing a belief system and how people ought to be able to give effect to their 
own belief system.  This finds its authority in the concept that “the truth or falsity of religions 
is not the business of officials or the courts”.553 Thus, it is incumbent upon the courts to view 
religions, and how individuals give effect to their beliefs broadly, in a manner that is as 
inclusive as possible.   
 
It may be argued that such a broad approach might be seen as giving religious charities 
pecuniary advantages over other non-charitable entities.  However, it must be remembered that 
charity law still requires certain tests to be met.  As the Court in the Scientology case has stated,   
religion is required to fall within a twofold test, and whilst public benefit is implied under the 
advancement of religion, this doctrine can be rebutted, as evidenced in Chapter 7.  Therefore, 
whilst the boundaries surrounding religion within the parameters of charitable law may appear 
to be drawn widely, charity law still provides containment to ensure that advantages granted to 
such charitable bodies are granted on the basis of compliance and continued governance 
requirements.  
 
An additional issue considered by the Court was in relation to accusations of Scientology being 
a sham religion and tainted with charlatanism.  Such issues would, perhaps, be a disqualifying 
criterion as a charitable entity.  It was asserted by trial judge Crockett J that Scientology “was 
no more than a sham … and the adoption of paraphernalia and ceremonies of conventional 
religion was a mockery.”554  In response to this accusation, Mason ACJ and Brennan J of the 
High Court stated that “charlatanism is a necessary price of freedom”.555  Therefore, even if “a 
self-proclaimed teacher persuades others to believe in a religion which he propounds, lack of 
 
 
552 At [45]. 
553 At [7]. 
554 At [25], referring to the Scientology case (1983) 1 VR at 109. 
555 At [25]. 
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sincerity or integrity on his part is not incompatible with the religious character of the beliefs, 
practices and observances accepted by his followers.”556   
 
Prima facie, such apparent criticism of a religion would appear to undermine the public benefit 
of religion, and thus disqualify it as a charity. However, in answer to this, what this falls back 
on is faith, and prescribing to the canons of conduct that are observed, which enable the 
followers to give effect to their belief.  Murphy J, in the same case, provided the context to this.  
He stated that whenever “legislature prescribes what religion is, this poses a threat to religious 
freedom.”557  Further, bias by courts nor officials against religion is not acceptable in a today’s 
society.558  Indeed, in reality if “each purported religion had to show that its doctrines were 
true, then all might fail.”559  To impose such judgment on one religion means that all religions 
should also be judged equally.  Therefore, just because a religious belief or practice seems 
“absurd, fraudulent, evil or novel”,560 or if a religion is novel, or lacking in members, this does 
not negate the fact that it may still be a religion.561  Rather, there is no “essence of religion”;562 
it is for each body to prove, on the standards set by charity law, that they are entitled to the 
privileges of charity.563  In other words, charity law can and does state what is sufficient to 
bring that body within charity law benchmarks. 
 
Murphy J was clear, nonetheless, that some religions may be hoaxes and consequently will not 
meet the prescribed charity law benchmarks.  However, this is not a presumption, and “to reach 
this conclusion requires an extreme case.”564  Being sceptical of a belief system is not sufficient 
to reach that conclusion, and religious scepticism has abounded for hundreds of years.  For 
instance, “religions, with their gods, their demigods, and their prophets, their messiahs and 
their saints, were created by the credulous fancy of men who had not attained the full 
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Nonetheless, religion sits deep with the psyche of humans, regardless of criticism, and is 
protected by law in so many jurisdictions, thus all beliefs have to be treated equally, even if 
some belief systems appear alien or deceptive.  Indeed, Murphy J highlighted the importance 
of protecting less popular religions.  This is because, generally, “all religions commence as 
minority groups, often gathering around the teachings of one seemingly inspired individual.  
Their rise to public acceptance is normally very slow and difficult.”566   Further, as had been 
argued previously in the United States’ Supreme Court case of Gillette v United States,567 a test 
of public popularity might risk increasing a claimant’s chances of legal success if their belief 
system echoed a more familiar or salient connection with a conventional religion. 
 
This approach echoes the discussions in Chapter 7 in relation to issues arising with popular or 
unpopular charitable purposes.  Briefly, as I addressed it in that chapter, it was observed by 
Elias CJ in the New Zealand Supreme Court case of Re Greenpeace of New Zealand Inc:568 
 
Just as unpopularity of causes otherwise charitable should not affect their charitable status, we 
do not think that lack of controversy could be determinative.  
 
In other words, if it were only the popular or non-controversial purposes that were charitable, 
this would be detrimental overall for the charitable sector because:569 
 
Such thinking would effectively exclude much promotion of change while favouring 
charitable status on the basis of majoritarian assessment and the status quo. Just as unpopularity 
of causes otherwise charitable should not affect their charitable status, we do not think that lack 
of controversy could be determinative.  
  
In application to the Scientology case, I respectfully acknowledge that Murphy J’s 
encompassing methodology is likely the most appropriate approach.  To find otherwise would 
mean that “the proliferation of religions and religious sects would present difficulties for any 
test based on public acceptability.”570   
 
 
566 At [39]. 
567 At [39], referring to Gillette v United States [1971] USSC 45 at 185. 
568 Re Greenpeace of New Zealand Inc [2015] 1 NZLR 169 at [75]. 
569 At [75]. 
570 Church of the New Faith, above n 537, at [40]. 
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Therefore, whilst Scientology may be subject to criticism, this is not a reason to preclude it 
from being charitable.  The Court confirmed that it fell within the twofold test prescribed by 
their Honours.  As such, it is caught within the ambit of charity law, thus it is fully justified as 
being a creditable charity.571 
 
Whilst Scientology may find credibility as a religion within the Australian charity law 
framework, other contemporary religious cases appear to be testing the boundaries of modern-
day believability.  As such, the question remains as to whether such cases risk undermining the 
relevance of the charitable sector as a whole.   
 
Over the last couple of decades countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Australia and New Zealand, have witnessed a rise in small groups who claim to be religious.  
Some of the groups are said to be “jokes, parodies or straightforward offence.”572  Examples 
include Jediism; The Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster; Matrixism; and the Missionary 
Church of Kopimism.573  The religious claims made by such groups may cause publically-
raised eyebrows, although there is much legal interest is being sparked as to the veracity of 
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572 Teemu Taira “The Category of ‘invented religion’: A new opportunity for studying discourses on ‘religion’” 
[2013] Culture and Religion Vol 14 No 4 at 477. 




It is likely of no surprise that the belief system of “Jediism” finds its history in the Star Wars 
films.  However, elements of its doctrines find their basis in other world religions, including 
Taoism, Buddhism, Hinduism, Judaism, Christianity and Paganism.574   
 
It has been stated that Jediism can be distinguished from the Jedis who are depicted in the Star 
Wars films.  In the films, the Jedi are fictional characters, whereas the Jedi referred to by the 
religious groups are factual people living their lives according to Jediism.  The history of 
Jediism is said to traverse a 5,000 year history because of its associations with the 
aforementioned religions, 575   and it is presented as an old religion “remythologized to a 
contemporary public.”576 
 
Despite its apparent history, it is still seen as an “invented religion”, and such a definition raises 
issues.  By attributing a religion the title “invented”, this automatically serves to discredit or 
undermine that particular belief system.  It has been asserted that such belief systems are only 
being invented so as to take advantage of the freedoms of religion set out by law and thus as a 
“resource for claiming rights, privileges and legitimacy”. 577   This may in turn discredit 
established recognised religions.  However, there are arguments that many established religious 
traditions “have misattributed authorship of sacred scriptures to founding figures.”578  Further, 
it is also asserted that religions such as Methodism, Mormonism and Adventism have 
developed, over some generations, a variety of methods that authenticate and naturalise their 
practices so as to “mask their recently invented nature in order to construct, unify, legitimise 




574 Charity Commission for England and Wales The Temple of the Jedi Order – Application for Registration 
Decision of the Commission 16 December 2016 at [22] and Registration Decision: The Jedi Society Incorporated 
(JED49459) 14 September 2015 The Charities Registration Board New Zealand at [22]. 
575 Adam Possamai “Gramsci, Jediism, The Standardization of Popular Religion and the State” in Jack Barbalet 
(ed) Religion and the State (Anthem Press, London, 2011) at 246. 
576 At 246. 
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Therefore, it could be argued that the word “invented” begins to lose its more critical undertone.  
In addition, so-called “invented religions”, such as Jediism, have demonstrated how their belief 
system has a historical path as opposed to being invented from scratch.580  Further, it might be 
contended that religions generally were invented by humans, and it is said that, for example, 
“people rarely speak of the ‘invention’ of Islam by the prophet Muhammad.”581  Regardless, 
Jediism, and indeed Scientology, as discussed earlier in the chapter, are invariably referred to 
as “invented” religions.  
 
Nonetheless, I assert that the use of such a term in the public discourse does reveal its pejorative 
associations, which immediately undermines those belief systems in the public eye, thus 
making their transition into public acceptance all the more difficult.  Irrespective, however, of 
the terminology utilised, Jediism has gained much attention in the public eye because of its 
recent judicial journeys in the United Kingdom and New Zealand.  For the purposes of this 
chapter, I will mainly concentrate on the New Zealand Registration Decision: The Jedi Society 
Incorporated582 because the research sits within the Australasian context of this part of the 
chapter.  I acknowledge that this Decision is not legally-binding, however, the Board’s 
determination is significant in the development arguments pertaining to “sham religions”, 
therefore its inclusion in the thesis on that matter is significant. 
 
The Charities Registration Board (Board) in the Jedi Decision referred to the question of 
Jediism being a sham religion; this was connected to the gravity of the religion.  In addressing 
this matter, the Board referred to the United States v Kuch,583 noting that in Kuch there was 
evidence that the organisation was full of “goofy nonsense, contradictions, and irreverent 
expressions.”584   
 
In applying this to the Jedi Decision, the Board affirmed that the gullibility of the believers is 
of no consequence, although there was sufficient evidence that the Jedi Society should be 
distinguished from Kuch.  This was because whilst the Society did take its mythological content 
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582 Registration Decision: The Jedi Society Incorporated, above n 574.  The Charity Commission for England and 
Wales came to the overall same conclusion as the New Zealand Board; see The Temple of the Jedi, above n 574. 
583 At [35]-[36], referring to United States v Kuch 288 F (DC 1968). 
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137 
from the Star Wars films, and allegedly not from divine inspiration nor revelation, which was 
similar to the Kuch entity, there was no evidence of ulterior motives in its doctrines nor any 
sense of insincerity.585 
 
Indeed, and of relevance as to how religions may be viewed in a contemporary context, the 
Board observed that whilst the Society’s doctrines were taken from a fictional source, this is a 
“sometimes more practical means of conveying philosophies applicable to real life.” 586  I 
contend that this suggests charity law is capable of recognising the practical realities of religion 
in modern day context.  This might give credence to a new belief system and enable it to benefit 
communities in ways that are appropriate to their specific needs, which more traditional 
religions may be unable to provide.   
 
My viewpoint finds authority in Adam Possamai’s research into novel religions.  Possamai 
suggests that such religions take “account of subjective needs, of emotional communication, of 
face to face rapport, as opposed to all the cold forms of functioning of the traditional religious 
institution.”587  In applying this to Jediism, it can be argued that Jediism fulfils a person’s needs.  
This can occur through expressing themselves on the internet and through forums, with 
emotional connections made in cyberspace without fear of discrimination or harassment.  
Indeed, members of Jediism, just as with other new age religions, can create cyber identities 
and change gender, name and age, in order to create a safe belief construction that provides 
comfort and support.588  This is different from the way in which traditional religions provide 
their religious outputs to members.  It speaks to the contemporary methods of communication 
undertaken in so many walks of life in current societies, which includes texting, social media 
apps and internet forums.   
 
Whilst it could be argued that electronic forms of communication fail to recognise the power 
of face-to-face communication, where, for instance, a priest might give comfort to parishioners 
or hear confessions, the opposite might be said to be true.  Chat rooms and forums form a part 
of the oral conversation construct.  Such liturgy is preserved online, where it can be shared and 
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form part of further conversations, adding to support networks and sharing of views and ideas.  
This creates a new type of face-to-face rapport in the religious environment.589 The public 
benefit of such networks may be undeniable because they echo traditional forms of 
communication albeit in extended, and generational-appropriate, formats.  
 
Returning to the Board Decision, the Board confirmed, nonetheless, that the Society was self-
professedly not sufficiently organised and non-dogmatic.  It did endeavour to advance its faith 
through its website, but the formal structure of learning was not elaborated upon, although the 
Society did have future plans to establish a Jedi school and a Jedi Temple.590 Consequently, 
the Board concluded that the “belief system is merely a collection of interconnected ideas based 
on the Star Wars universe, rather than [a] structured, cogent and serious religion.”591 
 
Nevertheless, the Board did perhaps leave the door open for the Society to reapply for 
charitable status, observing that “in time Jediism may develop the level of seriousness and 
structure necessary to advance religion”.592  This point is important because this reflects the 
sincerity given by judicial authority to contemporary religions in a charity context.  Charity 
evolves to meet the societal requirements, as has been discussed in other chapters, and not all 
conventional religions will meet the needs of contemporary society.  Whilst an “invented” 
religion may not be an obvious provider of charity, there is no reason, in reality, why it should 
not.  This is because it is equally likely to be able to provide spiritual comfort to its followers, 
just in a different format from that traditionally recognised.   
 
I contend that Jediism may be perfectly placed to provide a multitude of spiritual benefits 
because it exists at a time of the “loss of traditional security with respect to practical knowledge, 
faith and guiding norms.”593  Indeed, individuals are often increasingly uprooted or “deprived 
 
 
589 At 254. 
590 The Jedi Society Incorporated, above n 574, at [40]. 
591 At [40]. 
592 At [41].  It should be noted that the Charity Commission for England and Wales Decision of the Temple of the 
Jedi Order, above n 574, at [23]-[30], came to a similar conclusion in relation to the lack of sufficient cogency. 
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requirement.  
593 Possamai, above n 575, at 257, citing Ulrich Beck “Individualization, Institutionalization and Standardization: 
Life Situations and Biographical Patterns” in Ulrich Beck Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (SAGE, 
London, 1992) at 127-138. 
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of the cultural signifiers of traditional culture.”594  As a result, traditional methods of finding 
spiritual comfort and enlightenment may be unsatisfactory or inappropriate.  Consequently, 
finding new methods of spirituality may simply be a reaction to contemporary society and the 
pressures and changes it places upon its communities.  Indeed, it has been observed that in 
religions such as Jediism, “some science fiction, horror and fantasy narratives can be 
understood as cultural reservoirs for the construction of religion by spiritual consumers.”595   
 
Nonetheless, as observed in the Charity Commission for England and Wales The Temple of the 
Jedi Order (TOJO), 596  although interestingly not in the New Zealand Decision, seeking 
spiritual comfort through electronic means must still comply with public benefit.  The 
Commission did confirm that while the Jedi Doctrine and its services are accessible to the 
public, such services were focused on the “provision of a support service for the … members 
who are in need to help them seek solutions themselves.”597  This meant that the focus was too 
inward, as opposed to the requisite “outward focus on the general public.”598 I respectfully 
assert that the Commission was likely correct to conclude that the TOJO did not demonstrate 
sufficient public benefit in this matter as it does appear that the pastoral care is self-focused.  
However, it is not clear how this matter would necessarily be distinguished from pastoral care 
being offered to a Christian when being granted face to face spiritual counsel by a minister.  
This too would likely be construed as self-care.  Nonetheless, it is still not clear from the 
evidence given by the TOJO that sufficient public benefit was demonstrated overall on this 
matter.  This is relevant because at a time when religions are falling increasingly under the 
spotlight to justify their place in the world, the public may be comforted that at least with regard 
to controversial “new” religions, charity law governance appears stringent in its requirement 
to establish the overall benefit to society. 
 
Nevertheless, the acknowledgement by the New Zealand Board of the possibility that Jediism 
might be recognised as a charity is significant for the charitable sector because religions could 
 
 
594 At 257. 
595  Russell Sandberg “Clarifying the Definition of Religion under English Law: The Need for a Universal 
Definition” (2018) Ecclesiastical Law Society 20 at 144-145, citing Adam Possamai Religion and Popular 
Culture: a hyper-real testament (Peter Lang, Brussels, 2005) at 58. 
596 The Temple of the Jedi Order, above n 574 at [34]. 
597 At [34]. 
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provide benefit to new communities in ways that had not been conceived previously.  Indeed, 
as observed earlier, taking beliefs “from a fictional source is ‘a sometimes more practical means 
of conveying philosophies applicable to real life.’”599  This also reflects the applicability of 
charity law in a contemporary context, whereby religion might no longer be seen as having a 
“Christocentric or monotheistic bias”.600  This means that religion is more inclusive and may 
be welcomed in more communities, thus underpinning the ethos of charity generally. 
 
Nonetheless, whilst this Decision demonstrated that there is an apparent move away from the 
aforementioned “Christocentric or monotheistic bias”, there is evidence that this is not always 
the case in some jurisdictions.  For instance, it has been asserted that the advancement of 
religion within charity law has been strongly prejudiced towards the Judaeo-Christian 
religions, 601  and indeed, still continues to be in some jurisdictions.  This has led to “an 
inarticulate drawing upon the traditions of a subset of religious systems in order to formulate a 
requirement applicable to all.” 602   Indeed, it was further noted that “defining religion by 
reference to worship of a deity automatically create[d] a bias against Eastern religions.”603  As 
a result, such bias can lead to possible religious discrimination at the likely expense of 




IX. When Cultures Collide 
 
This part of the chapter considers charity law issues arising within Hong Kong, which derives 
its charity law framework from English principles.  I consider the problematic application of 
English charity law principles to non-Western religious beliefs.  This reveals that such 
methodology “tends to discriminate against non-Western and non-mainstream religion.”604  
 
 
599 The Jedi Society, above n 574 at [38]. 
600 Jonathan Benthall, “Scientology’s Winning Streak” (2014) Anthropology Today Vol 30 No 1 at 3. 
601 Andrew Iwobi “Out with the old, in with the new: religion, charitable status and the Charities Act 2006” 2009 
Legal Studies Vol 29 No 4 December at 626. 
602  At 626, citing PW Edge and JM Loughrey “Religious charities and the juridification of the Charity 
Commission” (2001) 21 LS 36 at 46.   
603  At 626, fn 44, citing Charity Law Association Response to the Draft Charities Bill (Main Report) at 
http://charitylawassociation.org.uk/wparty040727.html.  
604 Pauline Ridge “Religious Charitable Status and Public Benefit in Australia” (2011) Melbourne University Law 
Review Vol 35 at 1075.  It should be noted that the submissions made in this chapter extend considerably some 
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The likely reason being that “religious charity law strongly reflects its historical context and is 
grounded in a mainstream Protestant Christian paradigm.”605  I acknowledge that in charity 
terms, there are certainly limited materials available relating to this jurisdiction and the 
advancement of religion.  However, it would be a mistake to believe that lack of materials 
reflects the worth of considering this state’s charity law matters.  I assert that actually the 
opposite is true.  The issues arising with regard to the application of the advancement of religion 
principles within Hong Kong gives rise to concerns as to the potential discriminatory role that 
Western religious doctrines play in a contemporary charity law narrative.  This may lead to 
communities being undermined, and with that the social support provided by religious groups 
may be significantly reduced without charitable legitimacy. Consequently, it could be said that 
English charity law principles are “increasingly ill-fitting to the needs of contemporary 
society.”606  As such, I submit that it is important to highlight such matters and consider how 
charity law can address such difficulties, which this chapter aims to do.  As a result, even 
though the issues pertaining to Western notions of religion being applied to non-Western 
notions of religion may be seen to undermine the object of my inquiry, that of reconciling the 
advancement of religion, this may not be the case.  This is because I provide perspectives as to 
how charity law may be able to address these issues, and thus reconcile the advancement of 
religion appropriately. 
 
X. Ancestor Worship in Hong Kong 
 
The “law of charities in Hong Kong remains, in many respects, a classic common law affair”,607 
whereby English charity law principles apply.  A key issue with regard to the advancement of 
religion within the Hong Kong context is the construct of Traditional Chinese Religion (TCR), 
where ancestor worship sits at its core.  This occurs in clan halls called T’ong, where plaques 
and steles are raised so as to honour the dead ancestors, and their spirits are said to be contained 
within the monuments.  T’ongs are generally upheld by family clans, and membership of clans 
 
 
materials in Juliet Chevalier-Watts Charity Law International Perspectives (Routledge, Abingdon, 2018) at 181-
183 in relation to Ancestor Worship.   
605 At 1075. 
606 Rachael PS Leow “The Evolution of Charity Law in Singapore: From Pre-Independence to the 21st Century” 
(2012) Trust Law International Vol 26 No 2 at 90. 
607 Stefano Mariani “Traditional Chinese Religion trusts in Hong Kong” (2015) Trusts & Trustees June Vol 21 
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is claimed through the family name and a shared lineage from an ancestor; such membership 
is extensive.  Importantly, “TCR can be understood to be the religious dimension of traditional 
Chinese social and kinship structures.”608  Further, the fundamental importance of such culture 
is firmly embedded within Chinese society, even from Imperial times, whereby the clan “was 
the basic organizational and juridical unit of society, such that the conceptual and psychological 
lines dividing the family sphere remain less well defined than in most European cultures.”609  
This means that ancestor worship was, and remains still, of profound spiritual and cultural 
significance. Indeed, ancestor worship is “intrinsically tied to the Chinese identity as a 
communal people, bound by Confucian values to honor the family.”610  Failing to observe 
correct deference to the deceased is said to have disastrous consequences for society generally, 
as well as for the person who has failed in their cultural duty.  Further, ancestor worship is not 
limited to individuals or one family, as has been understood from a European perspective, 
which is the basis of English charity law principles.611  Consequently, ancestor worship is not 
without its issues in contemporary times especially when it is viewed from an English colonial 
law construct, which occurs in Hong Kong.  Indeed, it has been said that ancestor worship “still 
presents one of the greatest obstacles to the progress of Christianity”,612 suggesting an inherent 
prejudice against TCR in an originally-colonised state such as Hong Kong.   
 
The burden of English legal principles is certainly felt when considering TCR and the 
advancement of religion because the general rule is that trusts for the advancement of religion 
that encompass TCR will not be charitable.  The origin of this is to be found in Ip Cheung 
Kwok v Ip Siu Bun.613  The heavy weight of English charity law was apparent throughout the 
Court’s deliberations on the concept of ancestor worship.  It was clear that the Court was not 
able to make a distinction between TCR and Western-based religions, noting that “it is not a 
common or any God which is worshipped but private ancestors … which are more comparable 
to those pertaining to a gift for a private family chapel”,614 thus not charitable.   
 
 
608 At 539. 
609 At 539. 
610  Clark G Fobes “Chinese Ancestor Worship and Christianity: A Historical and Contextual Evaluation” 
(Research paper, The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 31 December 2018) at 3. 
611 Mariani, above n 607, at 539-540. 
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613 Mariani, above n 607 at 540, referring to Ip Cheung Kwok v Ip Siu Bun [1990] HKLR 499. 
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The Court did acknowledge that ancestor worship was “clearly a bulwark in the religious life 
and social structure of the Chinese”615.  However, it could not be charitable because English 
law prevented the requisite public benefit being ascertainable, no matter how “socially 
desirable ancestor worship may have been considered in China.”616 
 
In addition, the Court also considered the other part of the public benefit test, that being whether 
ancestor worship benefitted a section of the public.  That being that a trust would be charitable 
if the legatees had been the community at large or a sufficient section of the community.617  
This led to the consideration of the rule set out in Re Compton, which was later approved in 
Oppenheim v Tobaccos Securities Trust Co Ltd, whereby “even where a group of persons is 
numerous, if the nexus between their personal relationship to a single propositus or to several 
propositi, they are neither community nor a section of community for charitable purposes.”618  
In applying the principle from Compton and Oppenheim, the Court stated that it was 
“inescapable that a trust for the benefit of the male descendants of Ip Sze Shing … falls squarely 
within the ‘single propositus’ test”,619 which rendered the trust non-charitable.  Consequently, 
it appears unlikely that such cases would meet the charitable requirements of the advancement 
of religion.   
 
However, Stefano Mariani argues that the continuation of Ip as authority on ancestor worship 
in Hong Kong is “disappointing … because … there is much in [the] judgment militating 
against it being treated as the last word on the matter.”620  It is a convincing argument and one 
worth considering. 
 
In Ip, the Court agreed with the Singaporean Court in Choa Choon Neoh v Spottiswoode621 that 
ancestor worship was not charitable because of the clan relationships.  The Privy Council in 
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Yeap Cneah Neo v Ong Cheng Neo “approved Choa’s case”622 on this matter and Ip made 
reference to this authority also.   However, Mariani argues that Ip was “decided on its own 
convoluted facts”,623 and its reliance on Choa and Yeap was not appropriate.  This was because 
in Choa, “it was common ground that the trust … was not charitable”,624 and indeed, that 
Maxwell CJ in Choa was “at pains to emphasize that … this stood on the particular facts of 
that case, and should not be construed as questioning the validity of a charity for the 
advancement of Oriental religions in general.”625   
 
With regard to Yeap, the Court said that the trust was not charitable because of its perpituitous 
nature.626   Consequently, it was argued that the discussions on ancestor worship “was for the 
public benefit may be regarded as obiter, and in any event, both predated the more generous 
judicial approach … adopted in Bourne v Keane … and Re Hetherington.”627  In Bourne, there 
was “some judicial consideration of the analogy between … ancestor worship and Roman 
Catholic masses celebrated for the dead”,628 and in Hetherington, Catholic Masses were said 
to be for the public benefit.629  However, in Ip, the Court referred to Yeap, where a Sow Chong 
house (where a religious ceremony to a deceased husband and the testator) was said not to be 
charitable because that ceremony “can benefit or solace only the family itself”630  The Court in 
Ip, in reliance on Yeap, then noted that such ceremonies were closely analogous to “gifts to 
priests for [Catholic] masses for the dead”631 and not charitable. 
 
Mariani asserts that that determination has been “fundamentally undermined by … Re 
Hetherington … that a Mass for the dead was understood …. to have a public dimension if 
performed in public.”632  Indeed, Re Hetherington’s approach appears to align more closely 
with Choa’s assertion that “[ancestor worship] is agreeable to God … and its neglect entails 
disgrace on him whose duty it is to perform it … and mankind generally.”633 Further, both 
 
 
622 Ip Cheung Kwok, above n 613 at [103], referring to Yeap Cneah Neo v Ong Cheng Neo (1875) LR 6 PC 381. 
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types of ceremony “are believed to have spiritual implications transcending the purely personal 
or familial sphere.”634  Taking this argument one step further, it is asserted that in reality, and 
“specifically in a Chinese cultural context, the clan, being a fundamental and self-contained 
unit of social and religious organization, would constitute an important section of society.”635 
 
It is clear that there are issues in applying Western traditions of charity law to Chinese belief 
systems, not least because it could be argued that “colonial rule … [has] undermined the 
agricultural and village community bases of traditional Chinese popular religion.”636 This may 
have impacted adversely on the ability of religions to act under the umbrella of charity and thus 
ensure purposes are operating effectively throughout communities.  However, I contend, 
respectfully, that New Zealand jurisprudence may provide a suitable approach in such 
circumstances, specifically in regard to the issue arising with blood tie nexus, which provides 
substance to Mariani’s observations in relation to kinship issues found in ancestor worship that 
it “does not follow that a clan affiliation is susceptible to analogy with an Anglo-Saxon nuclear 
or extended family.”637  For this, I rely on Latimer v Commissioner of Inland Revenue.638 
 
XI. A New Zealand Māori Approach and Hong Kong  
 
This case concerned certain interest payments from a Trust being made accessible to Maori so 
as to assist their negotiating claims before the Waitangi Tribunal, which took into consideration 
all of the groundwork relating to research and preparation that was required prior to such 
negotiations.  One of the questions before the Court was whether assistance given to Māori 
claimants was for public benefit, in spite of the relationship of shared ancestry contained within 
each claimant group. 
 
Just as Hong Kong was bound by English charity law principles, so too originally was New 
Zealand, specifically in relation to the test set out in Compton and Oppenheim, as mentioned 
above.  However, the Court in Latimer approached this matter in a way that was specific to the 
unique perspective of New Zealand.   
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Blanchard J observed that there is a shared ancestry for Māori, which would, prima facie, fail 
the nexus test of Oppenheim because public benefit would fail.  Nonetheless, this was not a 
barrier because:639 
 
… the common descent of claimant groups is a relationship poles away from the kind of 
connection which the House of Lords must have been thinking of in the Oppenheim case when 
it said that no class of beneficiaries could constitute a section of the public for the purpose of 
the law of charity if the distinguishing quality which linked them together was a relationship 
to a particular individual either through common descent or through common employment. 
There is no indication that the House of Lords had in its contemplation tribal or clan groups of 
ancient origin. Indeed, it is more likely that the Law Lords had in mind the paradigmatic 
English approach to family relations.  
 
Whilst the test in Oppenheim was not undermined, it was evidently not appropriate in the New 
Zealand cultural context, not least because the House of Lords in Oppenheim could not have 
considered such a context.  Indeed, Blanchard J confirmed that charity law “has been built up 
not logically but empirically”, 640  suggesting that some elements of charity law are not 
appropriate in some circumstances; Latimer being one example.   
 
Further, his Honour confirmed that the majority decision in Oppenheim was criticised in Dingle 
v Turner,641 where the dissenting view of Lord MacDermott in Oppenheim was favoured.  In 
the Dingle case, Lord Cross of Chelsea stated:642 
 
In truth the question whether or not the potential beneficiaries of a trust can fairly be said to 
constitute a section of the public is a question of degree and cannot be by itself decisive of the 
question whether the trust is a charity … It may well be that … a trust to promote some purpose 
… will constitute a charity even though the class of potential beneficiaries might fairly be 
called a private class and … on the other hand, a trust to promote another purpose … will not 
 
 
639 Latimer at [38]. 
640 At [38], citing Oppenheim, above n 618, at 309. 
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constitute a charity even though the class of potential beneficiaries might seem to some people 
fairly describable as a section of the public. 
In application to Latimer, Blanchard J confirmed that in “the New Zealand context it is … 
impossible not to regard the Maori beneficiaries of this trust, both together and in their separate 
iwi or hapu groupings, as a section of the public”.643  
 
As a result, English law was put aside to respect New Zealand cultural issues falling outside 
the English framework.  I contend that such an approach could also be applied to the cultural 
perspectives specific to both Hong Kong in relation to ancestor worship.  Whilst English law 
would still be applicable, Latimer shows that there is “ample scope to perfect the adaption of 
common law to the particular societal character of”644 different cultures. 
 
It might be argued that Latimer was not an advancement of religion case, and therefore the 
principles would not apply to religious cases.  However, Blanchard J said charity law “has been 
built up not logically but empirically.”645  Therefore, principles might be applied outside of 
their original context, where appropriate to do so.  Indeed, my view finds weight in Ip.  The 
Court in Ip confirmed that Compton and Oppenheim were concerned with trusts for the 
advancement of education, not religion.  Nonetheless, the Court understood that the test in 
those cases was not to be confined to educational trusts,646 and could be applied to other 
circumstances.  Consequently, charity law principles are not necessarily confined to specific 
heads of charity and may be applied to other heads of charity.  
 
I respectfully suggest this may be applicable in circumstances pertaining to ancestor worship. 
This is because, just as Blanchard J in Latimer observed, “it is more likely that the Law Lords 
had in mind the paradigmatic English approach to family relations”,647 as opposed to specific 
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If this approach was observed, this would endorse Elias CJ’s statement in the Supreme Court 
case Re Greenpeace of New Zealand Inc that charity law is an “area of law which should be 
responsive to the way society works.”648 Indeed, if charity law is not cognisant of particular 
societal circumstances, this “is likely to hinder the responsiveness of this area of law to the 
changing circumstances of society.”649  Indeed, her Honour went further, noting the relevance 
of, inter alia, Latimer, observing that:650 
 
… the circumstances of the modern … state may throw up new need for philanthropy which 
is properly to be treated as charitable … for example, charity has been found in purposes which 
support the machinery or harmony of civil society, such as is illustrated … in … Latimer v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue …  
 
Utilising Elias CJ’s view that charity “has been found in purposes which support the machinery 
or harmony of civil society”, I assert, as I have in another chapter, that religion can be said to 
support the “harmony of civil society” because of its beneficial role within society generally. 
Therefore, there is authority to support my recommendation to adapt the common law in Hong 
Kong to take into consideration specific societal characteristics.  This would have the benefit 
of ensuring that religion is able to assist society generally because clans are extensive, thus any 
personal benefit would be ancillary to the overall public benefit. 
 
This is not the only reason, however, to perfect the adaption of the common law.  It has been 
submitted that there are other valid reasons to do so also. For instance, “the maintenance of 
ancestral temples and the performance of the attendant rites remain important features of 
Chinese communal life, in which devout and socially engaged wealthy individuals … continue 
to express interest.”651  Indeed, there is evidence that some ancestral trusts hold substantial 
wealth, and that wealth has been utilised to benefit some Hong Kong village communities.  
Such benefits include maintaining and upgrading village halls; cleaning a village pond; 
refurbishing ancestral and village temples; establishing a kindergarten; and maintaining a 
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sporting stadium that is utilised substantially by villagers.652  It might be argued that some of 
these purposes would not necessarily be charitable, but improvement of communities has been 
confirmed as charitable,653 thus ancestor worship funds may support charitable endeavours, 
and as a result, the reconciliation of the advancement of religion would be apparent within this 
context.  
 
Such commercial benefits echo the views expressed earlier about the relevance of 
commercialism within religion in a contemporary context, and provide further evidence that 
the application of Western-based religious charity law may not be appropriate in a number of 
cultures.  This is because it comes at the expense of non-Judeao Christian religious beliefs and 
may undermine “the machinery … of civil society” applicable to Hong Kong.  Although as the 
law stands in Hong Kong, such charitable endeavours are left without state recognition, and 
thus fail to obtain any charitable benefits that may support communities further.  
 
Therefore, I argue that the transplantation of Western laws into a different societal dynamics 
can cause deeply-held cultural and social observances to suffer, suggesting that the law is unfit 
for purpose in those circumstances.  Charity law, therefore, is likely to fail in its remit to support 
communities where it is needed.  However, options are available to assist the charity sector in 
such circumstances, as evidenced in New Zealand, although it may be some time before other 
states follow such examples. 
 
The final matter I address in this chapter also relates to cultural differences between Western-
based notions of religion and non-Western based notions of religion in a charity law context.  I 
offer some brief considerations in relation to a specific Islamic institution, that of the waqf, 
which is a “perpetual charity in the Islamic ethical system”,654 and how this institution may 




652 Selina Ching Chan “Selling the Ancestor’s Land: A Hong Kong Lineage Adapts” (2001) Modern China April 
Vol 27 No 2 at 273-275. 
653  “Community and economic development” Charities Services New Zealand 
https://www.charities.govt.nz/ready-to-register/need-to-know-to-register/charitable-purpose/community-and-
economic-development/  
654 Abdul Hasan M Sadeq “Waqf, perpetual charity and poverty alleviation” (2002) International Journal of Social 




XII. Waqf and the Advancement of Religion 
 
Before I begin, it is important to give an overview of waqf (awqaf, plural) and its role within 
Islam.  Islam is a “comprehensive religion that covers all aspects of human life.” 655 
Consequently, the Islamic faith is a complete code of life.  As such, it has a successful economic 
system, and waqf is one of the Islamic economic instruments.  It is related to pious, religious 
or charitable donations, and its conventional meaning is derived “from the canonical Islamic 
concept, which refers to a special kind of charity given for the purposes of benevolence.”656  
As noted with regard to Western concepts of charities, waqf refers to charities and gifts that 
are in perpetuity, thus it has public benefit, which again is a familiar concept for charity in 
Western culture.  There are, however, private awqaf, where, for example, a settlor creates a 
waqf for their benefit of their children.657 
 
Awqaf are cited as underpinning significant societal development, including, inter alia, 
establishing mosques, educational institutions, and libraries.  The benefit of awqaf also extend 
to non-Muslims, thus it goes beyond religious, cultural, racial and sectarian boundaries.  Its 
overall purpose is to eliminate poverty and to make improvements to the social and economic 
Muslim ummah (community).  Consequently, awqaf have had a fundamental role within 
Islamic society since the time of the Prophet to modern times.658  Indeed, it is said that from an 
economic view alone the waqf is a powerful mechanism in developing a state because of its 
underlying charitable framework.659  This is because charity underpins a functioning society. 
 
In an earlier chapter, the five pillars of Islam were outlined, and they include zakat, which is 
obligatory charitable giving and can only be given to Muslim.  Waqf is different from zakat 
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because waqf is voluntary charitable giving and can be given to Muslim and non-Muslim.660  
Therefore, at its most simple form, waqf is a benevolent, or charitable bequest, which enables 
an individual to bestow goods to Allah, which has civic benefit.   In other words, “[t]his call 
by the Qu’ran to be charitable has been viewed … by Islamic society to require the facilitation 
of an institutionalised mechanism for wealth redistribution in an efficient and practical manner, 
which is Waqf,” 661 which supports the construct of the reconciliation of the advancement of 
religion in a non-Christian context.  However, whilst the Qu’ran, which is the principal 
foundation of Islamic law, does not specifically refer to waqf, it does stress the importance of 
charitable giving. For instance, “Lo! those who believe and do good works and establish 
worship and pay the poor-due, their reward is with their Lord and there shall no fear come upon 
them neither shall they grieve.” 662 
 
This chapter mentioned the similarity between waqf and Western common law notions of 
charity, and indeed, it has been asserted that the establishment of trusts in England was based 
on the waqf, after British interactions with Islamic leaders in the Middle East, and adopted it 
into the English common law. 663   Nonetheless, it should be noted that there are some 
distinctions, and one of the key ones is that Islamic theology prioritises the family.  Common 
law charity, as would be recognised in such jurisdictions as New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom, on the other hand, excludes provisions for people who are related to the settlor, as 
propounded in the Oppenheim case, to which this chapter referred earlier.  However, Islamic 
theology asserts that giving to family can be charitable because:664 
 
A pious offering to one’s family, to provide against their getting into want, is more pious than 
giving alms to beggars.  The most excellent of sadaka (charity) was that which a man bestowed 
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663 Fahad Mohammed Alabdulmenem “Waqf in Islamic Legal System and Trust System in the United Kingdom: 
A Comparative Study” (2017) Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization Vol 61 at 212. 
664 Stibbard, Russell, and Bromley, above n 660, at 786-787, citing Abu Fata Mahomed Ishak v Russomoy Dhur 
Chowdhry (1894) Law Rept 22 Ind Ap 76 (PC), where Lord Hobhouse was citing the Prophet Mohammed but 
could not justify a family waqf as being charitable because it did not meet English charity law principles. 
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The House of Lords in Oppenheim, nonetheless, stated that such a relationship would negate 
charitable purpose because, as will be recalled:665 
 
… even where a group of persons is numerous, if the nexus between them is their personal 
relationship to a single propositus or to several propositi, they are neither community nor a 
section of community for charitable purposes.  
 
Further differences include the basis of charitable trusts and that of awqaf.  Whilst at their core 
both have as their intention to give up voluntarily assets or property for others, awqaf have 
their values and beliefs entrenched in religion.  Islam places strict restrictions on waqf and 
connects it to religion and the financial system.  Waqf has its origins within the Islamic 
charitable trust, and it still retains its historical holy nature.  Consequently, waqf must operate 
appropriately within Shari’ah in relation to its construction, structure, administration, 
objectives, and management.666  On the other hand, common law charity is, theoretically, 
secular in its foundations and free from religious regulation,667 although as earlier chapters 
outlined, their history is found in religious concepts, and it may advance religion as a 
recognised purpose. 
 
Nonetheless, both waqf and common law charity have had a profound influence on the 
development of societies, both Western and non-Western, in terms of providing social welfare, 
advancing religious education, research and providing infrastructure development. 668  
However, the common law does not necessarily recognise waqf as charitable.  As a result, this 
section of the chapter considers the issues related to that, and addresses whether in multicultural 
democratic societies, continuing to ignore this Islamic charity institution reflects a continued 
favouring of Western concepts of religion at the expense of non-Judaeo Christian religions, 
thus perhaps undermining my assertion that the advancement of religion is a reconcilable 
 
 
665 Ip Cheung Kwok, above n 622, at [129], referring to Re Compton [1945] Ch 123 and Oppenheim v Tobaccos 
Securities Trust Co Ltd [1951] AC 297 (HL). 
666 Alabdulmenem, above n 663, at 220-221; “shari’ah” is spelt in a variety of ways throughout the resources 
utilised in this thesis and I utilise the spelling of it as utilised in the appropriate resource. 
667 At 221. 
668 At 208. 
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construct in contemporary society.  Indeed, it has been asserted that “case law reveals that … 
the power of colonial law and courts … [has] … invalidate[d] … awaqf”669 over the years. 
 
Whilst the common law continues to ignore awaqf specifically as being charitable, what cannot 
be ignored is the ancient history between Islam and England in relation to awaqf, which is only 
recently coming to light.  It is said that the “the world’s first university, Al-Qarawiyin in Fez, 
Morocco … was … based on waqf,”670  and that waqf influenced Oxford University, and then 
later other eminent universities, because that University had its foundations in the Islamic 
model of waqf.671  As a result of such historical relationships, I assert therefore that such 
relationships may provide the foundations for recognising awaqf within the English concept of 
charity in the future, which would reflect the multi-faith realities of contemporary society.  If 
this were to occur, this would support the object of my inquiry that the advancement of religion 
is reconcilable in this very specific context, that of an Islamic construct in contemporary 
Western society, and in doing so, charity would likely be able to provide greater support to 
many communities as a result of more Islamic entities being able to obtain legal charitable 
recognition.   
 
XIII. Oxford University and Waqf 
 
It has been submitted that Merton College, Oxford, had waqf at the heart of its constitution and 
this constitution was the first of its kind.672  Further, the constitution was typically followed by 
additional Oxford and Cambridge colleges.   
 
Merton College’s founder was Walter de Merton, a minister and senior government officer.  
One of the key aspects of de Merton was his connection with the New Temple.  He conducted 
 
 
669 Hang Wu Tang “From Waqf, ancestor worship to the rise of the global trust: A history of the use of the trust 
as a vehicle for wealth transfer in Singapore” (2018) Iowa Law Review 103 (5) at 2278. 
670  Daniel Rahman “Waqf can empower youths, society” 15 May 2018 The Star  
www.thestar.com.my/opinion/columnists/whats-your-status/2018/03/15/waqf-can-empower-youths-society-
when-institutionalised-the-spirit-of-giving-and-caring-can-play-a-bi/#iC72Jb4XxXYRlZCC.99  
671 Sadeq, above n 654, at 135; see also Murat Cizakca A History of Philanthropic Foundations: The Islamic 
World from the Seventh Century to the Present (Bogazici University Press, Istanbul, 2000) at 50. 
672 Stibbard, Russell, and Bromley, above n 660, at 791, referring to Monica Gaudiosi “The influence of the 
Islamic law of Waqf on the development of the Trust in England: the case of Merton College” (1987-1988) 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 136 1231-1261. 
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his business here, as well as maintaining his wealth within this institution. The New Temple 
was the English base for the operation of an order called the Knights Templar.  This military 
religious organisation was established in Jerusalem in 1120.  By the 13th century, the order had 
“evolved in to a complex multinational trading empire with major centres of operation in the 
Middle East and Mediterranean regions.”673  Further, de Merton had significant involvement 
in discussions with the Pope’s envoy in relation to Sicily, which aided the transference of 
Islamic culture from Sicily to Norman England.674   
 
de Merton wished to educate his nephews, and from that desire, Merton College became an 
incorporated college; the first of its kind to be created.  Of note are some of the features of the 
founding documentation for the College, which appear to be based on waqf principles, such as 
specifying the charitable purpose of the Trust; the assignment of the property in perpetuity; and 
reserving the benefit to his family.  In other words, the Trust followed the Islamic practice of 
supporting his family and also long-term charitable objects.  Benefiting family members is, as 
has been mentioned, an acceptable charitable practice within the waqf framework.675 
 
In addition, the documentation set out requirements for student clothing, which for all intents 
and purposes was a school uniform, which followed similar provisions current at the time in 
waqf documents.  It is said that this was the template for school uniforms.  The documentation 
also set out provisions for forfeiture for bad behaviour and removal of unfit trustees, both of 
which had similar Islamic law principles.676   
 
Nonetheless, it is evident that at no point did de Merton make explicit reference to waqf or that 
it influenced the documentation; there was good reason for this.  This was because Merton 
College was founded at the time of the Crusades, meaning that “it would not have been wise 
for a prominent clergyman and government servant to announce his adoption of an Islamic 
institution.”677  Therefore, it is asserted that de Merton had a significant effect on not only 
esteemed places of learning but on trust law also. This is because “[b]y separating legal and 
 
 
673 At 791-792. 
674 At 792. 
675 At 792. 
676 At 792. 
677 At 792, citing Monica Gaudiosi, above n 672, at 1255. 
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beneficial ownership for the benefit of family members, it may furthermore have had a critical 
role to play in the evolution of the common law trust.” 678 Ironically, however, there has been 
little mention of this fundamental influence on Western notions of law throughout the centuries, 
perhaps reflecting the historical lack of recognition of non-Western religious concepts in the 
West which we still see today. 
 
Whilst waqf has at its heart religious aims, education is one of its key objectives, and this is 
clear from its history.  This is evidenced from de Merton’s utilisation of waqf principles in 
establishing Merton College.  Other key beneficiaries of awqaf were the poor and the needy; 
awqaf were also utilised to provide health services and provide assistance to abandoned 
animals.679  The breadth of Islamic philanthropy therefore echoed the charitable purposes 
detailed within the Preamble of the Statute of Elizabeth, as mentioned in earlier chapters. It is 
said, however, that Islamic philanthropy is much broader in its scope than common law 
charitable trusts.680 
 
Regardless of awqaf’s apparent charitable framework, difficulties arise in ensuring that such 
trusts meet common law requirements of charity, not least in relation to the public benefit test, 
because the Oppenheim nexus test rules out such recognition.  The other issue is that as the law 
stands “English … charitable purposes are … incompatible with Islamic charitable 
purposes” 681  because all Western charitable purposes must be exclusively charitable.  
However, this has not traditionally been how Arabic “settlors drafted their awaqf.”682  Often, 
awqaf would include charitable and non-charitable purposes that would benefit family.683  A 
further issue arises whereby Western courts have failed to recognise that “a purpose which is 
religious in the eyes of a devout Muslim is considered to be a religious purpose under charity 
law.”684  Instead, “the purpose must promote religion, not merely … secure the approval of the 
 
 
678 At 794. 
679 At 794. 
680 At 794. 
681 Tang, above n 669 at 2280. 
682 At 2280. 
683 At 2280. 
684 At 2280. 
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Almighty.”685  However, in Islamic law, seeking the approval of the Almighty is a religious 
purpose.686 
 
Such systematic failure to recognise key theological differences inevitably caused by 
transposing inherently different legal principles is disappointing because at its theological 
heart, waqf is broad in its capacity and capable of assisting many communities, not just Islamic 
ones.  Further, “there is no place in modern multicultural society for treating faiths other than 
Christian as non-religious.” 687   Consequently, I contend that for the benefit of multiple 
societies, charity law should consider seriously the role of waqf within Western concepts of 
the advancement of religion.  Of course, this may not be a popular stance to take.  Sharia law 
appears shrouded in mystery and mistrust in the West as evidenced when, in “2008 the 
Archbishop of Canterbury raised a media storm by suggesting that sharia law might in some 
limited respects be recognised by the civil legal system … that storm … still blows around.”688  
Nonetheless, Singapore may provide part of the answer to this issue. 
 
XIV. Singapore and Waqf 
 
Singapore introduced the Administration of Muslim Law Act 1968 (AMLA) to create a more 
inclusive approach towards the advancement of religion, which included waqf.689  The AMLA 
provided for the regulation of Muslim religious affairs.  This included instituting a council, the 
Majlis Uguma Islam, Singapura (MUIS), which advised and administered matters concerning 
Islam, generally in relation to marriage, divorce and inheritance.  Under MUIS, waqf is 
described as “the permanent dedication by a Muslim of any movable or immovable property 
for any purpose recognised by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable”.690  Every waqf 
must be registered with the MUIS, and its Fatwa Committee then decides on the validity of it.  
Only Muslim may found a waqf in Singapore, but the beneficiaries need not be Muslim.691 
 
 
685 At 2280 referring to Syed Shaik Alkaff v A-G (1923) 2 MC 38 (Sing) at 44. 
686 At 2280. 
687 At 804, referring to Donovan Waters QC “The Advancement of Religion in a Pluralist Society” (2012) Trusts 
& Trustees 17 at 660-662. 
688 Julian Rivers “The Secularisation of the British Constitution” (2012) Ecc LJ at 391. 
689 Rachael PS Leow “The Evolution of Charity Law in Singapore: From Pre-Independence to the 21st Century” 
(2012) Trust Law International Vol 26 No 2 at 92. 
690 At 92. 
691 Stibbard, Russell, and Bromley, above n 660 at 801. 
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The effect of the AMLA “was to relieve some of the strain imposed on a charity framework 
originating in England and forced to fit into the unique social and cultural history of 
Singapore.”692  This is certainly welcome legislation because it recognises the value of waqf 
within the social structure of a state. However, the law of charity in Singapore is still limited 
in its ability to recognise certain religious purposes as being charitable, just as it does in Hong 
Kong, which no doubt undermines the role of religious charities within that society.693  Further, 
there is also evidence that the AMLA has had limited impact on awqaf in Singapore, perhaps 
because, inter alia, there are other forms of “Islamic philanthropic purposes aimed at 
Muslims”.694  Indeed, it there appears to be a “preference for settlors ‘to manage their own 
[aw]aqf without any interference”695 that arises from the AMLA governance. 
 
Therefore, even with the progression of legislation in Singapore, notwithstanding its apparent 
limitations, the English model of charity law is constrained by its ability to recognise some 
waqf as charitable, especially family waqf, even though the New Zealand case of Latimer, as 
addressed earlier, provides authority for such possible recognition.  As it stands, even though 
the principle of religious freedom is extolled in many jurisdictions, charity law can still limit 
some expressions of religion, and invariably these are non-Judaeo Christian models of religion.  
This is an unfortunate development in our multicultural societies, and it is hoped that charity 
law governance can evolve in a more appropriate manner to meet the needs of such societies 




The positioning of this chapter was significant because in order to reconcile the black letter law 
assertions, and the arguments made in relation to waqf, it was important to have made a number 
of socio-political submissions prior to this in the thesis in order to gain an understanding of 
 
 
692 Leow, above n 689, at 93.   
693 See generally Juliet Chevalier-Watts Charity Law International Perspectives (Routledge, Abingdon, 2018) at 
chap 10. 
694 Tang, above n 669 at 2283, referring to Shamsiah Bte Abul Karim “Contemporary Shari’a Compliance 
Structuring for the Development and Management of Waqf Assets in Singapore” (2010) Kyoto Bull of Islamic 
Area Stud 3-2 at 144. 
695 At 2283, citing Karim, above n 694 at 144. 
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how the law sits within these specific frameworks.  As a result, the justiciable nature of the 
common law decisions, and those pertaining to waqf, became more inherently defensible once 
one had a clearer understanding of the relationship between law, society and politics. 
 
In considering the assertions in this chapter, I highlight some disconnects between ancient and 
modern concepts of charity in contemporary society.  That being said, in relation to matters 
such as commercialism and novel belief systems, credibility can be demonstrated in instances 
where courts have recognised as charitable some of these challenging circumstances.  Indeed, 
as confirmed in this chapter, charity law, through the necessity of public benefit, requires that 
these charities can meet stringent legal criteria and, as a result, will benefit societies as their 
objectives determine, thus reducing burdens overall on society.  Therefore, concerns relating 
to, for instance, commercialism and religion may be more readily eradicated because what has 
been demonstrated is that modern trappings of religion are actually compatible with the 
commercial world, and are meeting the needs of contemporary society.  For example, by 
assisting with reducing debt and by enabling charities to be competitive.   
 
Whilst such approaches may not necessarily be the perceived traditions of religion, religion 
now embraces many aspects of modern-day society.  This is evidenced, for example, in 
megachurches embracing sales strategies to disseminate their message to the public.696  The 
public generally now accept such commercial tactics, whilst charity law ensures that a church’s 
charitable objectives must still be met so as to satisfy charity law requirements.  Indeed, 
“[c]ommercialism is so characteristic of organized religion that it is absurd to regard it as 
disqualifying.”697  Whilst Hong Kong appears to reject commercialism within religion, I have 
demonstrated that within other jurisdictions, religious commercialism may benefit the charity 
sector by enabling charities to operate more effectively, for example, by enabling charities to 
compete more effectively for funding.  It is respectfully suggested that Hong Kong might wish 





696  Jack Barbalet, Adam Possamai and Bryan S Turner “Public Religions and the State: a Comparative 
Perspective” in (eds) Jack Barbalet, Adam Possamai and Bryan S Turner Religion and the State: A Comparative 
Sociology (Anthem Press, London, 2011) at 282. 
697 Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-Roll Tax (Vic) ("Scientology case") [1983] HCA 40 at [45]. 
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Nonetheless, this chapter also highlighted other disconnects, whereby the gaps are not so easy 
to bridge and issues remain. For instance, with regard to the dominant position of Judaeo-
Christian religious legal principles in communities that do not focus traditionally or culturally 
on such religions, Hong Kong in relation to TCR.  The other matter that was also raised in this 
chapter where cultural differences arose was in relation to the Islamic institution of the waqf.   
 
What these discussions illustrate is that the predominance of Judaeo-Christian-centric notions 
of charity and religion could undermine significant communities that may have benefitted from 
the assistance provided by religion. This in turn undermines the role of religion within society 
itself, further marginalising it.  This is unfortunate when religion faces such challenges within 
contemporary society.   
 
Marginalising a religion means marginalising its religious following because religion is not 
just a belief system, as demonstrated in earlier chapters.  For many, religion is an identity, 
family, community, way of life and law.  Charity law should be able to support such 
communities, but it is apparent that it may be failing with regard to some religious aspects 
because of the disconnects between law and religion.  I respectfully suggest that such matters 
are addressed on a governance and legal level, perhaps as Singapore did with the 
implementation of the AMLA, at least with regard to waqf.  Indeed, historical relationships 
between English universities and waqf may provide the foundations for such future charitable 
recognition.   
 
I contest that such changes are important because charity law must progress to ensure that it 
meets the evolving needs of societies, as pointed out by Elias CJ in the Greenpeace decision, 
whereby charity law is an “area of law which should be responsive to the way society 
works.” 698   As the English model of charity law stands in relation to some aspects of 
advancement of religion, it is not easy to say that it is responding to the way in which society 
works, as was urged by Elias CJ.  Consequently, it is more difficult to justify the rational for 





698 Re Greenpeace of New Zealand Inc [2015] 1 NZLR 169 at [70]. 
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I continue the thesis’ examination of the advancement of religion in the next chapter by 
critically reviewing the economic relevance of religious charities within a social and political 
context.  
161 




This thesis’ aim is to examine critically charity law’s sociopolitical-legal reconciliation of the 
advancement of religion.  I progress this analysis in this chapter by focusing on religion and its 
relationship with economics, and I look to understand the economic relevance of the 
advancement of religion, which sits within a socio-political context.  This chapter was relevant 
to continue the critical examination because it looks to embed religion within the socio-political 
framework to which I have made reference earlier in the thesis; economics being a subset of 
that framework.  I argue that this chapter aids my object of reconciling the advancement of 
religion because it illustrates, objectively, the social relevance economically of religion within 
charity.  Economics was selected as a pertinent argument because charity does not sit in 
isolation from the narratives that can determine state policies, which includes charity law, and 
thus the advancement of religion.   
 
What I confirm in this chapter is that economics and religion have long been associated, and 
further that because of this association, the high economic value of religious charities to many 
societies, democratic or otherwise, is key in aiding a plethora of communities through the work 
of religious charities.  Consequently, I assert that the advancement of religion can be reconciled 
from a secular perspective, that of being an economically-viable construct for the benefit of 
society generally.  From a secular perspective, I argue that giving religious charities an 
economic value is relevant.  This is because in many capitalist societies as might be recognised 
in, for example the United States and the United Kingdom, it may be that when something is 
valued, it is often given a monetary value, and that monetary value is then important to society 
because it is a method of measuring worth.  In giving religious charities a value, their worth, 
apart from the arguably unmeasurable spiritual benefits, may be seen as being of “worth” to 
society, therefore. 
 
It should be noted that the legal decision-making process as to whether a purpose fits within 
the legal rubric of advancement of religion is not subject to economic scrutiny.  Nonetheless, 
this chapter’s specific focus on economics within religion has relevance because charity law 
cannot be considered in isolation from social and policy narratives. Consequently, I provide, 
inter alia, a global overview of religion and economics; critically examine the role of Faith-
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Based Organisations (FBOs); and analyse the relevance of the Islamic institution of zakat on 
an economic level.  Overall, I provide tangible evidence as to the objective significance of 
religion within charity, which may have relevance also within a secular context. 
 
Economics and charity may be considered to be equally as strange bedfellows as 
commercialism and charity, as discussed in an earlier chapter.  Indeed, for many, equating 
economics and charity is distasteful.  For example, at least in Christian terms, money is said to 
be the root of all evil.  Further, it might be seen as demeaning a belief system by reducing it to 
mere economics.  Nonetheless, and perhaps surprisingly, at least from a Christian perspective, 
“Jesus says more about money than heaven, hell, or prayer, and there are over 2,300 verses 
pertaining to money in the Bible”.699  Evidently, money “occupies an important place in what 
we consider to be God’s inspired words.”700   
 
Further, generally speaking, religious participation, and particularly a conviction in the 
existence in hell, heaven and the hereafter, is said to have positive impact on the development 
of economics.  This is because religious beliefs are said to increase efficiency by promoting 
beneficial human characteristics such as integrity, hard work and prudence.  It has been argued 
that religious compensations, such as forgiveness of a person’s sins, and being granted salvific 
reward as a result of charitable endeavours, will encourage religious believers to work 
conscientiously and to carry out good works.701  Further evidence suggests that religious beliefs 
are linked to an increasing levels of education and, therefore, knowledge.702 Consequently, 
with higher levels of education generally come higher socio-economic levels of living. 
 
It is important to note that in the previous chapter I did consider some matters in relation to 
economics.  Specifically, this was set within a defined narrative relating to particular case law 
to assess critically the relationship between commercialism and religious charities.  However, 
this chapter takes a broader approach.  The narrative of this chapter frames religious bodies 
within the economics of states and communities, endorsing the fundamental importance of 
religious charities within communities. 
 
 
699 John Cortines “God’s Call to Give” 2017 The Christian Lawyer Vol 13 No 2 Fall at 9. 
700 At 9. 
701 Rachael M McCleary “Religion and Economic Development” 2008 Policy Review Apr/May at 49. 
702 At 48-49. 
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It should be noted that whilst this chapter does not take an explicit legal focus, it is implicit 
from the arguments presented in this chapter that the laws pertaining to charity will be 
influenced by the socio-political-economic frameworks that encase religion within 
communities. 
 
I acknowledge that my approach is not a common one to take.  However, this approach is 
important in order to consider the overarching socio-economic position of religious charities 
as part of this thesis’ overall deliberation of how the law endeavours to reconcile the 
advancement of religion as a legally-recognised head of charity.  Further, this approach fits 
within a sociological description of legal theory that refers to law being described in economic 
terms.703  In other words, the common law can be understood, in part, as “pursuing efficiency 
and have developed into systems of welfare maximization.”704  Welfare maximisation could be 
said to be part of the ethos of charity.  Indeed, the legal rules of charity can be said to be 
selected, inter alia, “with respect to their effect on the wellbeing of individuals in society.”705  
Therefore, this legal theory of charity law is relevant because “it is useful to know about the 
costs and benefits of implementing a certain rule or reaching a certain judicial decision.”706  
Consequently, it contributes to the religious charity narrative by providing additional 
legitimacy for the advancement of religion in a socio-economic context. 
 
One of the reasons that the approach being taken in this chapter is not a common one may be 
because of the general unwillingness to place an economic value on matters of morality and 
faith, hence the distaste mentioned earlier.  Although, as also mentioned earlier, and considered 
in the previous chapter, religion and money have long been associated.  So perhaps it is now 
time to consider the realities of this and provide an additional framework by which to assess a 




703 Jan M Smits The Mind and Method of the Legal Academic (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham, 
2012) at 22-23. 
704 At 23. 
705 At 63. 
706 At 66. 
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The limited times this type of approach has been taken may also be indicative of the fact that 
actually this is a relatively new area of research.  Consequently, “what we do not know dwarfs 
what we do know about the economics of charity.”707  It is also worthwhile noting that much 
of the research available at the time of writing this thesis had limited specific commentary on 
religious charities per se, although such charities were included generally in the research.  The 
available research often referred to FBOs; non-governmental organisations (NGOs); and 
religious organisations, many of which are charities or carry out charitable endeavours.  
Further, these terms were often used interchangeably and referred specifically to religious 
charities or religious not-for-profit (NFP) organisations.  It should be noted that “NFPs” is also 
used interchangeably for charities.  Consequently, in some instances, some of the arguments 
may be academic due to some assumptions or analogies that have had to be made in relation to 
religious charities generally.   
 
One final point needs to be made in relation to the limited availability of research in relation to 
economics and charity.  The lack of substantive research resulted in this chapter critically 
assessing what may be perceived as an eclectic selection of jurisdictions, which includes the 
United Kingdom, Germany, the United States and some Middle Eastern jurisdictions.  Such an 
approach is merely indicative of the research available for consideration at the time of this 
thesis.  What this does indicate, therefore, is that more research is required within this area to 
understand fully the real economic value of religious charities, not only within the charity 
sector, but more importantly, to civil society as a whole. 
 
Nevertheless, what I demonstrate is the economic relevance of religious charities, 
demonstrating a key function of religious charities within many societies, democratic or 
otherwise, and thus providing substantive evidence that the advancement of religion can be 
reconciled from this specific socio-political framework.  Such secular evidence is relevant 
because it provides tangible evidence to the non-religious communities who might suggest that 
intangible benefits have limited value, or are even meaningless, in an increasingly (allegedly) 
secular world.  At a time when society becomes more vocal about the relevance of religion 
 
 
707 Clive D Fraser “Faith, Hope and Christian Giving: How Religion Explains Giving when Warm Glow and 
Impure Altruism Do Not” (17 April 2018) http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3164327, citing JA List “The Market for 
Charitable Giving” 2011 J Econ Perspectives 25(2) at 177. 
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within charity, tangible evidence is likely to become paramount in order to counteract pressure 
being placed on states to assess the perceived value of this charitable purpose.   
 
It might be argued that knowing the socio-economic value of religion does not reflect the true 
value of religion generally because religion’s benefits are often ethereal in their construct.  
However, such demonstrable evidence provides an objective perspective, which might be 
persuasive for governments when considering policy approaches in relation to religions and 
their governance, which includes charitable governance.  Further, such socio-economic value 
enables faith leaders to demonstrate quantifiable worth to communities, which then has a 
meaningful value, as opposed to considering religion’s general ethereal worth, which for many 
is of limited relevance. 
 
In order to examine the relationship between economics and religion, and to aid my assertion 
that the advancement of religion can be reconciled within this specific framework, I first 
provide an overview of religion and economics generally, in order to contextualise the overall 
narrative.  It should be noted that focus is given to recent research emanating from the United 
States, although comparisons will be made to other jurisdictions where research is available to 
assess the international economic and religious trends. The focus is given to the United States 
because the available research is detailed, comprehensive and recent. 
 
The research has also highlighted connections between religion, economics and civil society 
and therefore I addresses, briefly, how charity sits within civil society, because it is apparent 
that some of the legal principles of charity are embedded within this particular framework. This 
section of the chapter is relevant, therefore, because it contextualises the economic and social 
framework of charity within civil society, and it also echoes some of the legal theory material 
in relation to framing charity law within society.   I refer to “civil” society generally as a society 
that is part of a recognised democratic society. 
 
I then consider the relationship between economics, FBOs and social welfare from a Western 
society perspective.  Finally, I consider the economic position of Islam within the charitable 
construct.  I contend that this latter point is just as important as considering Western 
perspectives because of the relevance of Islam within modern-day multicultural societies; 
religious charity discussions cannot be limited to Western notions of faith.  Indeed, these 
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discussions are judicious not only because of the challenging times for religions generally, but 
also specifically for Islam on an international scale. 
 
 
II. Religion and Economics – An Overview 
 
I begin the examination by providing some general background information pertaining to 
religion and economics that will contextualise the later assertions that religious charities can 
be reconciled within an economics construct.  
 
It has been observed that decisions with regard to charitable giving, which include not just 
financial gifts but also gifts of time, are closely related to “orientations toward divine guidance 
in financial decision making.”708  Taking the United States as an example, in 2008 over 89 per 
cent of households gave money to charity, and religious organisations were the most common 
cause to which households gave.  Even in the midst of an economic downturn in 2008, said to 
be the worst since the Great Depression, religious groups received USD 107 billion.  The 
second most common cause to receive gifts, educational organisations, ‘only’ received USD 
41 billion.709  Indeed, it is said that religious spending is generally resilient, and likely immune 
from such downturns.  This is because places of worship, and schools and hospitals with 
religious affiliations continue operating, and consequently, continue to spend money.  Further, 
despite the downturn in the economy since 2008 in the United States, faith-based spending, for 
example, on community social programmes, has increased by 3 times over the last 15 years.710   
 
Financial crises may actually increase religious participation and thus religious good in the 
community.  Research conducted in Indonesia illustrated how an Asian financial crisis led to 
increased religious participation through Koran and Islamic school attendance and through the 
increase in religious social organisations thus ensuring greater assistance with social relief.  
This increased religious intensity was not because there was more time for religious activities, 
 
 
708 Lisa A Keister Faith and Money: How Religion Contributes to Wealth and Poverty (Cambridge University 
Press, New York, 2011) at 79. 
709 At 79; see also Russell N James III and Keely S Jones “Tithing and religious charitable giving in America” 
(2011) Applied Economics 43 19 at 2442. 
710 Gene Veith “Religion’s economic impact” (20 September 2016) 
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/geneveith/2016/09/religions-economic-impact/. 
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rather it was a direct response to economic distress, where people increased labour and religious 
beliefs.711 
 
One might argue that this information is of limited value because some is dated, and therefore 
such economic relevance may not be of such significance in contemporary times.  However, 
research from the United States in 2016 suggests that this data is still relevant today because 
little has changed with regard to the United States’ economic relationship with religion.712   
 
In 2016, the total given by American individuals, bequests, foundations and corporations 
specifically to religious charities totalled USD 122.9 billion, which was a 1.8 per cent increase 
from 2015.  By way of comparison, educational charities, which were second as recipients of 
donations, received a ‘mere’ USD 59.9 billion.713  The United Kingdom provides similar 
statistics, whereby religious charities were joint first recipients of donations.714  New Zealand 
echoes these statistics, where donations worth NZD 447.9 million were made to religious 
activities, which represented 32.6 per cent of the overall amount donated in 2014; this was the 
sector that received the highest donations.  Culture and recreation, the sector that received the 
second highest amount of donations, received nearly 19.3 per cent of the total donations.715  A 
2017 Report revealed similar trends, whereby religious charities received the highest levels of 
donations in comparison with all other groups.716   
 
 
711 Sriya Iyer “The New Economics of Religion” (IZA Discussion Papers 9320, Institute for the Study of Labor 
2015) at 30-31. 
712 Brian Grim and Melissa Grim “The Socio-economic Contribution of Religion to American Society: An 
Empirical Analysis” [2016] Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion 12 3; Religious Freedom and 
Business Foundation https://religiousfreedomandbusiness.org/1-2-trillion-religious-economy-in-us; Brian J Grim 
“Religion may be bigger business than we thought.  Here’s why.” World Economic Forum 5 January 2017 at 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/religion-bigger-business-than-we-thought/; Joe Carter “How much 
economic value does religion provide America?” Action Institute Blog (15 September 2016) 
http://blog.acton.org/archives/89009-how-much-economic-value-does-religion-provide-america.html. 
713  Una Osili “What influences American giving?” The Conversation 25th July 2018 
https://theconversation.com/what-influences-american-giving-78800. Numbers are in billions of inflation-
adjusted USD. 
714 Fraser, above n 707, at 3. 
715  Mark Cox, Fiona Stokes, and Hugh Dixon “Giving New Zealand: Philanthropic Funding 2014” 2015 
Philanthropy New Zealand December at 11. 
716 John McLeod “The New Zealand Cause Report - Shape of the Charity Sector” JBWere (March 2017) at 16 
https://www.jbwere.co.nz/assets/Uploads/JBWereNZ-CauseReport-March2017-DigitalVersion.pdf; see also 




Returning to the United States, research indicates that religion is a substantial contributor to 
the United States’ financial and societal power, and this research is said to be the first of its 
kind to frame religion within such a context.717  For instance, the research shows that religion 
provides USD 1.2 trillion of social and pecuniary worth to the overall economy of the United 
States on an annual basis.  This can be equated to being the global fifteenth main national 
economy.  At the time of the research, this was “more than the global annual revenues of the 
world’s top 10 tech companies, including Apple, Amazon and Google.  And it’s also more 
than 50% larger than the global annual revenues of America’s six largest oil and gas 
companies.”718 
In terms of what this means for United States’ economy alone, religious organisations such as 
churches, mosques and temples of every denomination employ many thousands of people, and 
they buy billions of dollars’ worth of services in a wide variety of communities.  In addition, 
the congregations of these organisations spend USD 84 billion on their operations, which 
include paying staff and purchasing goods and services.  Such spending occurs within the local 
community, thus supporting local communities.719 
 
In addition, the economic relevance of religious organisations, religious schools and 
universities is significant.  By way of just one example, St Benedict’s Catholic Preparatory 
School in New Jersey prepares 530 boys for college, and then for later years.  These boys are 
generally living in some kind of poverty, and are from minority groups.  In an area prevalent 
with gang violence, this work enables nearly 100 per cent of its students to attend higher 
education establishments, including a considerable amount of students being able to attend Ivy 
League schools.  Graduates also return to the community and make a positive impact as a result.  
Uriel Burwell did just this after graduating from university.  Returning to his old community, 
he built a substantial number of reasonably priced homes; rehabilitated more than 30 houses; 
 
 
717 Kelsey Dallas “Economic impact of religion: New report says it’s worth more than Google, Apple and Amazon 
combined” (14 September 2016) https://www.deseretnews.com/article/865662454/Economic-impact-of-religion-
New-report-says-its-worth-more-than-Google-Apple-and-Amazon-combined.html. 
718 Grim, above n 712.  Grim’s methodology is discussed in Kelsey Dallas, above n 717; note the study gives an 
educated guess as to the economic worth of religion thus it is thought that the study has underestimated the value 
rather than overestimated it. 
719 Grim. 
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and obtained more than USD 3 million to construct further reasonably priced homes in the 
locale.720   
 
One might argue that this is not related to religious charities per se, rather this may include 
religious organisations generally.  It is not, however, easy to differentiate between the two 
when it is evident that religious organisations offer significant charitable services within 
communities, thus charity work is being undertaken all the while under the umbrella of religion.  
For instance, the congregations of United States religious groups deliver 130,000 alcohol 
assistance courses, which includes the Saddleback Church “Celebrate Recovery” programme.  
This programme has assisted nearly 30,000 people over 25 years.  In addition, congregations 
also provide many thousands of programmes to help those without work, and this includes the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.  This church provides employment assistant 
facilities nationally and internationally.721  The assistance provided to such communities as a 
result of the charitable works is likely difficult to measure but has assisted literally thousands 
of people and families without impinging financially on the state. 
 
Such assistance provided by religious organisations is also said to run counter to various 
stereotypes that are levelled at religions, for instance, some religions may be said to 
discriminate against certain sections of the community due to alleged sexual practices that may 
result in diseases.  HIV/Aids is one such example having originally been seen as being part of 
the homosexual community.  Those within such communities have been subject to much 
vilification as a result by some religious groups.   Nonetheless, over 25,000 congregations 
provide some level of assistance to people with HIV/AIDS.  This means for every 46 people 
with the illness, there is one HIV/AIDS ministry.  Indeed, in 2017, on the weekend of 9/11, a 
substantial number of churches in Chicago held free testing programmes for HIV, amongst 
other diseases.722   
Specific religious charities and organisations are said to “add another $303 billion of socio-





722 Grim; “HIV” refers to Human Immunodeficiency Virus - a virus passed through the blood stream; “AIDS” 
refers to Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome - an advanced form of HIV; see generally New Zealand AIDS 
Foundation https://www.nzaf.org.nz/. 
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of Columbus, whose 1.5 million members respond to disasters and other human needs.”723  In 
addition, religious groups are said to be responsible for operating much of the United States 
health care system, and the Catholic Church accounts for one in six hospital beds in that 
country.  Such outreach by religious organisations creates the ‘halo effect’ from which 
communities will benefit in a variety of ways, through provision of, for example, child care 
services, education, employment and social events.724  Many such services will fall under the 
umbrella of charity.   
The halo effect is evidenced in a number of specific ways.  For instance, it has been observed 
that religious participation increases life expectancy by up to 7 years; and improves health 
through lowering blood pressure and stronger immune systems.  It also has a positive impact 
on reducing juvenile delinquency, increasing school attendance and positively increasing the 
chances of graduating from high school.  Such factors, therefore, provide economic benefits 
for communities generally.  This is because burdens imposed on states to pay for court 
processes, subsequent incarcerations and rehabilitation programmes, are reduced.  In addition, 
improved employment will also reduce welfare costs.  Further, adults with religious leanings 
are not as apt to carry out crimes, and thus to rely on welfare and social support, in turn reducing 
the burdens on the state.725   
 
This contemporary snapshot of religion within the United States economy illustrates how 
religion and charity are fundamentally intertwined.  Without religion, and its charitable 
outreach, there would be significant economic cost within communities, and the country 
generally, thus providing evidence that the advancement of religion may be reconciled from 
this economic framework. 
 
Research from some other democratic states echoes that of the United States.  For example, 




724 Marcia Segelstein The Economic Benefits of Religion” National Catholic Register (27 September 2016) 
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 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/health/religion-live-longer-muslim-jewish-christian-hindu-buddhist-life-
expectancy-age-a8396866.html. 




also confirms the economic value of other charitable sectors, albeit in more general terms, and 
with mention of the position of religious charities within the sector.726  The research revealed 
the economic significance of sector itself, finding that Australian charities employ more than 
one million people and have approximately two million volunteers.  Of relevance is that the 
research revealed that the Australian charitable sector favoured the following purposes over 
and above other types of charitable purposes: religion; education; research; and health.727  This 
echoes the research undertaken in the United States. 
 
Research provided by the Charities Aid Foundation (CAF) in the United Kingdom revealed a 
similar picture, showing that religious entities were the recipients of the highest total donations 
amount in 2016, receiving 20 per cent of the total donation amount, with overseas and disaster 
relief receiving the second highest amount at 10 per cent.728  What was also interesting within 
the CAF data was the levels of trust associated with the charitable sector.  CAF acknowledged 
that only 50 per cent of the population believed that charities were trustworthy.  For a sector 
that aims to be transparent and accountable, this appears to be a low level of trust.  However, 
what is significant is that whilst only 50 per cent of the population believed that charities were 
trustworthy, the highest proportion of donations were made to religious organisations.729  This 
reveals the perceived value of religion generally, such that even when the public are faced with 
limited trust in a sector, one part of that sector – religion – is favoured over others, suggesting 
that the public find religion more trustworthy than other causes.730 
 
In addition, research suggests that those individuals who have a belief system are considerably 
more likely to make contributions to charity than secular individuals.  This is because, as 
considered in earlier chapters, faith is said to motivate people to make acts of generosity731 
 
 
726  “Economic impact of charity sector revealed” Governance Institute of Australia (8 December 2015) 
https://www.governanceinstitute.com.au/news-media/news/2015/dec/economic-impact-of-charity-sector-
revealed/. 
727 “Economic impact of charity sector revealed”. 
728 “CAF UK Giving 2017 “An overview of charitable giving in the UK” 2017 Charities Aid Foundation April at 
13. 
729 “CAF UK Giving, at 16. 
730 The CAF research does not make any comment on this particular point. 
731  John Bingham Religion ‘makes people more generous’ The Telegraph (9 June 2014) 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/10885180/Religion-makes-people-more-generous.html. 
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because religious affiliation is closely affiliated to the benevolent provision of time and 
money.732   
 
New Zealand research also revealed similar trends, whereby religious individuals were said to 
give more to charity than non-religious individuals because of experiencing subjective well-
being as a result of doing so.733  Indeed, studies have revealed that tithing734 encourages greater 
variety of giving overall.  This practice is determined as a pro-social behaviour and pro-social 
behaviour is said to be a conduit for increased pious endowments, as well as increased positive 
relationships with non-religious charities.735   
 
Evidence of religious pro-social behaviours is illustrated through research into the Evangelical 
Pentecostal Charismatic Movement (EPCM).  This movement is linked to the much of the 
global expansion of Christianity.  The community aspect of the EPCM encourages and creates 
greater prosperity, increases upward mobility and provides a greater sense of civic 
responsibility.  Consequently, the EPCM has been at the root of multiple initiatives including 
welfare institutes for vulnerable members of the community, as well as providing business 
loans and tackling employment issues.  Such initiatives extend further than just providing 
assistance.  They tackle directly fiscal growth and societal transformation.736 
 
Therefore, it can be argued that not only do people generally value religious charities over and 
above other charities, having a religious belief is also likely to increase the amount given to 
charities, religious or otherwise, overall. 
 
Studies such as these provide compelling evidence of the material contributions made to 
societies by religious belief.  This evidence is important because many faiths feel marginalised 
by government policies in contemporary times.  Therefore, this economic evidence should be 
 
 
732 Ida Berger “The Influence of Religion on Philanthropy in Canada” (2006) Volantas 17 at 130. 
733 Chris G Sibley & Joseph Bulbulia “Charity explains differences in life satisfaction between religious and 
secular New Zealanders” (2015) Religion, Brain & Behaviour 5 2 at 97. 
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N James III and Keely S Jones “Tithing and religious charitable giving in America” (2011) Applied Economics 
43 19 at 2441 and generally throughout the article. 
735 James and Jones at 2445. 
736  Peter S Heslam “The Rise of Religion and the Future of Capitalism” (2015) De Ethica. A Journal of 
Philosophical, Theological and Applied Ethics Vol 2:3 at 59-60. 
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valuable to policymakers in determining religious societal secular and tangible benefits, 
particularly within a charitable context.  Charitable governance will ensure that funds raised 
through religious endeavours benefit communities as determined by rules of law, thus assisting 
with public confidence in the sector.  As a result, I assert that this evidence underpins the object 
of my inquiry, that of reconciling the advancement of religion, and it is evidenced here with 
regard to the economics framework that I have been examining. 
 
I have made much reference to some democratic societies and the beneficial economic impact 
of religious organisations and charities on those societies, but in order to contextualise the 
relevance of this economic impact within a democratic society, I need to step back and consider 
what underpins charity within civil society before returning to the significance of economics 
and charities.  As I mentioned earlier, I refer to “civil” society generally as a society that is part 
of a recognised democratic society. 
 
III. Charity and Civil Society 
 
Law must connect to its contemporary place within society, and charity law is not exempt from 
this.  Earlier chapters confirm that charity law is underpinned by the concept of public benefit, 
which means that legally-recognised charities address contemporary social circumstances in 
an appropriate and sufficient manner.  Consequently, legally-recognised heads of charity, 
which includes the advancement of religion, are “essential to establishing and sustaining an 
equitable, inclusive and stable society.”737  In other words, “to promote a truly contemporary 
interpretation of the public benefit is to promote civil society.”738   
 
It could be asserted that public benefit should not be found if a religion, for example, reinforces 
sectarian differences.  This might be said to emphasise divisions and promote inequalities in 
communities.  In the alternative, it could be asserted that, in reality, religious charities enrich 
“the texture, health and general good of society, promoting diversity rather than stultifying it 
by protecting homogeneity.”739  The latter view is perhaps most pertinent in contemporary 
 
 
737 Kerry O’Halloran “Charities, civil society and the charity law reviews on the island of Ireland” 2004 Policy & 
Politics Vol 32 No 2 at 263. 
738 At 263. 
739 At 263. 
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multicultural and multi faith civil societies when growing voices seek to silence religions in 
many regards. 
 
How then does public benefit sit within a civil society?  The concept of civil society can have 
a variety of meanings.  It can mean the behaviours produced as a result of a society, such as 
trust, reciprocity, tolerance and inclusion.  These traits add to the economic success and social 
capital of civil society.  A civil society can come about through the meeting of certain 
preconditions, such as an effective rule of law, freedoms of speech and association.  Civil 
society can mean having a desirable state of society, where, for example there is free public 
education and health care.  Finally, civil society can be viewed by its composition.  This might 
include religious organisations, clubs and movements, and community-based organisations.740  
However one interprets civil society, the concept seems to be based on the free association of 
people pursuing aims that complement the public benefit efforts of the state, and thus resulting 
in a more “cohesive and engaged body politic.”741 
 
I argue, therefore, that charity law is a facilitative framework that promotes civil society, and 
that is so even if I just focus on the economic impact of charities generally.  Charity comprises 
the largest component of the NGO sector, and charity lends itself well to promoting civil 
society.  This is because charity law facilitates the work of charities through the principle of 
public benefit.  The public benefit ethos underpins charity’s mission to improve social 
circumstances through redistributing goods and funds.  Religious charities fulfil this mission 
through their teachings, outreach and provision of services, to name but a few of their offerings.  
As a result, religious charities “address the issues of fundamental concern and facilitate the 
growth of civil society.”742  In just economic terms alone, religious charities, as this research 
demonstrates, can help achieve some harmony in civil society through their public benefit, even 
in the face of increasing criticisms and societal alienation.  Consequently, the growth of civil 




740 At 264, referring to J Bothwell “Indicators of a healthy civil society” in J Burbridge (ed) Beyond prince and 
merchant: Citizen participation and the rise of civil society (International Institute of Cultural Affairs, Brussels, 
1997) at 1-2. 
741 O’Halloran, above n 737, at 264. 
742 At 266. 
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Now I have contextualised the economic and social framework of charity within civil society, 
I will consider the role of FBOs and their place within the fabric of a civil society; I do this 
specifically in relation to social welfare from 2 Western democracies, England, as part of the 
United Kingdom, and Germany.  Such organisations support numerous communities through 
their delivery of social welfare, thus are important economic actors within civil society, hence 
their consideration within this research.  The research contrasts FBOs in England with 
Germany to gain an understanding of the economic impact in the differing state approaches. 
 
IV. FBOs and Social Welfare 
 
One of the issues facing FBOs in contemporary democratic society in relation to the welfare 
services they provide, especially if government-funded, is ensuring that an FBO remains 
faithful to its religious heritage and traditions, whilst at the same time ensuring that it complies 
with government bureaucracy.  This can include observing contractual obligations, policies and 
practices within the sector.744  Further, it has been noted that many governments “do not follow 
and measure the scope of FBO activities”, 745  which in essence means it is difficult to 
understand the true economic value added to society by these organisations.  Earlier in the 
chapter, the research conducted in the United States revealed some of the true economic worth 
of FBOs, but outside of that there has been an obvious paucity of any similar research, certainly 
pertaining to jurisdictions outside the United States. 
 
Nonetheless, some recent qualitative research on a number of countries746 does shed some light 
on this area.  It illustrates that FBOs remain of real relevance in the delivery of social welfare.  
As a result, it is submitted that FBOs and their charitable endeavours continue to facilitate the 
growth of civil society.  This, as will be demonstrated, underpins the thesis’ premise that the 
advancement of religion is a central part of civil society, and as such I can reconcile the 
 
 
744 Wilma Gallet “Confused Identity: What Makes Faith-Based Organisations Faith-Based?” Ethos EA Centre for 
Christianity and Society (10 April 2017) http://www.ethos.org.au/online-resources/engage-mail/confused-
identity-faith-based-organisations. 
745 Amos Zehavi “Religious Supply, Welfare State Restructuring and Faith-Based Social Activities” 2013 Political 
Studies Vol 61 at 568. 
746 I consider England and Germany to contrast the two approaches of the states.  Other countries in this research 
included the Netherlands and Israel.  Of brief note, and in general terms, the Netherlands reflected the approach 
of Germany, and Israel reflected the approach of England.  As a result, it was deemed pertinent to focus on the 
research from England, as part of the United Kingdom, and Germany because both are recognised as democratic 
societies 
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advancement of religion as a charitable purpose through an economic framework as part of a 
civil society.  I begin by considering FBOs within England. 
 
 
V. England and FBOs 
 
The role of FBOs in providing social welfare fell significantly after the Second World War due 
to the post-war policies that expanded public services.747  However, the 1990s saw a resurgence 
of FBO welfare services under Conservative and Labour leadership.  John Major’s 
Conservative Government created the Inner City Religious Council (ICRC).  The ICRC 
enabled discussions within faith groups that were linked to the Government, and as a result 
encourage faith-based contributions within urban generation projects.  Subsequent Labour 
governments also supported this approach, expanding such initiatives institutionally and with 
further funding.748   
 
Whilst it was evident that governments supported such initiatives, what was not measured was 
the level of public support of FBOs and these initiatives.  Nonetheless, what can be gleaned is 
how much such services were worth to governments. For instance, the financial worth of the 
provision of FBO welfare assistance in the south-east of England by the state amounted to GDP 
12.9 million.749  Consequently, it can be argued that governments endorsed FBOs to provide 
social welfare through this funding.  This assertion is given weight by evidence provided by 
government reports recognising the FBOs’ capacity to deliver highly effective services. This 
was because of “their social capital, highly motivated leadership and infrastructure”.750   
 
Further, there is evidence to show that governments have progressively depended on marginal 
FBOs to deliver publicly-funded services.  In addition, state partnerships with faith leaders, 
such as Islamic leaders, have been encouraged because they are seen as a way of tackling 
 
 
747  Zehavi, above n 745, at 568, referring to A Dinham Faiths, Public Policy and Civil Society (Palgrave 
Macmillan, London, 2009). 
748  At 568, referring to A Zehavi “The Faith-Based Initiative in Comparative Perspective: Making Use of 
Religious Providers in Britain and the United States” (2008) Comparative Policies 40(3) 331-351. 
749 At 568-569, referring to South East England Faiths Forum “Economic Impact Assessment of Faith in the South 
East” (WM Enterprise, London, 2010). 
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religious zealotry in some sections of the community.751  Indeed, it has been asserted that 
“[f]aith communities have a new found importance as key civil players in the Government’s 
agenda which centres on localism, devolution of power, citizen choice, and community based 
service delivery.”752  As a result, I conclude that FBOs offer a positive socio-economic impact 
within these communities, thus supporting the object of my thesis that the advancement of 
religion can be reconciled, and specifically here from an economics perspective. 
 
Nonetheless, it has been observed that in England, governments appear reluctant to look 
systematically at the impact of FBOs on their local economies.753  This reluctance may stem 
from legitimate concerns about evaluating moral communities solely in economic terms.  
However, as I have already asserted, providing a secular and objective tool by which to measure 
impact is likely to benefit the religious sector, and the charitable sector also, because overall 
the impact appears to be positive. Another reason for the reluctance is perhaps because of the 
difficulty of measuring the true economic impact when one considers, inter alia, the number of 
volunteers that operate within FBOs; the thousands of hours given by volunteers; and the 
numerous services provided by FBOs.   
 
However, there may well be a way to assess the economic contribution and social return on 
investment of FBOs, or places of worship on their communities.  For instance, one could 
consider the direct economic upturn or downturn in a local community after the building of, 
for example, a mosque.  This would be measurable quantitatively. Although this would not 
take in to consideration the power of faith and doctrine that encourages support within the 
community.  Faith can act as a community of people, across multi-faiths, or inter faiths, or it 
can act as a single faith, or as a congregation.  All of which assist in communities, thus 
providing some kind of economic output.754  However, that kind of economic output is likely 
to be difficult to determine.  Indeed, as was noted about the 2016 United States research, those 
figures were said to be conservative, illustrating the difficulties of assessing true economic 
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752 Carl F Stychin “Pluralism, Equality and the Challenge of Faith-Based Services” (2014) Journal of 
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value.  Certainly, the lack of effective studies appears now to be being acknowledged,755 and it 
is the recommendation of this thesis that such fundamental research would be opportune, and 
of significance to states, communities and the charitable sector.   
 
Nonetheless, what has become evident from some of this research, and pertinent to this thesis, 
is that the motives for FBO initiatives that were supported by both Conservative and Labour 
governments stemmed from deeply religious convictions.  It was asserted that the resurgence 
of FBOs within communities was actually a reflection of broader trends, those trends being a 
resurgence in religion generally.  Not least because of strongly religious leaders who were 
influencing social policies at the time. Indeed, the “influence of the church is … central to 
English constitutional history”,756 as well as to modern times.  For instance, the religiously-
inclined individuals Tony Blair and Gordon Brown rose high within their political hierarchies.  
In addition, there was a marked disassociation with radical socialism, and a move towards 
ethics-based socialism that led New Labour to a more religious-orientated approach.757  The 
Blair years were also noted as expanding state-funded religious schools.  This led to an 
uncomfortable socio-political situation, whereby that Government increased equality to lesbian 
and gay communities, and that created conflict with a number of religious groups’ moral views.  
This approach by the government of the day had its groundings in the ethos of civil society, 
whereby faith was seen as having a fundamental position in public undertakings.758  In other 
words, this was a “distinctive view of civic religion that sees religion as contribution to the 
creation of a more dynamic civil society and the development of a more democratic political 
culture.”759 
 
What this tells us is that religion, welfare and politics cannot be isolated from each other.  
Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider in any more detail these complex 
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at 4; M Bevir “New Labour: A Study in Ideology” (2000) British Journal of Politics and International Relations 
2(3) 277-301; and A Zehavi (2008), above n 748. 
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FBOs in England was recognised implicitly as politics took a more religious stance, thus 
providing evidence that the advancement of religion can be reconciled through this economic 
and political framework because the value of religious charities as FBOs to English 
communities was recognised and endorsed by the government of the day. 
 
VI. Germany and FBOs 
 
In contrast to that of England, the role of FBOs providing welfare services in Germany appears 
to be shrinking. 
 
Prior to the Second World War and in the subsequent years, the German welfare model was 
motivated by the Roman Catholic principle of subsidiarity; this created a pivotal place in 
society for faith groups to provide welfare services.  However, as the years went on, 
secularisation and greater demands on welfare services presented challenging times for FBOs 
as economic times took a downturn.  This was because of reduced church membership and a 
reduction of independent resources.  This decrease in church membership also had a knock-on 
effect of reducing a particular state tax.  Revenue from church tax (Kirchensteuer) dropped as 
church-goers reduced in numbers, and this reduced the amount of revenue collected by the 
churches.  This tax had funded, inter alia, social services.  Further, growing competition from 
non-FBO welfare providers placed considerable pressure on FBOs.  This was evidenced in the 
number of full-time employees falling from 528,694 to 434,504 from 1998 to 2008 within the 
Catholic Caritas and Protestant Diakonie.760  It is said that FBOs do still play a role in providing 
welfare services, but increasing competition for contracts and diminishing resources present a 
bleak future for the role of FBOs within welfare generally within Germany.761 
 
The question then arises as to what the impact has been on German society as FBOs and their 
services diminish.  The research conducted on Germany does not provide an answer about this 
point.  However, what can be surmised, if one looks to the recent United States research, is that 
there is likely to be an overall negative economic impact on communities, not least in terms of 
increased unemployment and the reduction in taxes being paid to the government; these two 
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factors alone represent substantial economic losses to communities.  Consequently, it appears 
that FBOs in Germany are not positioned or encouraged to provide support as actively in 
communities as FBOs are within the United States and, indeed, England.   
 
Whilst it is not argued that secularisation as whole will be detrimental to Germany, or to states 
with similar approaches, such as the Netherlands and Australia, this thesis has demonstrated 
that, at least on an economic level, those states are likely to be poorer, thus providing evidence 
of the value of the advancement of religion from an economics perspective, and supporting the 
object of my inquiry.   Further research, however, is required to consider this matter, just as 
has occurred in the United States.  Only then can policymakers and lawmakers consider 
objectively the value of religious charities for their individual states. 
 
This chapter has so far focused generally on the Western Judaeo-Christian economic religious 
impact, but this ignores the relevance of Islam within the charitable construct.  Islam is 
important to consider because the charity narrative cannot just be framed in the Western 
construct of belief, especially in contemporary multicultural societies.  Such a consideration is 
timely because of the challenging times for religions generally, but also with regard to Islam 
on an international scale.  The news outlets and social media are alive with commentary on 
Islam, and much of it is negative.  This leads to fear of religion, especially Islam; 
disenfranchisement of Muslim communities; and, at its most extreme, can lead to violence 
within communities.  Thus, social changes and economic pressures are raising issues of social 
justice, equity and security, and I maintain that Islam is likely to be constructively influential 
on the social and political economics of states, thereby supporting the object of my inquiry that 
the advancement of religion can be reconciled from an economics perspective. As a result, I 
now consider the economic relevance of Islam within the charity paradigm, and I begin by 
introducing the relationship between Islam and charity and thus providing the foundations for 
my assertions in relation to Islam and the object of my inquiry later in the chapter. 
 
VII. Islam and Charity – An Introduction 
 
It should be noted, and in a similar fashion to earlier in the chapter, that there is a dearth of 
research in relation to the specific economic value of Islam within communities.  Nonetheless, 
I endeavour to provide a snapshot of the relevance of Islam within the charity framework.  By 
way of brief introduction, there are distinctions between Muslim and Christian civilisations 
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which date back to the foundations of their faiths.  Christianity developed as a consequence of 
the expansion of the Roman Empire, and thus Roman law.  The Empire had a cohesive legal 
code and system.  Accordingly, Christianity was not required to provide an additional system 
of law to govern daily lives of its citizens and its believers.  Christian citizens complied with 
Roman law, and with time, non-religious laws.762   
 
Islam arose through an alternate route.  Muhammad had to establish a religious and a social, 
partisan, and fiscal society.  Islam provided, and emphasised, the obligation to its believers to 
comply with Shari’a, Islamic law.  As a result, Islam regulates believers’ beliefs; behaviour; 
economics; politics; and social affairs.763  As has been mentioned earlier in the thesis, Islam is 
both a religion as well as a socioeconomic system. The system is founded on the following 
core pillars - Shahada: faith; Salah: prayer; Zakāt: charity; Sawm: fasting; and Hajj: pilgrimage 
to Mecca.  These 5 basic acts are considered mandatory by Muslims.764  
 
Marx memorably referred to religion as “the opium of the people”;765 this was not meant as a 
compliment.  He remarked that the true liberation could only be achieved through the 
elimination of religion, because it was “the illusory happiness of the people.”766  His view may 
have changed, however, if he could have observed how many, in contemporary times, are 
wielding “the power of faith in the service of emancipating the disenfranchised classes by 
combining theological beliefs with modern socialist ideas.”767  For instance, in Iran, an Islamic 
country, this approach was apparent in the debates of Mohammad Nakhshab, the Party of the 
 
 
762 Jean-Phillipe Platteau “Religion, politics, and development: Lessons from the lands of Islam” (2008) Journal 
of Economic Behaviour & Organization 68 at 333. 
763 At 333, referring to Avner Greif Institutions and the Path to Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006) at 206 and T Kuran “Why the Middle East is economically 
underdeveloped: historical mechanisms of institutional stagnation” (2004) Journal of Economic Perspectives 
18(3). 
764 Adam Bukowski “Social Role of Alms (zakat) in Islamic Economics” 2014 Ethics in Economic Life Vol 17 
No 4 December 2014 at 124 and “5 Pillars of Islam” Wikipedia 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five_Pillars_of_Islam accessed 23 August 2018; it should be noted that there are 
numerous spellings of zakat, with or without accents, throughout the variety of research available.  This thesis 
utilises the common spelling of “zakat”. 
765 Siavash Saffari “Charity or Mass Mobilization? Public Religion and the Struggle for Economic Justice” in 
Peyman Vahabzadeh (ed) Iran’s Struggles for Social Justice – Economics, Agency, Justice, Activism (Palgrave 
MacMillan, Cham Switzerland, 2017) at 66, referring to Karl Marx A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Right, translated by A Jolin and J O’Malley (Cambridge University Press, London and New York, 
1982) at 131. 
766 At 66, referring to Marx, above n 765, at 131. 
767 At 66. 
182 
Iranian People; Ali Shariati Mazinani, a revolutionary and sociologist; and Mahmoud 
Taleghani, a theologist, an Islamic campaigner, an democratic activist and a senior religious 
leader.768  This approach was additionally the main creed of organisations that included the 
People’s Mojahedin,769 and it continues to influence the works of devout people who undertake 
initiatives that focus on equality and relief of poverty.770 
 
Remaining within Iran, by way of example, it has been observed that there has been a push for 
economic liberalisation since the 1990s, and with that in increase in “NGOization of social 
services.”771  However, with this push has come a steady State reduction of security being 
provided to the indigent.  This has led to the increase of the appeal of charity amongst the pious 
and FBOs.  In a 2008, it was estimated that almost 75 per cent of all Iranian social welfare 
NGOs were established by religious people or organisations.  One can see the importance of 
religion in this regard when comparing the same statistics for instance in Egypt, which amounts 
to 20 per cent, and the United States, which amounts to 18 per cent.   
 
What this reflects is a broader shift within the Middle East generally to a proliferation of similar 
FBOs, with a focus on religious charity.  This is a result of political reforms and economic 
liberalisation across the geographical area, and indeed, many religiously-based charities that 
carried out social welfare operations were established following the Islamic Republic’s 
neoliberal change.772 
 
An example of this is a student organisation in the Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, 
which has over 500 volunteers.  They provide various welfare services to vulnerable youth; 
 
 
768 At 66. 
769 “The People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), also known as Mujahedin-e-Khalgh (MEK), is the 
largest and longest-standing Iranian opposition group with a five-decade history of struggling for freedom and 
democracy in Iran. The PMOI/MEK is also part of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), a large 
coalition of dissidents and organizations that support democratic regime change in Iran.” About the People’s 
Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) https://english.mojahedin.org/about-iranian-opposition-pmoi-
mek. 
770 Saffari, above n 765, at 66. 
771 At 74. 
772 At 74-75, referring to Masoumeh Bagheri, Fatemah Noughani, and Housein Moltafet “Formation of Voluntary 
Associations in Iran” (2008) The Indian Journal of Social Work 69(1) at 87; and Gerard Clarke “Faith Matters: 
Faith-Based Organizations, Civil Society and International Development” (2006) Journal of International 
Development 18(6) at 841 and 842. 
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vulnerable women; and others affected by poverty.  The organisation’s maxim is a philosophy 
of the first Shi’i Iman that “all persons bare [sic] responsibility towards their society”.773 
 
The relevance of Islam within the charitable welfare forum is not just apparent in the Middle 
East.  In the United Kingdom, during Ramadan alone, the Muslim Charities Forum estimated 
that Muslims across Britain donate approximately GDB 100 million in this one small period.  
This ensures a wide variety of charitable works can be delivered off the back of such 
generosity.774  Such charitable generosity during Ramadan has also been observed, by way of 
example, in Tampa, Florida where the economic impact of this religious period is two-fold.  
The fasting that is required does mean a possible reduction in consumer expenditure, but the 
breaking of the fast is financially beneficial to communities.  Charities can expect to increase 
their donations substantially during this time, perhaps by up to a third of their yearly income,775 
thus providing substantive evidence of the economic value of religion within the charity 
framework, thereby supporting the object of my inquiry that the advancement of religion can 
be reconciled, and specifically in this particular context.   
 
I noted earlier that zakat, which is almsgiving, or charity, is one of the 5 Islamic pillars.  In 
earlier chapters I also referred to zakat within the contexts of tithing and the rule of law. I now 
consider this specific form of Islamic charity and its socioeconomic place within the religious 
construct.  This is timely because not only is zakat an important tool in the charitable narrative 
but zakat is also “going through a period of innovation and critical re-examination”.776  My re-
examination forms part of the wider discourse as to how this critical religious doctrine may be 
utilised more effectively, “making the transition from idealized religious and historic models 
into operational institutions that can meet the very real challenges of the present.”777  This 




773 At 75, referring to IAPSRS Catalogue The Iman Ali Popular Students Relief Society. 
774  “Give safely to charities this Ramadan” The Charity Commission for England and Wales 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/give-safely-to-charities-this-ramadan. 
775 Tierra Smith “Ramadan having an economic impact on local charities, businesses” Tampa Bay Times (12 May 
2018) http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/economicdevelopment/ramadan-having-an-economic-impact-on-local-charities-
businesses/2328175. 
776 Jennifer Bremer Zakat and Economic Justice: Emerging International Models and their Relevance for Egypt 
(Third Annual Conference on Arab Philanthropy and Civic Engagement June 4-6 Tunis, Tunisia 2013) at 52. 




Whilst it is acknowledged that Western notions of religions, such as those espoused by 
Christianity, are enshrined in charity, as evidence in earlier chapters, it is said that such charity 
is based more on a voluntary basis, whereas zakat is more rigidly prescribed.  It is considered 
to be the duty of pious Muslims to give to those in poverty.  Consequently: 778 
 
… in some Islamic economies strongly based on Islamic principles given by Allah to 
Muhammad, with the prime example of Pakistan, zakāt is imposed by law and is not considered 
a charity but more of a duty. ‘The commandment to establish zakāt is mentioned [in the Qur’an] 
more than 100 times, usually in conjunction with salah (prayer), as two means of purification’.   
 
Whilst zakat is said to purify the heart, it is also concerned with economic justice.  Thus, zakat 
is seen as improving poverty, and fulfilling an important role in wealth redistribution from the 
rich to the eight classes of beneficiaries stipulated in the Qur’an.779  Its objective, therefore, is 
to assist the needy, the indigent, and the poor.780  This echoes the first Pemsel head of charity, 
that of the relief of poverty.  Here, poverty is a broad term that can encompass the needy, the 
impotent, and the indigent, as well as those suffering from financial hardship.  However, zakat 
clearly finds its ethos in religion as opposed to the general charitable public benefit found in 
the relief of poverty.  Nonetheless, it is said that during the early days of Islam, zakat was 
utilised to eradicate poverty, thus suggesting that this Islamic construct supports my argument 
that the advancement of religion, through religious charities, is reconcilable because zakat is 
said to provide economic justice. 
 
Further confirmation that this Islamic principle is reconcilable from a religious charity 
perspective is evidenced where it is asserted that zakat is said to relate directly to Islamic 
governance and the welfare of the people because it is a pillar of Islam.  This in turn underpins 
the concept of a civil society, which was addressed earlier.  Its relevance in social economics 
 
 
778 Bukowski, above n 764, at 124, referring to M A Quraishi The Institution of Zakat and its Economic Impact 
on Society (Islamic Finance into the 21st Century: Proceedings of the Second Harvard Forum on Islamic Finance, 
Centre for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1999). 
779 Adamu Ummulkhayr; Rafidah Mohamad Cusairi; and Musa Yusuf Owoyemi “Zakah Administration and its 
Importance: a Review” (2016) Journal of Humanities and Social Science Vol 21 Issue 6 Version 8 June at 115. 
780 Bukowski, above n 764, at 124. 
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has been recognised by many societies, so much so, a number of states have implemented 
measures to ensure the collective administration of zakat, either through government-backed, 
or voluntary organisations.  This is evident in countries such as Malaysia, Pakistan, and 
Indonesia, and even in non-Islamic states, including the United Kingdom, the United States, 
and South Africa. It has been asserted that those states are faring better in terms of controlling 
poverty than those without such provisions. 781   
 
Unfortunately, there are limited verifiable records which confirm the real dollar amount that 
zakat generates, but anecdotal evidence suggests that the sums are significant, ranging from 
several billion dollars, to tens of billions of dollars.782  Whilst there is limited specific data on 
the overall specific economic value of zakat on a socioeconomic scale, there is much evidence 
of its general benefits within a number of communities.  In addition, zakat is said to have a 
multiplier effect, or also referred to as halo effect, as discussed earlier.  This is because it 
increases a society’s employment rates and levels of income, and as this happens, so standards 
of living increase, leading to increasing amounts of zakat being collected.   
 
Other benefits have been recorded, for example, in Brunei, where asnaf (zakat recipients) are 
provided with food and shelter; the shelter can also include construction, repair and rental.  In 
addition, asnaf are provided with education up to higher degrees; medical expenses; disaster 
relief; and business capital.  Where asnaf own their own land, or have suitable homes, they can 
be provided with rent, and assistance with bills.   
 
Other states also report socioeconomic benefits of zakat.  For instance, the reduction in poverty 
in Indonesia is said to amount to 10.79 per cent as a result of zakat.783  In Kano, a northern 
Nigerian city, the Hubshi Commission, a state-supported zakat administration, reported it spent 
NGN 7.3 million as zakat on 397 indigents in 2015.  The recipients received debt relief; 
 
 
781 Ummulkhayr et al, above n 779, at 116. 
782 Bremer, above n 776, at 51. 
783 Ummulkhayr et al, above n 779, at 117, referring to R Abdullah Zakat management in Brune Darussalam: A 
case study (The 7th International Conference The Tawhidi epistemology: zakat and waqf economy, Bangi, 2010); 
and EA Hasham & S El-Sha’er “Can zakat help to enhance financial inclusion? Case Study Egypt” (2015) 
International Journal of Education and Research 3(3). 
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established businesses; medical assistance; and travel assistance.  It has been reported that its 
inhabitants have benefitted substantially from zakat such as this.784 
 
It is certainly true that zakat can relieve poverty in the short term.  However, focusing purely 
on such short-term charitable ventures can actually reduce the value of zakat.  The aim being 
to create a society that promotes equitable living.  This suggests zakat is perhaps not the 
panacea for all social ills.   One might argue that this should be charity’s overall aim regardless 
of the vehicle being utilised, which clearly can include zakat.  Unfortunately, it is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to address the complex issue of how charity may encourage poverty, but I 
can consider how zakat can be utilised to improve long term social issues.   
 
One example can be seen in Tafahna al-Ashraf, an Egyptian village that transformed itself from 
being within poverty to thriving through zakat and systematic reinvestment over 30 years.  Its 
process of transformation could be used as a model of success for other projects.  Some of its 
key success features involved strong local direction and leadership.  This was because the 
project was administered mostly by the community.  Secondly, there was engagement with the 
local population by those in charge.  Thirdly, the project began with income-generating 
activities, and shares of the income were invested to undertake additional programmes.  
Fourthly, the aim was always for the future of the village.  It has been reported that no villagers 
are now on an income low enough to receive zakat, and the zakat generation now focuses on 
supporting the neighbouring poor and needy students, 3000 of whom receive zakat to assist 
with their studies.785 
 
However, the success of this village is not widely known, and neither has it been widely 
replicated,786 although the research does not elucidate on why this might be.  Perhaps, like 
many aspects of zakat, and its administration and initiatives, zakat is still shrouded in mystery 
to the non-Muslim world, as much of Islamic practice remains, even in this multi-cultural 
 
 
784 At 118, referring to SA Ashafa “The administration of zakah in Lagos and Ogun states” (2014) Research on 
Humanities and Social sciences 4(21); SM Ibrahim and A Shaharuddin “In search of an effective zakat institution 
management in Kano State, Nigeria” (2015) 1 Journal for Studies in Management and Planning (7); and HN Wali 
“Utilization of zakat and Islamic endowment funds for poverty reduction: A case study of Zakat and Hubshi 
commission, Kano State – Nigeria” (2013) Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development 4 (18). 
785 Bremer, above n 776, at 67-68. 
786 At 67-68. 
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world.  This is unfortunate because zakat, as a charitable tool, offers a bridge to join the 
apparently ever-growing social chasm between the Christian West and the Islamic East. 
 
Nonetheless, there are some other zakat success stories.  There is evidence that some states are 
achieving long term social successes by implementing novel approaches in the utilisation of 
zakat.  For instance, in Indonesia zakat institutions are blending zakat funds with funds from 
other sources.  One such combination has occurred by adding waqf funds.  Waqf has been 
discussed in a previous chapter, but for the present purposes, waqf is a unique institution within 
Islam, and is a “voluntary charity which is strongly encouraged within Islam”.787  Further, it is 
said to be “endowed for a charitable purpose to be held in perpetuity and stands out as one of 
the greatest achievements along the history of Islamic civilization.”788  It is relevant to note, as 
has been mentioned earlier, waqf is different from zakat in that waqf is voluntary charitable 
giving, and further, it can be given to Muslim and non-Muslim.789  This reflects its value within 
society and thus may provide further evidence of the Islamic charitable constructs supporting 
my assertion that the advancement of religion is reconcilable within an economic framework. 
 
Returning then to the matter of blending zakat and waqf funds, there is a benefit in such a 
process because the investment part of waqf administration can be important in increasing 
socially-equitable and financial opportunities, as the numerous charitable undertakings are 
subsidised.  For instance, a waqf-established land bequest might be utilised to facilitate local 
businesses, with subsequent revenue being reinvested in to healthcare and education for those 
families, as well as training workers, and other purposes that may support the equity and 
development of those communities.  Interestingly, such models were common in medieval 
awqaf (plural of waqf). For example, a mosque or a hospital would often be bordered by 
businesses that were established with waqf assets on waqf property.  The businesses would 
provide income to support the mosque or hospital.  Contemporary financial management 
schemes would offer wider and more creative types of funding and financing to leverage off 
the asset base of waqf through zakat institutions,790 thus, in theory, would be of great value to 
 
 
787 Mochammad Arif Budiman “The Significance of Waqf for Economic Development” 2014 Equilibrium Vol 2 
No 1 June at 20. 
788 At 21. 
789 Paul Stibbard, David Russell and Blake Bromley “Understanding the waqf in the world of the trust” (2012) 
Trusts & Trustees Vol 18, No 8, September at 786. 
790 Bremer, above n 776, at 57. 
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many communities and supports the object of my inquiry that religious charities can be 
reconciled through socio-legal frameworks, and specifically here, through an economic 
framework, that being a subset of a social framework. 
 
IX. Management of Zakat 
 
The key to zakat, therefore, is effective management to ensure a positive socioeconomic 
impact, although this is not always so easy to achieve.  States do play a significant part in the 
operation of zakat in many Islamic-majority countries, and indeed, in “contrast to the other 
pillars of the Islamic faith … zakat is established by law in sixteen of the world’s forty Muslim-
majority countries.”791  However, this does not mean that such legislation makes zakat legally-
mandatory.  For example, Egypt collects zakat through a number of state-owned entities.  
However, zakat is said to be voluntary.  That means that individual methods of collecting zakat 
are commonly utilised, especially through mosques.   
 
In circumstances where zakat is obligatory, a state will gather it; this occurs in Pakistan and 
Saudi Arabia.  However, even if states do collect zakat, other mechanisms are also invariably 
utilised to collect it, and despite there being formal collection systems available, individuals 
may make direct donations as part of ensuring their religious obligations.792  Such variety in 
the means of collection means that accurate economic figures relating to zakat are going to be 
difficult to assess. 
 
Regardless of the issues with its collection, there is evidence that there are greater innovative 
forms of zakat administration through non-state channels than through state channels.  This is 
especially so in Islamic-minority states, including the United Kingdom and the United States.  
Whilst it is difficult to build an accurate picture of such processes, research from the Islamic-
American Zakat Foundation in the United States showed that by 2010, there were 11 
organisations with a total of USD 46.7 million in assets, and those funds had annual growth 
rates of 10-59 per cent.793 
 
 
791 At 58, referring to Russell Powell “Zakat: Drawing Insights for Legal Theory and Economic Policy from 
Islamic Jurisprudence” (2009) University of Pittsburgh Tax Review 7 at 59. 
792 At 59. 
793 At 59. 
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The Middle East is also seeing new models of zakat emerging; Egypt has two such models.  
The first being Lafakr.com, which translates as “no poverty”.  Its purpose is to stimulate 
bequests; encourage people to volunteer; and encourage partnership with other charities.  
Lafakr.com makes no specific reference to zakat, but its processes suggest it is zakat in origin.  
Its fund distribution is linked to organisations which are concerned with collecting and 
distributing zakat.  These are “AlOrman; the Food Bank; and Resala”.794   
 
The second is the National Bank for Development charitable accounts, and these accounts are 
utilised for charitable purposes, and include the Children’s Cancer Hospital; Resala Institute; 
and Dar Al Orman.  Accounts are opened in cooperation with the Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank, 
and the United Arab Emirates bank allows customers to pay zakat via cell phone and provide 
zakat assistance via cell phone also.795 
 
Some of the greatest zakat innovations, however, have been taking place in South East Asia, 
such as Indonesia and Malaysia.  Collecting Indonesian zakat is undertaken in a number of 
ways, including public and provide collectors, Muslims organisations and mosque committees.  
Many of the Indonesian programmes focus on fiscal growth; supporting of small commercial 
enterprises; and providing employment preparation.  Such programmes ease immediate 
burdens, as well as empowering the poor long term, which fulfils the ethos of zakat, as well as 
charity generally.  A number of calls have also been made to utilise broader hybrid zakat 
institutions to assist with poverty relief, such as combining the aforementioned zakat and waqf.  
Such novel arrangements might operate as inspiration for other Arabic zakat institutions.796 
 
Zakat clearly has an important place in improving the socioeconomic position of communities 
through its charitable endeavours, and it is suggested that there should be greater recognition 
of its benefits, as well as its potential, to operate even more effectively.  It is evident that the 
management of zakat does require attention, on a global scale, to ensure that its real 
effectiveness is captured.  As well as more effective management, it is further suggested that 
there should be greater systematic measures being undertaken to consider novel models of 
 
 
794 At 61. 
795 At 61. 
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zakat, such as combining waqf funds, to mobilise resources over the long term. 797  Such 
measures are likely to ensure that zakat’s socioeconomic impact is more effective and 
widespread on a long-term basis although even without such measures, its benefit from a 
socioeconomic perspective does provide evidence that the advancement of religion, through 
this religious charitable endeavour, is reconcilable from an economics perspective. 
 
X. Conclusion  
 
This chapter undertook an uncommon approach in relation to the examination of religion and 
charity.  It did so by, inter alia, considering religion and economics globally; critically 
examining the role of FBOs; and analysing the significance of zakat on an economic level.   
This chapter revealed that religion, charity and economics have been bedfellows for 
generations, and their relationship is still as close today as it was in centuries past.  Research 
suggests that a religious upbringing and religious participation increases levels of trust in 
governmental institutes and underpins the rule of law.  Further, economic and political 
institutes of high quality reduce state costs and encourage economic growth.  Consequently, 
politics, economics and religion appear to have a symbiotic relationship.  Within an effective 
civil society, which is invariably based on strong economic and political institutions, religious 
charities and FBOs appear to be the bedrock of communities.  This is because of their intrinsic 
socioeconomic value within communities, be that through Islamic or Western-based models of 
charity, thus supporting my assertions that the advancement of religion is a reconcilable 
construct in economic terms.  
 
It is true that I did not explicitly refer to traditional legal frameworks and models, as previous 
chapters have undertaken, but there is sound reason for this.  This thesis looks to understand 
the social, political, and economic relevance of the advancement of religion.  This charitable 
purpose is underpinned by the rules of law, but to understand its place within society on a 
broader level, I considered a number of key factors, including economic relevance.  Economics 
are intrinsically bound to numerous social and political pressures and factors.  Consequently, I 
provided a snapshot of the secular relevance of religious charities, which is often missing from 
much literature.   
 
 
797 At 71; Ummulkhayr et al, above n 779, at 119. 
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This evidence is important because it is tangible, and oftentimes, society will see tangible 
evidence as being of more value than the general ethereal benefits that are usually associated 
with religion.  Such evidence can be utilised by policy makers; charities; and law makers, for 
example, to advocate for the retention of the advancement of religion because of its 
fundamental tangible place within civil society.  I demonstrate how the economic outcomes of 
religious charities provide an objective measurement of its value, placing religion’s relevance 
within a secular narrative that can be quantified by policy makers and the public alike.  As a 
result, this chapter was key in embedding religion within an economics framework and then 
demonstrating that the advancement of religion can be reconciled as an economically-viable 
construct because of its benefit to a variety of societies, democratic or otherwise.  
 
Nonetheless, I am mindful of the dearth of research in this area because unless governments 
understand the real, and likely currently underestimated, economic value of religious bodies in 
many states, policies and laws will not sufficiently support welfare models that endeavour to 
underpin civil societies.  I contend that further research would be valuable to evaluate public 
policies and support decision-making so as to ensure charity law operates effectively within 
society.  Indeed, it may be that such economic evidence would ensure that the requisite public 
benefit requirement is confirmed even in situations where religious public benefit has 
historically proven difficult to measure.  The next chapter indeed turns now to the issue of 













In order to reconcile the advancement of religion, the key object of my thesis, I could not ignore 
the doctrine of public benefit, a charity law construct, which subsequently is the fundamental 
concern of this chapter.  As a result, I critically assess public benefit as part of the continuing 
narrative of the reconciliation of the advancement of religion.  This is because this doctrine is 
key in determining whether or not a purpose advances religion, either as a rebuttable 
presumption, or to be established explicitly, depending on the jurisdiction, as I will explain 
later in the chapter.   
 
In order to undertake this examination, I critically consider existing law and theories and bed 
some of my assertions about the reconciliation of the advancement of religion within those 
constructs.  I do acknowledge that much has been written about public benefit throughout the 
years, however, I assert that it would have been remiss of me to ignore this fundamental 
principle when I am endeavouring to demonstrate that the advancement of religion is 
reconcilable from a legal perspective.  I argue that even through the doctrine of public benefit 
has been criticised over the years, it is a defendable principle that provides another avenue of 
reconciling the advancement of religion.  Further, it is important to critically review black letter 
law constructs as part of the object of my inquiry because the advancement of religion is a legal 
principle, and whilst, as my thesis has demonstrated, it is embedded in various socio-political 
frameworks, its legal basis cannot be ignored.  This is because at the heart of public benefit, at 
least in regard to its presumption, it acknowledges the spiritual element of religion, which is an 
intrinsic element of religion itself.  Therefore, this chapter is fundamental for developing the 
 
 
798 Some of the research presented in this chapter refers to some of the author’s earlier published articles to 
underpin submissions.  Further, it should be noted that some of the research utilised in this chapter refers to 
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Religion and Public Benefit” in Barry Bussey (ed) The Status of Religion and the Public Benefit in Charity Law 
(Anthem Press, New York, 2020). 
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argument that the advancement of religion is reconcilable and specifically within its legal 
framework. 
 
I do acknowledge that earlier chapters have discussed some aspects of public benefit with 
regard to other matters.  However, this chapter focuses specifically on the principle of public 
benefit and its function within the advancement of religion.  In doing so, I consider significant 
cases that demonstrate how public benefit can provide a check and balance for the advancement 
of religion, illustrating that public benefit has a key function in underpinning the legitimacy of 
the advancement of religion.  However, issues arise with regard to the evolving jurisprudence 
with regard to the presumption of public benefit, which may have undermined the position of 
religion within charity. Indeed, the doctrine has “generated lively parliamentary, legal and 
journalistic debate in recent years, not least in relation to … the merits … of religious 
organisations”.799 
 
Nonetheless, I conclude that the advancement of religion can be reconciled with the utilisation 
of the presumption of public benefit800 because it is authorised and controlled appropriately by 
the rules of law.  Further, public benefit provides a measurable safeguard to ensure that charities 
benefit the community through distributing their charitable resources appropriately.  
Consequently, its function legitimises the advancement of religion and ensures accountability 
for religious purposes within society, thus demonstrating the reconcilability of the 
advancement of religion.   I begin this journey by outlining the doctrine of public benefit in 








799 Mary Synge “A State of Flux in Public Benefit Across the UK, Ireland and Europe” (2013) 16 CL & PR 163 
at 164. 
800 It should be noted that not all common law jurisdictions presume public benefit.  For example, the United 
Kingdom has removed the presumption of public benefit for all heads of charity.  New Zealand and Canada, inter 
alia, however, presume public benefit for all heads of charity except the fourth.  This is discussed later in the 
chapter.   
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II. Introduction to Public Benefit 
 
To appreciate the requirement of public benefit, one must consider the English801 common law 
model of charity, which is generally traced to the Statute of Elizabeth.  As referred to in Chapter 
3, 802  the Act’s Preamble set out a comprehensive, albeit incomplete, listing of legally-
acknowledged charitable purposes.  This listing was later abridged to just four in 
Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax v Pemsel, as follows:803 
 
Trusts for the relief of poverty; trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for the 
advancement of religion; and trusts for purposes beneficial to the community not falling under 
any of the preceding heads.  
 
Many common law jurisdictions have continued to acknowledge these four heads of charity.  
For example, s 5(1) of the New Zealand Charities Act 2005 states: 
 
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, charitable purpose includes every 
charitable purpose, whether it relates to the relief of poverty, the advancement of education or 
religion, or any other matter beneficial to the community. 
 
Section 3 of the United Kingdom Charities Act 2011 sets out a list of charitable purposes that 
includes the above four heads, as well as additional purposes that are explicitly legally-
recognised as charitable.   
 
Courts tended to view the collective feature that adjoined the variety of charitable purposes 
was that of public benefit,804 although interestingly, the Statute of Elizabeth did not make any 
explicit reference to any notion of public benefit.  Nonetheless, the Preamble was said to 
promote purposes that effected public benefit.  For instance, it was observed that “if there is 
any thread linking these crude judicial attempts to define charity, it is in the conception of 
charity as a public use.”805  Therefore, for an object to be recognised as charitable, it must 
 
 
801 This always includes Wales. 
802 See chap 3 for the full Preamble. 
803 Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax v Pemsel [1891] AC 531 (HL) at 583 
804 Jonathan Garton Public Benefit in Charity Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) at 1-3. 
805 At 18, citing Gareth Jones History of the Law of Charity 1532-1827 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1969) at 121 (emphasis retained). 
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firstly be a legally-acknowledged charitable purpose, and secondly, there must be a public 
benefit.  
 
In relation to that second element, which is the focus of this chapter, generally speaking, those 
charities whose purposes were to relieve poverty, to advance education, or to advance religion, 
were said to be presumed for the public benefit.806  For those purposes that fall under the fourth 
head, that of any other purposes beneficial to the community, public benefit must be determined 
explicitly.  As will be discussed later in the chapter, England and Wales has made significant 
changes with regard to presuming public benefit.807  However, for jurisdictions such New 
Zealand, Australia (generally speaking), Canada, and Hong Kong, the presumption of public 
benefit is still thought to exist with regard to the first three heads of charity. 
 
In general, “there are two essential elements of the public benefit requirement: first, the pursuit 
of an organization’s purposes must be capable of producing a benefit which can be 
demonstrated and which is recognised by law as beneficial.”808  Secondly, “that benefit is 
provided for, or available to, the public or a sufficient section of the public.”809  This is 
expressed in the New Zealand High Court case of Liberty Trust v Charities Commission:810 
 
It is accepted that in order to have a charitable purpose, the entity must be carrying out its 
purposes for the benefit of the public. This means that the entity must confer a “benefit” and 
that it does so in respect of the public or a sufficient section of it.  
 
Further, Mallon J, in that case, noted that with regard to the advancement of religion public 
benefit is presumed.  This is because it is “well settled”811 that “a gift for religious purposes is 
prima facie charitable, the necessary element of public benefit being presumed unless and until 
 
 
806 There is an argument that this presumption may be a fallacy, but it is beyond the scope of this thesis to address 
this issue further.  See Mary Synge The ‘New’ Public Benefit Requirement Making Sense of Charity Law? (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2015); Juliet Chevalier-Watts Charity Law International Perspectives (Routledge, Abingdon, 
2018) at 81; and Independent Schools Council v Charity Commission for England and Wales [2011] UKUT 421 
(TCC) for further discussions. 
807 Charities Act 2011, s 4(2) (UK). 
808 Debra Morris “Charities and the Modern Equality Framework – Heading for Collision?” (2012) Current Legal 
Problems Vol 65 at 298; see also Gilmour v Coats [1949] AC 426 (HL). 
809 At 298; see also Verge v Somerville [1924] AC 496 (PC). 
810 Liberty Trust v Charities Commission [2011] 3 NZLR 68 at [99], referring to Re New Zealand Computer 
Society Inc HC Wellington CIV-2010-485-924, 28 February 2011 at [14]. 
811 Liberty Trust at [99]. 
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the contrary is shown”.812  As a result, where “purposes are found to be religious in nature the 
court ‘will generally assume a public benefit unless the contrary is shown’”. 813   This 
assumption “reflects the court’s reluctance to enter into questions concerning the comparative 
worth of different religions, and also the view that religion itself commonly generates benefit 
to the public”.814  “In addition, there should be no undue private benefit.”815 
 
Whilst the initial consideration for public benefit will be the presumption of its existence, at 
least in the majority of common law jurisdictions, a court must be satisfied that the purpose 
does satisfy this requirement, and it can be rebutted.  Consequently:816 
 
… the presumption will be rebutted … if there is evidence that the purpose is subversive of all 
morality, or it is a new belief system, or if there has been public concern expressed about the 
organisation carrying out the particular purpose, or if it is focused too narrowly on its adherents.  
 
It has been observed that where a religion “promotes conduct inconsistent with the prevailing 
public policy then there are grounds for denying charitable status”.817  An example of this may 
be a religion that encourages dangerous risk-taking behaviour.818  
 
It is asserted that public benefit is utilised to rationalise charities’ preferential legal treatment 
and the advantages granted to entities that obtain registered charitable status, such as tax 
benefits that are afforded to the entities themselves, and their donors.819  It is also the doctrine 
 
 
812  At [99], referring to Jean Warburton, Debra Morris and NF Riddle Tudor on Charities (9th ed, 
Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2003) at [2-048]; and included in the footnotes: In the United Kingdom in 2006, 
legislation was passed requiring charities to be demonstrably for the public benefit. (Refer to s 3 and s 4 of the 
Charities Acts 2006 and 2011 respectively (UK); also see Charity Commission for England and Wales Analysis 
of the Law Underpinning the Advancement of Religion for the Public Benefit (December 2008) 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/358534/lawrel
1208.pdf.  It should further be noted that since the decision of the Upper Tribunal Tax and Chancery Chamber in 
Independent Schools Council v Charity Commission [2011] UKUT 421 (TCC), some elements of the Charity 
Commission for England and Wales Guidance on Public Benefit has been rewritten. 
813 Liberty Trust above n 810, at [99], citing Gino Dal Pont Charity Law in Australia and New Zealand (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2000) at 166. 
814 Liberty Trust at [99], citing Dal Pont, above n 813, at 166. 
815 Morris, above n 812, at 298-299; see also Royal College of Nursing v St Marylebone Corporation [1959] 1 
WLR 1077 (CA). 
816 Liberty Trust at [100], citing Warburton, Morris and Riddle, above n 812, at [2-052]. 
817 At [100], citing Dal Pont above n 813, at 167. 
818 At [100], citing Dal Pont, at 167. 
819 Morris, above n 808, at 299. 
197 
that is used to justify charities receiving “exemption from the ‘beneficiary principle’ and the 
‘certainty of objects’ rule … [and] not [being] subject to the ‘perpetuity rule.’”820   
 
Courts have historically found the public benefit requirement of this head of charity to be 
challenging, and the doctrine has been subject to much criticism.  For instance, some have 
“alluded to the difficulties inherent in the modern day operation of the public benefit 
requirement”. 821   Further, “few would regard the formulation of the requirement and the 
manner in which it has been applied as wholly coherent and satisfactory.”822  Indeed, “[t]he 
concept of public benefit is intangible and nebulous; its effects can only be represented as 
variable and unpredictable.  Imprecision has resulted in illogical and capricious decisions, 
sometimes impossible to reconcile.”823 
 
Consequently, some religious purposes have been found not to demonstrate the requisite public 
benefit, for instance, when performing rites in a private situation;824 and when observing that 
intercessory prayers are “manifestly not susceptible of proof”.825 Notwithstanding these limited 
observations, the common law has said “little about when and on what basis a purpose that 
advances religion will meet the public benefit test.”826  Further, and of note is “that Anglo-
Commonwealth courts have managed to avoid articulating how the public benefits from the 
advancement of religion.”827  Case law does occasionally refer to “the edifying effects of the 
collective participation in religious celebrations, and the manner in which religion may ‘take a 
man outside his own petty cares’”.828   However, more often than not, courts merely assume 
religion “is good for man to have and to practice religion.”829  So the courts have shied away 
from asserting such claims, and instead favour standing neutral as to different religions as the 
 
 
820 At 299, referring to inter alia, Morice v Bishop of Durham (1805) 10 Ves 522; Re Koeppler’s Will Trusts [1986] 
Ch 423; and Income Tax Special Purposes Commissioners v Pemsel [1891] AC 531 at 581. 
821 Andrew Iwobi “Out with the old, in with new: religion, charitable status and the Charities Act 2006” (2009) 
Legal Studies 29 4 at 630. 
822 At 630, referring to M Freeland “Charity law and the public/private distinction” in C Mitchell and S Moody 
(eds) Foundations of Charity (Hart, Oxford, 2000) at 111 and 121. 
823 At 630-631, citing GHL Fridman “Charities and public benefit” (1953) Can B Rev 31 at 539; see also Gilmour 
v Coats [1949] AC 426 (HL) at 443. 
824 Kathryn Chan “The Advancement of Religion as a Charitable Purpose in an Age of Religious Neutrality” 
(2017) Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 6 at 118, referring to Re Hetherington [1990] Ch 1 (Ch). 
825 At 118, citing Gilmour v Coats [1949] AC 426 (HL) at 446. 
826 At 118. 
827 At 119. 
828 At 119, citing Re Hetherington, above n 824, at 12. 
829 At 119, citing Gilmour v Coats, above n 825, at 459. 
198 
general assumption is that “any religion is at least likely to be better than none.”830  It is perhaps 
this reluctance to address explicitly the notion of public benefit within the advancement of 
religion that has led to concerns as to this doctrine’s validity, and consequently inherently leads 
to criticisms of religion remaining as a charitable purpose. 
 
Nonetheless, I will demonstrate that whilst the public benefit doctrine may be accused of being 
intrinsically vague, or that it is allegedly applied inconsistently, or even results in capricious 
decisions, this doctrine can provide a justifiable legal safeguard. It is a check and balance in 
the process of ensuring that a purpose is charitable.  Such a safeguard ensures that the 
advancement of religion, within charity law, benefits communities through distribution of 
charitable resources, as well as the state generally, notwithstanding some evidence of 
controversy in the construal of public benefit as regards to religion.  
 
What is evident is that the principle of public benefit is complex, and its complexity has led to 
perceived inconsistencies and anomalies that have likely done little to placate the public as to 
the contemporary significance of religion.  I illustrate this point by considering two cases that 
may be construed as controversial: Holmes v Attorney-General831 and Liberty Trust v Charities 
Commission.832  These cases demonstrate that whilst, prima facie, the public benefit test might 
be thought to cause mischief because of its alleged inconsistent application, in reality what they 
demonstrate is that public benefit, and its presumption, is a valuable tool.  Its value is found in 
ensuring that religious entities operate for the public, as prescribed by law, and thus benefit the 
public appropriately where evidence cannot be produced to the contrary.  Such an approach 
reflects the rules of natural justice.  Further, I provide evidence that the presumption of public 
benefit supports the doctrine of benignant construction, as well as ensuring that charity law 
remains as relevant in contemporary times as it did in bygone eras, even when some charitable 






830 Neville Estates Ltd v Madden [1962] Ch 832 at 853. 
831 Holmes v Attorney-General The Times, Feb 11, 1981; see also Joyce v Ashfield Municipal Council [1975] 1 
NSWLR 744. 




III. Holmes v Attorney-General 
 
This case related to a religious body known as “the Brethren”, or the “the Exclusive Brethren”, 
and in earlier times, “the Plymouth Brethren.”  The question for Walton J in this case was 
whether the purposes of the deed were charitable.   
 
In this case, The Brethren claimed to be an “ultra-puritan sect,”833 and evidence was provided 
that it was a Christian sect.  Consequently, Walton J noted that “the trust deed is one for 
religious purposes … because it has long been settled that the law presumes that it is better for 
a man to have a religion … rather than to have no religion at all.”834  Nevertheless, “that is only 
the first step.  That presumption is capable of being rebutted.”835  On that point, even though 
the sect called themselves the “the Exclusive Brethren”, his Honour concluded that there was 
no lack of benefit on that matter because there was elements of public proselytising, and that 
outsiders were allowed to attend meetings.  This meant that the Brethren fell outside the concept 
of an enclosed order, as determined in Cocks v Manners, and Gilmour v Coats.836 In those 2 
cases, the Courts held that enclosed orders did not satisfy the public benefit test.  In addition, 
Walton J noted that Thornton v Howe provided evidence that the law does not “make any 
distinction between one sect and another.”837  His Honour did confirm that where particular 
tenets are “adverse to the very foundations of all religion, and that they are subversive of all 
morality”,838 then this would likely rebut the presumption of public benefit.  However, his 
Honour concluded that when one was considering “what is basically a fundamental puritan sect 
…there is not the slightest reason to suppose … there is anything which remotely falls within 




833 Holmes v Attorney-General, above n 831, at 2. 
834 At 3. 
835 At 3. 
836 At 4, referring to Cocks v Manners [1871] 12 Equity at 574, and Gilmour v Coats [1949] AC 426. 
837 At 4, referring to Thornton v Howe [1862] 31 Beav at 19. 
838 At 4, referring Thornton v Howe, at 19. 
839 At 4. 
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Consequently, here is evidence that the presumption of public benefit is likely to be viewed as 
operating appropriately in the circumstances without need for a Court to pursue any lengthy 
debate about the merits of a particular religious sect, because clearly a Judge is simply “a mere 
man of the world”840 and not capable of making a determination on spiritual matters. 
 
Nonetheless, that was not the end of the story for the Brethren.  There was a question as to 
whether the disciplinary practices of the Brethren may be contrary to public interest.  If so, the 
public benefit would be rebutted.  These practices concerned what were referred to as “shutting 
up” and “withdrawal.”  Briefly, “shutting up” is based on Biblical principles of protecting the 
assembly from a transgressor’s evil, and to give the transgressor the opportunity “to perceive 
that evil and to put it away from himself.”841  A transgressor, therefore, will be required to stay 
from meetings until his transgressions are absolved.  He is permitted, generally, to remain with 
his family, and to associate with members although not in relation to fellowship.  “Withdrawal” 
is generally final and “involves complete separation from the transgressor and the evil which 
he represents.”842  This does mean severing the transgressor him from his family, but that is 
apparently a rare occurrence.843  
 
These punishments certainly appear to be severe, and indeed, as Walton J noted, there have 
been “very serious allegations … made against the Brethren in connection with these 
matters.”844  Nonetheless, it was evident that rebutting the presumption of public benefit might 
be difficult even though his Honour stated that these allegations had been made.  It might be 
argued that reservations about rebutting the presumption would likely cause public concern.  
This is because it could be asserted that it should not be difficult to rebut the presumption of 
public benefit in circumstances where it has been alleged that members of a sect are suffering 
through the sect’s practices of punishment.  In response to this, I argue that these are merely 
allegations, and evidence must be made available to confirm or deny such allegations.  I 
respectfully acknowledge that his Honour was correct to avoid rebutting the public benefit 
because although the Brethren were likely to have described the disciplinary practices “in a 
 
 
840 At 5. 
841 At 5. 
842 At 5. 
843 At 5. 
844 At 5. 
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much more favourable light than it wears in reality”,845 the reality was that there was no 
evidence put before him by the allegers as to the merits of their claims.  That meant that Walton 
J could not give them any credence.846 Consequently, the trust was charitable.  I submit that 
this is exactly as it should be because his Honour’s approach is underpinned by the rules of 
natural justice.  Therefore, I assert that this case provides evidence of the importance of the 
presumption of public benefit in situations which, although might be deemed controversial 
when viewed in the cold light of day, illustrate that presuming the benefit ensures that 
procedural fairness is observed.  
 
What this case does is reflect some of the challenging circumstances in which courts are 
expected to grapple with the doctrine of public benefit.  It may be seen as reflecting a liberal 
determination of public benefit, and as a result it could be asserted that the presumption of 
public benefit is a challenging tool for the judiciary to exercise.  This is because the resulting 
judicial decisions can appear to liberalise the advancement of religion.  Such liberalisation of 
religion may cause consternation to the public because, prima facie, the benefit may not 
necessarily be apparent. 
 
However, what Holmes does is illustrate that when one is considering the advancement of 
religion as a head of charity, it is inescapable that “no advances in technology or information-
gathering will ever enable the meaningful evaluation of something fundamentally incapable of 
evaluation.” 847   Therefore, it is appropriate that the presumption of public benefit be 
acknowledged broadly because to do otherwise would risk undermining the rules of natural 
justice.  
 
I now turn to the case of Liberty Trust.  I acknowledge that much has been published concerning 
this decision.  However, I assert that I would be remiss to ignore the issues of public benefit 
contained within this case because the decision heralded a liberal religious discourse within 
New Zealand that had not necessarily been witnessed previously.  Therefore, its principles 
 
 
845 At 5. 
846 At 5. 
847 Jonathan Garton Public Benefit in Charity Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) at 110; see also Juliet 
Chevalier-Watts “Charity Law, the Advancement of Religion and Public Benefit – Will the United Kingdom Be 
the Answers to New Zealand’s Prayers?” (2016) VUWLR 47 at 408. 
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make a valuable contribution to this chapter.  Further, in previous research I have argued that 
this case “extended the doctrine of public benefit in relation to the advancement of religion, 
‘beyond the realms envisioned’”.848  This earlier approach suggested that public benefit may 
not be such an appropriate tool by which to administer the advancement of religion within 
charity law.  However, I now assert that perhaps a more appropriate argument is that Liberty 
Trust exemplifies the benefits of assessing public benefit through a presumption.  This is 
because not only does it reflect the doctrine of benignant construction,849 but it also reflects the 
idea that charity law ought to, and does, evolve with the times, and to do otherwise would 
stultify the law.   
 
I acknowledge that I have utilised this case in earlier chapters.  However, I argue that there is 
value in considering this case in this chapter because of its contribution to the public benefit 
doctrine and the advancement of religion. Therefore, the approach of this chapter differs in the 
context and assessment of Liberty Trust from previous chapters. 
 
IV. Liberty Trust  
 
Chapter 3 sets out the facts of Liberty Trust.  In this case, Mallon J affirmed the presumption 
of public benefit with respect to the advancement of religion.850 Her Honour noted that this 
presumption would be rebutted, or would have to be explicit, where:851 
 
… there is evidence that the purpose is subversive of all morality, or it is a new belief system, 
or if there has been public concern expressed about the organisation carrying out the particular 




848  Juliet Chevalier-Watts “The Operation of Public Benefit in New Zealand – Meeting Contemporary 
Challenges?” (2015) CL&PR at 188 citing Juliet Chevalier-Watts “Charitable Trusts and the Advancement of 
Religion: On a Whim and a Prayer?” (2012) VUWLR 403 43 at 419. 
849 As considered in chap 3. 
850 Liberty Trust, above n 810, at [99], citing Gino Dal Pont Charity Law in Australia and New Zealand (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford) at 166. 
851 Liberty Trust at [100]. 
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This implicitly acknowledged the approaches taken in Thornton v Howe where the court stated 
that the presumption would be denied in circumstances where particular doctrines might be 
“adverse to the very foundations of all religion, and that they are subversive of all morality.”852 
 
Therefore, the question for Mallon J was whether the loan scheme bestowed a public benefit.  
In answer to this, the public benefit could be presumed because it was not demonstrated that 
the loans were in breach of public policy or that such money lending was in breach of Christian 
principles.853  Prima facie, therefore, the benefit could be presumed.  However, one cause for 
concern was that such a lending scheme enabled the receivers to live debt free, which could be 
said to be “focused too narrowly on its adherents”.854  In other words, it had an extensive private 
benefit, which would outweigh the public benefit.  Nonetheless, her Honour confirmed that 
such a benefit was merely part and parcel of living a Christian life, therefore the public benefit 
was not too remote.855 
 
I have argued in previous research that this was too “generous an interpretation of the ethos of 
public benefit”.856  Further, it was conflicting with the view that public benefit must be “more 
than a hopeful outcome”.857  In fact, Mallon J herself indicated that public benefit will be denied 
if “it is focused too narrowly on its adherents.’”858  Nonetheless, the lending scheme did 
advance religion, and according to established law, the presumption of public benefit must be 
presumed in those situations.  This is regardless of whether or not a court “may have a different 
view as to the social utility of the Liberty Trust scheme and whether it is an activity deserving 
of the fiscal advantages that charitable status brings.”859  In fact, even if a court has an opposing 
standpoint, this does not authorise that court to disprove the presumption of public benefit.860  
 
 
852 Thornton v Howe above n 837, at 20. 
853 Liberty Trust, above n 810, at [101]-[102]. 
854 At [100]. 
855  At [113]; see Canterbury Development Corporation v Charities Commission [2010] 2 NZLR (HC) where the 
benefit was held to be too remote, albeit not related to advancement of religion. 
856  Juliet Chevalier-Watts “The Operation of Public Benefit in New Zealand – Meeting Contemporary 
Challenges?” (2015) CL&PR at 191 and Juliet Chevalier-Watts “Charity law, the Advancement of Religion and 
Public Benefit – Will the United Kingdom be the Answer to New Zealand’s Prayers?” (2016) VUWLR 47 at 403-
404. 
857 Canterbury Development Corporation, above n 855, at [67] and Chevalier-Watts “The Operation of Public 
Benefit in New Zealand – Meeting Contemporary Challenges?” (2015) CL&PR at 191. 
858  Liberty Trust, above n 810, at [99] citing Dal Pont, above n 810, at 166. 
859 At [101]. 
860 At [101]. 
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Further, Mallon J confirmed that “[g]iven the assumption of public benefit, and that the Court 
does not intrude into matters of faith except where they are contrary to public policy, it is not 
for the Court to say that teaching biblical financial principles is not a public ‘benefit’.”861 
 
Just as Hammond J in Re Collier (Deceased) confirmed there is good social policy in finding 
the public benefit where it is possible to do so, it could also be argued that Mallon J’s liberal 
approach to public benefit also finds its roots in good social policy.  This is even though:862 
 
Arguably there is a line to be drawn between the outworkings of a religious faith that, being 
ancillary and incidental in nature, can be seen to manifest an organisation’s religious beliefs, 
and those that are disproportionate and unrelated to such an organisation and its beliefs.  
 
Certainly, it might be problematic to distinguish between the private benefits of such a loan 
scheme and any perceived public benefits that may arise from them.  So there may still be 
weight in the assertion that this may be sufficient to rebut the public benefit.  Nonetheless, what 
Mallon J’s approach does do is speak to the fact that while “a mass in a church may have more 
ready acceptance as being of a religious nature and for religious purposes”863 than would the 
scheme in question,  the  judgment is persuasive as to why such loans demonstrates public 
benefit.  Just because a purpose is not popular or a purpose is controversial does not mean that 
it should not be charitable, and this lies in good social policy. To consider otherwise would be 
deleterious for the charitable sector, as set out in Chapter 5 when considering the dictum of 
Chief Justice Sian Elias in the New Zealand Supreme Court case Re Greenpeace of New 
Zealand Inc.864 
 
Liberty Trust, therefore, illustrates two important principles.  Firstly, the implicit recognition 
of benignant construction. In other words, whilst a trust instrument may not expressly convey 
the way in which a religion may be disseminated, one should look to their overall purposes.  
Thus, Mallon J looked benevolently at the Trust’s underlying purpose and recognised the 
charitable purpose.  Consequently, even though, at first sight, it might have been difficult to 
 
 
861 At [102]. 
862 Kerry O’Halloran Religion, Charity and Human Rights (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014) at 
447. 
863 Liberty Trust at [122]. 
864 Re Greenpeace of New Zealand Inc [2015] 1 NZLR 169 at [75]. 
205 
find the balance between both public and private advantages being afforded by the scheme, 
Mallon J acknowledged the intention of dominant public benefit.  As a result, the Trust’s 
objects were charitable.865  Secondly, that charities should operate on a basis of benefit to the 
public without their purposes being limited to being popular or being non-controversial.  If the 
requirement of being publically popular or non-controversial was enforced, this would 
represent a barrier within the charitable sector.  This is because such a requirement would 
stultify not only the law, but also likely be detrimental to the third sector generally because 
charitable assistance is not always popular for some sections of the community.  Sometimes, a 
pragmatic approach has to be undertaken for the benefit of a community overall.   
 
This is illustrated in the New Zealand High Court case of Re Centrepoint Community Growth 
Trust.  In this case, Cartwright J noted that:866  
 
In present-day society, many who are not “worthy'' are none the less the objects of charitable 
assistance … Consequently the outrage … although inevitable, cannot be the defining reason 
for refusing to assist with a payment …  
 
It is acknowledged that the Centrepoint case revolved mainly around the relief of poverty, but 
I contend that notions of unpopularity or unworthiness extend to the advancement of religion 
also.  Therefore, Cartwright J’s view that unworthy objects cannot be the reason to invalidate 
a charitable purpose is the same reason that unpopular objects cannot be the reason to invalidate 
charitable purposes.  This is because:867  
 
It would be unfortunate if charities law were to stand still: this body of law must keep abreast 
of changing institutions and societal values. And, it is to New Zealand institutions and values 
that regard should be had.  
 
Charity law has a duty to ensure that charities meet the needs of contemporary societies, and 
such societies will undoubtedly be very different from those purposes first envisioned by the 
legislators of the Elizabethan period.  If the law did not progress, then charity would fail its 
 
 
865 Liberty Trust, above n 810, at [124]-[125]. 
866 Re Centrepoint Community Growth Trust [2000] 2 NZLR 325 at [57]. 
867 At [56], citing D V Bryant Trust Board v Hamilton City Council [1997] 3 NZLR 342 at 348. 
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beneficiaries, to the ultimate detriment of society generally.  For instance, promoting the ending 
of slavery was an unpopular purpose of its time,868 yet it was held to be charitable because it 
benefited societies globally.   
 
Therefore, I argue that public benefit should be interpreted liberally, where appropriate to do 
so, and it is defensible with regards to the modern advancement of religion.  Indeed, as asserted 
in the Greenpeace case, “a strict exclusion risks rigidity in an area of law which should be 
responsive to the way society works.”869 This is because: 
 
Just as the law of charities recognised the public benefit of philanthropy in easing the burden 
on parishes of alleviating poverty, keeping utilities in repair, and educating the poor in post-
Reformation Elizabethan England, the circumstances of the modern outsourced and perhaps 
contracting state may throw up new need for philanthropy which is properly to be treated as 
charitable.  
 
Certainly, religion may not be thought of as being a modern part of society; it is ancient in 
origin.  However, the current varied social and political pressures on religion are new, even 
though there is much evidence of the benefits of religion generally within society.  What can 
be said, therefore, in favour of religion within charity, as supported by case law, is that “charity 
has been found in purposes which support the machinery or harmony of civil society”. 870  
Religion can be said to “support the machinery or harmony of civil society” because of the 
variety of benefits it offers to society generally, for instance, through providing emergency 
assistance, succour and general living assistance. 
 
V. Concern about Public Benefit 
 
Even though I have presented evidence that the decisions in Liberty Trust and Holmes were 
appropriate, and thus support my assertions that the advancement of religion is reconcilable 
through public benefit, it might still be argued that such liberal interpretations of public benefit 
would be of concern to society.  This is because religious entities might be given the advantages 
 
 
868 Re Greenpeace of New Zealand Inc, above n 864, at [71], referring to Jackson v Philips (1867) 96 Mass 539 
14 Allen 539 (Mass SC). 
869 At [70]. 
870 At [70]. 
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of charitable status at the expense of secular non-charitable organisations whilst being seen as 
having too limited public governance.  In response to this concern, I assert that public benefit 
serves as a limitation on purposes that would not meet public requirements. For instance, public 
benefit can fall foul of illegal purposes or be in opposition to public policy.  If such 
circumstances arose, the presumption of public benefit would be denied871 as the consequential 
benefits to the public would not be in evidence.872  Although as illustrated in Holmes, it is likely 
that the rules of natural justice should be considered appropriately when considering such 
evidence. 
 
An additional consideration in relation to the concept of harm, morality, or illegality, all of 
which would likely be contrary to public policy, as observed in Thornton v Howe,873 is that 
there is no guidance on what is meant by “harm”.874  Indeed, many would argue that some 
religious practices do amount to harm:875 
 
Cults split up families and take children away from their parents – in the Roman Catholic 
Church they call it vocation.  Irrational beliefs, such as that God spoke in Korean – was that 
less plausible than his being monolingual in Hebrew, Latin, or Arabic?  And would any 
dispassionate observer accept without faith, the doctrines of resurrection, or the Athanasian 
Creed. 
 
Consequently, it is perhaps wise to ensure the applicability of the presumption of public benefit 
when it would be difficult to determine whether a purpose did really breach public policy, or 
whether it would appear to be a perceived harm because a person did not follow a prescribed, 
and already accepted, religious practice. 
 
I further submit that the public should actually be reassured by the decisions of Holmes and 
Liberty Trust. This is because they reflect the underlying rationale of charity - that of providing 
 
 
871 In the United Kingdom, the presumption of public benefit has been removed, and all purposes must expressly 
confirm their public benefit, and I consider that matter later in the chapter.  In many common law jurisdictions, 
such as New Zealand and Canada, the presumption of public benefit is still said to exist. 
872 Registration Decision: The Jedi Society Incorporated (JED494458) 14 September 2015 at [45]-[46]. 
873 Thornton v Howe, above n 837 at 19. 
874 Robert Meakin (2017) “Taking the Queen’s Shilling: the Implications for Religious Freedom for Religions 
Being Registered as Charities” 178 Law & Justice Christian Law Review at 70. 
875 At 70, citing Ian Williams The Alms Trade (1st ed, HarperCollins Publishers Ltd, 1989), at 124. 
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succour to the needy, which is what religion is presumed to do, regardless of the era.  Charity 
has existed since time immemorial, and these cases reflect the fact that charity law can evolve 
alongside the evolution of societal needs. 
 
This is surely the tenet of charity - to avail itself to society as determined through the rule of 
law. Therefore, charity law must be able to evolve as society evolves.  Certainly, a mortgage 
scheme and disciplinary practices may not have been envisioned by the legislators of 1601, but 
the same can be said of many contemporary charitable objects, including human rights and 
protection of the environment. 876   Such purposes would likely not have been considered 
charitable in bygone days.  Yet charity law permits such purposes today and few would 
question their beneficial effects within society.  Liberty Trust and Holmes merely reflect a 
tolerant and progressive approach within the laws of charity to meet societal requirements as 
they evolve. 
 
The advancement of religion within the confines of charity law continues to have imposed upon 
it stringent legal principles, even in the unusual contexts of Liberty Trust and Holmes, including 
the principle of public benefit, as evidenced in this chapter.  On these occasions, the Courts 
found that the purposes provided succour to the needy – an underlying principle of religion.  
The law achieved its purpose, and a purpose merely being controversial should not negate its 
charitability877 as that would undermine the role of charity within society, supporting the 
vulnerable and those in need, regardless of judgment.  I contend, therefore, that these arguments 
rebut the suggestion that public benefit may not be an appropriate tool to administer the 
advancement of religion.  This is because the Courts in Liberty Trust and Holmes demonstrated 
solid legal reasoning in relation to public benefit to substantiate their assertions, thus affirming 
the processes of the rule of law, and demonstrating that the advancement of religion is 
reconcilable from a legal perspective.   
 
In all the cases to which this chapter has referred the public benefit has been presumed.  
However, as has been mentioned, the United Kingdom has now removed the presumption of 
public benefit from all its legally-recognised charitable purposes, which includes the 
 
 
876 Re Greenpeace of New Zealand Inc, above n 864, at [71]. 
877 At [75]. 
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advancement of religion.878  I now turn my attention to some issues relating to the removal of 
that presumption and its impact on charity, and thus whether its removal undermines my 
assertions that the advancement of religion is a reconcilable construct from a legal perspective. 
 
VI. Proving the Public Benefit – The Effects 
 
The rationale for removing the presumption of public benefit appeared to have been to “ensure 
a level playing field for all potentially charitable organisations.”879  As this is a relatively recent 
legal change, there have been limited cases to test this new public benefit test.  Nonetheless, 
there are two Decisions of the Charity Commission for England and Wales that highlight some 
issues relating to the removal of this presumption, and suggest that retaining a presumption 
may be more beneficial, overall, for the charity sector.880  The Decisions are the Application 
for Registration of the Gnostic Centre881 and the Application for Registration of the Druid 
Network.882  These Decisions were mentioned briefly in Chapter 3 in relation to defining 
religion.  This chapter considers the Decisions in further detail specifically in the context of 
public benefit. 
 
I assert that it is essential to include these Decisions because they were the Charity Commission 
for England and Wales’ first Decisions with regards to the advancement of religion subsequent 
to the relevant provisions of the Charities Acts 2006 and 2011.  In other words, s 4(2) states “it 
is not to be presumed that a purpose of a particular description is for the public benefit.”883  
Consequently, these two Decisions play a key role in this thesis in emphasising the issues 
pertaining to the removal of the presumption of public benefit.  As a result, they lay the 
foundations for submissions following their discussion relating to ethical frameworks and the 
‘benefits’ of public benefit. 
 
 
878 Charities Act 2011, s 4. 
879 Synge, above n 806, at 9. 
880 It should be noted that I have considered these Decisions in previous published research because of the 
fundamental importance of these Decisions. However, this thesis provides additional critical consideration of the 
issues relating to these Decisions and their place within the continuing role of public benefit advancement of 
religion in charity law, for which I advocate. 
881 Application for Registration of the Gnostic Centre (Charity Commission for England and Wales, 16 December 
2009). 
882 Application for Registration of the Druid Network (Charity Commission for England and Wales, 21 September 
2010). 
883 Charities Act 2011, s 4(2) (UK). 
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I consider the Gnostic Centre Decision first.  Prior to this Decision, it is worthwhile noting that 
historically, and even in contemporary times, “[a]s between different religions the law stands 
neutral, but it assumes that any religion is at least likely to be better than none”.884 Further:885 
 
The liberal acceptance of trusts for the advancement of religion as being for the public benefit 
is consistent with the attitude and views of the court that would extend toleration to the need 
to support religion as a ‘valuable constituent in the character of our citizens’. 
 
With regard to the Decision of the Gnostic Centre, it appears that the new public benefit 
requirements remove such liberal acknowledgement for the advancement of religion.  As such, 
this is perhaps what the future holds for religious organisations when applying for charitable 
status and this may cause concern for the charitable sector. 
 
VII. The Gnostic Centre  
 
The Gnostic Centre was established to “promote and advance and research on Gnosticism, both 
ancient and modern,”886 which fell within the advancement of religion, and the Commission 
addressed the characteristics of a religion for charitable purposes.887  For the purposes of this 
chapter of interest is criteria 4 which I set out in Chapter 3, which is that of a ‘belief system 
that promotes an identifiable positive, beneficial, moral or ethical framework.’  This is because 
the Commission stated that this framework would demonstrate how a belief system is able to 
impact beneficially within society.888  In other words, it will establish the requisite public 




884 Hester v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2005] 2 NZLR 172 (CA), [6], citing Neville Estates Ltd v 
Madden [1962] Ch 832 at 853; Juliet Chevalier-Watts Charity Law International Perspectives (Routledge, 
Abingdon, 2018) at 102-103. 
885 Hubert Picarda “Charities Act 2011: a dog’s breakfast or dream come true? A case for further reform” in 
Matthew Harding, Ann O’Connell and Miranda Stewart (eds) Not-for-Profit Law Theoretical and Comparative 
Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014) at 143, citing Gass v White 32 Ky 170 (Ct App 
1834). 
886 Gnostic Centre, above n 881, at [19]. 
887  At [22], referring to The Advancement of Religion for the Public Benefit, s C2 and Annex A, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/358531/advancement-of-religion-
for-the-public-benefit.pdf; the four criteria are set out fully in Chapter 3. 
888 Gnostic Centre, above n 881, at [60]. 
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Curiously, there is no evidence to support this particular criteria in statute or case law. 889 
Further, neither does the Commission set out its authority for relying upon this benchmark, 
except in relation to the case of Gilmour v Coats.890  Confusingly, the Commission actually 
referred to the Court of Appeal Gilmour decision and not to the House of Lords decision.  In 
referring to the Court of Appeal case, the Commission stated that the Judges observed public 
benefit as being “a benefit to the community in light of evidence of a kind cognisable by the 
court.”891   
 
Nonetheless, in the House of Lords case, it was noted that public benefit, inter alia, is merely 
“a condition of legal charity.”892  Further, neither the Court of Appeal nor the House of Lords 
made reference to the criteria that the Commission set out, and certainly not the fourth criteria 
that I set out, on which the Commission relies.  The House of Lords case does refer to public 
benefit being “too remote” in relation to edification by example,893 but the Commission does 
not refer to the public benefit of the Gnostic Centre being too remote.   
 
Therefore, it has been argued that the initial approach of the Commission in relation to public 
benefit is at best confusing, and it certainly appears to have limited authority.  At worst, it has 
been argued that the Commission’s standpoint was incorrect.894  I contend that either approach 
is concerning for charity law because, as I noted earlier, the law has already been observed as 
being “illogical and even capricious”. 895   By utilising authority in such a manner, the 
Commission has done little to reassure the public that charity law is any less illogical or 
capricious in this particular instance, and indeed, this may undermine my assertion that the 




889 Peter Luxton and Nicola Evans “Cogent and cohesive? Two recent Charity Commission decisions on the 
advancement of religion” 2011 Conveyancer and Property Lawyer at 146. 
890 Gnostic Centre, above n 881, at [46], referring to Gilmour v Coats [1948] Ch 340 (CA). 
891 At [46], citing Gilmour v Coats, above n 890. 
892 Gilmour v Coats, above n 890, at 446. 
893 Gilmour v Coats, at 454. 
894 Luxton and Evans, above n 889, at 147, referring to, inter alia, Hubert Picarda QC Written Evidence to the 
Joint Committee on the Draft Charities Bill (HL Paper No 167-2; HC Paper No 662 DCH 297 2004); Jeffrey 
Hackney “Charities and public benefit” (2008) LQR 124 34; and Anne Sanders “The mystery of public benefit” 
(2007) CL & PR 10 (2) at 3. 
895 Gilmour v Coats, above n 890, at 443. 
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An additional problem also arose with this Gnostic Centre Decision, and it is pertinent to the 
advancement of religion specifically.  That being that a court, or its equivalent, is not the proper 
forum to decide religious doctrine issues, or indeed decide upon such “moral or ethical 
frameworks.”896  Removing the presumption of public benefit required the Commission to 
ascertain positive effect emanating from the Gnostic Centre’s core beliefs to the public.  This 
was because to advance the ethical or divine well-being, or community enhancement in a way 
that has public benefit, there has to be a promotion of a principled or moralistic tenet that will 
be evidentially of public benefit.  Yet, due to the very nature of religions, it is not clear how 
such things can be proven substantively.  This is because “no advances in technology or 
information-gathering will ever enable the meaningful evaluation of something fundamentally 
incapable of evaluation.”897  In spite of that, the Commission asserted the Gnostic Centre failed 
on this matter.898 
 
Overall, therefore this decision certainly raises issues in relation to the rejection of the 
presumption of public benefit, and unfortunately for the Gnostic Centre, it did not seek to 
appeal, citing pecuniary limitations, and the Decision remains unchallenged. 899   This is 
regrettable for the charity sector because it suggests that religions may indeed struggle to 
demonstrate the requisite public benefit when their very nature may preclude them from doing 
so.  As a result, the downward consequences for beneficiaries that may have been supported 
by such registered charities may be negative.   Interestingly, this may suggest that removing 
the presumption of public benefit, in reality, provides evidence that my assertion that the 
presumption of this doctrine is in fact reconcilable from a charity law perspective.  This is 
because the presumption has provided historical, and indeed current, legal certainty, whereas 
its removal suggests now that there may be some lack of legal clarity, which will do little to 






896 Luxton and Evans, above n 889, at 147. 
897 Jonathan Garton Public Benefit in Charity Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001) at 110. 
898 Gnostic Centre, above n 881, at [59]. 
899 Luxton and Evans, above n 889, at 149; Juliet Chevalier-Watts Charity Law International Perspectives 
(Routledge, Abingdon, 2018) at 105. 
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VIII. The Druid Network  
 
In comparison, the Commission decided the opposite in the Application for the Registration of 
the Druid Network,900 even though, prima facie, the two applications may have been construed 
as similar.  However, in a similar vein to the Gnostic Centre Decision, the Druid Decision has 
also provoked negative commentary, not least because whilst established Christian religions 
may have to prove their public benefit, this Network that “seems predominantly to afford 
outreach via the Internet and has only two solstice rituals a year to witness any … 
edification.”901  Further, the Decision also supports my assertion that the advancement of 
religion is reconcilable through the presumption of public benefit because this Decision 
actually reflects yet further inconsistencies within this new legal framework.  
 
The purposes of the Network include providing information in relation to philosophies and 
traditions of Druidry and to enable the undertaking of Druidry.902  As with the Gnostic Centre 
Decision, the Commission relied on the four criteria, as set out earlier, and I will again focus 
on these specific criteria.   
 
In a change from the Gnostic Centre Decision, the Commission found that the Network 
promoted its ethical codes in ways that were vital and core to their creed.  The Network 
achieved this through providing details about living ethically; through caring for the 
environment; and encouraging access to historical places of interest and to ancient relics, 
amongst other methods.903  This led the Commission stating that the Network had demonstrated 
adequate verification of “an identifiable positive beneficial ethical framework … that is capable 




900 Application for the Registration of the Druid Network (Charity Commission for England and Wales, 21 
September 2010). 
901 Hubert Picarda “Charities Act 2011: a dog’s breakfast or dream come true? A case for further reform” in 
Matthew Harding, Ann O’Connell and Miranda Stewart (eds) Not-for-Profit Law Theoretical and Comparative 
Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014) at 146; see Luxton and Evans, above n 889, at 150; 
Chevalier-Watts, above n 899, at 105-107. 
902 Druid Network, above n 900, at [5]. 
903 At [51]-[52]. 
904 At [53]. 
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The Commission did not make reference to Gilmour v Coats, as it did with in the Gnostic 
Centre Decision, rather it relied on one other authority, Cocks v Manners.905  It is not clear to 
which principle in Cocks the Commission is making reference.  However, it is thought to be as 
follows:906 
 
It is said, in some of the cases, that religious purposes are charitable, but that can only be true 
as to religious services tending directly or indirectly towards the instruction or the edification 
of the public; an annuity to an individual, so long as he spent his time in retirement and constant 
devotion, would not be charitable, nor would a gift to ten persons, so long as they lived together 
in retirement and performed acts of devotion, be charitable.  
 
Nonetheless, it has been asserted that this statement does not provide support for the 
Commission’s fourth characteristic, because “identifiable”, “beneficial”, “moral”, “ethical”, or 
“framework” are not referred to in Cocks.  Further, the Court in Cocks determined that the gift 
failed for charitability.907   
 
Therefore, it is unclear as to the relevance of Cocks as authority in the Druid Network Decision.  
Whilst it is certainly beneficial to the charitable sector that the Druid Network was found to be 
charitable, one might argue that the Commission’s standpoint, since the removal of the 
presumption of the public benefit, causes concern.  This is because its approach can be said to 
be comparatively limited, as well as being rigid in its approach.908  This approach differs from 
the Commission’s earlier approaches, as is evidenced in the Decision of Church of Scientology 
(England and Wales).909 In that Decision, the Commission relied substantially on recognised 
case law, and it provided thorough evaluation of pertinent issues and relevant law.   
 
In summary with regard to the Druid Network and Gnostic Centre Decisions, I find myself in 
agreement with Russell Sandberg that:910 
 
 
905 Cocks v Manners (1871) LR 12 Eq 574. 
906 Luxton and Evans, above n 889, at 149, citing Cocks v Manners, above n 905, at 585. 
907 At 150. This approach was approved in Gilmour v Coats, above n 890. 
908 At 150. 
909 At 150-151, referring to Church of Scientology (England and Wales), Charity Commission Decision for 
England and Wales (November 17, 1999). 
910  Russell Sandberg “Clarifying the Definition of Religion under English Law: The Need for a Universal 
Definition” (2018) Ecclesiastical Law Society 20 at 144-145. 
215 
 
It is difficult to disagree with Luxton and Evans that the reasoning of the Commission in both 
the Gnostic Society and Druid Network applications was reached ‘in reliance on the 
Commission’s own guidance with virtually no mention, let alone analysis, of the underlying 
case law and its application to the case in hand.’ 
 
I respectfully concur that these two Decisions demonstrate “the Commission’s lack of 
awareness of the need for legal rigour when making a legal decision.”911  If this is correct, this 
is a concerning development because such Decisions are contrary to the intentions of the 
legislative reform with regard to public benefit wherein it was undertaken, inter alia, to provide 
clarity and to garner public confidence.  In reality, the very opposite appears to have occurred, 
at the expense of legal clarity and of great concern no doubt to religious communities and the 
outreach that they provide through their charitable endeavours.  This then supports my 
submissions that the advancement of religion can be reconciled through the presumption of 
public benefit, not least because of the certainty and clarity provided by that doctrine. 
 
IX. Preston Down Trust 
 
Of interest also is the Charity Commission case involving the Plymouth Brethren, that of the 
Preston Down Trust, which also reflected the problematic issue with proving public benefit 
with religious groups. 
 
Originally, in 2012, the Charity Commission rejected the Trust’s application for registration 
because the Commission concluded that it did not advance religion due to lack of public 
benefit.912  The Trust owned a meeting hall that was used by the Plymouth Brethren Christian 
Church.  The Preston Down Trust was particularly interesting not least because “there was 
legal precedent ruling that the Plymouth Brethren were charitable”,913 as discussed earlier in 
 
 
911 At 145, citing Luxton and Evans, above n 889 at 150. 
912 Debra Morris “Elasticity of the Boundaries in England and Wales: What is (and isn’t) Charitable?  An 
Opportunity Lost (or Not Yet Fully Embraced)?” (2015) at 23 (Conference Proceedings National Centre on 
Philanthropy and the Law), referring to Letter by the Charity Commission Legal Advisor to the Trust, 7th April 
2012. 
913 Robert Meakin “Taking the Queen’s Shilling: the Implications for Religious Freedom for Religions Being 
Registered as Charities” (2017) Law & Just Christian L Rev 57 at 64-65, referring to Holmes v Attorney-General 
The Times 11th February 1981. 
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the chapter in relation to the Holmes case.  Just as in Holmes, these Brethren were the same 
fundamental Christian group.   
 
In 2012 the Commission stated that neither the Preston Down Trust nor the Church 
demonstrated sufficient public benefit either in its services, nor in its doctrines or practices,914 
which was in direct contrast to the decision in Holmes although obviously the Preston Down 
decision came about after the statutory change to remove the presumption of public benefit.  
However, the Holmes decision had already concluded that the public benefit was established, 
therefore it might be asserted that this latest decision was an unusual approach for the 
Commission in the face of previous determined evidence. Nonetheless, it was asserted that the 
Holmes decision turned on the presumption, or had “at least been largely influenced by the 
existence of a presumption … of public benefit.”915  Certainly, in my discussions, I utilised the 
Holmes case as supporting the presumption of public benefit.  However, this new decision 
might cause concern about the justiciability of such a conclusion by the Commission because 
an identical group had previously been found to be charitable and on the same basis.  
Nevertheless, the Commission distinguished Holmes because “there was real doubt that the 
decision in Holmes could be relied upon”916 because it was determined in reliance on the 
presumption of public benefit.  This creates an interesting dichotomy whereby two identical 
groups’ charitability can be decided in opposition to each other because of a statutory change, 
which in turn creates discord within a charity law context. 
 
The Commission also had heard allegations in relation to the Brethren’s practices that might 
deem them harmful, echoing the decision in Holmes.  Just as in Holmes, the Commission could 
not give any weight to such allegations because there was no substantive evidence of the 
perceived harms, therefore it played no part in the overall decision-making process. 
 
The Trust appealed to the Charity Tribunal, but events took an interesting turn.  Shortly after a 
hearing in 2012, the Trust was granted a stay in proceedings in order to negotiate on matters 
outside of the Tribunal in a cost saving exercise.  Talks between the Trust and the Commission 
 
 
914 Morris, above n 912, at 23. 
915 At 23, footnote 114. 
916 Application for Registration of the Preston Down Trust Charity Commission for England and Wales 3 January 
2014 at [43]. 
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took place, and evidence was shared from independent experts, particularly in respect to the 
“allegations of detriment, harm or disbenefit which could outweigh or militate against public 
benefit.” 917   What the Commission observed was that the Trust “had demonstrated a 
willingness to do what it could as a Christian organisation to ensure … it would act with 
Christian compassion … in carrying out its disciplinary practices and its relations with former 
members of the Brethren.”918   
 
Consequently, the Commission concluded that the Trust demonstrated sufficient evidence that 
the Trust did fulfil the public benefit test and it revised its original decision pertaining to the 
Trust’s charitability.  Debra Morris opined that actually this revision of the decision indicated 
that the Commission “upheld the main elements of the public benefit test from the pre-Charities 
Act case law.”919  If that is correct, this suggests that the Preston Trust case has done little to 
assuage concerns about the removal of the presumption of public benefit, and instead, has 
merely added to concerns that its removal has created inconsistencies in the determination of 
public benefit, at least for religious bodies.  Consequently, I assert that this then does tend to 
support the object of my inquiry that the advancement of religion is reconcilable, and 
specifically through the legal construct of public benefit. 
 
Of course, it must be acknowledged that this decision by the Commission “does not have the 
same precedential status as that of a case decided in the Upper Tribunal”.920   However, its very 
existence casts doubt as to whether the desire of the Government at the time to create certainty 
and clarity on public benefit by removing the presumption of public benefit has actually been 
achieved in reality.  Indeed, following this decision, “the House of Commons Public 
Administration Select Committee subsequently recommended that ‘the removal of the 
presumption of public benefit … be repealed …’”.921  Whilst it is apparent that no such 
recommendation has been adopted at the time of writing, this type of pronouncement is 
 
 
917 At 24. 
918 At 24; it should also be noted that the disciplinary practices referred to in Holmes of “shutting up” and 
“withdrawal” are now known as “shrinking” and “excommunication”, respectively, as per Morris, above n 912, 
footnote 115. 
919 At 25. 
920 At 25. 
921 Pauline Ridge “Not for profit law and freedom of religion” in Matthew Harding (ed) Research Handbook on 
Not-for-profit Law (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham, 2018) at 302, citing House of Commons 
Public Administration Select Committee “The Role of the Charity Commission and Public Benefit: Post-
Legislative Scrutiny of the Charities Act 2006 (HC 76, 21 May 2013) at [91]-[93]. 
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indicative of overall concerns relating to public benefit in the United Kingdom.  In addition, 
such pronouncements add weight to my assertions that the presumption of public benefit is 
actually valuable in cases relating to the advancement of religion so as to try to reduce concerns 
relating to inconsistencies about the determination of public benefit.  Further, if this statutory 
amendment were to be repealed, as recommended, this would avoid the Commission, and 
courts, having to make “judgments about the value of religious doctrine and practice.”922  This 
seems an impossible task for a legal body to undertake meaningfully when it has already been 
determined that many religious doctrines and practices are outside of such value-making 
judgments.  The Preston Down decision reflects this lack of meaningful judgment if indeed it 
is correct that the Commission “upheld the main elements of the public benefit test from the 
pre-Charities Act case law.”923   
 
Returning to matters arising from the Gnostic Centre and Druid Network Decisions, there is a 
further concern regarding those Decisions, and that is in relation to the assertion that the ethical 
framework criteria, which was criterion 4, discussed above, has been conflated with the public 
benefit requirement.  In other words, the question should really be whether the activities of an 
entity are beneficial for the public, not whether it has an identifiable ethical framework.  The 
Commission has chosen to identify an ethical framework as a means of assessing public benefit, 
and it is argued that this confuses two entirely different issues,924 and in doing so, provides 
further evidence that the advancement of religion can be reconciled from this legal perspective.   
I turn to this matter now. 
 
X. Public Benefit and Ethical Framework 
 
It is stated that whilst “benefit” itself is unspecified legally, it has been described in a variety 
of ways, which includes “edification and improving effects, instruction of the public, or moral 
uplifting and spiritual comfort.”925  Further, it is said that there are three main levels of public 
 
 
922 Meakin, above n 913, at 64. 
923 Morris, above n 912, at 25. 
924 Suzanne Owen and Teemu Taira “The Category of ‘Religion’ in Public Classifications: Charity Registration 
of the Druid Network in England and Wales” in Trevor Stack, Naomi Goldenberg and Timothy Fitzgerald (eds) 
Religion as a Category of Governance and Sovereignty (Brill, Leiden, 2015) at 99. 
925 At 99, citing Peter W Edge and Joan M Loughrey “Religious charities and the Juridification of the Charity 
Commission” (2006) Legal Studies 21 1 36-64. 
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benefit.  Firstly, there should be material and spiritual benefits gained from performing 
activities.  Second, these should edify and inspire the public.  Third, religious charities should 
have secular activities that provide various civic benefits.926 
 
The Gnostic Centre was unable to persuade the Commission that its teachings met with an 
identifiable ethical or moral framework.  The Centre asserted that individuals would become 
spiritually aware and exhibit positive behaviour, and as a result would then benefit society.  It 
could be argued that much the same could be said of traditional church services – individuals 
receive spiritual enlightenment and there is a downstream positive impact on communities as 
a result.  However, the Commission stated that the Centre’s teachings were not sufficient and 
too anecdotal to determine the benefit.  It could be asserted that the benefits provided by 
traditional church services as mentioned are also too anecdotal to determine benefit. 
Interestingly, the Druid Network had no issue convincing the Commission of its beneficial 
ethical framework because they advanced religion through promoting their beliefs, providing 
public rituals, and promoting interfaith activities and religious harmony.927  This is perhaps 
because they echoed traditional church activities, although the rational was not explained. 
 
Nonetheless, it has been asserted that the conflation of the ethical framework and public benefit 
can be understood in two ways.  Firstly, it is a practical way of evaluating whether a group 
should be given the benefits of charity in cases where the entity’s beliefs and practices might 
be regarded as deviant from the standard society moral framework.  Secondly, because an 
ethical framework is connected to the category of religion, it can tell us about this religion in a 
contemporary context.928  For example, in the Druid Network Decision, mention was made of 
“sacrifice”.929 “Sacrifice”, in religious terms, suggests animal or indeed human sacrifices, 
which would be an unusual, and certainly frowned-upon practice, in contemporary Western 
societies.   
 
Consequently, the Druid Network had to reiterate that its sacrifices involved no bloodshed, but 
rather referred to sacrifice of time within the community.  This rhetoric is important because it 
 
 
926 At 99, referring to Peter W Edge Religion and Law: An Introduction (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2006). 
927 At 100. 
928 At 100. 
929 Druid Network, above n 900, at [49]. 
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meant that the Network was able to provide evidence of its public benefit, whilst at the same 
time eschewing its ancient practices, which today would be deemed immoral and uncivilised.  
Unfortunately, what this suggests is that religions are having to ensure that their rhetoric 
reflects a taming of their principles to become socially acceptable in today’s times.   
 
Indeed, much time was given by the Commission in exploring this reinvented determination of 
sacrifice,930 illustrating the importance of language in ensuring that a religion complies with 
modern day public benefit requirements.  Further, much of what the Network outlined as being 
part of the sacrifice required related to secular activities, such as promoting animal and human 
rights, and highlighting social issues.931  This focus on secular activities moves away from what 
would generally be seen as core religious activities usually associated with religious groups, 
such prayers, edification and church services.  It might be asserted, therefore, that conflating 
the public benefit and ethical frameworks undermines the ethos of the religious undertakings 
of the entity by packaging them in a secular, modern context.  This may not be appropriate to 
do merely in order to meet charity law requirements. 
 
An additional point of note, and one that pertains implicitly to the power of the new public 
benefit condition, is that there is evidence that the Network refashioned its objects in order to 
meet this new public benefit obligation.  The Network’s purposes are “[t]o provide information 
on the principles and practice of Druidry for the benefit of all and to inspire and facilitate that 
practice for those who have committed themselves to the spiritual path.”932  However, its 
original constitution declared:933 
 
As is true of any mystical religious tradition, the deeper mysteries and practices that would be 





930 At [49]-[53]. 
931 At [52]. 
932 Pauline Ridge “Religious Charitable Status and Public Benefit in Australia” (2011) Melb U L Rev Vol 35 at 
1079, citing Druid Network, above n 900, at [5] and fn 45, whereby it states “the Network provided detailed 
evidence to the Commission to show how it benefited the community … also provided evidence to why it did not 
cause any detriment or harm.” 
933 At 1079, citing Druid Network, above n 900, at [74]. 
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The Commission was concerned that this inferred that a number of the Network’s undertakings 
were restricted to selected groups.  This would then fall outside of the limits of the public 
benefit doctrine.  Accordingly, the Network changed its constitution. The constitution then 
stated: “There are no occult, secret or hidden practices within Druidry; teachings are open to 
all.”934 
 
It is clear that these new objects differ fundamentally from the old ones.  This is an illustration 
of “the power of the public benefit requirement as a means for the state to mould religious 
purposes to its own ends.”935   However, the Network was not alone in its constitutional 
changes to gain charitable status.  In the Preston Down Trust case, I noted that the Trust entered 
negotiations with the Charity Commission in order to come to an acceptable compromise 
whereby the Trust could be construed as meeting public benefit.  To do this, the Trust 
demonstrated that it had made changes to its religious practices to make them more palatable 
in the eyes of the public.  In doing so, the Trust obtained charitable status and the Commission 
therefore “obtained regulatory power over the group.”936 
 
This is surely a concerning development within charity law and certainly for religions and this 
is because here is evidence of religions having to conform to secular, and perhaps populace, 
notions of religion, which may be contrary to their original teachings.  Indeed, what this 
suggests is that the public benefit has been evaluated “in secular charitable activity with an 
erosion of the spiritual element of advancing religion.”937   
 
As a result, one has to ask how much of its actual “religion” has been abandoned by the 
Network, and indeed the Brethren, in order to demonstrate their public benefit to ensure it is 
now compatible with English law.  Perhaps this does mean that “the removal of the 
presumption of public benefit has triggered a view that religion itself is not publicly beneficial 
unless it satisfies some further, non-religious, criterion.”938  This is evidentially not correct, as 
 
 
934 At 1079, citing Druid Network at [75]. 
935 At 1079, referring to Julian Rivers The Law of Organized Religions – Between Establishment and Secularism 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016) at 165. 
936 Pauline Ridge “Not for profit law and freedom of religion” in Matthew Harding (ed) Research Handbook on 
Not-for-profit Law (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham, 2018) at 302. 
937 Meakin, above n 913 at 64. 
938 Julian Rivers “The Secularisation of the British Constitution” (2012) Ecc LJ at 395. 
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this thesis alone has demonstrated that religion has countless non-secular benefits, and further 
it is concerning because this undermines the notion that religion is generally “a positive ethical 
task and publicly beneficial activity”.939 As a result, that in itself should be sufficient as a 
criterion for the privileged status of charity.   
 
Removing the presumption of public benefit is perhaps a step too far for some religions because 
it is likely some will not be able to show the requisite proof, no matter how clever the rhetoric, 
even though there is likely much presumed public benefit.  For those such as the Druid Network 
and the Brethren, who could demonstrate the explicit public benefit, there is a question about 
how much of their actual religion might have been abandoned in order to obtain that privileged 
status as charity.   
 
Indeed, it has been asserted that removing the presumption of public benefit has pressed 
religion into the “service of a secular conception of ‘public interest’.”940 In other words, rather 
than a government viewing religions as delivering distinct community welfare services in 
conjunction with government services, religions are now contained by “the embrace of the state 
… at the same time made subject to its agenda and values.”941  Certainly, I have argued in a 
previous chapter that secular evidence regarding the benefits of religion may help support the 
advancement of religion in a social sense.  However, as I also acknowledge, religion is not just 
about secular benefits.  Religion has many non-secular benefits that cannot necessarily be 
quantified. 
 
Nonetheless, such state intervention may well reassure the populace that religions will not 
necessarily be unduly advantaged by having charitable status.  Nevertheless, this fear is perhaps 
unfounded because the real damage is likely to occur to religions themselves as they have to 
illustrate their secular activities to meet the expectations of the public.  Whereas in reality, it is 
oftentimes their spiritual benefits that are of such importance to those in need.  Those spiritual 
benefits maybe seen as having limited public value, which undermines the ethos of many 




939 Owen and Taira, above n 924, at 101. 
940 Rivers, above n 938, at 396. 
941 At 396. 
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Consequently, I respectfully assert that the Commission’s approach has simply added 
uncertainty to an already difficult legal area.  This is because the reality is that the public benefit 
doctrine needs clarifying, especially with the recent removal of its presumption by England 
and Wales legislators.   Therefore, I contend that the advancement of religion is reconciled 
through the presumption of public benefit, which adds to the overall object of my inquiry that 
the advancement of religion is reconcilable from a number of differing contexts, and a legal 
framework is just one. 
 
XI. The “Benefit” of the Presumption of Public Benefit 
 
This section of the chapter provides further evidence of the reconcilability of the advancement 
of religion through this specific legal framework by considering, inter alia, some of the 
underlying characteristics of public benefit and its role in religious charities. 
 
It was asserted earlier that the removal of the presumption was to create certainty and 
consistency; the discussions pertaining to the Gnostic Centre, The Druid Network, and the 
Preston Down Trust provide evidence that the opposite may have occurred.  This is concerning 
for charities generally because it is not clear how religious organisations should present their 
public benefit so to reflect their underlying purposes accurately, and in a way to ensure that the 
public benefit fits within a framework that appears to have little legal authority.   
 
I contend that the presumption of public benefit is actually a useful jurisdictional instrument in 
assessing whether or not a purpose meets society’s and charity’s measure of benefit.  For 
instance, Liberty Trust has already provided the parameters whereby the presumption can be 
rebutted:942 
 
 … if there is evidence that the purpose is subversive of all morality, or it is a new belief system, 
or if there has been public concern expressed about the organisation carrying out the particular 




942 Liberty Trust, above n 810, at [100], citing Warburton, Morris and Riddle, above n 812, at [2-052]. 
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Those parameters take into consideration the acknowledgment that religion is generally 
beneficial to society, hence why the benefit should be presumed.  However, they are sufficient 
enough to ensure stringent consideration of a religious organisation.  Focusing on ethical 
frameworks, and with that, essentially secular activities, reflects a judicial “rejection of spiritual 
benefit”.943  As a result, such a rejection “both undermines the very nature of what it means to 
be religious and flies in the face of the importance … attributed to spiritual matters”,944 which 
is a key aspect of religion, and one of the key attractions for many seeking religious 
undertakings.   
 
However, one might ask, as perhaps many non-believers may, why legally there should be a 
presumption in favour of advancing religion.  One response may be found by looking to the 
history of religion in England and Wales.  That common law jurisdiction, and its overseas 
territories, adopted the presumption of public benefit when Christianity was the key religion, 
and prior to modern times it would have been unlikely that any person would have challenged 
the presumption that Christianity was inherently beneficial to society.   
 
In current times, just as it could be said for historical times, it is said that the benefits of religion 
and forms of spiritual belief can be seen most clearly in the direct effect on their adherents.  
For instance, “in the peace and equanimity instilled by the prospect of eternal salvation or other 
forms of redemption; and on communities of the like-minded, by being part of a collective 
bound by the same values and modes of worship.”945  This does not necessarily answer the 
question as to how this will benefit the public generally, but it has been argued that the wider 
community will benefit, albeit more indirectly.  For instance, from the exposure to the 
modelling of good civic conduct; dissemination of relevant teachings; through leading good 
lives; and doing good works that will enhance secular welfare more widely.946 
 
There are, of course, other benefits to the community that are derived from religion.  These 
include the presence of churches and places of worship in communities.  These represent places 
 
 
943 Jonathan Garton Public Benefit in Charity Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) at 193. 
944 At 193. 
945 Kerry O’Halloran Religion, Charity and Human Rights (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014) at 
479. 
946 At 479. 
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of solace, community and pastoral care.  Further, such buildings provide significant teaching 
and learning, as well as offering culturally-enriching experiences such as music, architecture, 
sculptures and other art, and public ceremonies.  In addition, whilst it might be trite to say, 
religions still remain centres of generosity, altruism, high moral standing and education.  These 
elements can and do counteract the stresses of everyday life.  Indeed, “religion … continues to 
uphold and represent virtuous and decent behaviour and serves as a reminder … that ‘good 
works’ are needed if society is to be a better place.”947  Thus, the presumption of the public 
benefit of religion makes much sense legally and socially, and evidentially supports my 
assertions that it ensures that the advancement of religion can be reconciled for the benefit of 
society. 
 
Nonetheless, the United Kingdom did remove that presumption in the Charities Act 2006, along 
with s 8(1) of the Charities and Trustee Investment (Scotland) Act 2005, and s 3(1) of the 
Charities (Northern Ireland) Act 2008.948  This is likely to have been a welcome change for 
many, not least because of the repeated and determined calls, as highlighted in Chapter 1, for 
the advancement of religion to be removed as a charitable head, or at least to be apparently 
more stringently controlled.   
 
However, it has been argued that the Charity Commission for England and Wales did recognise 
that the advancement of religion satisfied the public benefit test in ways that differed from the 
other heads of charity.  It is therefore not entirely clear how Parliament intended religious 
entities to meet the new public benefit condition.  This concern is raised because the 2006 and 
2011 Acts are silent as to how this should be achieved, as is Parliament.949   
 
Certainly, the Commission’s 2008 draft supplementary guidance on public benefit did remind 
the public that religious bodies would have to set out the effect of their belief systems, doctrines 
and undertakings, and demonstrate community benefit.  In addition, the Commission 
 
 
947 At 479. 
948 Donovan Waters QC “The advancement of religion in a pluralist society (Part II): abolishing the public benefit 
element” 2011 Trusts & Trustees Vol 17 No 8 at 732. 
949 At 732. 
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acknowledged that some organisations would find this difficult, and it set out to provide some 
guidance on the matter:950 
 
The benefits to the public should be capable of being recognised, identified, defined or 
described but that does not mean that they also have to be capable of being quantified. Benefits 
that can be quantified and measured may be easier to identify but we also take non-quantifiable 
benefits into consideration, provided it is clear what the benefits are. The benefits may or may 
not be physically experienced. We realise that often in the case of charities whose aims include 
advancing religion some of the benefits are not tangible and could be potentially difficult to 
identify. However, this is not to say that a public benefit assessment would only take account 
of tangible, practical benefits. 
 
This suggests that spiritual benefits may be taken into consideration.  However, the 
Commission only included spiritual benefits contributing “to the spiritual and moral education 
of children”.951  Adults have been excluded from the guidance, and it would appear to be quite 
deliberate.  This means that benefiting from spiritual matters will not be sufficient to meet the 
public benefit test, which is a large section of the community deliberately excluded from the 
test.   
 
Indeed, it has been suggested that the Commission’s carefully-worded guidance means that it 
is not possible to speak of spiritual benefits being beneficial to any persons other than children 
being educated.952  On the other hand, it is acknowledged that the Commission has provided 




950 At 733-734; “Public benefit - Principle 1: There must be an identifiable benefit or benefits” Charity 
Commission for England and Wales 2008 at D2 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/358531/advan
cement-of-religion-for-the-public-benefit.pdf.  It should be noted that the Commission states: “This guidance is 
currently under review.  It no longer forms part of our public benefit guidance and should now be read together 
with our set of 3 public benefit guides. It will remain available to read until we publish replacement guidance.” 
“The Advancement of Religion for the Public Benefit” 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/358531/advan
cement-of-religion-for-the-public-benefit.pdf.  
951 “Public benefit - Principle 1: There must be an identifiable benefit or benefits” at D2. 
952 Waters, above n 948, at 734-735. 
953 “Public benefit - Principle 1: There must be an identifiable benefit or benefits”, above n 950, at D2. 
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…  whether a religious organisation’s aims are for the public benefit is a question of judgement. 
We have to decide … whether there is public benefit in the light of the evidence and facts 
before us.  
 
Nonetheless, the “absence of any measuring yardstick in those words is striking”,954 and does 
little to acknowledge the very real difference in the benefits to be found in religion in 
comparison with the other heads of charity.  Consequently, I submit that this may undermine 
the role of religion within the charitable sector at the expense of the sector itself.  One only has 
to review the evidence provided throughout this thesis to recognise the value of religion within 
charity to understand the real threat to the sector if the advancement of religion is undermined 
in this manner.  In addition, the requirement to confirm that a purpose provides explicit 
evidence of its public benefit is seen as a fundamental devaluation of religion.  This is because 
the “flat rate public benefit test”955 imposed across all charitable purposes, reinforced by the 
activities test is viewed as secularising religion.  Further, a “flat rate public benefit test”956 is 
unlikely to be applicable to religion in the same way as it is to the other secular charitable 
purposes.957 
 
Indeed, this new proof of public benefit ignores the fact that religions offer more than secular 
conceptions of benefit.  Religious belief offers “spiritual, emotional and intellectual resources 
… to people who are searching for answers to ethical and existential questions.”958  Such 
resources enable people to develop emotionally, and “constitute options for autonomous 
choices.”959  Such spiritual resources also provide other benefits.  For example, in the spiritual 
requirement of tithing, which comes from charitable obligations that a religious belief places 
upon individuals.  It is argued that tithing creates a wellspring of charitable activity, and 
communities feel benefited, emotionally and physically, from such provision of tithes.  It 
appears that perhaps only the physical effects will now be acknowledged under United 
 
 
954 Waters, above n 948, at 735. 
955 Kerry O’Halloran Religion, Charity and Human Rights (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014) at 
481. 
956 At 481. 
957 At 481. 
958 Kathryn Chan “The Advancement of Religion as a Charitable Purpose in an Age of Religious Neutrality” 
(2017) Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 6 at 124, referring to Matthew Harding Charity Law and the Liberal 
State (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014). 
959 At 124, referring to Matthew Harding Charity Law and the Liberal State (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2014). 
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Kingdom law.  However, the ethereal public benefit that arises “from the existence of the 
normative universe that caused” 960  a person to give, because of unquantifiable religious 




This chapter was important to support my assertions that the advancement of religion is a 
reconcilable construct, and specifically from the evidence provided in this chapter, from the 
legal context of public benefit.  This is because public benefit and religion are inherently and 
intrinsically linked.  Not least because religion may fill voids that exist between personal 
morality and the overall recognition of societal principles which uphold the law and societal 
behaviours.  For instance, public benefit is implied in religion because religion can offer 
certainty, comfort, codes of conduct and reassurance in the face of inadequacies of humans’ 
place within the universe.  These inferences emphasise the continued function of religion 
within society. This provides a justification for the continued acceptance of religion within 
society generally.  Consequently, I contend that charity law can provide the vehicle by which 
religion can benefit communities appropriately, not least because of public benefit, ensuring 
that the advancement of religion is reconcilable. 
 
Certainly, there is abundant evidence that churches, which are invariably charitable, continue 
to exert a fundamental influence in endeavouring to reduce contemporary societal issues.  
Examples of this are seen whereby governments subcontract services to religious groups, for 
example, in the provision of traditional welfare services such as clothes, money and education.  
Further, religious group involvement in large-scale humanitarian aid is legendary, and includes 
groups such as the Salvation Army and Catholic Relief Agencies.961   
 
In addition, public benefit may be inherently inferred from the general redistributive process 
of transferring property from a religious person to the community through acts of altruism and 
tithes, which are obligations on the adherents of many religions.  This occurs without direct 
coercion from the state, yet benefits the state intrinsically because of the communities that are 
 
 
960 At 127. 
961 HR Sorensen and AK Thompson The Advancement of Religion is Still a Valid Charitable Object in 2001 
(Working Paper No CPNS13 for Charity Law in the Pacific Rim 4-6 October QUT Brisbane 2001) at 12. 
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then supported; the pressure is thus reduced on the state.962  What can be asserted is that 
“maintenance of the normative universes that promote these narratives is instrumentally 
valuable to the public as a whole.”963 
 
In judicial terms, case law has revealed that the presumption of public benefit has generally 
assisted courts when considering with the advancement of religion.  In cases such as Liberty 
Trust and Holmes, where there was an accepted relationship between religion and charity, a 
court could uphold an object as charitable to the full extent of the law.  The presumption acted 
as a check and balance where there was both findings of public benefit and no public benefit.  
Overall, the presumption weighed in favour of charitability, therefore the value of the 
presumption of public benefit is illustrated. 
 
Similarly in Re Watson,964 there was evidence for and against finding the charitable purpose.  
The evidence against was that the works of HG Hobbs had nil worth in relation to the Christian 
faith.  However, Hobbs’ writings were not contrary to fundamental religious beliefs or morals, 
thus the presumption of public benefit was not rebutted.  Therefore, Plowman J was able to 
weigh up the evidence, and sufficient evidence was presented not to rebut the presumption, 
leading to a finding of the purposes being charitable.965 I contend that assessing the public 
benefit in this manner illustrates its effectiveness as a check and balance for the advancement 
of religion.  Further, it gives credence to the doctrine of benignant construction, which is clearly 
a benefit to society overall. 
 
I maintain that evaluating religion’s explicit public benefit in many instances is not merely 
impractical, it is effectively impossible, because religion’s spiritual components are 
fundamentally incapable of being evaluated.966  In other words, the “indemonstrable nature of 
any supernatural belief places endeavours undertaken to give effect to that belief beyond 
effective evaluation”.967  Nonetheless, I argue that having an indemonstrable public benefit 
should not negate charitable status, rather the presumption of public benefit should be applied.  
 
 
962 Chan, above n 958, at 133. 
963 At 133. 
964 At 165, referring to Re Watson (deceased), Hobbs v Smith [1973] 3 All ER 678. 
965 At 165, referring to Re Watson at 682; 683; and 688. 
966 Garton, above n 943, at 110. 
967 At 192. 
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If there is sufficient evidence to rebut that presumption, such as a purpose being contrary to 
public policy or an illegal purpose, then this can be a sufficient regulatory mechanism by which 
to deny charitability.   
 
Consequently, I contend that the role of the public benefit in this context is valuable because it 
acknowledges that spirituality is at the heart of religion.  It is disingenuous, at the very least, 
for states to recognise that religion can be charitable without acknowledging, explicitly, that 
very concept. With respect, the United Kingdom’s rejection of the presumption of public 
benefit rejects the heart of religion, that of spiritual benefits, and I assert that this may 
undermine the absolute construct of religion, thus undermining religion as a whole within 
society.  As I have demonstrated throughout this thesis, religious charities provide numerous 
benefits to a wide variety of societies, and undermining the overall construct of religion through 
the removal of public benefit may in turn undermine the charity sector, which may then 
undermine its social welfare endeavours.  I submit, therefore, that the presumption of public 
benefit ensures provides not only a method of reconciling the advancement of religion, but also 
may go some way to preserving the charitable endeavours of religious charities to benefit 
society as a whole. 
 
The presumption of public benefit within the advancement of religion has, generally speaking, 
tended towards some clarity and predictability – two basic requirements of the rule of law.968  
Consequently, I view the public benefit doctrine, in conjunction with its presumption, as a 
valuable instrument in a court’s arsenal to assess the overall value to a community, not just the 
secular benefits of religion.  The utilisation of the doctrine in this context ensures that 
distribution of charitable resources is authorised and controlled by the rules of law,969 which 
provides surety to the public.  It is certainly unlikely that the United Kingdom will reinstate the 
presumption of public benefit, but I would respectfully suggest that other jurisdictions consider 





968 Kathryn Chan The Public-Private Nature of Charity Law Divide (Bloomsbury, London, 2016) at 6. 
969 At 11. 
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I therefore submit that this chapter has demonstrated that removing religion’s presumption of 
public benefit risks charity law being uncertain, biased or unstable, and “threatens the law’s 
ability to provide people with definite expectations … [s]uch is the rule of law and its virtue.” 
970  Such factors are key to consider within charity law because where disincentive and 
inconvenience occur, the betterment of society will flounder.971 
 
Public benefit is an organic principle, and I have presented evidence to support the object of 
my inquiry whereby its value may be recognised where courts have to determine modern day 
charity law challenges, which arise particularly in regard to issues associated with the 
advancement of religion.  I cannot deny that the doctrine of public benefit is not without issue, 
but its value is clear when it comes to the very specific requirements of assessing the benefit 
of religion within charity law because of the inherent complexities of assessing such benefits.   
 
It is possible, as I mentioned in the previous chapter, that assessing the economic value of a 
religion may satisfy the public benefit requirement.  However, as stated, research relating to 
the economics of religion is limited and invariably it will be difficult currently to assess such 
values accurately.  Further, merely equating a pecuniary value to religion may actually 
undermine some of the complex benefits afforded by religions to society through their 
charitable endeavours.  Consequently, I contend that the advancement of religion, and the 
advantages that are granted through being a recognised charitable purpose, can be justified, and 
therefore reconciled, through the appropriate recognition and application of the presumption of 
public benefit because it is legitimised through the rules of law whilst continuing to 
acknowledge the very nature of religion.  Indeed, the case of Holmes provided one method of 
determining how the public benefit may be rebutted, and those in in circumstances where the 
purposes “adverse to the very foundations of all religion, and that they are subversive of all 
morality”.972  This may seem like a high threshold but such a parameter implicitly recognises 
that matters of faith and spirituality benefit humankind overall, and yet it explicitly 
acknowledges that some religions may not, and in those circumstances it will not be appropriate 
 
 
970  Emma Dowse “Political Purpose and Charity Law in New Zealand. The public benefit requirement: 
opportunities, issues and solutions in response to Re Greenpeace of New Zealand Incorporated [2014] NZSC 
105” (LLB Dissertation University of Otago 9 October 2015) at 11. 
971 At 11. 
972 Holmes v Attorney-General The Times, at 4, referring Thornton v Howe, above n 837, at 19. 
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to acknowledge any charitable nature.  One should not be naïve to the fact that not all religions 
will have the best interests of humans at their core.  However, this is unlikely to be a common 
situation, especially because many religions, even the controversial ones such as Scientology 
and Jediism “are remarkably similar to established religions in terms of doctrine.”973  This was 
acknowledged in the United States in Founding Church of Scientology v United States,974 
whereby the Court noted that Scientology “had many of the characteristics of other recognised 
religions.”975   
 
As a result, I assert that the presumption of public benefit avoids the problem of forcing courts 
or charitable bodies to evaluate “religious doctrines and practices of a religion.”976  Due to the 
very nature of religions, the truth of many practices and claims cannot be verified by a court, 
therefore it is difficult to imagine how these matters will be addressed adequately in the future.  
Indeed, as Murphy J in Church of the New Faith v Commissioner for Payroll Tax observed that 
many of the “established religions … would not satisfy such criteria”977 and:978 
 
Christianity claims to have begun with a founder and twelve adherents.  It had no written 
constitution, and no permanent meeting place.  It borrowed heavily from the teachings of the 
Jewish religion, but had no complete and absolute moral code.  Its founder exhorted people to 
love one another and taught by example.  Outsiders regarded his teachings, especially about the 
nature of divinity, as ambiguous, obscure and contradictory, as well as blasphemous and illegal. 
 
Consequently, it is likely that early Christianity would have fallen outside the constructs of 
religion, at least for charitable purposes. This suggests that new or controversial religions being 
determined in today’s climate might also be subject to such scrutiny that determines they fail 
as a religion at charity because their public benefit cannot be explicitly proven, yet they may 
share many doctrines of established religions who are charitable.   This seems an inequitable 
situation. I demonstrate in this chapter, therefore, that the presumption of public benefit is likely 
 
 
973 Robert Meakin “Taking the Queen’s Shilling: the Implications for Religious Freedom for Religions Being 
Registered as Charities” (2017) Law & Just Christian L Rev 57 at 67. 
974 At 67, referring to Founding Church of Scientology v United States 409 F2d 1146 (1969). 
975 At 67. 
976 At 67. 
977 At 68, citing Church of the New Faith v Commissioner for Payroll Tax (1983) 154 CLR 120 at [46]. 
978 At 69, citing Church of the New Faith v Commissioner for Payroll Tax, at [46]. 
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still a useful method of determining the charitability of religious bodies because of the complex 
and spiritual nature of religion itself which invariably render their explicit public benefit 
incapable of determination by a court whereas their intrinsic benefit is already established.  As 
a result, it supports my assertions that the advancement of religion is reconcilable through the 
legal framework of the presumption of public benefit. 
 
In the following penultimate chapter, I turn my attention to potential risks in removing the 
advancement of religion as a legally-recognised charitable purpose, and how such a removal 
may provide evidence as to further the object of my inquiry, that of reconciling the 
advancement of religion.  
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As established in Chapter 1, the overarching aim of this thesis is to review critically the 
reconciliation of the advancement of religion as a legally-recognised head of charity in the 
context of the legal and socio-political environment.  As the research was undertaken, and as I 
have demonstrated throughout this thesis, I have established that the advancement of religion 
within charity law, underpinned by the rule of law, is reconcilable within a number of 
contexts,979 including legal, social, and political.  Nonetheless, in providing a thorough and 
complete examination of this head of charity, I deemed it important to consider some of the 
possible implications if this charitable purpose were to be removed as a head of charity.  This 
is because it if can be shown that removing this particular charitable purpose would likely have 
a detrimental effect on democratic society, then this would provide another method by which 
to reconcile the advancement of religion for the benefit of society.  Therefore, this is the is 
focus of this chapter. 
 
I acknowledge that there is no evidence in any reported decisions from the Commonwealth 
jurisdictions that this head of charity is to be removed.  Nevertheless, I maintain it is pertinent 
to address this specific point within this thesis, not only because it ensures a comprehensive 
examination of the advancement of religion, but also because “… the voices favouring 
abolition of the religious charity appear to be growing in strength”. 980   For example, as 
mentioned, in 2018 a Bill was introduced to the Australian Victorian Parliament which would, 
inter alia, “remove the advancement of religion as a charitable purpose for charity law”.981  In 
 
 
979 For example, HR Sorensen & AK Thompson The Advancement of Religion is Still a Valid Charitable Object 
in 2001” (Working Paper No CPNS13, Charity Law in the Pacific Rim, Centre of Philanthropy and Nonprofit 
Studies, QUT, Brisbane, Australia, August 2002) at 10. 
980 Kathryn Chan “The Advancement of Religion as a Charitable Purpose in an Age of Religious Neutrality” 
(2017) Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 6 at 113; see also Barry W Bussey “The Legal Revolution Against 
the Place of Religion: The Case of Trinity Western University Law School” 2016 BYU Law Review Issue 4 
January at 1213. 
981  Peter Mulherin “Religious Organisations’ Tax Exemption Status: Mark Sneddon quoted in Victorian 
Parliament Debate” (22 May 2018) 
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addition, and as observed in Chapter 1, the rationale to continue to support “archaic British 
law”982 with respect to the advancement of religion is arguably “no longer relevant in a secular, 
21st century democracy”.983 This is because an organisation “should not get tax exempt status 
because you promote belief in a supreme being, or multiple supreme beings.”984  Consequently, 
any reconciliation of the advancement of religion is implicitly shadowed with public calls for 
its removal. 
 
In reflecting on the removal of the advancement of religion, I consider some key factors of 
religion that are unique to religious charities that are not necessarily part of the construct of 
other secular charitable groups.  These unique properties contribute significantly to the support 
given to, and provided by, religious charities and groups, thus providing evidence to support 
my assertion that the advancement of religion is a reconcilable principle. 
 
I conclude that any removal of this charitable purpose would have wider implications for 
society generally, because implicitly charity, and charity law, are influenced by society and 
social contexts.  Therefore, if religion were to be removed from charity law, then society may 
also lose the influence of religion, for example, through significant reductions in social welfare 
programmes and activities that are provided by religious groups. 
 
Consequently, this chapter forms part of this wider discourse of the role of religion within 





982 David Farrar, Kiwiblog 23 February 2015, citing The Herald 
http://www.kiwiblog.co.nz/2015/02/advancement_of_religion_should_not_be_a_charitable_purpose.html 
983 Farrar.   
984 Farrar; see also Bryce Edwards “[who runs New Zealand?] Religious charities” Liberation (27 January 2008) 
https://liberation.typepad.com/liberation/who_runs_new_zealand/; Dann Flynn “An unprecedented attack on 
faith and freedom defeated” The Spectator (25 May 2018) https://www.spectator.com.au/author/dan-flynn/; 
Rationalist Society of Australia “Petition: remove “advancement of religion” as a charitable purpose” (19 
November 2015) https://www.rationalist.com.au/petition-remove-advancement-of-religion-as-a-charitable-
purpose/; Wendy Williams (ed) “Advancement of Religion as Charitable Purpose Question” ProbonoAustralia 
(15 December 2017) https://probonoaustralia.com.au/news/2017/12/advancement-religion-charitable-purpose-
question/; Meredith Doig “Religion’s tax break is a cross we shouldn’t have to bear” The Sydney Morning Herald 
(24 March 2016) https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/easter-is-a-good-time-to-revisit-taxexempt-status-of-
religious-organisations-20160324-gnpzjj.html; Luke Appleby “’Comprehensive’ review of Charities Act now 
underway, minister Peeni Henare, as calls to change tax treatment of religious charities grows” 1News TVNZ (7 
March 2018) https://www.tvnz.co.nz/one-news/new-zealand/comprehensive-review-charities-act-now-
underway-minister-peeni-henare-says-calls-change-tax-treatment-religious-grow?variant=tb_v_1; see Chapter 1 
for additional discussions. 
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may arise for societies with the removal of the advancement of religion as a head of charity.  I 
begin by considering the nexus between religion, society, and charity, which has been 
considered in previous chapters.  However, I address this matter with regards to the 
consequences to society if the advancement of religion were to vanish from legal charitable 
purposes.  Therefore, this section contextualises religious charities as part of the broader 
discussions within this chapter. 
 
II. Religion, Society and Charity – an Overview 
 
As I observed in some earlier chapters in relation to the lack of available research, or up-to-
date research in those specific areas, the research in the particular context of this chapter is also 
limited.  Certainly, there is extensive research about the influence of religious charities, both 
positive and negative, however, there is limited information available about what would happen 
if religion were to be removed from charity law.  Obviously, because it is a theoretical question 
at the time of writing, all of the information available is academic in nature, and it means that 
I may have to make some assumptions or assertions based on the research available.   
 
Nonetheless, what these lack of enquiries highlight is the need for more research to understand 
the real consequences should governments determine that removing the advancement of 
religion as a charitable purpose is the correct approach to take.  
 
As I established in earlier chapters:985 
 
The relationship between religion and society cannot be understood without reference to law, 
and the relationship between religion and law cannot be understood without reference to 
sociology.  A sociology of law and religion is concerned with how social forces shape the legal 
regulation of religion and how law is used to affect religion and its social expression.  It seeks 
to shed further light upon the complex relationship between religion, law and society. 
 
I established in Chapter 6, from an economics perspective, that generally speaking, law, and 
thus charity law, must fit within a modern social context to operate appropriately and 
 
 
985 Russell Sandberg and Rebecca Catto “Law and Sociology: Toward a Greater Understanding of Religion” in N 
Doe and R Sandberg (eds) Law and Religion: New Horizons (Peeters, Leuven 2010) at 28. 
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effectively.  This means that the advancement of religion, alongside other the charitable 
purposes, is “essential to establishing and sustaining an equitable, inclusive and stable 
society,”986 or, in other words, “to promote a truly contemporary interpretation of the public 
benefit is to promote civil society.”987  Indeed, it has been asserted that religion is a “valuable 
constituent in the character of our citizens”. 988  This latter point was made specifically in 
reference to United States’ citizens, although no doubt it would also apply to many 
jurisdictions.  Further, it has been said that religion is “necessary to the advancement of 
civilisation and the production of the welfare of society”.989 
 
Consequently, I contend that religion, society and law have a symbiotic relationship where one 
influences the other, and in this context, I refer generally to democratic societies, as has been 
referenced throughout this thesis. Politics equally influences the law, and vice versa, and 
obviously charity law forms part of the legal framework that is influenced by politics.  
Therefore, religion and politics are also closely associated.  As a result, it is argued that 
“religion is a normal part of the political discussion.”990  For instance:991 
 
All sorts of values feed into a political position, and most are accepted as a legitimate part of 
political debate.  Different economic schools of thought, for example, contribute to different 
kinds of economic policy.  Different beliefs about the nature, causes and consequences of 
climate change contribute … to different stances on emissions reduction.  Different ideological 
orientations nurture different approaches to international relations. 
 
Therefore, accepting religion in the political arena enables religious contribution to policies, 
education and civic discourses, which in turn leads to the promotion of democratic 
principles.992  “Far from ushering in theocracy, this openness to faith enhances pluralism and 
diversity.” 993   For example, the United States Supreme Court, whilst acknowledging the 
 
 
986 Kerry O’Halloran “Charities, civil society and the charity law reviews on the island of Ireland” 2004 Policy & 
Politics Vol 32 No 2 at 263. 
987 At 263. 
988 Sorenson & Thompson, above n 979, at 10, citing Hubert Picarda Law and Practice Relating to Charities (3rd 
ed, Butterworths, London, 1999) at 84. 
989 Sorenson & Thompson, above n 979, at 10, citing Picarda, above n 988, at 84. 
990 Marian Maddox “An Argument for More, not Less, Religion in Australian Politics” (2009) ARSR 22.3 at 361. 
991 At 361. 
992 Antony Barone Kolenc “Religion Lessons from Europe: Intolerant Secularism, Pluralistic Neutrality, and the 
U.S. Supreme Court” 2017 Pace International Law Review Vol 30 Issue 1 Winter at 54. 
993 At 54. 
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religious basis of the country, also acknowledged the United States’ “respect for freedom of 
religious practice that extended to other faiths as well.” 994   Therefore, religion can be 
recognised as having a “vital political role.” 995   This is because not only is religion an 
“important source of viewpoints in the process of democratic self-government, but also a 
powerful political motivator behind some of the [United States’] greatest crusades.”996  Such 
views apply equally to Europe where many would “prefer to live in a country of pluralism that 
grants a more complete freedom of public behaviour even if [they] belong to a minority and 
have to support the predominance of an established religion.”997 
 
Nonetheless, politically, the advancement of religion is a challenging principle because 
religious charities may be seen as being advantaged at the expense of other social necessities.  
For example:998 
 
 … in present society, while health services are suffering from underfunding and other public 
goods like education and welfare are increasingly strained, the prospering pursuit of 
advancement of religion with its intangible and questionably ‘public’ benefits is problematic. 
 
Therefore, it becomes clearer as to why this head of charity may be regarded as having an 
untenable future.  However, removing the advancement of religion from charity law would 
have consequences, and it is likely these would be detrimental for society in a number of 
regards, demonstrating, therefore, why it is a reconcilable principle, as I assert.   
 
In order to illustrate some likely consequences for societies generally, which would include the 
democratic societies to which I’ve made reference throughout this thesis, this chapter provides 
a comprehensive review of a case study of two New Zealand religious charities that operate on 
 
 
994 At 55, citing Thomas C Berg “Can State-Sponsored Religious Symbols Promote Religious Liberty?” (2013) 
Cath Legal Study at 34, citing Holy Trinity Church v United States 143 US 457 (1892) at 458-459. 
995  Patrick M Garry “Religious Freedom Deserves More than Neutrality: The Constitutional Argument for 
Nonpreferential Favoritism of Religion” (2005) Florida Law Review Vol 57 January No 1 at 34. 
996 At 34, referring to some political movements that were inspired by the Social Gospel movement, such as the 
demand for the freer immigration of refugees; the abolitionist movement of the 19th century; and the civil rights 
movement of the 20th century. 
997 Kolenc, above n 992, at 55, citing Pierre-Henri Prelota “The Lautsi Decision as Seen from (Christian) Europe” 
(2013) ME L Rev 65 at 786. 
998 Sofia Zudova On the taxation of religious charities and the public benefit of charitable exemptions (Victorian 
Parliamentary Internship Research Report June 2016) at 6. 
239 
an international scale to fight global poverty.  Consequently, the next part of this chapter 
concentrates primarily on this specific research, and then moves to providing some general 
conclusions in relation to the possible removal of the advancement of religion as a head of 
charity. 
 
The New Zealand case study in question demonstrate religion’s ability to address global 
poverty through the utilisation of a skills framework peculiar only to religious charities and 
bodies.  As a result, the following discussions demonstrate how such groups utilise techniques 
and principles within this framework that are not available to other charitable groups to carry 
out charitable works.  By implication, therefore, if the advancement of religion were removed 
as a head of charity, those methods utilised specifically by religious charities will vanish 
because they are not available to secular charitable organisations to utilise.  
 
Of course, it could be argued that if faith groups were no longer available to carry out charity 
work, people will donate to secular causes instead.  As the research indicates, however, this 
may not be the case because of the methodology of the faith groups.  As a result, if such 
organisations were to lose their charitable status as a result of the advancement of religion being 
removed as a head of charity, the detrimental consequences for society become self-evident 
because the welfare provided by such charities would likely be eliminated due to lost support 
and funding.  Consequently, the burden on societies would increase in direct proportion to the 
lost charitable welfare.  In economic terms alone, as established in Chapter 6, this is likely to 
have serious financial implications for many communities.  Other consequences may include 
alienation of minority or religious groups. 
 
It should be noted, by way of explanation, and as echoed in previous chapters, that much of the 
research referred to in this thesis uses terms such as “charity”, “non-governmental organisation 
(NGO)”, and “not-for-profit organisations”, interchangeably.  It is not always easy to determine 
if such bodies are legally-recognised charities, however, the aid work that they undertake is of 
a religiously philanthropic,999 or charitable, nature.  Thus, similarities may have to be drawn 
 
 
999 “Philanthropy” is not a legally-recognised form of charity thus a body may have philanthropic purposes but is 
not legally charitable.  Nonetheless, in some research “philanthropy” and “charity” are used interchangeably, 
which this chapter acknowledges; see Juliet Chevalier-Watts Law of Charity (ThomsonReuters, Wellington, 2014) 
at chap 1. 
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between those organisations and legally-recognised charitable organisations because their 
work is invariably identical.      
 
It should also be noted that whilst the New Zealand case studies to which this chapter refers 
focus on the relief of global poverty specifically, the principles and methodologies of the 
religious charities that have been referred to in relation to relieving poverty are also utilised in 
other forms of charitable works undertaken by religious groups, not just relief of global 
poverty.  Consequently, these two case studies merely provide an example of the religious 
framework in which religious charities operate generally. 
 




It is evident from previous chapters, and indeed from common awareness generally about 
religious charities, that religious charities are renowned for providing humanitarian aid on 
community and global scales.  Of course, one cannot ignore the historical darker side of 
religious charities and religious NGOs, with assistance oftentime exchanged for religious 
transformation.  Certainly, religion has been notorious for the oppression of certain groups or 
minorities.  Nonetheless, religious groups and charities have had significant positive global 
impact in relation to social welfare, international humanitarian relief and social development 
efforts.1000 
 
However, it has been observed that in reality, religion has long been ignored by the social 
sciences as a result of social sciences being profoundly influenced by secularisation 
theory.  This is because it is thought that religious institutions have lost their social significance 
in contemporary society.1001  Nonetheless, recent civil studies have explored the not-for-profit 
 
 
1000 I Mylek and P Nel “Religion and relief: the role of religion in mobilizing civil society against global poverty” 
(2010) Kotuitui: New Zealand Journal of Social Sciences Online 5:2 at 82-83, referring to, inter alia, J Berger 
“Religious nongovernmental organizations: an exploratory analysis” (2003) Voluntas 14 (1) 15-39; and MR 
Kroessin and AS Mohamed “Saudi Arabian NGOs in Somalia: ‘Wahabi’ Da’wah or humanitarian aid? In G Clarke 
and M Jennings (eds) Development, civil society and faith-based organizations: bridging the sacred and the 
secular (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2008) 187-213. 
1001  Mylek and Nel, above n 1000, at 81, referring to, inter alia, B Wilson Religion in Sociological 
Perspective (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1982) at 149. 
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area and the nexus between philanthropy1002 and religion.  The studies have found that religious 
organisations are viewed as more important than other organisations by poor people, and that 
recipients of aid trust religious organisations more than non-religious aid entities.1003   
 
Indeed, the role of religious NGOs and charities cannot be underestimated in relation to aid.  It 
is said that “few other charity sectors exhibit the continuing presence of so many religiously 
based organizations as does overseas development, with anything up to one-quarter of Northern 
and international NGOs being ‘Christian’”.1004  In addition, such groups generally command 
considerable fiscal resources.  For instance:1005 
 
… the [largest] four faith-based development agencies had a combined annual income of 
approximately $2.5 billion at the beginning of the new millennium … almost two-thirds of the 
annual budget of the UK Department for International Development. 
 
The question, therefore, arises: what is it specifically about religious charities that enables them 
to gather such resources and mobilise in such a way so as to relieve global poverty in 
comparison with other charitable models?  So, prior to addressing the two New Zealand case 
studies specifically, it is necessary to set out the framework employed by religious charities, 





1002 “Philanthropy” used in this context is a general term relating to ensuring the welfare of others, and may be 
related to charitable work, but is not recognised as a legal term within charity law. 
1003 Mylek and Nel , above n 1000, at 81-82, referring to, inter alia, F Kniss and DT Campbell "The effect of 
religious orientation on international relief and development organizations" (1997) Journal for the Scientific Study 
of Religion 36(1) 93-103; R Wuthnow and W Cadge "Religion and the nonprofit sector" in W Powell and R 
Steinberg (eds) The nonprofit sector: a research handbook (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2006) 485-505; 
KA Ver Beek "Spirituality: a development taboo" (2000) Development in Practice 10(1) 31-43; and SM Thomas 
The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: the Struggle for the Soul 
of the Twenty-First Century (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2005).  
1004 Mylek and Nel, above n 1000, at 83, citing A Whaites “Pursuing partnership: World Vision and the ideology 
of development – a case study” (1999) Development in Practice 9(4) at 410. 
1005 At 83, citing G Clarke “Faith-based organizations and international development: an overview” in G Clarke 
and M Jennings (eds) Development, civil society and faith-based organizations: bridging the sacred and the 
secular (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2008) at 26-27; see also John Edens “New Zealanders give generously 
– almost $3 billion a year – but rarely talk about it” Stuff (10 July 2017) 
https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/94560462/new-zealanders-give-generously--almost-3-billion-a-year--but-





B. The Model/Framework of Religious Charities 
 
This part of the chapter refers to a theoretical framework that draws on sociological 
explanations, which underpin and provide a narrative of religion’s role in charitable 
endeavours, and provides evidence to support my assertions that the advancement of religion 
is reconcilable, and evidently through this framework.  There are three key aspects to this 
framework.   
 
1. Religious social capital  
The first aspect is religious “social capital”.1006  This reveals the needs of others to communities 
and individuals and provides recruitment opportunities through its networks.  By exposing 
people to the needs of others, this provides opportunities for recruitment and promoting trust, 
in turn leading to the promotion of charitable activity.  Research indicates that “the most 
important predictor of charitable giving is … a donor’s ‘network-based social capital’ the 
degree to which the donor is embedded socially, or involved and engaged in society.”1007  Of 
particular importance is the notion that “faith communities … are arguably the single most 
important repository of social capital in America.”1008  This is likely to be the case in other 
jurisdictions if the research presented in previous chapters relating to religion and its social 
context is also considered. 
 
As has been observed in earlier chapters, it is well documented that religious persons undertake 
greater levels of charitable activities than secular persons.  It is thought that this is because of 
the connectedness between religious individuals within religious networks and communities.  
 
 
1006 “Social capital broadly refers to those factors of effectively functioning social groups that include such things 
as interpersonal relationships, a shared sense of identity, a shared understanding, shared norms, 
shared values, trust, cooperation, and reciprocity. However, the many views of this complex subject make a single 
definition difficult.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_capital; see also generally Arthur C Brooks “Does 
Social Capital Make You Generous?” (2005) Social Science Quarterly Vol 86 No 1 March; and Arthur C Brooks 
“Faith, Secularism, and Charity” (2004) Faith & Economics No 43 Spring at 7. 
1007 Mylek and Nel, above n 1000, at 84, citing JJ Havens et al “Charitable giving: how much, by whom, to what, 
and how? In W Powell and R Steinberg (eds) The nonprofit sector: a research handbook (Yale University Press, 
New Haven, 2006) at 545. 
1008 At 84, citing RD Putnam Bowling alone: the collapse and revival of American Community (Simon & Schuster, 
New York, 2000) at 66. 
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Such communities and networks enable easy mobilisation when required. In addition, and as 
earlier observed in the thesis, religious people have higher levels of donating to charity and 
volunteering than non-religious persons.1009  One key point to make about social capital is that 
it is “not only the types of social connections that matter … but the ideas, virtues and social 
practices that make up [their] content.”1010  This particular point leads on to the second key 
aspect of this framework that enables it to fight global poverty so effectively, that of religious 
content. 
 
2. Religious content 
Religious content includes belief and education, and the standards and observances which 
support them.  It is said that a combination of these elements specific to religious charities 
creates such a potent tool out of religion in the war against international deprivation.  This is 
because religious content connects belief with activity, making it a dynamic mobilising power.  
In other words, religious content directs behaviour towards activities; it motivates its religious 
followers in to positive action; and it encourages commitments to charitable objectives.  This 
makes religion suitable for tackling such global political-social issues such as poverty. 
Therefore, it is seen as a practical aspect to religious teaching, and the United Nations noted its 
value in charity:1011 
 
 … most religions incorporate a social dimension in their teachings that focuses on improving 
conditions for [those] suffering from poverty, hunger, and other forms of injustice.  
 
Even though religious content is said to have an important impact in the delivery of charity, it 
is “surprisingly understudied.”1012  Nevertheless, some research does illustrate its influence.  
For example, in the United States, reports of the “content of sermons, discussions, and other 
group activities … influences parishioners’ likelihood of engaging in giving and 
volunteering”.1013  Thus, both religious social capital and religious content are part of the 
 
 
1009 At 84, referring to, inter alia, SM Monsma “Religion and philanthropic giving and volunteering: building 
blocks for civic responsibility” (2007) Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion 3 at 7. 
1010 At 84, citing SM Thomas The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International 
Relations: the Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2005) at 236 
(emphasis retained). 
1011 At 85, citing “Religion and public policy at the UN” (Park Ridge Centre, Chicago, 2002) at 15. 
1012 At 85. 
1013 At 85, citing Monsma, above n 1009, at 8. 
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mechanism that enables religious charities to mobilise against poverty.  However, it is argued 
that those two elements alone are not sufficient to explain the “extent of religion’s role in this 
area; something else helps it to mobilize religious and secular alike in fighting global 
poverty.”1014  That additional factor is found in “religious cultural power”, which is the third 
element in the theoretical framework that underpins religion’s role in charitable endeavours.   
 
3. Religious cultural power 
Religious cultural power is a force unique to religion that enables it to mobilise civil society in 
its mission to end global poverty, amongst other welfare assistance.  Religious cultural power 
offers means by which society can be inspired to, and be stimulated to, assist in relieving 
poverty.  It has the ability to influence political processes through its appeal to cultural 
resources, which include symbols, moral authority and ideologies.  This enables the religious 
message to be spread more widely through communities, including secular communities.  As 
it does so, it garners more support and more power through generation of political support, 
funding and social connections.1015   
 
The social theory movement has long-recognised the relevance of resources within a cultural 
context and acknowledges “philanthropic activity is mobilized by the medium of moral or 
cultural capital in the form of symbolic expressions of need.”1016  Indeed, it is said that religion 
is “perhaps one of the most important repositories of cultural resources, with world religions 
‘offer[ing] especially revealing instances of … cultural power.’” 1017   Certainly, the 
“relationship between religious cultural symbols, morality and wider worldviews, and the 




1014 At 85. 
1015 At 86, referring to, inter alia, RH Williams and NJ Demerath III “Cultural power: how underdog religious and 
nonreligious movements triumph against structural odds” in NJ Demerath III, PD Hall and T Schmitt (eds) Sacred 
companies: organizational aspects of religion and religious aspects of organizations (Oxford University Press, 
New York, 1998) at 367-368. 
1016 At 86, citing PG Schervish “Philanthropy” in R Wuthnow (ed) The Encyclopedia of Politics and Religion Vol 
ii (Congressional Quarterly, Washington DC, 1998) at 601. 
1017 At 86, citing Williams and Demerath, above n 1015, at 364. 
1018 At 86, and referring to R Falk Religion and Human Global Governance (Palgrave, New York, 2001); SM 
Thomas, above n 1001, and I Linden “The language of development: what are international development agencies 
talking about?” In G Clarke and M Jennings (eds) Development, Civil Society and Faith-based Organizations: 
Briding the Sacred and the Secular (Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire and New York, 2008). 
1019 At 86-87, citing “Religion and public policy at the UN” above n 1011, at 15. 
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Religions express themselves through symbols, rituals, doctrines, holy places, devotional and 
other types of sacred literature, and structures.  These carry great meaning and emotional 
investment for religious people since they embody their understandings of sacred realities.  
Religious people may ‘sacrifice’ themselves – a potent, ancient religious concept – wholly 
devoting themselves to the holy, unto death. 
 
These religious notions of morality and sacrifice are especially powerful in mobilising the 
alleviation of global poverty because even against the odds, commitment and motivation 
inspire people to make sacrifices.  Religious moral language also has the ability to motivate 
indignation or moral outrage, or inspire a moral duty.  This is because “whereas secular 
transformative thought tends to appeal mainly to alienated intellectuals, religious revolutionary 
language and aspirations have deep roots in popular culture and possess great mobilising 
potential.”1020  Indeed, “religious promises of victory and justice offer hope in struggles for 
social and economic justice.”1021 
 
Such cultural resources are important weapons in the armoury of poverty elimination to 
mobilise, and further, these resources bridge the gap between the secular and religious.  This 
is because:1022 
 
[While] secular NGOs also rely to a degree on appeals to morality as a means of mobilising 
public opinion … religious NGOs are more directly able to raise moral issues and tap into 
religious discourse, thereby fuelling a sense of moral duty, indignation, or outrage, which 
makes change possible … Theirs is a distinctly moral tone, charged with notions of ‘Right’ 
and ‘Wrong’ – culturally resonant with large portions or the world’s population. 
 
Consequently, religious cultural power enables religious individuals to recruit support and 




1020 At 87, citing R Falk, above n 1018, at 30. 
1021 At 87, referring to, inter alia, EO Hanson Religion and politics in the international system today (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2006). 
1022 At 87, citing J Berger “Religious nongovernmental organizations: an exploratory analysis” (2003) Volantas 
14 (1) at 35. 
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In summary, the outlined framework of religious social capital, religious content and religious 
cultural power is unique to religious charities and religious NGOs, and “ultimately gives 
religion such a powerful potential to mobilize civil society in the fight against global 
poverty.”1023  Now it is important to demonstrate the realities of such a framework, and this 
can be achieved by considering the two New Zealand case studies of World Vision New 
Zealand (WVNZ) and Tearfund.  Both organisations are registered charities in New 
Zealand.1024  I consider both specifically in the context of the religious social capital, religious 
content and religious cultural power framework. 
 
IV. New Zealand Case Studies: WVNZ, Tearfund and Social Capital 
 
As has been established, religious social capital enables mobilisation of religious organisations 
through its networks, and through the “norms of trust and reciprocity these engender”;1025 this 
is demonstrated by both WVNZ and Tearfund.  WVNZ is part of an international network that 
is categorised by the norms of trust, reciprocity and organisation that are representative of 
social capital norms.  This leads to members becoming aware of global poverty issues and 
mobilises staff through its social capital.  The social capital mobilisation is especially active 
through WVNZ’s network of churches and partnership with churches, thus mobilising the 
public to engage with, inter alia, sponsorship, fundraising and volunteering.1026   
 
Tearfund also utilises such social capital strategies.  Its Christian network is part of its core 
constituency, and many churches identify with the evangelical component of its programmes, 
ensuring substantial support for Tearfund.1027 
 
Turning aside for a moment from the examples of WVNZ and Tearfund, there is further 
evidence of the important role of religious social capital as a charitable tool, and this comes in 
 
 
1023 At 87-88. 
1024  Tearfund’s charity registration number is CC21725, and World Vision’s charity registration number is 
CC25984.  WVNZ is the New Zealand body of World Vision International.  WVNZ advocates and raises funds 
for World Vision field offices in developing countries.  It is New Zealand’s largest relief and development charity.  
Tearfund is the New Zealand equivalent to The Evangelical Alliance Relief Fund.  It carries out its operations 
through Christian partnership organisations.  Both are Christian organisations.  
1025 Mylek and Nel, above n 1000, at 89. 
1026 At 89-90. 
1027 At 90. 
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the form of faith-based organisations (FBOs), as discussed in earlier chapters.  In the context 
of social capital in this chapter, it has been observed that the role of FBOs and increasing social 
capital has been growing in relevance.  For instance, within the various communities, agencies 
and organisations that FBOs operate, relationships develop, and reinforce community and 
religious identities.  This reduces constructs of isolation and exclusion, especially within 
marginalised communities.1028  As such, FBOs are a “crucial site not only for bonding capital 
but also of a bridging capital within and beyond the city.”1029  Consequently, the relevance of 
religious social capital is evidenced as a valuable tool in the religious charity’s tool box. 
 
Nonetheless, whilst social capital is important for religious organisations, which includes 
WVNZ and Tearfund, religious content is also of great significance in ensuring the success of 
the organisations. 
 
1. WVNZ, Tearfund and religious content 
In organisational terms, WVNZ is underpinned by Christian teachings, beliefs, values and 
practices, with trustworthiness and accountability as key elements of its operational principles.  
Such norms reflect the organisation’s commitment to ensuring it complies with various NGO 
codes of conduct; this mobilises staff to commit to working for WVNZ.  Such values motivate 
the staff even though remuneration may be lower than in other organisations.1030  Similarly, the 
public are also mobilised through such motivation because of the manner in which WVNZ 
practices its public engagement.  Consequently, its networks embrace and promote WVNZ’s 
practices and principles of Christianity, underpinned by trustworthiness, accountability and 
transparency.  These are considered key motivators to mobilise the public.1031 
 
It is said that religious content plays an even more important role in mobilisation in Tearfund 
than with WVNZ.  This is because Tearfund’s literature is explicitly full of biblical references, 
and it signifies the compassion of Jesus Christ.  Its central values include prayer, justice, faith, 
integrity and culpability, all underpinned by its explicit reference to the scriptures throughout 
 
 
1028 Lily Kong “Global Shifts, theoretical shifts: Changing geographies of religion” (2010) Progress in Human 
Geography 34(6) at 766. 
1029 At 766, citing J Beaumont “Faith action on urban social issues” (2008) Urban Studies 45 at 2021. 
1030 Mylek and Nel, above n 1000, at 90-91, referring to, inter alia, L Tripp “Gender and development from a 
Christian perspective: experience from World Vision” (2000) Gender and Development 7(1) at 62-63. 
1031 At 91. 
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its literature.  Such motives are advocated by its staff, and indeed, draw employees to the 
organisation.  Such factors also mobilise the public, even the secular public, because of the 
levels of trust and accountability associated with the organisation.1032 
 
2. WVNZ, Tearfund and religious cultural power 
It is said that religious cultural power is even more effective in mobilising poverty relief than 
the religious social capital and religious content.1033  The use of cultural religious language is 
widespread within WVNZ, as evidenced in their frequent use of biblical concepts such as 
“justice” and “service” in fighting for the poor and oppressed.  The official WVNZ literature 
reflects such language, noting, inter alia, that they seek to change unjust structures that impact 
on the poor and that they serve the poor.   
 
Religious symbols are valuable in relation to the cultural power wielded by WVNZ.  Its own 
logo is that of a cross-shaped star, which implies hope, sacrifice and light. The use of the word 
“hope” is scattered liberally throughout their literature, which in turn explicitly provides 
motivation. 1034  Indeed, such “shared religious understandings form powerful motivational 
forces for staff who may not accept purely secular development discourse.”1035  It is not only 
staff, however, who are motivated by such cultural power; the public are also motivated by it.  
WVNZ’s use of religious language and religious symbols resonates with both religious and 
non-religious groups because of words such as “injustice” and “social justice.”  Even though 
such language is associated with Judeo-Christian notions of morality and justice, the language 
crosses over into the secular realms of morality and justice.  Consequently, WVNZ’s message 
is accessible by a wide range of communities, including secular communities, in a positive 
way.1036 
 
Tearfund is also no stranger to utilising religious cultural power to assist in mobilising poverty 
relief.  For this organisation, Christian notions of sacrifice and service, as demonstrated by 
Christ, are of value in mobilising secular support, and this is because “everybody can engage 
 
 
1032 At 91. 
1033 At 91. 
1034 At 92. 
1035 At 92. 
1036 At 92. 
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with ideas of service and sacrifice.”1037  These concepts of doing good; making a difference; 
providing justice; and offering morality, are concepts understood just as clearly by secular 
communities as they are by religious communities. Consequently, cultural understandings are 
shared, and mobilisation across communities is ensured. 
 
3. WVNZ and Tearfund: a conclusion 
What these case studies demonstrate is the power that religious charities can wield through this 
specific religious framework in order to mobilise staff and the public to fight against world 
poverty which is not necessarily available to secular charities.  Religion can therefore be said 
to have particular significance for relief and aid programmes because of its inherent narrative 
that appeals to religious and secular communities alike. This narrative includes concepts of 
justice, service, sacrifice and morality, which broadens the appeal of these religious charities 
to wider audiences, as opposed to relying solely on religious messages, which would risk 
alienating some religious organisations in largely secular communities. 1038  This religious 
narrative is sophisticated and proven to be successful.  If such a narrative is lost, the 
consequences for societies will likely be grave because these narratives are unique to religious 
groups, as demonstrated by WVNZ and Tearfund.  The consequences to society are likely to 
include increased levels of global poverty, which has serious significance in terms of increased 
humanitarian disasters and suffering.  Such disaster and suffering is something that global 





There may be many questions as to why religion remains such a prominent focus of so many 
communities.  One answer may be because religion “is one of the few catalysts that exists 
through which a private conscience becomes a public conscience”,1039 which generally occurs 
through religious charities and bodies.  Nonetheless, calls for the removal of the advancement 
of religion become ever louder, although there is yet reluctance to consider such a move, and 
 
 
1037 At 92. 
1038 At 93. 
1039  Terrance Carter “Advancing Religion as a Head of Charity: What are the Boundaries?” (2007) The 
Philanthropist at 261. 
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perhaps wisely.   This may be because it is said that religion is “necessary to the advancement 
of civilisation and the production of the welfare of society”,1040 which supports my assertions 
that the advancement of religion is reconcilable within a variety of contexts.  Perhaps more 
controversially it is because:1041 
 
The duties enjoined by religious bodies … furnish a sure basis on which the fabric of civil 
society can rest without which it would not endure.  Take from it those supports and it would 
tremble in to chaos and ruin.  Anarchy would follow order and liberty, freed from its restraining 
influence, would soon degenerate in to the wildest licence, which would convert the beautiful 
earth into a howling pandemonium, fit only for the habitation of savage beasts and more savage 
men. 
 
Such consequences would likely raise a cynical eyebrow in contemporary times, but what can 
be said is that:1042 
 
[I]nstitutional religion alone seems to reliably and consistently provide that collector function.  
Institutional religion has had an undefined role in … shaping collective conscience and values 
in moral ways – and when [it] is pluralized, so much the better for we avoid … ‘the tyranny of 
the majority.’  
 
Religious charities are legitimised through the rules of charity law, and amongst those rules is 
the doctrine of public benefit.  As I determined in Chapter 7, as a general principle, the 
advancement of religion is validated through the application of the presumption of public 
benefit.  Public benefit is measured through appropriate constructs of charity law.  Such benefit 
is discernible tangibly through such religious traditions as creating and fostering “distinctively 
normative commitments, which tend to encourage the transfer of material resources from 




1040 Sorensen & Thompson, above n 979, at 10, citing Hubert Picarda The Law and Practice Relating to Charities 
3rd ed (Butterworths, London, 1999) at 84. 
1041 At 10, citing Picarda, above n 1040, at 84.  Sorenson & Thompson note Picarda does not provide a citation 
for the quotation although it is said to be from Trustees of the First Methodist Episcopal Church South v City of 
Atlanta 76 Ga 181 at 192 (1886). 
1042 Carter, above n 1039, at 261, citing Sorensen & Thompson, above n 979, at 3. 
1043 Kathryn Chan “The Advancement of Religion as a Charitable Purpose in an Age of Religious Neutrality” 
(2017) Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 6 at 133. 
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I have demonstrated throughout this thesis how religious charities are celebrated for their 
ability to inspire the transference of means for charitable use that appear, in many ways, to be 
outside the scope of other charities.  This is apparent from the substantial support they receive 
on an international scale, and their extraordinary ability to relieve human suffering on so many 
levels.  The impact of religious exhortations and teachings within the charitable sector cannot 
be underestimated.  Research is only recently beginning to demonstrate, at least in economic 
terms, how valuable religious charities and bodies are to the overall health of society generally.   
 
If the advancement of religion were to be removed as a head of charity, I contend that the 
impact would certainly likely be felt quickly in terms of economic losses.  However, other 
trickle-down consequences would also be felt.  For instance, minority communities may 
become more isolated, and religious communities may feel threatened as religion might 
become seen as lacking legal legitimacy.  Further, no doubt increasing burdens would be placed 
on families, communities, and indeed governments, as religious bodies would not be able to 
undertake social welfare roles, or would only be able to play a more limited role in such 
welfare. 
 
However, the advancement of religion is reconcilable, and not least because it has legal 
legitimacy, and part of this legitimacy is granted through the doctrine of public benefit. This 
doctrine is a “primary public policy concern.”1044  It ensures that the purposes of a charity 
“demonstrably serve and [are] in harmony with the public interest”,1045 ensuring that purposes 
are a “beneficial and stabilizing influence in community life.”1046 Indeed, it “is enough for rule 
of law purposes if the courts make the measurable determination of whether the particular 
religious purpose violates the law or public policy”.1047  If, however, the advancement of 
religion were removed as a head of charity, this could be “injurious to those organisations that 
are overwhelmingly small community based groups”, as many religions are,1048 which surely 




1044 Carter, above n 1039, at 266. 
1045 At 266. 
1046 At 266. 
1047 Donovan Waters “The Advancement of Religion in a Pluralist Society” (2011) Trusts & Trustees Vol 17 7 1 
August. 
1048 Zudova, above n 998, at 12. 
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Certainly, generally speaking, governments are committed to diversity and accommodating 
faith, as evidenced, for example through the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990,1049 and the 
United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act 1998.1050  Further, it is said that in the United States, that 
the exercise of religion “is ‘the nation’s first freedom’, occupying a place of ‘preferential 
treatment’ in the Constitution’s Bill of Rights.”1051   
 
Such religious freedom perhaps comes about because of the nature of humans themselves.  
Aristotle observed that humans are political creatures because they are reasoning creatures.1052  
Thus, the “crux of the cognitive-science or anthropological case for religious freedom is that 
man is by nature a religious animal for much the same reason.”1053 As a result, human animals 
are believing animals, and as rational beings, humans seek to understand the “ultimate cause 
that supplies explanations and guidance for their lives.”1054  If religion were repressed, it would 
not be to repress an odd quirk of human nature, rather, it would be to “repress the variable yet 
inevitable religious choices and experiences of actual human beings.”1055  It has been argued 
that to repress religion is to “deny the very essence of what it means to be human.”1056  In fact, 
repressing religion would occur at the “price of undermining individuality and disrupting 
society.”1057  Accordingly, it could be argued that religion has “earned the right to be treated 
with respect and protected by the state.”1058   
 
One way in which commitment to diversity and accommodation of faith can be achieved, and 
has been successfully achieved, is through charity law and its observation of specific rules of 
law.  Consequently, its removal as a head of charity might be, at the very least, nonjusticiable, 
 
 
1049 Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 15. 
1050 Human Rights Act 1998, sch 1, art 9.  
1051 Kolenc, above n 997, at 51, referring to Lamb’s Chapel v Ctr Moriches Union Free Sch Dist 508 US 384, 400 
(1993), per Scalia J. 
1052 Timothy Shah and Matthew J Franck “What is Religion? The Anthropological Basis of Religious Freedom” 
in Religious Freedom: Why Now? Defending an Embattled Human Right (The Witherspoon Institute, New Jersey, 
2012) at 15. 
1053 At 15. 
1054 At 15. 
1055 At 15. 
1056 At 15. 
1057 At 15. 
1058 Kolenc, above n 997, at 51. 
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because “[i]t surely cannot be challenged even in a liberal and democratic environment, that 
the rule of law must prevail”.1059 
 
I contend that religious charities play a unique and valuable role within societies making them 
indispensable partners for strong democratic governments.1060 Religion is woven into everyday 
spaces of life, and societies and communities are infused and shaped by religious values, 
consciously or otherwise. The way in which religion is experienced on a charitable and non-
charitable basis is “multifaceted and multiscaled”,1061 leading to a variety of partnerships and 
relationships throughout communities and sectors, therefore providing evidence of the 
multifacted contexts in which the advancement of religion may be reconciled, and thus 
justified.   
 
There is evidence that religion “can and does have a significant role in identifying and 
promoting values that advocate and encourage personal attitudes towards others and conduct 
between citizens which, even in a non-legal sense, is charitable.” 1062   Further, there is 
acknowledgment that religion continues “to have relevance in bridging the gap between private 
conscience and the general acceptance of values that sustain the law and social behaviour.”1063  
Indeed, religious involvement, as this thesis has demonstrated, “in large-scale humanitarian 
projects and welfare relief is legend.”1064 
 
Thus, for religion to operate effectively, “those who believe must be allowed to engage in 
practical manifestations of their faith.”1065  This means that “it is … appropriate for the state to 
provide broad support for religious organizations by granting them charitable status.  In doing 
so, the state acknowledges the benefit that comes from advancing religion within a pluralistic 
society.”1066 There is already evidence in New Zealand that dramatic decline in church numbers 
is impacting on levels of support for some religious charities, and resultant fundraising is 
 
 
1059 Waters, above n 1047. 
1060 Kolenc, above n 997, at 55. 
1061 Kong, above n 1028, at 769. 
1062 Carter, above n 1039, at 285-286, citing Sorensen & Thompson, above n 970, at 15. 
1063 Sorensen & Thompson, above n 979, at 12. 
1064 At 12, referring to, inter alia, the Salvation Army; City Missions; Catholic Relief Agencies; SDA Melanesian 
programs; and LDS charities. 
1065 Carter, above n 1039, at 285-286. 
1066 At 286. 
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becoming increasingly difficult.  As a result, this is increasing pressure on other forms of social 
welfare to fund alternative social welfare providers.1067   
 
Consequently, I claim that removing the advancement of religion as a charitable purpose 
without more research to assess the likely and real impacts on society would be to damage any 
such social and civil partnerships and relationships that exist as a result of religious charities.  
It risks alienating vulnerable groups, as well as disestablishing some communities.  Such 
failures would likely have lasting and damaging economic and emotional consequences for 
societies as a result.  Accordingly, I do not support the removal of the advancement of religion 
as a head of charity at the current time because of the likely widespread and long-term negative 
consequences on an economic and social basis for society generally.  Rather, the evidence 
provided in this chapter supports the object of my inquiry further that the advancement of 
religion is a reconcilable construct and from a variety of contexts. 
 
In the final chapter, I conclude this thesis’ overall findings.  
 
 
1067 Paul Morris “The 2013 Census and Religion” The Royal Society at 4 
https://royalsociety.org.nz/assets/Uploads/Our-futures-submissionPaul-Morris.pdf. 
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Chapter 9. Conclusion 
 
I. Overview 
The purpose of this research has been to review critically the advancement of religion as a 
legally-recognised head of charity through a socio-legal narrative, and I have provided 
substantive evidence that it is reconcilable through a variety of sociolegal contexts.  This is 
because I set out the socio-political and legal frameworks of religion, and the place of religion 
within charity, and thus charity within society.  In other words, I presented multi-layered 
contexts in which the advancement of religion can be reconciled as a charitable purpose.  As a 
result, I assert that the advancement of religion could remain as a charitable purpose because it 
can be understood from its sociolegal contexts. 
 
Consequently, this chapter overall concludes the thesis by providing an overview of the 
research and a summary of the findings of each chapter.  Its concluding remarks consider, inter 
alia, the value of this research. 
 
I submit that this thesis is timely because it has become evident from my research conducted 
over the years that the advancement of religion has presented various legal and social 
challenges.  Consequently, I have sought to evaluate some of these issues within a sociolegal 
framework.  One of the first issues relates to the numerous international inquiries into charity 
law and regulation within the last 60 years.  For instance, the United Kingdom, New Zealand 
and Australia have all passed legislation that reconsiders or extends the meaning of charitable 
purpose, which inherently includes the advancement of religion.  Such changes have 
ramifications for a wide variety of charity law stakeholders, not least in terms of interpretation 
and application of the law.  Other issues have arisen, including removing the presumption of 
public benefit, as well as applying Judeo-Christian models of religion in circumstances that do 
not relate to such religious constructs. 
 
This research is significant because whilst much has been written over the years about this 
charitable purpose in a legal construct, including by myself, there has been more limited 
combined research undertaken on this head of charity’s significant social, political and 
economic role within society, which is what this thesis does.  The timeliness of such research 
is evident not only because of the variety of international legal changes in recent years, but also 
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because of increasing political and social discussions as to the position of religion generally 
within society, as well as within charity law. 
 
The legal theories presented to underpin the research, as well as evidence presented in the 
chapters, demonstrate the fundamental place of charity law within a healthy-functioning civil 
society.  Religion, as part of charity law, plays its role in supporting such civil societies, and as 
such, furthers the well-being and harmony of society, even in spite of the growing criticism of 
religion.  Consequently, this thesis demonstrates that charity law is an appropriate vehicle to 
uphold the virtues of the advancement of religion in a legally-appropriate manner, thus 
providing legitimacy and public confidence in the charitable sector.   
 
I acknowledge that there still remain issues associated with this head of charity, such as 
concerns regarding the doctrine of public benefit.  Nonetheless, I have provided evidence that 
the advancement of religion plays a fundamental role within society, and, as such, I contend 
that governments should continue to validate its position within the rules of law because it can 
be understood from its sociolegal contexts, and thus is reconcilable as a charitable purpose. 
 
As a result, this research provides much substantive evidence for states, policymakers and 
charity law stakeholders to consider charity law governance and law in line with current the 
socio-legal climate.  
 
In order to carry out this critical review of the advancement of religion, this research traversed 
a range of socio-political and legal matters.   
 
II. Chapter 1 
 
Chapter 1 introduced many of these themes to underpin and contextualise the arguments and 
assertions that have been made throughout the thesis.  I began with outlining the ancient and 
interrelated concepts of charity and religion, noting that charity has underpinned, and continues 
to, fill a variety of welfare gaps within societies.  As is established early on from this chapter, 
religion has been closely associated with charity for millennia and remains a fundamental part 
of the charitable sector. 
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Nonetheless, in the interests of balance, I do set out some of the public criticisms that have 
been levelled at religion generally, and at the advancement of religion.  Criticisms include 
religion being granted charitable privileges even as societies allegedly become more secular.  
It is asserted that due to an increase in secularism, this has served to limit the value of religion 
more generally within an allegedly more secular contemporary society, hence the assertions 
that is inappropriate to grant religious charities legal benefits of being a charity.  Another 
criticism is the condemnation of apparently wealthy religious bodies maintaining their 
charitable status, which appears to fly in the face of the generally-accepted doctrines of 
religion, such as humility, generosity and eschewing of wealth.  The purpose of setting out 
some of these issues is to illustrate the pressures facing religious charities and to contextualise 
some of the foundations for the assertions within the thesis. 
 
Other themes introduced in Chapter 1 included the relationship between religion and society; 
state control and religion; the rule of law; the economics of religion; and issues associated with 
the removal of the advancement of religion as a charitable purpose.  Each of these matters were 
addressed more fully in later chapters. 
 
III. Chapter 2 
 
Chapter 2 set out the methodologies utilised in the thesis and the legal theories that underpin 
the research.  I utilised, generally, traditional doctrinal methodologies to assess critically legal 
principles within primary and secondary legal materials.  In doing so, the methodology enabled 
me to offer insights into current doctrines and jurisprudence and place the legal discussions 
within their social and political contexts. 
 
In relation to legal theories, it was evident that there is generally a dearth of charity law legal 
theory.  Nonetheless, Matthew Harding, inter alia, provides useful consideration of such legal 
theories.  These theories speak to the societal relevance of charity law, specifically in relation 
to the advancement of religion to illustrate the goals of such charitable bodies, and how they 





IV. Chapter 3 
 
Chapter 3 was important because it set out the complex relationship charity, law, religion and 
society, reflecting the nexus between these constructs, and in doing so, this chapter embedded 
the function of the advancement of religion within its sociolegal foundations, thus the 
discussions in this chapter began the reconciliation of the advancement of religion assertions 
that were subsequently developed throughout the later chapters. 
 
Some of the key concepts included the history of charity and charity law, which provide some 
historical markers for continued discussions. The history of charity and charity law is relevant 
because much of contemporary law and principles are framed within the historical background.  
No discussion would be complete without the historical markers to underpin the dialogue. 
 
The research speaks to religion generally, the definition of the advancement of religion, and 
the meaning of secularism.  Consequently, Chapter 3 provided evaluation of each of these 
concepts in order consolidate the critical discussions throughout later chapters.   
 
It was also important to contextualise the relationship between law and religion.  This is 
especially pertinent in current times when there are many public discussions of the need to 
separate government and religion.  The research demonstrated that whilst many would see 
government and religion as being separate entities, and that they should remain that way, the 
reality is that law and religion are closely aligned.  As a result, it is inevitable that the 
advancement of religion will be impacted by, and will impact upon, policies and politics of the 
day.  This, therefore, is of relevance for the narrative of this thesis because it provided evidence 
of the reconciliation of the advancement of religion within these sociolegal contexts. 
 
Consequently, the themes in Chapter 3 are significant.  They provide observations in relation 
to religion and the advancement of religion that reflect the stronghold of such principles in 
contemporary societies that are influenced by, and influence law and society generally, and 





V. Chapter 4 
 
Chapter 4 was an important chapter in order to further the object of my inquiry, that of 
reconciling the advancement of religion.  This was because it provided evidence of the 
correlation between the rule of law, charity law and the advancement of religion, thus 
demonstrating that this charitable principle was reconcilable under the sociolegal context of 
the rule of law. 
 
In carrying out this critical assessment, I considered the doctrine of the rule of law in relation 
to the advancement of religion.  The rule of law is relevant to many discussions posited in the 
thesis because charity law would not exist without this doctrine.  Consequently, this chapter 
set out some introductory matters pertaining to this doctrine, including Dicey’s key 
commentary; the relationship between religion and the law and the rule of law; and a pertinent 
case study of a religious organisation and the rule of law.  I note that Tom Bingham’s 
discussions of Dicey were beneficial in adding to this thesis’ consideration of the rule of law 
because Bingham’s observations appear to support the role and function of charity law.  
Bingham notes that acknowledging the rule of law does not require “us to swoon in adulation 
of the law”,1068 and certainly charity law is not without issue, as has been evidenced in this 
thesis.  Rather, the rule of law enables charity to operate as effectively as possible in a world 
that is “divided by differences of nationality, race, colour, religion and wealth…”.1069  Bingham 
concludes that the rule of law “remains an ideal”,1070 just as charity law does.  Therefore, 
charity, as an ideal concept, through the rule of law, aims to unify and draw together the 
differences in our society for the benefit of society. 
 
This chapter, therefore, provides evidence of the continued and inherent links between the rule 
of law and of religion.  As such, the rule of law could be said to provide validation of religion 
within charity.  This is because charity law provides an appropriate vessel in which to ensure 
that the advancement of religion provides public benefit to communities through the 
recognition of the rule of law.  As a result, this chapter demonstrated that the rule of law 
 
 
1068 Tom Bingham The Rule of Law (Penguin Group, London, 2010) at 9. 
1069 At 174. 
1070 At 174. 
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underpins and legitimises the advancement of religion, which then assists with the effective 




VI. Chapter 5 
 
Once I had made a number of socio-political submissions that were framed within their own 
socio-political context in the preceding chapters, Chapter 5 turned to the black letter law in 
relation to the reconciliation of the advancement of religion.  I argue that it was important to 
set out some of the socio-political contexts first in order to gain an understanding of how the 
law sat within those frameworks.  The justiciable nature of the black letter law decisions then 
became innately justifiable because there was a clear explanation as to the relationship between 
the law, society, and politics. 
 
As a result, this chapter furthered the thesis’ research by considering key issues relation to 
religion and charity within a contemporary context.  In doing so, this chapter set out methods 
of providing credibility to the advancement of religion even when the circumstances 
surrounding some of these issues may be deemed controversial or legally challenging. 
 
The chapter began by critically evaluating the relationship between commercialism and 
religion and how that might relate to the advancement of religion.  It is said that commercialism 
within religion is distasteful, not least due to perceived concepts of religion not abiding greed.  
However, this research revealed that religion and commercialism have a long history.  Further, 
some commercial activities can sit appropriately within the advancement of religion and may 
not discredit the charity sector.  Commercialism within religion in a contemporary context 
reflects the evolutionary nature of religion and how it can operate effectively and appropriately 
to continue to support communities.  I respectfully suggest that courts should continue to 
approach such legal issues in this benignant manner so as to support the charitable sector 
because the advancement of religion can be reconciled through commercialism. 
 
This chapter also considered issues relating to religion, new age beliefs and alleged 
charlatanism.  Such issues may undermine religion generally, and also undermine the charity 
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sector.  Therefore, it was important to review such matters within this thesis’ narrative.  In 
carrying out these discussions, I considered Scientology and Jediism and the roles of such 
religions in a modern-day charity law context.  The research revealed how these belief systems, 
whilst undoubtedly contentious, can be justified within the parameters of charity law.  Such 
contemporary approaches speak to charity law’s ability to adapt to different paradigms that 
exist in modern society when “traditional” religions may no longer offer new generations the 
benefits they once did to different populations.  Thus, religion may be viewed as being 
generationally-appropriate, and it may benefit communities in ways that have not been 
determined previously.  Consequently, I support these courts’ approaches and support a 
continued liberal approach to such cases. 
 
Other matters addressed in this chapter included the problematic application of the English 
charity law religious paradigm, that of Judaeo-Christian concepts of religion, within primarily 
non-Judeo-Christian states, which includes Hong Kong, which still utilise the English concepts 
of charity law.  In continuing this discussion, I also referred to the key Islamic charity concept 
of waqf. 
 
This research revealed the disconnect in the charity law narrative in matters outside of the 
Western concepts of Judaeo-Christian-centric religious charity law paradigms.  This may lead 
to marginalisation of some religious communities that are currently not granted the support or 
benefits offered by charity law.  It may also lead to the undermining of the charitable sector 
because it could be argued that Judeo-Christian concepts of the advancement of religion 
discriminate against some non-Western concepts of religion.  In today’s difficult political and 
social climate, such discord is unwelcome because it is imperative that religion is viewed in a 
more positive light more generally. Decades of hostility towards religion generally has led to 
societal discord as societies become more multi-ethnic and multi-religious.  This then speaks 
to the necessity of viewing religion more favourably for harmony within society.  Nonetheless, 
this chapter does seek to provide some consideration as to how, legally, such matters may be 
resolved.  For example, if courts were to recognise that some religious purposes do “support 
the machinery and harmony of civil society” that were discussed in this chapter, as propounded 
in New Zealand case law or by Singapore’s Administration of Muslim Law Act, even when 
historically those purposes failed for public benefit.  Such acknowledgement would be 
culturally appropriate in many circumstances. 
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Consequently, I assert that Chapter 5 was an important part of the thesis because it 
demonstrated that that the advancement of religion can respond to some of the needs of society, 
for example, by acknowledging society’s desire to embrace new belief systems, or indeed, 
continue to embrace culturally important belief systems.  In this manner, the advancement of 
religion is reconciled within these legal contexts. 
 
 
VII. Chapter 6 
 
Whilst Chapter 5 provided some consideration of commercialism and religion, Chapter 6 
extended this discussion by examining the relationship between religion and economics.  This 
chapter was important within the framework of my research because, in recalling the object of 
my research was to reconcile the advancement of religion, this chapter embedded religion 
within the socio-political context of economics.  I argue that this is relevant to the reconciliation 
of the advancement of religion because I demonstrate, objectively, the social relevance 
economically of religion within charity.  This was an important argument to make because 
charity law does not sit in isolation from the narratives that can determine state policies, which 
include charity law, and thus the advancement of religion.  Consequently, what I confirmed in 
this chapter was that religion, charity, and economics have long been associated, and as a result 
of that close nexus, the advancement of religion can be reconciled from the secular economics 
perspective generally. 
 
In undertaking this approach, I looked to evaluate the economic relevance of the advancement 
of religion within a social and political environment.  This research is key because it provides 
tangible and objective evidence of the importance of religious charities that can be understood 
in a secular context.  The transitioning from the religious to the secular is germane because the 
research demonstrates that there are public voices declaring the irrelevance of religious 
charities within secular societies.  This secular evidence provides a political and social 
commentary that can assist in the continued validation of the advancement of religion but from 
a rarely-taken perspective. 
 
263 
As part of the discussions, the chapter critically reviewed actual dollar-value figures associated 
with religious charities; the “halo effect” of religious charities on society; the social welfare 
importance of FBOs; and the principle of zakat within the charity law paradigm. 
 
This chapter, therefore, provided demonstrable evidence of the benefits of religion within 
charity, and thus provided another context for the reconciliation of the advancement of religion.  
For some secular states and bodies, this may be of more value than trying to comprehend the 
generally-espoused ethereal benefits of religion that are said to arise from, for example, praying 
and church attendance.  Consequently, I contend that this research may provide an objective 
method of measuring religion’s value in a contemporary context, placing religion within a 
secular, and thus contemporary, narrative.  I do acknowledge, however, that further research is 
required in this area to obtain accurate figures on a national and international scale as to the 
real economic benefits of religious charities. 
 
 
VIII. Chapter 7 
 
In order to reconcile the advancement of religion, the key objective of my thesis, I could not 
ignore the doctrine of public benefit, which was therefore the key focus for this chapter.  As a 
result, Chapter 7 returned to the type of traditional black letter law discussions normally 
associated with the advancement of religion - that of the doctrine of public benefit.  In providing 
evidence to support my object, I critically analysed existing law and theories, and bedded my 
assertions pertaining to the advancement of religion within those constructs. 
 
The doctrine of public benefit is steeped in history, and sometimes controversy.  Its associated 
controversies may be thought to undermine the charity sector.  Nonetheless, this chapter 
revealed that the judicious application of public benefit can enable validation of advancement 
of religion, and thus benefit the requisite communities appropriately. 
 
The chapter considered religious charity law cases that have been deemed controversial. Whilst 
the cases may be controversial, the research demonstrated that public benefit can serve as an 
effective tool in the judicial armoury ensuring that charity law remains within the confines of 
public policy, and that the purposes continue to support the harmony of civil society. 
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Other matters for consideration included the removal of the presumption of public benefit in 
the United Kingdom and the possible legal challenges associated with such a statutory change.  
The research provided evidence that removing this presumption may do little to reflect the true 
overall value of religion with communities.  This is an unfortunate stance in today’s climate, 
which is already placing much negative pressure on religions generally. I acknowledge that the 
United Kingdom is unlikely to amend this legislative development, even in light of the 
criticisms it is facing.  However, I respectfully advocate that other common law jurisdictions 
might hesitate to make similar changes because of the potential costs to the charity sector in 
denying religious organisations their ability to operate as charities. 
 
Overall, therefore, I argued that the presumption of public benefit, which is confirmed in states 
such as New Zealand and Canada, provides a useful tool by which religious benefits can be 
construed to take into consideration religion’s multi-faceted benefits.  Previous chapters 
asserted that religion has commercial and economic benefits for communities, and this is not 
denied.  However, they are not the only benefits for communities.  Religion still invariably 
embraces various forms of spirituality and prayer.  These cannot be measured in mere monetary 
terms, and the presumption of public benefit inherently recognises this.  This ensures that the 
benefits of religious charities are felt widely within communities without being limited to mere 
secular constructs, as decisions such as the Druid Network and Preston Down Trust suggest 
might be the future for some religious trusts.  Consequently, I support the retention of the 
presumption of public benefit because it appears to acknowledge the underlying and 
unmeasurable ethos of religion - that of spirituality and belief, which are still fundamental even 
in contemporary society.  As a result, this chapter supports the object of my inquiry, that the 
advancement of religion is reconcilable through the presumption of public benefit because at 
this doctrine’s heart, it acknowledges the spiritual element of religion, which is a key 
component of religion.  Even though spirituality may not be inherently measurable, the public 
benefit doctrine provides a safeguard against religions operating to the detriment of the public.  
As a result, public benefit, and its presumption, does provide some certainty and predictability, 






IX. Chapter 8 
 
As part of my inquiry in to the reconciliation of the advancement of religion, this chapter was 
important because if I could show that removing this charitable purpose from the charity law 
framework would likely have a detrimental impact on society, then this would provide another 
avenue to reconcile the advancement of religion, but from a perspective that has little been 
critically assessed. 
 
Consequently, Chapter 8’s discussions arose as a result of the ever-growing dissent as to the 
relevance of religion generally, and consequently, the advancement of religion in contemporary 
society.  As a result, I assessed some of the consequences of the removal of the advancement 
of religion as a charitable purpose. 
 
I note that no state has confirmed that it is considering removing this purpose from charity law, 
although a Bill was presented to the Australian Victorian Parliament in 2018 that would, inter 
alia, do just that.  Therefore, any discussions pertaining to the advancement of religion are 
inherently shadowed by calls for its removal.  Previous chapters have provided evidence for 
the continued support of this charitable purpose, but this chapter specifically focused on issues 
that may be associated with its subsequent removal. 
 
As part of the discussion, I returned to the relationship between religion, society and charity.  
However, I looked to frame the concepts within the repercussions for society if the 
advancement of religion were to be removed.  Leading on from this discussion, I considered a 
case study of New Zealand charities that revealed a religious framework, based on sociological 
principles, which is specific to religious charities alone.   
 
It is said that it is this framework that leads to the renowned successes of religious charities 
within the social welfare environment.  Consequently, if the advancement of religion were to 
vanish as a head of charity, this framework would not be available to other non-religious 
charities.  Previous chapters demonstrated that religious charities receive, overall, more 
donations and support globally than secular charities, and it is likely due to this specific 
framework.  The impact of religious charities globally in social welfare is also legendary in 
comparison with secular charities.  By implication, therefore, it might be presumed that if the 
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advancement of religion is removed as a head of charity, this framework will also become 
unavailable in the charity sector.  Consequently, I contend that the impact will be detrimental 
on a local and global scale for communities. As a result, this chapter was valuable in presenting 
a socioreligious reconciliation of the advancement of religion that crosses from the religious to 
the secular, and as such, it aids in providing a sociological understanding of religion that builds 
upon the doctrinal analysis that had been undertaken in previous chapters.  This helps in 
understanding the relevance of religion within society generally, and then, as it is embedded in 
charity law.  As a result, this research from this chapter may assist in providing the public with 
confidence as to religious charities’ fundamental relevance within democratic societies, and 
overall, it provides evidence that the advancement of religion is reconcilable from this 
sociological context. 
 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that there is limited research available in regard to this 
issue, and some assumptions have had to be made.  Therefore, I recognise that it is important 
for this lack of research to be addressed before any state could consider seriously the position 
of the advancement of religion within charity law.  I recommend that further research is 
undertaken in this area to ensure that future policies and laws are enacted to take into 
consideration the full impact of religious charities on society.  
 
 
X. Overall Findings 
 
Overall, this thesis’ deliberation as to how the advancement of religion may be reconciled 
through a variety of sociolegal contexts has revealed numerous issues facing charity law and 
religion.  Nonetheless, I demonstrate not only the resilience of religion within charity law 
throughout the millennia, but also that the advancement of religion is a defendable and effective 
institution for delivering charitable objectives.  Such objects include redistribution of goods 
and funds through teachings, outreach and provision social welfare.  As a result, religious 
charities address many issues within civil society and enable the healthy function of civil 
society as may be recognised in democratic societies through the rule of law and the public 
benefit doctrine.  Consequently, I contend that the advancement of religion is reconcilable 




It might be argued that charity law is an organic law, and within that sits the advancement of 
religion, and consequently, I contend that religion still has a place within charity as part of a 
healthy and functioning civil society that requires an organic law to function appropriately.  As 
such, the advantages granted to religious charities through the rule of law are, overall, justified 
and reconciled because they are grounded within charity law.  Of course, it cannot be denied 
that the advancement of religion is subject to criticism, and still should be subject to criticism, 
as is appropriate in a democratic society.  However, in answer to such current criticisms, I have 
provided evidence that charity law infrastructures facilitate the social benefits of religion, 
which are achieved because of religion’s ability to “ameliorate hardship, demonstrate altruism, 
generate engagement in community life, enrich the fabric of society and generally facilitate 
social cohesion.”1071  The research suggests that such facilitation may not be available through 
secular charities, which serves to underpin my assertions that the advancement of religion is 
reconcilable because it serves to support society through its charitable purposes. 
 
Therefore, this holistic socio-political and legal commentary means that this research extends 
the charity law narrative in comprehensive detail.  As such it will be of interest to the charity 
sector, policymakers, practitioners, the judiciary and academics alike.  
 
I assert that this substantive research may go some way to balance the negative pressures being 
placed upon religion in society and may help reduce marginalisation and polarisation of 
religious communities. Protecting and encouraging religion in communities encourages 
philanthropy, volunteerism, and promotes civil cohesion,1072  perhaps in ways that are not 
demonstrated so effectively through other secular organisations.  Further, this research 
recognises that religion has been, and still is, “a natural and necessary source and dimension of 
any regime of law, democracy and human rights.”1073  Indeed, “[d]espite the best wishes of 
those who desire religion to be at an end … it is inconceivable that religion will ever cease to 
 
 
1071 Kerry O’Halloran Human Rights and Charity Law International Perspectives (Routledge, Abingdon, 2016) 
at 19. 
1072 H R Sorensen & A K Thompson The Advancement of Religion is Still a Valid Charitable Object in 2001 
(Working Paper No CPNS13 for Charity Law in the Pacific Rim, Queensland University of Technology, Centre 
of Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies, 4-6 October 2001) at 14. 
1073 John Witte Jr “Law, Religion, and Human Rights” (1996) Columbia Human Rights Law Review Vol 28 1 at 
30. 
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be a force to be reckoned with.”1074 Given that religion is likely to remain a constant in society, 
not least because it still “remains a strong independent source of motivation in modernity,”1075  
any “legal revolution that eliminates or severely curbs religious accommodation … will place 
significant pressure on the democratic project.”1076  
 
Therefore, I concur that losing the traditional, or indeed, new models of religion, “will cause 
significant negative consequences to society’s efficacy.” 1077  Certainly, history has 
demonstrated that “we are best able to maintain civil peace when religious accommodation is 
a high priority in public policy.”1078  Accordingly, I advocate that the advancement of religion 
should remain a “high priority in public policy.” This is, not least, because “the strong 
normative universes of religion tend to encourage the transfer of charitable resources … to 
charitable objects in ways that the weaker normative universe of the civic community does 
not.”1079 The “price of [such a] a revolution”,1080 in other words, removing the advancement of 
religion as a head of charity, is as yet unquantified, thus any move to have it removed may not 
be “worth it in the end.”1081 Consequently, I contend that in a time of global political and 
religious upheaval, demonstrating the benefits of religion through the charity law lens can only 
serve to benefit civil society. 
 
Overall, therefore, I conclude that the advancement of religion should remain as a charitable 
purpose at law.  This is because it is reconcilable through the socio-political and legal contexts 
of religion, and what charity means within society.  In other words, this multi-layered context 
provides a diverse method of reconciling the advancement of religion.  Further, I contend that 
I could not have reconciled this charitable purpose by considering just one context in isolation 
from others.  This is because charity law, and thus the advancement of religion, is influenced 
by, and with its socio-political contexts.  As a result, the advancement of religion is a valid 
 
 
1074 Barry W Bussey “The Legal Revolution Against the Place of Religion: The Case of Trinity Western University 
Law School” 2016 BYU Law Review Issue 4 January at 1213. 
1075 At 1213, citing Charles Taylor A Secular Age (Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 2007) at 530. 
1076 At 1213. 
1077 At 1213. 
1078 At 1213. 
1079 Kathryn Chan “Advancement of Religion in an Age of Religious Neutrality” (2017) Oxford Journal of Law 
and Religion at 124. 
1080 Bussey, above n 1074, at 1127. 
1081 At 1127. 
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